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1. Neural Implants & Threats to 
Identity 
Identifying the problem of threats to identity from 
neural implants 
 
‘I no longer recognize myself’; ‘She’s a different person’; ‘I feel like a new person’ 
 
1.1 Neural Implants and Threats to Identity 
 
The key problem this thesis addresses is: What is the impact of neural 
implants, such as Deep Brain Stimulation or a Cochlear ear implant, on a person’s 
personal identity? Put explicitly: What role do neural implants play in changes in 
self-understanding, agency and autonomy and what is the significance of these 
changes for philosophical and practical conceptions of personal identity? 
 
I explore the problem of the impacts of neural implants on personal identity 
through reference to first-personal accounts wherein patients or their family and 
significant others, express the claim that following the implantation they are no 
longer themselves or no longer the same person. I apply contemporary approaches 
to identity, agency and autonomy in moral psychology to argue that the sense of 
identity at issue in these claims is practical identity, and not metaphysical identity, 
and that the first-personal accounts reveal aspects of selfhood, raising concerns 
related to narrative agency and autonomy.   
 
In this introductory chapter I set out the problem this thesis addresses and 
explain why this is a problem, both from a practical, and a philosophical, 
perspective.  I also set out my conclusion to the problem, the way I argue for my 
claims and the benefits of the approach I develop. I conclude with a description of 
a set of neural implants that are in use or being developed, as well as a set of first-
personal accounts concerning self change following implantation.  
1.1.a Threats and uptake 
 
Here I set out why statements about identity change, such as: ‘I am no longer 
the same person’, present both a practical and philosophical problem. These 
responses to implantation suggest a practical problem concerning uptake of 
implants. Whilst some find that the implant fixes or ameliorates their condition, 
others, with the same type of condition and implant, respond with feelings of 
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frustration and alienation, despite the fact that the condition for which they sought 
treatment might be fixed or ameliorated. Understanding these statements 
concerning identity change also presents a philosophical problem: How are we to 
understand these responses? I show that there is no shared agreement in the 
literature about how to understand the first-personal descriptions of identity 
change and so the impacts of neural implants on selfhood. On reductionist 
approaches to personal identity, these statements are understood as metaphorical 
or misplaced claims, and whilst there is shared agreement by many, that rather, 
these are claims about practical identity that we should take seriously, there is 
disagreement about whether the salient ethical issue should be understood in 
terms of threats to identity, or to agency, or to autonomy or to authenticity. 
Moreover, there is disagreement about how these central concepts should be 
understood, which obscures what it is at stake in the first-personal accounts of the 
impacts of neural implants. Given suggestions for therapeutic direction by 
ethicists and philosophers in this area, adequately understanding these claims is of 
pressing significance. Before going on to establish these claims, I briefly sketch 
out what neural implants are (I further develop, and give a more detailed account 
of neural implants in section 1.4).  
 
Neural implants, also known as neural prostheses, are medical bionic devices, 
which are substitutes for sensory, cognitive and motor function damaged due to 
disease or trauma. Neural implants are medical bionic devices which combine 
biology and electronics.1 Neural implants include sensory prostheses such as 
bionic hearing, for example the Cochlear ear implant, and bionic vision, for 
example, the bionic eye, neural-prosthetic limbs, as well as neuro-bionic devices 
implanted in the brain, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for Parkinson’s 
Disease, as well as epilepsy prediction devices. Neural implants act by recording 
and/or electrically stimulating, or blocking signals from a neuron or group of 
neurons in the brain or sensory nerves. The Cochlear produces hearing sensations 
by electrically stimulating nerves inside the inner ear of severely or profoundly 
                                            
1 The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 defines a medical device as something used on humans for 
therapeutic benefits which measures or monitors functions of the body and has a physical or 
mechanical effect on the body. As such, medical devices includes a wide range of devices ranging 
from noninvasive devices such as gloves and bandages to invasive devices such as pacemakers and 
medical bionic devices such as Deep Brain Stimulation. It has been recognised that presently 
regulation surrounding medial bionic devices by the TGA is inadequate. This is particularly salient 
when medial bionic devices combine drug delivery to achieve their therapeutic aims. For 
discussion of regulatory gaps, see Karinne Ludlow, Diana Bowman, and Graeme Hodge, Final 
Report: Review of Possible Impacts of Nanotechnology on Australia’s Regulatory Frameworks (Melbourne: 
Monash Centre for Regulatory Studies, Monash University, 2007); Eliza Goddard, Clinical Trials 
for Nano-bionics: Testing Wearable and Implantable Medical Devices (Canberra: Australian Government: 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, 
2013). 
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deaf patients. Neuro-bionic implants2 connect directly to a person’s brain (they are 
usually placed on the surface of the brain or attached to the brain’s cortex).3 These 
implants may simply record the brain’s activity, such as epilepsy prediction 
devices, or stimulate the central nervous system, such as DBS and Vagus nerve 
stimulation. DBS has been used to treat both motor symptoms associated with 
Parkinson’s but is also used to treat psychological conditions such as clinical 
depression. These devices, in addition to stimulation, may be combined with 
automated drug delivery systems.  
 
The development of neural implants is relatively new: the Cochlear has been 
used since the late 1970s in Australia; DBS for Parkinson’s Disease has been in 
use since the late 1990s in the USA; and, epilepsy prediction devices are currently 
being tested in first-in-human trials.4 Neural implants are made from materials 
including tungsten, silicon, platinum-iridium and stainless steel, as well as nano-
materials (for example, in the Cochlear).5 The application of neural implants has 
been limited until recent advances in neurophysiology and computer micro-
processing power. 
 
These advances in science and technology present the opportunity to develop 
devices that enhance human abilities, such as long range sight or super fast limbs, 
as well as application to surveillance through radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags or “brain chips”.  There is also research being conducted into brain-
computer interfaces which involve creating interfaces between neural systems and 
computer chips, which may for example, allow for long term memory storage of a 
patient’s memory where that patient has a degenerative condition affecting their 
memory. 
 
Some of the ethical discussion concerning neural implants has focussed on 
concerns related to safety and efficacy, as well as issues related to access and 
equity. Whilst these are important areas of inquiry, my interest is with questions 
concerning the impacts of neural implants on personal identity. I want to 
understand how neural implants may affect a person’s selfhood, who she is, what 
keeps her identity stable and who she can become. This is a question that has 
                                            
2 Neural implants which include brain implants, can be contrasted with brain-computer 
interfaces, which connect the brain directly to a computer. I focus on neural prosthetic implants 
throughout this thesis; that is, devices used to replace a biological function. 
3 Cochlear implants stimulate the auditory nerve and whilst part of the peripheral nervous 
system has a similar interface to implants that interface directly with the brain. 
4 M.J. Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study,” The Lancet 
Neurology 12 (2013). 
5 See Gordon G Wallace et al., “Medical Bionics,” in Organic Bionics (Wiley-VCH Verlag 
GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2012). 
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received little attention, until recently, in the ethical literature.6 My thesis 
specifically addresses whether, once a clinician has given you a neural implant, 
you are ‘you’ and not just whether the implant has fixed your impairment.  
 
First-personal accounts from recipients of neural implants describe their 
experience of changes in embodiment, in the things that they can do, and/or the 
set of choices available to them, and in how they feel about themselves and their 
relationship with others. Below, I outline examples of people’s accounts of 
Cochlear implants and DBS. These first-personal accounts and their use in the 
thesis are expanded in section 1.5. These accounts present problems related to 
practical uptake of neural implants, but are also a source of understanding 
concerning selfhood and why it matters. 
 
Michael Chorost has a profound hearing impairment and received a Cochlear 
implant. In his biographical account of living with a Cochlear implant, Rebuilt, 
Chorost describes radical changes in perceptual experience as well as in how he 
feels about himself and his relationship with others, as he adopts and adapts to his 
implant.7 Chorost explains that the implant exercises ‘control’ over his senses, 
making if/then decisions on his behalf and calls himself ‘part-cyborg’.8 He also 
describes, often in funny detail, the practical consequences of adopting one of two 
different operating systems available for his Cochlear, which he describes as 
choosing between two versions of reality, as well as the possibilities of social 
engagement that the Cochlear affords him (as well as the misunderstandings). 
Chorost describes adopting and adapting to his Cochlear as a journey of self-
transformation. In referring to himself as being ‘part-cyborg’, he describes himself 
as a different self, but not a different kind of self.9 Whilst most of Chorost’s 
account is dedicated to the trials and tribulations of living with his Cochlear, he 
also speculates about what life would have been like had he learnt to use sign 
language and whether he may have felt a stronger sense of belonging with the 
signing deaf community than he has with the oral/aural hearing community. 
Chorost describes feelings of alienation from others and that his ‘hearing’ with the 
Cochlear implant is always, in part, a guessing game, like stones skipping over the 
water. At the same time he stresses how his ‘hearing’ is the product of so many 
                                            
6 Further as Kyle and Dodds note, whilst attention is paid to what these technologies may 
mean for humanity per se, there is little discussion about how these technologies are experienced 
and understood by the individuals who adopt them. They write: ‘How might nanobionics and 
nano-wearables shape human perceptions, experiences and understandings of self and the world?’ 
Renée Kyle and Susan Dodds, “Inside, Outside: Nanobionics and Human Bodily Experience,” in 
Nano Meets Macro: Social Perspectives on Nanoscale Sciences and Technology, 264. 
7 Michael Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World (Boston: Mariner Books, 
2006). 
8 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 40. 
9 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 33. 
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collaborators and how the implant has taught him how to listen, and not just hear, 
and to communicate better.  
 
Mike Robbins suffers from Parkinson’s Disease and receives DBS to control 
his tremors. He appears in a video pleading for further DBS trials on animals, and 
demonstrating how the DBS enables him, amongst other things, to conduct a 
conversation without interruptions from bodily tremors.10 By switching off the 
DBS, Mike also shows the effects of those tremors without the stimulation. When 
switching the DBS (back) on, Mike states ‘I’m now going to turn myself on’.  
 
Like Chorost, Robbins seems to identify with his implant. Some clinical 
studies, however, have shown that while DBS may reduce a patient’s Parkinson’s 
related motor control symptoms, some patients report problems, which are often 
described as problems of psycho-social adjustment. Schüpbach and colleagues 
identify three kinds of problems of psycho-social adjustment: personal, marital and 
socio-professional adjustment.11 One patient describes that whilst she has 
improvement in motor control from the DBS treatment, she now feels ‘like a 
machine’, that she does not recognise herself, nor has interest in continuing her 
life’s projects. She is quoted as saying: 
Combating the disease gave meaning to my life. I hope that stimulation will allow 
me to get on with my life and projects. … Now I feel like a machine, I’ve lost my 
passion. I don’t recognize myself anymore.12 
For her, it seems like the implant is a source of alienation from herself. Other 
patients are quoted as expressing similar feelings: ‘I don’t feel like myself any 
more’ and ‘I haven’t found myself after the operation’.13 A contrasting description 
is a patient who describes his experience of DBS as if he has awakened from a 
slumber. Schüpbach and colleagues describe a change in many of his professed 
values following DBS and a desire to seek out new experiences and relationships. 
This patient says:  
I want to recover my social standing and establish new relationships outside my 
couple. During all these years of illness, I was asleep. Now I am stimulated, 
stimulated to lead a different life.14 
Whilst these changes are endorsed by the patient, the changes lead to marriage 
conflict, due to the patient’s wife being unable to understand these changes in her 
                                            
10 Mike Robbins’ video can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h8tWlYv1Ykc 
11 M. Schüpbach, M. Gargiulo, and M. L. Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A 
Distressed Mind in a Repaired Body?” Neurology 66 (2006). See also M. Schüpbach and Yves 
Agid, “Psychosocial Adjustment After Deep Brain Stimulation in Parkinson’s Disease,” Nature 
Reviews Neurology 4 (2008); Y. Agid et al., “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: the Doctor is 
Happy, the Patient Less So?” Parkinson’s Disease and Related Disorders (2006). 
12 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
13 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
14 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
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husband’s behaviour and values (as anything other than caused by the DBS). She 
says she does not recognise this new man, who she describes as a different person 
and expresses feelings of being lost. She says:  
Ever since the operation, I feel lost. Before, when he was sick, we were a perfect 
couple. Now, he wants to live the life of a young man, go out, meet new people, all 
of that is intolerable! I would rather he be like he was before, always nice and 
docile!15  
 
These first-personal accounts show the practical impacts of changes in 
embodiment and relations with others on the identity and self-understanding of 
recipients of neural implants. People who have undergone these changes often use 
locutions such as ‘I am no longer the same person’ or ‘I am a different person’ and 
people speaking about people who have received these implants often use similarly 
phrased locutions, such as ‘She is not herself any more’ or ‘She is no longer the 
same person’. How can we understand these self-descriptions? Sometimes 
recipients of neural implants describe the implant as an extension of their agency 
and autonomy - Mike Robbins forcefully demonstrates how the DBS implant 
controls his tremors and allows him to participate in activities and be the person 
he values being. Further, Robbins appears to identify with the DBS device - for 
example, when switching the implant (back) on, he says: ‘now I’m going to turn 
myself on’. Other recipients, however, express feelings of alienation, even of 
becoming a different person. Michael Chorost describes feelings of personal 
transformation, but also expresses concern about what he may have missed in 
terms of belonging to a deaf signing community, as well as what he still misses out 
on in the hearing community. These accounts demonstrate changes in self-
understanding and identity that individuals (and their family) experience 
following the adoption of neural implants, as well as the varying responses that 
individuals may have to these changes, sometimes pulling in opposite directions. 
This suggests that neural implants offer opportunities for positive self-
transformation, but they may also be experienced as sources of alienation from 
one’s previously valued goals, beliefs and characteristics. Given implants can be 
experienced as threatening or empowering, these accounts indicate a significant 
practical problem concerning the uptake of neural implants, that is: same implant, 
                                            
15 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. Clearly the patient’s wife has become used to seeing her 
husband as her dependent and not as an independent agent. Wilson et al describe problems 
patients have in adjusting to being ‘symptom free’ following treatment for epilepsy, what they refer 
to as “the burden of normality”. This quote demonstrates that it is not just the patients, but their 
family and caregivers may also experience changes in their role as caregiver as difficult or 
threatening. See Sarah J Wilson, Peter F Bladin, and Michael M Saling, “The “Burden of 
Normality”: Concepts of Adjustment After Surgery for Seizures,” The Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 70 (2001); Sarah J Wilson, Peter F Bladin, and Michael M Saling, “The 
Burden of Normality: a Framework for Rehabilitation After Epilepsy Surgery,” Epilepsia 48 Suppl 
9 (2007). 
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same condition, different uptake. What does it mean to say an implant works for 
me, but not for you? 
 
These questions raise the philosophical problem of how we understand change 
that is not brought about by the agent herself. Philosophical discussions 
concerning the ethical issues raised by direct medical intervention in the brain and 
the significance of personal self-change have tended to focus on whether these 
interventions compromise personal identity and so pose a threat to personal 
identity. Focquaert and DeRidder note that: 
One of the most salient worries related to personal identity is the fear of creating 
a new person, of radically changing a person’s self up to the point where they can 
no longer be considered the same …[there is] the widespread philosophical worry 
that one’s personal identity might be compromised as a result of brain 
interventions: ‘The fear is often expressed that an individual may no longer be 
“the same person” he or she used to be prior to an intervention in the brain. In 
other words … these interventions are said to threaten personal identity’.16 
As this quote suggests, a threat to identity is understood in terms of no longer 
being the same person. But what is it to be the same person? And how should we 
understand such a claim? Are people saying they are literally a different person? 
Should these claims be understood as merely metaphorical?  
 
In order to understand these claims about personal identity change, much of 
the recent literature in neuroethics invokes the concept of narrative identity to 
explain the sense of identity at issue in these claims of self-change and perceived 
threats to identity from intervention in the brain.17 Narrative identity concerns our 
self-conception. These approaches argue that selfhood is an act of self-constitution 
                                            
16 F. Focquaert and D. DeRidder, “Direct Intervention in the Brain, Ethical Issues 
Concerning Personal Identity,” Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4 (2009), 1; R Merkel et al., 
Intervening in the Brain. Changing Psyche and Society (Berlin: Springer, 2007). As Focquaert and 
DeRidder point out such concerns are not restricted to direct interventions in the brain but are 
also raised in the psychopharmacological context. For a similar point, see Neil Levy, Neuroethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); David DeGrazia, “Enhancement Technologies 
and Human Identity,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (2005). 
17 See: E Gisquet, “Cerebral Implants and Parkinson’s Disease: a Unique Form of 
Biographical Disruption?,” Social Sciences & Medicine 67 (2008); Walter Glannon, “Stimulating 
Brains, Altering Minds,” Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (2008); Martjee Schermer, “Changes in the 
Self: the Need for Conceptual Research Next to Empirical Research,” American Journal of Bioethics 9 
(2009); Maartje Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation,” Frontiers in Integrative 
Neuroscience 5 (2011); Marya Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain 
Stimulation,” The Journal of Clinical Ethics 21 (2010); Marya Schechtman, “Getting Our Stories 
Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity,” in Personal Identity & Fractured Selves, ed. Debra J. 
H. Mathews, Hilary Bok, and Peter V. Rabins (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2009); Françoise Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to 
Personal Identity From Deep Brain Stimulation,” Neuroethics (2011); V Johansson, “Authenticity, 
Depression, and Deep Brain Stimulation,” Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience (2011); Karsten Witt 
et al., “Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity,” Neuroethics (2011); Catriona 
Mackenzie and Mary Jean Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” in Handbook of Neuroethics, ed. Jens Clausen and Neil Levy (Netherlands: Springer, 
2014); Frederic Gilbert and Eliza Goddard, “Thinking Ahead Too Much: Speculative Ethics and 
Implantable Brain Devices,” American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 5 (2014). 
  13 
and that narrative structures our experiences over time and so a person’s sense of 
first-personal continuity over time. Narrative identity is contrasted with numerical 
identity - a concern with sameness wherein the continuity of a person over time is 
defined either by bodily criteria, for example DNA or the brain, or psychological 
continuity, for example autobiographical memory or a set of core characteristics. 
A change in numerical identity would mean a person literally goes out of existence 
or literally becomes someone else. Most accounts in the neuroethical debates 
argue that it is narrative identity and not numerical identity at stake in the 
accounts of first-personal change - the changes in mood cited above from DBS, 
for example, do not change a person’s body, nor completely alter or wipe out a 
person’s memory.18 They argue that it is changes in characteristics and values that 
are at issue in these statements, and that they are not claims about being a person 
or entity with a new ontologically distinct status.19 They disagree, however, on 
whether the salient threat is to identity, authenticity, agency or autonomy. They also 
disagree as to how these key concepts should be conceptualised, including how 
they are interrelated.  
 
Marya Schechtman argues that once we understand that it is narrative identity 
at issue in first-personal accounts we understand the salient issue with respect to 
neural implants is their impact on narrative coherence. Schechtman argues that 
neural implants can pose a threat to narrative identity by disrupting the narrative 
thread.20 Schechtman contrasts this understanding of a threat to narrative 
continuity with approaches that view threats to identity in terms of a static of fixed 
view of identity, such as in terms of core commitments and traits. If the disruption 
to the narrative thread is extreme or abrupt enough it can literally break off one 
narrative and start another. Walter Glannon appears to support this position, 
when he suggests that if DBS radically alters a person’s narrative it can effectively 
turn someone into a different person.21 Schechtman’s argument that it is narrative 
identity at stake in these first-personal statements of identity change has been 
extremely influential.  
 
However, whilst Schechtman’s approach is extremely influential, amongst 
those that adopt a narrative approach to identity, there are different views on the 
significance of narrative change and specifically whether narrative change 
constitutes a threat to identity. Many argue that once we understand which sense 
of identity is at issue, narrative and not numerical, we defuse any concern about 
                                            
18 Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation,” 2-3. 
19 See Glannon, “Stimulating Brains, Altering Minds.”; Schermer, “Changes in the Self: the 
Need for Conceptual Research Next to Empirical Research.”; Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep 
Brain Stimulation.” 
20 See Schechtman, “Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity.”; 
Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation.” 
21 Glannon, “Stimulating Brains, Altering Minds,” 291. 
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threats to identity altogether. David DeGrazia and others, who agree that 
narrative identity is at issue in these cases, argue that DBS and medical 
intervention does not, and cannot pose a threat to identity.22 They argue that the 
charge of a threat to identity is based on a static or fixed view of identity linked to 
a mistaken conception of authenticity in terms of self-discovery (discovery of one’s 
true self). Whilst there is narrative change, narrative is a dynamic concept; 
change, per se, is not a threat to identity. Marjeete Shermer recognises that 
changes, particularly abrupt changes, can ‘disrupt the narrative flow of life’; 
however, she argues that the salient issue is not about threats to identity caused by 
narrative change, but whether the person endorses the change or not. Shermer 
writes: 
Changes in narrative personal identity are not necessarily ethically problematic in 
themselves — that is, apart from possible harmful consequence for others. People 
always change in many respects throughout their lives; personal identities are not 
static but develop over time. … Some of the changes that DBS can bring about in 
personality, cognition, behavior, or mood may actually be sought by the patient 
and be the goal of treatment, for example mood improvement in depression, or 
tic-reduction in Tourette’s syndrome. Other changes may not be intended but can 
still be welcomed by the patient, for example an elevated mood or increased 
libido. The same changes can, however, be evaluated differently by different 
patients. The relevant ethical point is therefore whether or not the patient himself 
perceives the changes in his personality, mood, behavior, or cognition brought 
about by the DBS as disruptive of his personal identity.23 
 
Françoise Baylis also dismisses claims of threats to identity from DBS.24 Baylis 
presents a relational narrative approach to identity to argue that the real threat to 
identity comes not from medical intervention, but from social understandings of 
disability, which constrain and shape the identity-constituting narratives available 
to people with impairments. Focussing on cases of self-alienation in DBS, Baylis 
argues that if DBS does pose a threat it is to our agency, for example when actions, 
such as compulsive gambling are caused by the treatment, and do not arise from 
our choosing.  
A … plausible response to the question “Is DBS for PD a threat to personal 
identity?” suggests that DBS is such a threat but only insofar as it is a threat to 
agency—the ability to make informed and rational choices—as when a person’s 
actions do not flow from her intentions or beliefs but rather are the result of direct 
brain manipulation.25 
                                            
22 DeGrazia, “Enhancement Technologies and Human Identity,” The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 30 (2005). 
23 Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation,” 2-3. This view is shared by Synofzik 
and Schlaepfer, who write: ‘[T]he ethically decisive question is not whether DBS alters personality 
or not, but whether it does so in “a good or bad way” from the patient’s very own perspective’. M 
Synofzik and TE Schlaepfer, “Stimulating Personality: Ethical Criteria for Deep Brain Stimulation 
in Psychiatric Patients and for Enhancement Purposes,” Biotechnology Journal 3 (2008), 4. 
24 Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity From Deep Brain 
Stimulation.” 
25 Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity From Deep Brain 
Stimulation,” 524. 
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In such cases, threats to agency can compromise one’s ability to meaningfully 
author their lives. 
 
Catriona Mackenzie and Mary Jean Walker, drawing on Baylis’ account of 
what is at stake in first-personal descriptions of self-alienation, argue that the 
potential threat posed by DBS is better understood as a threat to autonomy, rather 
than to identity and/or authenticity.26 They argue that the first-person 
phenomenological descriptions of self-alienation, as Baylis shows, draw attention 
to the distress experienced as a result of being unable to achieve equilibrium in 
one’s self-narrative. They write: ‘This distress, in our view, points to threats to 
autonomy rather than to identity or authenticity, as the salient concern underlying 
narratives of self-alienation’.27 Mackenzie and Walker contrast this understanding 
with approaches that dismiss potential threats to identity on the basis of an 
argument against threats to authenticity. Mackenzie and Walker argue that ‘the 
ethics of authenticity [as it is understood in neuroethical debates by DeGrazia and 
Shermer] provides a misleading normative framework for assessing the ethical 
implications of changes in identity arising from the use of neurotechnologies’.28 
 
So, in the philosophical and bioethical literature there is disagreement as to 
what is the salient issue in changes that follow from neural implants, and 
neurotechnological intervention more broadly. Some, like Schechtman, frame the 
discussion in terms of threats to identity, whilst DeGrazia dismisses the charge, 
invoking a distinction between identity and authenticity. Baylis in contrast argues 
that the threat from neurological intervention is to agency. Mackenzie and Walker 
argue that the threat is best conceived as a threat to autonomy. What is the salient 
issue with respect to the impacts of neural implants and neurotechnologies? 
Shermer notes that ethical discussions as to whether the changes in behaviour, 
mood or cognition following from DBS result in changes to personal identity ‘is 
complicated by a lack of clear and undisputed definitions of central concepts such 
as personality, self, identity and authenticity’, and concludes we need conceptual 
clarity in the area.29  The theoretical literature on the impacts of neural devices on 
personal identity is divided. Also, there is no universal agreement on the meaning 
of the central concepts at issue - identity, agency and autonomy (as well as 
authenticity). 
 
                                            
26 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity.” 
27 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 390. 
28 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 375. 
29 Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation,” 2. 
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Much of the philosophical and bioethical literature seeks to answer whether 
neural implants are ethically acceptable medical treatments to offer to patients, 
and answer that question in relation to patients’ autonomy and its promotion. 
However the approach to autonomy (individual or relational) best suited to these 
cases is contested. All these accounts advocate preparing the patient for narrative 
change and argue that attention needs to be assessed on a case-by-case.30 
However, without an appropriate understanding of what is at issue in claims of 
self-change, the problem of practical uptake looms large. If it is not change per se, 
as noted by Shermer, whether the treatment is ethically good or bad, comes down 
to whether the patient thinks it is good or bad. However, this response just leaves 
us where we started, that is, with the problem that some like the changes and 
some do not. We need a further way to adjudicate the normative significance of 
these changes. Judgements about the impacts of neural implants on identity 
cannot just come down to individual responses - we need an account of the central 
concepts and their interrelation, so that we make an ethical judgement about these 
changes. In order to understand the impacts of neural implants on personal 
identity, and how we understand cases of personal change over time where the 
initiating cause of the change is due to factors outside of a person’s control or 
agency, we need first to unpack the key concepts at issue and map our their 
relation.  
 
The problem with framing the impact of neural implants solely in terms of 
threats is that the opportunities for self-transformation and increased self-
direction are ignored. However, the problem with arguing that there is no threat 
from neural implants does not take into account that some experience neural 
implants as a very real source of alienation (from their values, desires and 
characteristics).  
 
In comparing the first-personal accounts of the impacts of neural implants 
with the philosophical accounts of self-change and threats to personal identity, I 
am looking to see how the first-personal accounts both inform and, challenge, 
these philosophical accounts, and to adjust the theoretical accounts accordingly. 
From a contrasting perspective, I am also looking to see how the philosophical 
accounts might inform the first-personal discussions of self-change and potential 
threats to identity. 
1.1.b Practical identity, narrative agency and relational autonomy  
 
The central concepts this thesis addresses are: identity, agency and autonomy. 
These concepts relate to our sense of what’s morally at stake in selfhood and self-
                                            
30 For example, see Synofzik and Schlaepfer, “Stimulating Personality: Ethical Criteria for 
Deep Brain Stimulation in Psychiatric Patients and for Enhancement Purposes,” 10. 
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change - our self-understanding, what it is to be a person over time, who can act, 
in accordance with our values, to be self-governing. I follow a convention adopted 
by Kim Atkins of using selfhood to indicate a non-metaphysically privileged 
ontological understanding of selfhood.31 Like Atkins, I will often use the terms 
‘identity’ and ‘selfhood’ interchangeably. These central concepts are related, 
sometimes overlapping, concepts, that are certainly not fully discrete. The central 
people writing in this area, in the kinds of ways that are relevant to my questions, 
recognise a close connection between these concepts. In fact they recognise that 
they are overlapping conceptual areas.  
 
Understanding the nature and relationship of these concepts will give an 
account of the complex nature of selfhood that addresses my problem concerning 
the impacts of neural implants on personal identity.32  I draw on the following 
understanding of these key concepts to defend my argument: practical identity, 
narrative agency and relational autonomy.  I further demonstrate what is at stake in 
selfhood and self-change with respect to practical identity, relational autonomy 
and narrative agency. Understanding the concepts in this way illuminates why it is 
that we invest in ourselves and why it matters to be a self that persists through 
change. Practical identity, relational autonomy and narrative agency have a high 
level of overlap; however they are different. I develop a conceptual approach that 
gives an account of selfhood, treating these concepts as aspects of selfhood, none 
of which can be reduced to another.  
 
In this thesis I present what I think is the best way of conceptualising these 
concepts for the purpose of my arguments. I argue that in order to understand 
claims to be a different person requires a practical approach to identity that asks: who 
someone is and what makes them the someone that they are, in contrast to a 
metaphysical approach to identity that asks: what makes a person the same person at 
one time and another. A practical approach to identity focuses on the first-
personal experience and self-understanding. I follow Christine Korsgaard who 
defines practical identity as ‘a normative self-conception’ and continuity of identity 
in terms of agential continuity.33 As Schechtman argues, it is this sense of identity 
that is at issue when asking questions about self-transformation and self-crises.34 I 
develop my account of practical identity by drawing on the work of Kim Atkins to 
                                            
31 Kim Atkins, Narrative Identity & Moral Identity – a Practical Perspective. New York: Routledge, 
2008. 
32 Mackenzie presents a relational analysis of autonomy in terms of (three) dimensions of 
autonomy, none of which can be reduced to another, see: Catriona Mackenzie, “Three Dimensions 
of Autonomy,” in Feminism and Autonomy, ed. Mark Piper and Andrea Veltman (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
33 Christine Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to 
Parfit,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989); Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996). 
34 Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
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show that practical identity arises from our embodiment in a socially embedded 
context and involves the integration of three perspectives: first-, second-, and 
third-personal.35  
 
I argue that a proper understanding of practical identity over time requires a 
narrative understanding of agency. To make this argument I draw on 
Schechtman’s argument that narrative integrates selfhood over time and through 
narrative structures we constitute a persisting subject of experience.36 I further 
develop my approach to narrative agency by drawing on Atkins and Françoise 
Baylis37 to argue for an embodied relational understanding of narrative agency. 
The implications of the relational aspects of practical identity, as Hilde Lindemann 
Nelson points out, are that identity acts like a lever for agency, either opening up 
possibilities for agency or closing down possibilities for agency.38 
 
In order to understand the type of agent I can be (over time), we must look at 
how I can govern my life, my options for self-realisation. I argue that 
understanding questions of self-change and the impacts of neural implants on 
identity requires an approach to autonomy that accommodates the relational 
nature of autonomy, that is the role of others and social institutions in the 
development and exercise of autonomous selfhood. I argue that the exercise of 
autonomy is better understood in terms of our skills for self-governance, in a 
context of what can practically be realized. To develop a relational approach to 
autonomy I draw on Diana Tietjens Meyers’ procedural approach to autonomy in 
terms of a set of competences for self-direction, self-governance and self-
discovery39 and Catriona Mackenzie’s weak substantial approach to relational 
autonomy which includes normative competences for self-trust.40 Further, I argue 
that a narrative account of agency gives temporal persistence to (practical) 
identity and (relational) autonomy; that is, narrative integrates agency and 
autonomy competences providing for self-integration over time.   
 
                                            
35 Kim Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
36 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves. 
37 Françoise Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” in Being 
Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law, ed. J. Downie and J. J. Llewellyn 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). 
38 Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001). 
39 Diana Tietjens Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989). 
40 Catriona Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism,” 
Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (2008); Catriona Mackenzie, “Autonomy,” in The Routledge Companion 
to Bioethics, ed. John D Arras, Elizabeth Fenton, and Rebecca Kukla (New York: Routedge, 2015). 
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 1.2 An Embodied, Relational Approach to Narrative 
Agency and Autonomy  
 
I argue that the first-personal accounts reveal aspects of selfhood and what is 
at stake in being a persisting agent who can act, choose their values and realise 
their projects, and show how neural implants shape this kind of selfhood. To 
capture what is going on in these first-personal accounts I argue that we need to 
understand these aspects of selfhood as important, including why people care 
about being a continuing self over time.  
 
I argue that an adequate account of selfhood to address the concerns raised by 
the first-personal accounts of implant recipients is one that can support our 
practical concerns about identity, agency and autonomy; an account that captures 
practical identity and narrative agency and autonomy explains these practical 
concerns. Further I argue that an embodied and relational approach to narrative 
agency and autonomy is one that is best able to meet this test for adequacy.  
 
I argue that practical identity is at stake in these first-personal descriptions of 
self-change, and not metaphysical identity. Further, I argue that a narrative 
approach to questions of personal identity is the best approach because (only) a 
narrative approach can explain the complex and dynamic nature of selfhood, as 
well as continuity of selfhood. A narrative account understands identity as a 
project of narrative integration which can come apart. It can thus explain the 
significance of changes in selfhood and self-understanding and better inform the 
question of threats to identity from neural implants.   
 
Developing an approach to selfhood as narrative, relational and embodied 
provides a basis for understanding how changes, caused by neurological 
intervention, can impact on our personal identity. Changes in embodiment, and 
the social context, can impact on agency and one’s ability to practically realise the 
self we value, impacting on our autonomy competences, by either frustrating or 
facilitating our ability to self-govern, affecting how we can meaningfully author 
our lives. These changes can threaten the coherence of our lives - as the inability 
to unify different dimensions of our identity, and so challenges our normative self-
conceptions. Changes can challenge our sense of self and capacity to integrate 
ourselves over time (to integrate a meaningful self-understanding).  
 
This understanding refigures the question of potential threats to identity. The 
concern is not about whether someone is literally the same or a different person, 
but whether a person is able to integrate changes consequent on neural implants. 
This places the focus on changes to embodiment and agency caused by implants, 
and their impact on autonomy competency - how they hinder, but also how they 
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may promote, our abilities to self-direct, and self-evaluate, our choices and 
meaningfully contribute to authoring our lives.  
 
So, although we started with an account of personal identity, it turns out that 
what really matters is selfhood. It matters not just that I am persisting being, but 
that I can tell a story about myself, make choices and act on these. The reason the 
first-personal accounts are interesting is that they tell us how people understand 
their selfhood. My approach thus clarifies the confusion concerning what’s at 
stake in self-descriptions of neural implants - the first-personal accounts focus on 
one, or other, of these aspects of selfhood and the shared concern about what it is 
to be an enduring self. 
 
On the basis of this argument, I further argue that the embodied, relational 
approach to narrative agency and autonomy that I develop, provides an approach 
to theorizing disability and the impacts of impairments, which better informs our 
understanding of these treatments and provides a direction for therapeutic repair. 
 
My approach develops a “full-blooded” account of selfhood and agency. The 
approach I develop can account for the differences between agency, autonomy 
and identity as well as their interrelation, and can accommodate cases where 
people have compromised autonomy, yet afford them agency and identity. 
 
This thesis works in the space of moral psychology, using first-person 
phenomenological accounts to inquire into the practical impacts of neural implants 
on self-understanding, identity, autonomy and agency. As such, this thesis is not in 
the field of metaphysical (or reductionist) approaches to moral psychology, but 
rather develops a (relational) narrative approach to agency and autonomy. This 
account positions itself against metaphysical accounts of personal identity and 
postmodern accounts of personal identity and agency. I argue that a narrative 
approach to personal identity is a better account for understanding the impacts of 
neural implants on personal identity, because it understands identity as about self-
constitution, and is robust enough to provide for identity, agency and autonomy, 
and the necessity (both conceptually and morally) of integration, as well as the 
fragility of this self-integration. In contrast, metaphysical accounts assume self-
integration as given by numerical identity, whilst postmodern accounts fail to 
acknowledge the trauma of self-disintegration by arguing identity is an illusion.  
 
Thus, I offer a “how-to approach” rather than a “what-is approach”. That is, I 
argue in order to understand the significance of personal change following from 
neural implants that we must first set out and define the main concepts and how 
they are related to one another. So, my focus is not “are you (or aren’t you) the 
same person” (though my approach might provide an answer to this), but more so, 
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offers, in the first instance, a way to approach the question of change consequent 
upon neural implants. Further, this thesis is not in the field of practical ethics; for 
example, it does not make an assessment about the ethical permissibility of neural 
implants, nor does it propose guidelines for the use of neural implants, nor suggest 
models for public consultation about neural implants. 
1.2.a Resources of the approach  
 
The approach I develop clarifies the bioethical and philosophical literature 
about how implants threaten personal identity. It sets out the conceptual terrain 
and relation between identity, agency and autonomy and reveals what is at stake 
in our concerns for practical identity and selfhood. Further it provides theoretical 
explanation of the practical problem of uptake and provides direction for 
therapeutic responses.  
 
The approach I develop provides resources by which we can make a 
judgement about the impacts of neural implants on personal identity. This 
approach can explain why and how a neural implant can be perceived as 
threatening, or, empowering. On this approach, the ethical significance of changes 
following neural implants is not just a matter of whether the patient endorses the 
changes or not. Rather, via looking at impacts on autonomy competences, and 
narrative agency, we have the tools by which to judge the ethical significance of 
these changes. Further, this approach offers resources for understanding the 
conditions which give rise to treatment with neural implants, and provides 
direction for repair, in terms of focusing on autonomy competences. With this 
approach we are better equipped to understand how a treatment, whilst aimed at 
‘fixing’ a condition, might adversely impact on a person’s selfhood; a treatment 
might frustrate activities that once contributed to defining/constituting who an 
individual took themselves to be; for example, a painter whose medication for 
schizophrenia, whilst removing their cognitive symptoms, causes tremors which 
make them unable to paint, and thus engage in activities that in part define them. 
Similarly, the social and personal impacts of adoption of a medical practice which 
advocates the use of Cochlear ear implants at the expense of encouraging people 
to learn to use sign-language, might lead to social disenfranchisement and an 
inability to participate in Deaf culture. However, the approach I offer is not a “one 
size fits all” approach – rather, as identity, agency and autonomy come in degrees 
and are first-personal all the way down,41 although with a recognition that 
                                            
41 The use of first-personal here refers to the role of the first-personal perspective in the 
constitution of our identities. This use is distinct from the use of first-personal accounts of implant 
recipients, where the use of ‘first-personal’ draws attention to the phenomenology of having an 
implant. 
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selfhood is intersubjective or relational, this approach advocates a particularism, 
which attends to the role of others in repair.  
 
Whilst I focus on DBS for Parkinson’s Disease, and the use of the Cochlear 
implant for hearing impairments, the conclusions that follow apply to a range of 
treatments for a variety of conditions. Moreover, and further, the conclusions that 
follow can illuminate many cases of self-change where the agent is not the 
initiating cause - for example, from illness, trauma or the like, including the flux 
and contingency that characterize human lives.  
 
Whilst not in the area of practical ethics, the approach I develop provides a 
direction for practical ethics. Discussions concerning the ethical permissibility of 
neural implants given changes or challenges to personal identity should account 
for the diversity of responses patients have to neural implants, and rather than 
frame debates in terms of ‘threats to identity’, the focus should be on how neural 
implants might foster or hinder the exercise of our autonomy competences.  
 
Further, as mentioned earlier in this introduction, there is research and 
development into neural implants which are intended for use beyond therapeutic 
purposes. Whilst this is an interesting issue, and not unrelated to questions of 
personal identity, the approach I develop informs, and provides theoretical 
support for, a different direction in the enhancement debate. 
 
1.3. Chapter Outline   
 
In this introductory chapter I have outlined the problem this thesis addresses: 
How do we understand claims concerning identity change from recipients of 
neural implants? I have argued that these accounts raise concerns about practical 
identity or selfhood and that practical identity is best understood as structured by 
narrative, and indicated that I will set out a relational and embodied approach to 
narrative agency and autonomy. I further argued that the approach I develop can 
make sense of the first-personal accounts and clarifies the philosophical and 
bioethical literature, and so adequately explains how implants might threaten 
identity by hindering the exercise of autonomy competences, which in turn may 
threaten narrative integration. This approach also explains why some may find 
changes liberating, because they are changes which foster the exercise of 
autonomy competences and contribute to narrative integration. I argue that this 
understanding can explain the problem of practical uptake, provide a theoretical 
direction for understanding the conditions which give rise to treatment, as well as 
provide direction for therapeutic treatment.  
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I develop this argument throughout the chapters of this thesis. In the following 
four chapters I set out the three main concepts - practical identity, narrative 
agency and relational autonomy, and sketch out how they are put together. In the 
final chapter I set out the resources of my approach for theorizing disability, as 
well as therapeutic directions for repair. 
 
In the second chapter I argue that it is a practical sense of identity at issue in 
the first-personal accounts by recipients of neural implants, and not a 
metaphysical sense of identity. A practical approach examines and explains what 
matters to us in identity claims and why we invest in ourselves. I draw on 
Korsgaard, Ricoeur and Atkins to develop my argument. I use critiques by 
Korsgaard and Ricoeur of reductive or impersonal accounts of identity, focusing 
on Derek Parfit, to demonstrate that metaphysical identity is not at stake in these 
first-personal claims, that identity cannot be reduced to a set of distinct, causally 
related time-slices which can explain a person’s identity without reference to the 
individual and that questions concerning the first-personal perspective cannot be 
reduced to the third personal perspective. I then develop an embodied relational 
approach to practical identity that is best suited to addressing what’s at stake in 
changes to practical identity, drawing on Korsgaard’s understanding of practical 
identity as a normative self-conception, and Atkins’ tri-perspectival account of 
selfhood. I build on Korsgaard’s account, by showing that practical identity arises 
from our embodiment which is relationally constituted. This account shows how a 
practical identity account can illuminate understandings of threats posed to 
identity by neural implants in terms of challenging our ability to act out of our 
self-conceptions. 
 
In the third chapter I argue that in order to understand what is at stake in 
these cases of change to our practical identity, we need to adopt a narrative 
understanding of the unity and continuity of practical identity. Using 
Schechtman’s critique of psychological continuity approaches to personal identity, 
I demonstrate that the narrative self-constitution account of agency can account 
for the persisting subject of experience and so explain what matters to us about 
personal identity, and so, changes in identity. I further defend Schechtman’s 
narrative approach from Galen Strawson’s objections that narrative is a false 
descriptive thesis as well as an ethically pernicious thesis. In doing so I show that 
Schechtman (and others) are making a conceptual claim about how experience is 
necessarily organized, without which, personhood, and the practices and attitudes 
surrounding personhood, is difficult to attain and maintain. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I then develop an approach to narrative agency that is 
best suited to explaining how implants impact on narrative identity and agency. I 
build on Schechtman’s account, by developing Atkins’ argument that a narrative 
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approach must understand narrative identity as embodied, and by drawing on 
Nelson and Baylis who argue that narrative identity and agency must be 
understood as relational. I show that this approach illuminates potential threats to 
personal identity; neural implants may engender changes, or disrupt the narrative 
structures that give meaning to our lives. Neural implants can challenge narrative 
coherence and frustrate unified agency. This approach focuses repair on achieving 
narrative integration.  
 
In the fifth chapter I argue that autonomous agency should be understood 
relationally, and as a suite of skills or autonomy competences. These competences 
can be facilitated or frustrated by neural implants. I draw on feminist critiques, by 
Baier and Mackenzie, of libertarian individualistic conceptions of autonomy, to 
show that autonomy must be understood as relational, that is as developed in 
relations with others. I then develop an approach to relational autonomy, drawing 
on Meyers’ notion of autonomy competence and Mackenzie’s articulation of 
normative competency to argue for paying attention to the role of others and 
social scaffolding in both facilitating and hindering the development and exercise 
of autonomy competences.  I show that this approach can explain how implants 
can be seen as both empowering when they facilitate the exercise of autonomy and 
normative competence and contribute to narrative integration and hindering when 
they frustrate the exercise of autonomy and normative competence and contribute 
to narrative fragmentation.  
 
The arguments in chapters two to five set out an account of selfhood which 
illuminates claims about threats to personal identity from neural implants.  
 
In the sixth and final chapter I apply this account of selfhood to theoretical 
understandings of disability to argue that the account I develop provides an 
approach which can explain disability in both its positive and negative impacts on 
autonomy competence and narrative integration. I set out two standard 
interpretations of disability, the medical and social model, and drawing on work 
by Jackie Leech Scully, demonstrate that the embodied relational approach to 
narrative selfhood that I develop can account for both the embodied status of 
disability and well as the social shaping of understandings of disability, both of 
which can foster and hinder our sense of ourselves as enduring over time and 
being able to act on the choices we value. Further I discuss the role of neural 
implants and repair, and propose additional directions in terms of narrative repair. 
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1.4 Neural Implants 
1.4.a Cochlear implant  
 
Bionic ear implants (or Cochlear implants) are used to treat people who have 
severe, profound or total hearing loss, those who have developed hearing loss, as 
well as those who are born congenitally deaf. A Cochlear implant is a neural 
prosthesis which produces hearing sensation by electrically stimulating the 
auditory nerve receptors inside the inner ear to elicit auditory sensations in the 
brain. The implant is designed to assist recipients to understand human speech, 
rather than replicating the full range of auditory sensation. The implant device 
consists of a receiver-stimulator (surgically fitted under the skin behind the ear) 
and an external speech processor (which sits behind the ear, similar to a hearing 
aid). The external microphone picks up sound and the external speech processor 
captures this sound and converts it into digital code. This code is then transmitted, 
wirelessly, to the receiver-stimulator, which converts the digital code into 
electrical impulses sent to an electrode array positioned in the cochlea. The 
stimulation along this array of the cochlea’s hearing nerve then sends the impulses 
to the brain where they are interpreted as sound. See Figure 1.1 below which 
depicts the main components of the Cochlear implant. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Bionic ear: Cochlear implant42 
 
The multichannel Cochlear implant, developed by Graham Clark and 
colleagues, was first implanted in a human subject in 1978, and the first children 
                                            
42 This image comes from the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication 
Disorders (NIDCD): http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/hearing/pages/coch.aspx 
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received Cochlear implants in 1985-6.43 To date, more than 180,000 people 
worldwide have been fitted with Cochlear implants.44 Research and developmental 
studies have shown, based on the neuroplasticity of younger brains, that the 
earlier the implant is fitted, the better the hearing uptake and development of 
communication skills.45 New research is showing that two Cochlear implants 
(bilateral, one for each ear), can provide better depth perception - they are better 
at localising sounds and speech in noisy rooms than one implant.  
 
Cochlear implants are being improved all the time. For example, initially the 
external sound processor was very large and difficult to move around with.46 Also, 
developments in the number of electrodes are providing more powerful devices. 
Cochlear implants have been designed (from the beginning) so that the software is 
upgradable – removing the implanted hardware is considered an option only in the 
case of faulty or defective devices. Recipients of a Cochlear may visit practitioners 
to upgrade parts of the software or for an entirely new system software upgrade.  
  
Adopting an implant typically involves surgically fitting the device, turning on 
the device in the weeks following the surgery, an initial “mapping”, fine-tuning of 
the mapping of the neural responses to localised stimulation of the cochlea, and 
then typically presenting to the audiologist for upgrades to the software. It is 
important to note that the Cochlear implant does not provide its recipients with 
‘hearing’, but rather a simulation of hearing, by stimulating aural nerves based on 
processed sound information. Moreover, many recipients note the years of 
adaptation to interpreting the sounds that are heard, as well as getting used to 
wearing the device (the external bits fall off, the wires get in the way).  
1.4.b Deep Brain Stimulation  
 
As well as neural prosthetic devices for sensory impairments, neural implants 
have been developed for cognitive applications, that is, neuro-bionic devices.47 
Neural implants have been developed and are being developed that monitor 
neural activity in the brain, spinal cord, or elsewhere in the body, and/or stimulate 
nerves electrically for therapeutic applications. These implants ‘are used to 
                                            
43 For a fuller discussion of Clark’s role in the developing the Cochlear implant, see Graeme 
Clark, Sounds From Silence: Graeme Clark and the Bionic Ear Story (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 
2000). 
44 The Bionics Institute, “Bionic Ear: Fact Sheet.”  www.advancedbionics.com 
45 Uptake of Cochlear implants in young recipients has often been advocated by the medical 
profession, at the expense of learning sign language. 
46 Cochlear Ltd have now developed a Totally Implantable Cochlear Implant (TICI). 
47 These devices draw on technology in the heart pacemaker, Jamie Talan, Deep Brain 
Stimulation: a New Treatment Shows Promise in the Most Difficult Cases (New York: Dana Press, 2009), 
1-2. And, also on developments in sensory neural prosthetics Wallace et al., “Medical Bionics.” 
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address medical problems that have no alternative solutions, such as neurological 
conditions that have not responded to drug treatments’.48   
 
 Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) uses a “brain-pacemaker” device, or 
neurostimulator, which uses electrodes to deliver electrical stimulation to targeted 
areas of the brain in order to treat symptoms of a neural disorder, such as the 
tremors associated with Parkinson’s Disease. Two holes are drilled in the patient’s 
skull to fit two electrodes which protrude deep into the brain. These electrodes are 
connected to a lead attached to the neurostimulator which is surgically implanted 
in the recipient’s chest. The neurostimulator generates the electricity which is 
delivered to the electrodes. The patient is awake during this procedure. An 
external programmer then adjusts the settings of the neurostimulator in order that 
the right amount of electricity is delivered to the brain to alleviate the respective 




 Figure 1.2 A Deep Brain Stimulation implant.  
 
DBS was first developed for, and is approved to treat movement disorders, 
including Essential Tremor, Parkinson’s Disease and dystonia. Parkinson's 
disease is a neurodegenerative disease; the primary symptoms are related to 
                                            
48 The Bionics Institute, “Neurobionics: Fact Sheet.”  www.advancedbionics.com 
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movement - tremor, rigidity and postural instability. Parkinson’s disease is caused 
by the death of nerve cells in the brain, and gets worse as more brain cells die. 
DBS does not cure Parkinson's Disease, but it can help manage some of its 
symptoms and subsequently improve the patient’s quality of life. At present, the 
procedure is used only for patients whose symptoms cannot be adequately 
controlled with medications, or whose medications have severe side-effects, i.e., 
for otherwise treatment-resistant movement and affective disorders. The device 
can relieve symptoms for a period of time; it then needs to be re-stimulated. 
Medtronics, one of the largest manufacturers of DBS devices, states that over 
100,000 people have received Medtronic DBS therapy.49  
 
DBS directly changes brain activity in a controlled manner and its effects are 
reversible (unlike those of lesioning techniques). Two common stimulation sites in 
the brain are the subthalamic nucleus (STN) and the globus pallidus interna 
(GPi), targeting different sites achieves differing results. Other sites are also being 
evaluated. Although invasive like the Cochlear implant, the neural stimulation in 
DBS, is, like the name suggests, deep in the brain, rather than through the 
cochlea. In DBS a neural array is placed in the brain to directly stimulate nerves 
involved in motor control. So, there is additional physical risk and potential for 
unintended stimulation of the brain. 
 
However, as numerous authors note, the underlying principles and 
mechanisms of DBS are not clear. This in part involves developments in 
knowledge of specific brain function - which spot in the brain for which 
condition? - but also is dependent on developing theories of neurocognition, 
including brain and neuroplasticity, which problematizes the idea that the brain is 
location-function specific. Also, in contrast to the Cochlear implant which 
stimulates the cochlea in a fine-tuned way, experiences related to DBS may be 
directly to do with stimulation of the brain.  
 
Whilst mainly used for movement disorders such as those associated with 
Parkinson’s disease, DBS is also used to treat neurological diseases, such as 
Tourette’s syndrome, as well as psychological conditions, such as depression and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Testing of these devices involves clinical trials, as 
well as experimental treatment.  
 
Risks associated with DBS are those of major surgery and the major 
complications include haemorrhage and infection. Neuropsychiatric side-effects 
have also been identified, including apathy, hallucinations, compulsive gambling, 
hypersexuality, cognitive dysfunction, and depression. However, these may be 
                                            
49 http://www.medtronic.com/patients/parkinsons-disease/therapy/benefits-and-
risks/index.htm 
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temporary and related to correct placement and calibration of the stimulator. 
Whilst DBS has been shown to improve motor symptoms, studies, such as those 
by Schüpbach and colleagues, describe what they call problems of psycho-social 
adjustment.  
 
1.4.c Epilepsy prediction devices  
 
Neural implants are also being developed to treat epilepsy. Epilepsy is a brain 
disorder characterised by unpredictable seizures. Approximately 60 million people 
of the world’s population suffers from epilepsy, and in 30-40% of these persons, 
medication is ineffectual in controlling seizures.50 Epileptic seizures, as well as 
their unpredictability, makes daily activities potentially life threatening. The onset 
of seizure and loss of consciousness during bathing, for example, or whilst driving, 
can result in falls and injuries, and also death. The unpredictable onset of seizures 
contributes to the risk of injury, and also, psychosocial disability. For these 
reasons, people who suffer from epileptic seizures experience a poorer quality of 
life due to the limits on the person’s activities and social interactions, as well as 
medical and associated financial burdens. Cook et al argue that the uncertainty of 
seizure occurrence is a major component of impairment on quality of life.51 
 
Neural implants used in epilepsy prediction devices monitor brain activity and 
indicate the likelihood of a seizure. In these devices, electrode arrays are surgically 
attached to the brain which collect electroencephalogram data (EEG). The EEG 
leads send data to a telemetry unit which is implanted just under the clavicle. The 
telemetry unit then sends data wirelessly to an external (hand held) advisory 
device. Via an algorithm applied to the telemetered EEG, the external advisory 
device displays the information via a set of seizure advisory lights - blue for low 
likelihood, white for moderate and red for high likelihood - as well as an audible 
tone or vibration. Figure 1.3 below depicts a seizure advisory system.  
 
                                            
50 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study.” 
51 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study,” 563. 
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Figure 1.3 Epilepsy prediction implant52  
 
Mark Cook and colleagues have developed the seizure advisory system 
described above. Cook et al have conducted a first-in-human clinical feasibility 
study, in which 15 patients with drug resistant epilepsy were implanted with a 
long-term, seizure advisory system to assess safety and efficacy.53 Despite some 
device-related adverse events, the study concluded that the intercranial EEG 
monitoring showed successful prospective seizure prediction, i.e. ‘that seizure 
prediction is possible and could lead to new therapeutic strategies and more 
independence for individuals with epilepsy’.54 Moreover, Cook et al argue that 
seizure prediction in patients could ‘improve safety, increase independence, as 
well as allow acute treatment’.55 
                                            
52 This image is from Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, 
Implanted Seizure Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man 
Study,” 564. 
53 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study.” Reporting 
points were scheduled at 4, 12 and 24 months after implantation. 
54 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study,” 570. The study 
noted though that the clinical usefulness of seizure prediction is inconclusive in part due to the 
inability of some patients in appreciating the predictive capacities of the device. 
55 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study,” 563. 
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Reliable anticipation of seizure occurrence could allow patients to avoid 
dangerous situations and enable administration of treatments, such as the 
electrical stimulation or acute drug delivery, targeted to when a seizure is likely to 
occur, rather than chronic administration, which is current clinical practice.56  
Like deep brain stimulation, the concern is with the brain. However with 
epilepsy detection the EEG leads only monitor, and do not directly interfere by 
neuro-stimulation, and so, is invasive (because of the surgical intervention), but 
not as invasive as DBS (because the device does not deliver stimulation to the 
brain). As such there is less risk of causing unintended neural stimulation, but it is 
invasive nonetheless. The epilepsy prediction device monitors what is happening 
in the brain and the individual interprets what the monitor tells them. However, 
with further development of the device, it will not only predict the probability of a 
seizure, but will deliver neuro-stimulation or drug treatment so as to prevent or 
suppress a seizure. This would change the device from a predictive monitor into 
an active treatment interfering with seizures directly on the brain.  
 
Given the novel stage of development of epilepsy prediction devices, there is 
little ethical literature that specifically addresses cases involving epilepsy 
prediction and further suppression devices. Frederic Gilbert raises concerns 
related to autonomy derived from both predictive devices as well as from the 
possible development of devices which then deliver stimulation or drugs to 
prevent a seizure.57   
 
1.5 Accounts of Neural Implants 
 
I am concerned in this thesis to address the practical, real world, issues raised 
by neural implants. I am trying to make sense of them and why they raise 
questions. The first-personal accounts show that neural implants present 
opportunities for self-governance and direction (through the exercise of 
autonomous agency for example), but for others, that neural implants also present 
as sources of alienation.  
 
Here I outline three stories about individuals who have had medical bionic 
devices implanted in their brains to help show the kinds of issues for selfhood and 
identity that arise from these medical technologies. These stories each discuss the 
way that the recipients feel about changes that have occurred following 
implantation; they discuss how the implants have shaped who they are and raise 
issues concerned with the impacts of these implants on their identity, including the 
                                            
56 Cook et al., “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure 
Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: a First-in-man Study,” 564. 
57 Frederic Gilbert, “A Threat to Autonomy: the Intrusion of Predictive Brain Devices,” 
American Journal of Bioethics - Neuroethics (Forthcoming December 2015). 
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relationship between the implant and their sense of self, their autonomy and 
agency, as well as the role of impairment in practical identity. I start from the 
assumption that although these first-personal accounts are not framed 
philosophically, these accounts say something of philosophical interest. These 
stories open up conceptual challenges to accounts of personal identity, which an 
adequate account of self and identity, impairment and well-being, should explain. 
I argue that these accounts illuminate aspects of practical identity or selfhood. I 
argue that in these accounts people are making claims about what it is to be a self 
and so what matters in being an enduring person over time who can act on their 
choices and values and realise their self-conceptions.   
1.5.a Mike Robbins  
 
Mike Robbins got a Deep Brain Stimulation device to treat severe tremors 
caused by Parkinson’s disease. Mike’s made a video, in which he turns the device 
off and then on again to demonstrate the efficacy of the device in controlling the 
symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease, including tremors. With the device on, Mike 
discusses clearly and forcefully his condition and the role of the device in allowing 
him to manage the tremors associated with Parkinson’s. Mike then switches the 
device off, and within seconds, Mike’s right arm begins to shake almost 
uncontrollably and it takes all his intentional focus to control the tremors, at the 
expense of being able to continue the discussion for his audience. Mike then turns 
the device back on, saying ‘Now I’m going to switch myself on’, his tremors 
subside and Mike continues his discussion. A similar claim is made by Andrew 
Johnson when he says of his neurostimulator: ‘This checks that I’m on’.58   
 
The way that Mike explains it, the device makes him able to be himself. Mike 
gives power to the device as central to his ability to be himself, because it allows 
him to act in ways that are important to maintaining his personhood, in facilitating 
his agency. This reveals his sense of the way in which the device shapes who he is. 
Mike’s impairment interrupts his agency making things that previously had been 
done unreflectively present to his consciousness. 
 
Mike’s example raises questions about what is really me? What is the 
impairment? What is the role of the implant? Is it something that is alien to me? 
Or something that frees me to be the agent I want to be? Should we see the device 
                                            
58 For another video by a Parkinson’s sufferer receiving DBS, Andrew Johnson (AJ), who 
like Robbins, advocates for the use of DBS, see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBh2LxTW0s0. In this video, AJ, like Robbins, turns the 
device off, and then on again, to demonstrate the efficacy of the DBS in controlling his tremors. 
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as supporting the capacity to be a self? Helmut Dubiel presents a more detailed 
and less upbeat picture of living with his DBS implant.59  
1.5.b Michael Chorost  
 
Michael Chorost got a Cochlear implant in his early 40’s. Chorost was born 
hearing impaired from exposure to the Rubella virus in utero to hearing parents. 
At age 2 he was fitted with a hearing aid and by his late 30s had lost all hearing 
prior to being fitted with the Cochlear. Chorost, an English literature PhD and 
computer programmer, describes the impact of his hearing impairment on his 
personal and social experiences, as well the struggles and personal transformation 
he experiences with his Cochlear implant, in the book, Rebuilt. 
 
A striking feature of Michael’s narrative post implant is his descriptions of 
himself as now part cyborg with an artificial bionic device which makes choices on 
his behalf and which fundamentally alters his experience of reality and the world. 
Michael writes:  
The essence of cyborgness is the presence of software that makes if-then-else 
decisions and acts on the body to carry them out. … [A] real cyborg technology 
exerts control of some kind over the body. A pacemaker is a cyborg technology, 
because it steps in to regulate heart function when it senses defibrillation. This 
kind of control gets at the heart, so to speak, of what it means to be a cyborg: to 
have cybernetic, meaning “algorithmic and automated,” control of the organism. But 
pacemakers and cochlear implants are very different kinds of cyborg technologies. 
A pacemaker regulates the pump that keeps your body going, and as long as it 
works, your life is what it was before. You can forget about it. … When the 
control is over your senses, however, you can never forget about it. You are living 
in a new version of reality.60 
What could this ascription of cyborg mean about the role of the Cochlear for 
Chorost, for his understanding of himself and his agency? Does it challenge 
questions of autonomy? Do the choices reflect Chorost or the implant? 
 
Chorost describes the implant as different to himself and also that it affects 
him (it makes choices for him and produces his experience of reality). He does not 
have to be conscious of it, but it makes him, as he remarks, a different kind of self. 
This raises questions such as: What is it to be a self? What role does the implant 
play in who he is? What is it to be a person and not a cyborg (and not a robot)? 
Chorost describes himself as differently human with a different body. What about 
the impact of the device on the capacity to have certain experiences? And how 
does he integrate this experience of reality into his sense of who he is? 
                                            
59 For Dubiel’s account, see: Helmut Dubiel, Deep in the Brain: Living With Parkinson’s Disease 
(New York: Europa Editions, 2009). 
60 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 40-41. 
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1.5.c Mr Garrison  
 
Mr Garrison is a fictional character in a series of hypothetical case studies 
concerning brain disorders which raise philosophical issues about personal 
identity.61 Mr Garrison, a 61 year old hard-working military engineer and 
dedicated family member, has been treated with DBS for both the motor 
symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease, as well as a related apathy syndrome. Whilst 
the treatment has had the expected positive outcome of minimising the tremors, it 
has also had the unexpected outcome of contributing to radical changes in his 
behaviour, beliefs and character traits. Mr Garrison, prior to the DBS treatment, 
was shy and introverted, post treatment he became gregarious and extroverted, 
seeking to dominate conversation and be the centre of attention. Previously, a 
loyal Republican party member, post DBS treatment, Mr Garrison became a 
Democrat member, attaching himself to various social movements and causes. He 
later quits his job without consulting with his wife and directs their charity 
donations, without her consent, to the various environmental and social causes to 
which he now commits most of his time.  
 
Whilst Mr Garrison endorses these changes in his characteristics and values, 
his wife views the implant as the source of these changes, and views his new self as 
alien to Mr Garrison - his ‘new’ desires, traits and behaviour are seen as the result 
of the implant and not as autonomously chosen. Direct manipulation is often 
criticised as a means of changing minds in contrast to indirect means, such as 
rational persuasion. Do the conceptual issues raised by the device challenge 
conceptions of autonomy as free rational choice? We therefore need to explain 
further whether this threatens, on face value, the choice to have the implant. Mr 
Garrison agreed to/consented to DBS for Parkinson’s Disease but what he ended 
up with is a set of new values, characteristics and beliefs. This suggests that even if 
he chose the treatment he didn’t consent to brain washing. Moreover, some have 
interpreted the extent of the changes as threatening Mr Garrison’s identity. What 
does it mean to say that his identity is threatened by the neural implant? How 
should we understand claims about him being a different person?  
 
                                            
61 See Debra J.H. Mathews, Hilary Bok, and Peter V. Rabins, eds. Personal Identity & Fractured 
Selves: Perspectives on Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 2009). In the theoretical case study of Mr Garrison the respondents are asked to address the 
question of whether Mr Garrison is the same or a different person. This hypothetical case study 
parallels some of the patients’ experiences raised by Schüpbach and colleagues, particularly the 
example of the husband who describes DBS as awakening from a slumber, whilst his wife 
expresses the sentiment that she does not recognise her husband anymore, see: Schüpbach, 
Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed Mind in a Repaired 
Body?”.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
  
These first-personal accounts raise phenomena that we should make sense of - 
that is, claims to being a different person or no longer the same person, and in 
some cases restoration of their sense of self.  I argue that an adequate account of 
selfhood to address the concerns raised by the first-personal accounts of implant 
recipients is one that can support our practical concerns about identity, agency 
and autonomy. Further I argue that a narrative, embodied and relational account 
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2. Practical Identity: Who are you?  
Locating the threat to identity from neural implants 
in practical identity 
 
‘I feel like a new person’; ‘I don’t know who I am anymore’; ‘She’s a different person’; ‘I 
don’t feel like myself anymore’; ‘I haven’t found myself again after the operation.’ 
 
In this chapter, in order to develop my argument that a relational embodied 
approach to narrative agency and autonomy provides resources for understanding 
the impacts of neural implants on a person’s identity, I inquire into the sense of 
personal identity at stake in the accounts of first personal change discussed in the 
last chapter. I argue that the sense of identity raised in these accounts is practical 
identity, which concerns our characteristics and traits, and not metaphysical 
identity, and that any adequate account of identity of persons requires an 
adequate account of characterisation across change in order to address the 
concerns raised by the accounts regarding implant recipients’ experiences.  I 
further argue that any adequate approach to practical identity must take into 
account the role of embodiment and the social context in constituting who I am. 
The embodied relational approach shows that who I am - a coherent identity - is 
an achievement of an integrated bodily perspective and that subjectivity is 
interpersonal.    
 
This approach locates the potential threat to personal identity consequent 
upon neural implants in practical identity - to our agential continuity, to our 
conception of who we are and our ability to act out of these self-conceptions. This 
can challenge our ability to formulate an integrated bodily perspective, as well as 
challenging the relation between our actions and reasons.  
 
In the first section I locate the descriptions of first-personal change and claims 
of changes to identity within the philosophical literature concerning different 
questions about personal identity. I show that the descriptions of first-personal 
change concern questions about characterisation, which ask about who we are, 
and which some argue can be reduced to, or exhausted by, questions of 
reidentification, which ask about what we are.  
 
In the second section I criticise reductionist approaches to personal identity. I 
outline Derek Parfit’s reductionist view and the role of thought experiments in 
establishing this view. I then criticise this view using Christine Korsgaard and 
Paul Ricoeur to show that the first-personal perspective cannot be reduced to the 
third-personal perspective and that questions about practical identity cannot be 
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reduced to questions about our metaphysical identity. The practical unity of 
identity consists in agency, and cannot be reduced to impersonal causal 
interrelations. Moreover, this nonreductionist critique shows that metaphysical 
approaches to personal identity and change, by extrapolating from our 
embodiment and relation with others, are inappropriate, as well as uninformative, 
with respect to understanding the changes in identity with which I am interested.  
 
In the third section, I set out Korsgaard’s approach to practical identity as a 
self-conception. I then extend this approach, drawing on the work of Kim Atkins 
to argue that a practical approach to identity must account for the importance of 
embodiment and relationality in the constitution of our first-personal perspective 
and understanding of who we are. I set out an account of selfhood as tri-
perspectival, grounded in relational embodiment.  
 
In the final section I return to the accounts of first-personal change to 
demonstrate the resources that a practical identity approach offers in illuminating 
self-change consequent upon neural implants. This approach refigures the 
potential threat to identity as a threat to our practical identity and to our agential 
continuity - to our conception of who we are and our ability to act out of these 
self-conceptions. This changes the focus from whether I survive or not to what is 
the impact on my agency and activities of self-constitution.  
 
2.1. Personal Identity and Neural Implants 
 
In this section I show that the accounts of first-personal change reported 
following neural implants draw our attention to the nature and importance of the 
first-personal perspective in understanding self-change. The accounts describe 
changes in aspects of a person’s life - their characteristics, values and embodiment 
- and draw our attention to the importance of addressing questions about the 
“who” of personal identity. Some people describe becoming a “different” or “new” 
person following a neural implant. In what sense should we understand these 
claims? 
2.1.a  Accounts of first-personal change 
 
‘I feel like a new person’; ‘I don’t know who I am anymore’; ‘She’s a different person’; ‘I don’t 
feel like myself anymore’; ‘I haven’t found myself again after the operation.’ 
 
Michael Chorost describes the changes to his personal identity consequent 
upon his Cochlear implant. He describes, drawing on the theory of neural 
plasticity and neural reprogramming, how the implant mediates his perception of 
reality (by computationally controlling the relevant nerve endings), and the 
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experience of being reprogrammed by the Cochlear.  He describes the impacts on 
his subjective awareness of his body - he writes of ‘[l]iving in a different body, 
learning what it gives you’;62 about being in a ‘bizarre new body’63 and the post-
activation ‘new body I’ve found myself in’;64 and of his identity, he writes: ‘And 
now I am becoming something else: not inhuman, not posthuman, but differently 
human’.65 Following activation of his implant Chorost describes himself as part-
cyborg ‘with strings and wires hanging out’, ‘incomplete’ and ‘unfinished’; he 
writes ‘I had most definitely not reacquired my self’.66  
 
Chorost describes a journey of self-transformation, crediting his own 
experiences of his integration with the implant, as an achievement for him, as 
much as for the programmers and engineers who made the implant and wrote the 
computer program that Chorost claims has changed him so significantly. Chorost 
also describes being cut off from the world before receiving a (conventional) 
hearing aid in early life, and his awkward engagement with others, accompanied 
by the sense that he was missing out on things through his inability to engage in 
everyday activities. On the day he lost his hearing completely, and prior to 
implantation with the Cochlear, Chorost writes: ‘All I know is that my ear died, 
and I fell’.67 Following the surgery to fit his implant Chorost describes himself in 
terms of being ‘switched on’.68 Chorost also describes the different things he can 
do in his ‘new’ body, such as talk on the telephone and participate in 
conversations, as well as changes in his personality and relations with others, such 
as a renewed sense of confidence and a renewed interest in socialising and forming 
intimate relationships. 
 
The study by Schüpbach et al of patients treated for Parkinson’s Disease with 
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) shows that despite significant improvements in 
motor control, some patients experience problems, which Schüpbach et al 
describe as problems of  ‘psycho-social adjustment’ including significant changes 
in the patients’ perceptions of themselves, their embodiment, as well as in their 
relations with family and in their professional lives.69 Schüpbach et al present the 
following examples: A female journalist who expressed hope that the DBS would 
help her continue her life and important projects, who, following the treatment, 
reports a loss of vitality - she is quoted as saying she has lost interest in her work, 
family and life. She notes that fighting Parkinson’s Disease gave her life meaning. 
                                            
62 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 48. 
63 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 55. 
64 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 54. 
65 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 33. 
66 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 83. 
67 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 69. 
68 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 53. 
69 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1811. 
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She says: ‘Now I feel like a machine, I’ve lost my passion. I don’t recognize myself 
anymore’.70 In contrast, another patient, following DBS treatment, describes 
feeling renewed confidence and interest in life describing himself as having being 
‘asleep’ prior to the treatment. He says: ‘During all these years of illness, I was 
asleep. Now I am stimulated, stimulated to lead a different life’.71 His wife 
however finds her husband’s new interests and behaviour difficult to understand 
and accommodate. She says she prefers him as his was before - ‘nice and docile’.72  
 
Similar issues are picked up in the fictional case study of Mr Garrison, whose 
characteristics, values and motivations change radically following DBS. While 
endorsed by Mr Garrison, the change in his identity leads to marital conflict with 
his wife, who is bewildered by the change and no longer recognises the man he 
has become. She finds it difficult to see the change in her husband’s characteristics 
as his own, but rather as caused by the implant. 
2.1.b Questions of personal identity  
 
In this section, I differentiate four distinct, yet interrelated, questions 
concerning personal identity. These inquire after the conditions for personhood; 
the criteria for individuation and for reidentification; and, the characteristics that 
identify an individual. I introduce and outline the claim that there has been a 
tendency in mainstream analytic philosophy to ignore questions of 
characterisation and/or to treat descriptions of changes in characteristics as 
metaphorical claims about identity change. 
Amélie Rorty outlines four questions that arise when philosophers reflect on 
personal identity: questions of “class differentiation”; “individual differentiation” 
(or “the problem of individuation”); “individual reidentification”; and “individual 
identification”.73 Rorty outlines these questions as follows. Class differentiation 
                                            
70 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
71 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
72 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”, 1812. 
73 Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “Introduction,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 1-2. Mackenzie identifies the same four 
types of questions concerning personal identity. Mackenzie labels these as: the conditions for 
personhood and class differentiation; individuation and reidentification; and, Characterisation. 
Catriona Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” in Practical Identity and Narrative 
Agency, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Atkins (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), 1. 
Eric Olson identifies eight questions concerning personal identity, see Eric T. Olson, “Personal 
Identity,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2010). I draw on Rorty 
and Mackenzie because they emphasis identifying questions of characterisation on their own terms 
and set out the four different types of questions in the context of an argument that these types of 
questions have been construed as metaphysical, and that questions of characterisation are 
conflated with questions of reidentification. 
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asks: ‘What distinguishes the class of persons from their nearest neighbors, from 
baboons, robots, human corpses, corporations?’; Individual differentiation asks: 
‘What are the criteria for the numerical distinctness of persons who have the same 
general description?’; Individual reindentification asks: ‘What are the criteria for 
reidentifying the same individual in different contexts, under different 
descriptions, or at different times?’; and, Individual identification asks: ‘What 
sorts of characteristics identify a person as essentially the person she is, such that if 
those characteristics were changed, she would be a significantly different person, 
though she might still be differentiated and reidentified as the same?’74 
 
The first question asks about the conditions for personhood and class 
differentiation: ‘What makes a being a person, as distinct from some other kind of 
entity?’75 For example, is it consciousness that distinguishes persons from 
animals? John Locke defined a person as ‘a thinking intelligent Being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as it self, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places’.76 This type of question might be asked, and becomes 
salient, in a bioethical context in cases of advanced dementia. In such cases, we 
might say that the person has gone; this bears on questions of advance directives, 
for example. 
 
The second and third questions are connected - they ask about “numerical 
identity” or sameness. Numerical identity is often contrasted with qualitative 
identity. Numerical identity is concerned with identity in the sense of being one 
and the same thing. Qualitative identity is concerned with identity in the sense of 
being perfectly similar – that all properties are in common. For example, two dogs 
of the same kind, for example, both Jack Russells could be described as 
qualitatively identical. Qualitative resemblance implies that many properties are in 
common. Dogs of different kinds, for example, my Jack Russell dog and my 
neighbour’s kelpie resemble each other, but are not qualitatively identical. 
Numerical identity, in contrast, requires absolute sameness - it is the logical 
relation that can hold only between a thing and itself. These questions ask about 
when we say of two occurrences of the one thing, that they are one and the same 
thing.77 The question of individuation, when applied to persons, asks: ‘Which 
criteria are relevant in determining whether one individual should be counted as 
                                            
74 Rorty, “Introduction,” 1-2. 
75 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 1. 
76 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
Book II, ch 27, Sec 9, 335. 
77 Parfit distinguishes qualitative and numerical identity as follows: ‘There are two kinds of 
sameness, or identity. … [T]wo white billiard balls are not numerically but may be qualitatively 
identical. If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it 
was. But the red ball that I later see and the white ball that I painted red are numerically identical. 
They are one and the same ball.’ Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), 201. 
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the same or as a different person from another individual who is qualitatively 
identical or extremely similar?’78 The question of reidentification, when applied to 
persons, asks: ‘[O]n what basis should we reidentify a person as numerically the 
same despite qualitative differences over time, or under different descriptions?’79 
A change in numerical identity would mean literally going out of existence and 
becoming another thing, or person, i.e. becoming someone else, something else, or 
dying. The fact that these questions are distinct is demonstrated for example 
through consideration of a person with advanced dementia. We may say they have 
ceased to be a person but this does not imply that the individual entity that has 
dementia has ceased to exist.  
 
The fourth question focuses on a person’s characteristics, including, for 
example, the character traits, values, beliefs, bodily and mental capacities, as well 
as the social and family commitments, that make a person who they are, such that 
a change in those characteristics, might motivate the claim she is a different 
person, despite being numerically the same. This question asks:  
Which characteristics (character traits, motivations, values, mental and bodily 
capacities and dispositions, emotional attachments, commitments, memories, and 
so on) make a person the particular person that she is?’ And when might 
significant change to these characteristics warrant the judgment, whether by the 
person herself or by others, that she is a different or no longer the same person 
even if numerically she is the same?80  
The focus on characteristics is more similar to Locke’s understanding of 
forensic identity.81 This form of identity involves a relation of attribution. Locke’s 
concern here, unlike in the concern about the category of personhood above, is to 
provide an account of how we can hold someone responsible for their actions, and 
also be rewarded or punished for those actions.  
 
Rorty states that whilst these questions concerning personal identity are 
distinguishable, a solution to one will influence, though probably not dictate, a 
solution to the others. Rorty further remarks that there has been a tendency in 
mainstream analytic philosophy to think that questions concerning our 
characteristics can be settled through reference to criteria for individual 
reidentification. This amounts to taking the claims about changes in characteristics 
as qualitative changes, changes that are to be understood as metaphorical. That is, 
the person is numerically the same, but they say they are now a different person 
following a traumatic incident, for example. This is not a contradictory statement, 
rather people are understood as expressing a change in their qualitative identity. 
Parfit demonstrates this understanding, when he writes: 
                                            
78 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 1. 
79 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 1. 
80 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 1. 
81 For Locke’s discussion of forensic identity see Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Book II, Sec 26, 346-7. 
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We might say, of someone, ‘After his accident, he is no longer the same person’. 
This is a claim about both kinds of identity. We claim that he, the same person, is 
not now the same person. This is not a contradiction. We merely mean that this 
person’s character has changed. This numerically identical person is now 
qualitatively different.  
When we are concerned about our future, it is our numerical identity that we are 
concerned about. I may believe that, after my marriage, I shall not be the same 
person. But this does not make marriage death. However much I change, I shall 
still be alive if there will be some person living who will be me.82 
Rorty argues however that questions about change in individual identification 
or characteristics cannot be reduced to the conditions for reidentification, because 
it is the person’s perspective or self-understanding of the change that matters in 
this domain: that is, whether the individual in question identifies with herself or her 
preferences as those of a continuous self. As Rorty writes: 
Defining the conditions for individual identification does not reduce to specifying 
conditions for reidentification because the characteristics that distinguish or 
reidentify persons (e.g., fingerprints, DNA codes, or memories) may not be 
thought by the individual herself or by her society to determine her real identity. 
For instance, it might be possible that an individual be considered reidentifiable 
by the memory criterion, but not be considered identifiable as the same person 
because all that she considered essential had changed: her principles and 
preference rankings were different, her tastes, plans, hopes, and fears. She 
remembered her old principles of choice well enough and so, by the memory 
criterion, might consider herself the same old person; but by grace or reeducation 
she could be counted on to choose and act in a new way.83 
Rorty notes that answers to the question about criteria for individual 
reidentification by the philosophers she is criticising analyse the conditions of 
temporal reidentification, trying to define conditions for distinguishing successive 
stages of a continuing person from stages of a successor or descendent person. I 
will have more to say about reidentification and reidentification theorists below in 
section 2.2.a. 
 
Schechtman also distinguishes between different, yet related, questions 
concerning personal identity, and like Rorty, she argues that conceptually 
significant questions about changes in characteristics cannot be reduced to, or 
exhausted by, specifying the criteria for individual reidentification.84 In The 
Constitution of Selves, Schechtman contrasts questions of reidentification and 
questions of characterisation. Questions of reidentification ask ‘what it means to 
say that a person a t2 is the same person as a person at t1’.85 This inquiry is 
concerned with the logical relation which every object bears to itself and to 
                                            
82 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201-02. 
83 Rorty, “Introduction,” 2. 
84 Both Schechtman and Rorty challenge the framing of debates about personal identity in 
terms of a choice between physiological and biological continuity approaches. They both argue 
that these approaches fail to distinguish between different questions about personal identity, that 
this undermines the debates, and leads to endless or ceaseless fighting without the possibility of a 
resolution. 
85 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 73. 
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nothing else. Questions of characterisation ask ‘what it means to say that a 
particular characteristic is that of a given person’.86 This inquiry is concerned with 
the logical relation of attribution. The question of characterisation asks which 
actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on are to be 
attributed to a given person. Importantly, argues Schechtman, questions of 
characterisation speak to our practical concerns with identity - concerns related to 
our survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation. 
Schechtman calls these practical concerns the “four concerns” or “four features” of 
our existence. Schechtman, like Rorty, argues that questions of characterisation 
cannot be reduced to questions of reidentification - they are not variants of the 
same question, because something conceptually significant about personhood is 
left out of these reductive moves. Schechtman argues that these questions - 
reidentification and characterisation, belong to different domains with different 
foci. Answers to questions of characterisation, including the four features 
identified above, come in degrees, whereas questions of reidentification require an 
all or nothing answer. Characterisation questions, then, allow for changes that do 
not indicate a change in what a person is, but rather a change in the properties 
that the person has, including properties relevant to determining responsibility for 
actions. These questions are related though - that is, ‘[T]he question of whether 
action A is attributable to person P is obviously intimately connected to the 
question of whether P is the same person as the person who performed A’.87 
Schechtman proposes a solution to the relation between questions of 
characterisation and reidentification, which I discuss in the following section. 
Moreover, Schechtman uses the distinction between these two understandings to 
develop her narrative self-constitution account as an answer to the 
characterisation question, which I outline and defend in the following chapter. 
 
The characterisation question, argues Schechtman, concerns the kind of 
identity that is at issue in an identity crisis. Schechtman writes:  
In an identity crisis, a person is unsure about what those defining features are, 
and so is unsure of his identity. The characterization question seeks a means of 
resolving this kind of uncertainty and determining which characteristics 
constitute a person’s identity.88 
However, despite their everyday practical significance, Schechtman notes that 
questions related to characterisation have not generally been considered by 
analytic philosophers in discussions of personal identity. 
 
By clearly distinguishing questions of characterisation from questions of 
reidentification, Schechtman draws our attention to the “Who” of personal 
identity. Schechtman notes that characterisation questions can be asked from 
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87 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 77. 
88 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 74. 
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either a first- or third-person perspective. Schechtman draws on examples from 
literature, including Nora’s revelation at the end of A Doll’s House when she realises 
that the person she has presented to the world is a ‘sham’, a product of the 
expectations of society and not of her own making and direction.89 Schechtman 
also draws on examples from everyday life, for example, the wife who finds out 
she has lived with a killer and asks: Who are you? Or in less sensational 
circumstances, the woman who is ruthless at work, but a loving wife and mother 
at home, and asks: Who is she, or who is she really? The loving wife or the 
ruthless opponent?90  
2.1.c Questions of personal identity and accounts of first-personal 
change 
 
Which questions concerning personal identity are raised by the first-personal 
accounts of self change by patients following a neural implant? Do they raise 
questions about the conditions for personhood, such that changes to these 
conditions might mean that they have become nonpersons? Our accounts of Mr 
Chorost, Mr Robbins or the fictitious Mr Garrison do not seem to be discussing 
the difference between personhood and non-personhood. Whilst Chorost’s 
description of himself as part cyborg does seem to touch upon this, Chorost’s 
quote in which he describes himself as ‘differently human’ but not ‘inhuman’ or 
‘posthuman’ suggests that Chorost dismisses the change as a change in category, 
rather he wants to focus on the impact of self-transformation. Do they raise 
questions about changes to numerical identity such that changes would warrant 
the claim that they have gone out of existence and/or become a new metaphysical 
entity? Again, our cases don’t seem to be saying this either, despite claims that 
they feel like a different person.  
 
Rather, the accounts describe changes in a person’s characteristics - their 
values, desires, or embodied engagement with the world from their first-personal 
perspective (or from the perspectives of those that are close to them) and as a 
result of changes to these characteristics they feel like a different, or no longer the 
same, person and might warrant the statement from others: ‘She’s a different 
person’, even though they are numerically the same. They show that some 
characteristics matter more to us than others and that these play a role in why we 
do the things we do.  
 
And what about the relation between these questions? Do questions of 
characterisation reduce to questions of reidentification? If it is reduction then the 
claims about identity change consequent upon neural implants can and should be 
                                            
89 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 74. 
90 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 75. 
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taken as merely metaphorical - they are not claims about “real” identity change, 
but merely linguistic expressions for reflecting on feelings as changes in their 
“qualitative identity”. In order to explore the characterisation question further, 
and the relationship to questions of reidentification, I now turn to philosophical 
critiques of metaphysical reductionist approaches to personal identity by 




This section has shown that we can ask different questions concerning 
personal identity. We can ask about the conditions of personhood; the criteria for 
individuation and reidentification and we can ask questions related to 
characterisation. The descriptions of self-change however mainly focus on changes 
concerning characteristics, desires, values and embodiment, that is, about ‘who’ 
the person is and the significance of these changes in their self-understanding and 
so seem to mainly relate to questions of characterisation, though there are some 
issues or concerns that may speak to the conditions of personhood (e.g. 
cyborgness).  Any adequate account of identity should be able to properly account 
for changes in characterisation in order to explain the accounts of self-change 
people express following a neural implant. 
 
2.2. Practical Identity  
 
As noted in the section above, philosophical engagement with questions of 
personal identity has tended to treat questions of personal identity reductively, in 
terms of questions of reidentification. In this section, in order to show that 
questions of characterisation can “stand on their own”, I argue for recognition of 
the irreducibility of the first-personal perspective to questions about personal 
identity, and for the practical necessity of the deliberative standpoint. This shifts 
our focus from questions of ‘what I am’ to ‘who I am’. This helps to develop my 
argument that practical identity is at stake and not metaphysical identity in the 
accounts of first-personal change consequent upon neural implants. Further, an 
adequate account of identity of persons requires an account of characterisation 
across change in order to address the concerns raised by recipients of neural 
implants. I show that questions of characterisation cannot be reduced to questions 
of reidentification, and further, reductionist approaches ask us to extrapolate or 
strip away our embodied social relations with others and so occlude what is 
important in the first-personal accounts of change consequent upon neural 
implants.  
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Firstly, I introduce mainstream approaches to questions of personal identity - 
psychological and biological continuity approaches, identifying their main 
assumptions. I then present Parfit’s reductionist conclusion that personal identity 
is ‘not what matters’. Drawing on Korsgaard’s and Ricoeur’s critiques of Parfit, I 
argue that questions concerning the first-personal perspective cannot be reduced 
to the third-personal perspective; rather, the first-personal perspective and 
practical standpoint are irreducible. These nonreductionist critiques show that 
identity cannot be reduced to a set of distinct, causally related time-slices which 
can explain a person’s identity without reference to the individual (and that in 
specifying the unity relation we have specified a person’s life), rather, personal 
continuity is better understood in terms of the continuity and unity of the agent 
acting from a deliberative standpoint.  
2.2.a Approaches to personal identity 
 
In the section above (2.1.b), I identified several distinct, yet interrelated 
concerns, raised by questions about personal identity. Rorty and Schechtman 
distinguish these questions within the context of 20th Century debates in personal 
identity dominated by the Anglo-American analytic approach, which adopts a 
metaphysical approach to the questions of identity, sometimes called the “standard 
picture”. This approach takes the question of identity to concern the numerical 
persistence of objects—how a single entity persists through change. Personal 
identity is framed as the more specific question of how a person persists through 
change.  As Schechtman writes:  
Contemporary philosophers of personal identity in the analytic tradition place 
their concern about personal identity within the context of more general worries 
about the identity conditions of changing objects over time—the ship of Theseus 
is replaced plank by plank, the acorn becomes a mighty oak, and persons change 
both physically and psychologically. The general problem then is the metaphysical 
question of how a single entity persists through change. The more specific 
question is the question of how a single person does.91 
 
As Schechtman explains, this metaphysical understanding frames the 
reidentification question which aims to specify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for identity, such that we can say what it is that makes someone the 
same person at two separate times. Schechtman identifies these claims as follows: 
Put most simply, the goal of contemporary personal identity theorists is to provide 
a criterion of personal identity over time. … Their question is metaphysical, not 
epistemological; they want to tell us not just how we know when we have one and 
the same person at two different times, but what makes someone the same person 
at those two times.92 
                                            
91 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 7. 
92 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 7-8. For an example of this view, see Parfit: ‘Many 
writers use the ambiguous phrase ‘the criterion of identity over time’. Some mean by this ‘our way 
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Schechtman offers a general description of ‘the reidentification theorists’ goal 
as that of providing a criterion of personal identity that defines the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for saying that a person-stage at t2 and a person-stage at t1 
are stages of the same person’.93 Moreover, reidentification theorists take 
themselves to be addressing the fundamental problem of philosophical identity; if 
they are correct, then it is expected that their approach will capture all our basic 
intuitions about personal identity. This general approach, Schechtman argues, has 
lead to one of the most intractable debates in the literature - between those 
arguing that personal identity consists in bodily continuity and those arguing that 
personal identity consists in psychological continuity.  Bodily continuity theorists 
argue that personal identity should be defined in terms of the continuation of a 
single human body. 
[B]odily continuity theorists hold that bodily continuity is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for continuity of personal identity, even despite radical 
psychological changes, for example, loss of memory or marked changes of 
personality and character. Thus person A at an earlier time t1 is the same as 
person B at a later time t2 if B is the same bodily continuant as A, by virtue of 
having enough of the same functioning brain and/or body or being the same 
human animal.94 
Psychological continuity theorists argue that personal identity should be 
defined in terms of the continuation of a single psychological life, i.e. in terms of 
psychological connections between person-stages at different times.  
[P]sychological continuity theorists hold that a person A at an earlier time t1 is 
the same as person B at a later time t2 by virtue of the right kinds of psychological 
connections holding between A and B, for example that B remembers doing or 
experiencing things that A did or experienced, acts on intentions formed by A, 
exhibits traits of character, personality and temperament that are sufficiently 
similar to those of A, and so on.95 
 
Continuity theorists use thought experiments, which ask us to imagine, from a 
first- or third-personal point of view, radical physical or psychological changes to 
persons brought about via bizarre science-fiction technologies, in order to decide 
the appropriate criterion for personal identity. The thought experiments function 
as puzzle or exception cases to test our intuitions concerning whether it is bodily 
or psychological continuity. Normally we associate a person with one (and only 
                                                                                                                           
of telling whether some present object is identical with some past object’. But I shall mean what this 
identity necessarily involves, or consists in.’ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 202. 
93 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 12. 
94 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 3. Mackenzie cites Bernard Williams 
as an exemplar of bodily continuity theories, see: Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973) and Eric Olson as a proponent of the animalist variant of this 
theory, see: Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity with Psychology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
95 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 3. Mackenzie includes the following 
as exemplars of the psychological continuity view: David Lewis “Survival and Identity,” 
Philosophical Papers, Vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); John Perry, Personal Identity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984). 
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one body); we think of people as human beings. Bodily continuity theorists take it 
that we are essentially human beings. However, psychological continuity theorists 
argue that whilst we normally associate people with their body, personal identity 
concerning our psychological continuity can come apart from human identity, and 
when this happens this shows that we are essentially persons. We can think of 
ourselves as human beings and as persons. Whilst we normally understand a 
person and a body go together, the thought experiments show how they can come 
apart.  An early version of this argument is found in Locke’s mind swap thought 
experiment. The thought experiments used vary, however an original one can be 
found in Locke.96 Locke asks us to imagine the case where a Cobbler’s and 
Prince’s minds are swapped - the mind of the Prince enters the body of the 
sleeping Cobbler whose own mind departs. According to Locke the individual 
who wakes up is the same human being as the Cobbler but a different person - the 
Prince.  
For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s 
past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobbler as soon as deserted by his own 
Soul, everyone sees he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable 
only for the Prince’s Actions.97 
 On the psychological account, if your mind were transplanted into a new 
body, you would think of this as getting a new body rather than somebody else 
getting a new mind. So, identity goes with the mind in transplants. Our intuitions 
show that a single person can inhabit more than one body. Locke’s solution is to 
propose that personal identity tracks psychological continuity. On a biological 
account, he would remain the Cobbler as he is the same human being. So, identity 
goes with the body and not the mind in these thought experiments.  
 
Schechtman acknowledges the intuitive appeal of both bodily and 
psychological continuity approaches. In everyday practice, a person is identified 
with one and only one body; we observe people’s actions and behaviours and 
reidentify people by reidentifying them with their bodies, for example, we might 
look for a scar to identify the person with the human being/body before us.98 The 
psychological continuity approach however, by focussing on psychological 
continuity, pays attention to psychological aspects of identity that we value, and 
the practices based around these, which become particularly salient in cases of 
advanced dementia, for example. Despite the intuitive appeal of both, Schechtman 
                                            
96 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch XXVII, 340. I recognise that 
Locke’s discussion takes place in the context of being held responsible at the Resurrection and so 
involves concern for who will be held responsible and to whom actions will be attributed. Whilst I 
will not be concerned with Resurrection per se, I will have more to say about Locke’s concerns 
with attribution, and how we should understand the relation between attribution and identity, 
below. 
97 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch XXVII, 340. 
98 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 130. 
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concludes however that both share a fundamental methodological problem which 
proves their efforts futile. Schechtman writes:  
The goal contemporary reidentification theorists have set for themselves—
providing a reidentification criterion for persons that captures the relation 
between identity and the four features—survival, moral responsibility, self-
interested concern, and compensation—is incoherent and ultimately impossible to 
meet. This has led some reidentification theorists to conclude that the relation we 
assume in our daily commerce between identity and the four features is illusory. I 
have suggested that this conclusion is too hasty—no reidentification criterion can 
capture the four features, but that does not mean that there is no identity theory 
of any kind that can. The intuitive connection we make between identity and the 
four features can be vindicated and understood if we recognize that the question 
of personal identity is not monolithic, and that our intuitions linking identity to 
the four features arise not in the context of questions of reidentification, but 
rather in the context of questions of characterization.99 
Schechtman argues that the reidentification project is incoherent because it 
tries to answer the characterisation question with reference to the reidentification 
question, but each has a different logical form and demands a different kind of 
answer. By addressing questions that are properly questions of characterisation, in 
terms of the criteria for reidentification, both biological and psychological 
continuity approaches are unable to explain the continuity of identity. Focussing 
on psychological approaches Schechtman demonstrates that the well-known 
problems concerning transitivity and branching result from attempting to meet the 
constraints of the reidentification question.100 In contrast, Schechtman argues that 
the solution is to understand that both questions speak to our intuitions about 
identity - the characterisation question addresses concerns about personal identity, 
the practical question, and the reidentification questions about human identity, the 
metaphysical question.101 My aim here has been to draw attention to Schechtman’s 
claim that these questions have been conflated in the analytic literature using 
thought experiments, I will return to Schechtman’s analysis of this conflation in 
the following chapter, through her argument that questions of characterisation are 
best answered via a narrative approach to identity.   
 
Mackenzie identifies four interconnecting assumptions underpinning much of 
the analytic debate on personal identity, concerning whether bodily continuity or 
psychological continuity is the correct criterion for continuity of personal 
identity.102 These assumptions are: 
The first is that the relation between person A at t1 and person B at t2 is a logical 
relation of identity. The second is that our fundamental interest in continuity of 
personal identity over time is primarily an interest in continuity of numerical 
                                            
99 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 73. 
100 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 26ff. 
101 Schechtman’s solution mobilises the distinction between human being and person, in a 
similar way to how Locke distinguishes between man or human as a biological category and person 
as a forensic or moral concept. 
102 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 3. 
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identity.103 The third is that the concept “person” is structured around a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain for its correct application. 
The fourth is the reductionist assumption that what makes for continuity of 
personal identity over time is the causal connections between distinct temporal 
parts or stages of the person and that these connections can be described without 
reference to the first-person perspective.104 
 
As Mackenzie notes a number of theorists have questioned some or all of these 
assumptions. In what follows, I focus on the reductionist assumption and its 
conclusion that we can explain a person and the continuity of their life without 
reference to the first-personal perspective. I focus on reductionism because it is 
presented as the only methodological alternative to nonreductionism (understood 
as the idea that there is some non-material essence or soul that provides a person 
with continuous identity through change). Secondly, Parfit’s claim that numerical 
(of one’s body) identity is not essential to survival, gives us a way to critique his 
understanding of embodiment, which I do in section 2.3 drawing on Atkins’ 
account of practical identity.  
2.2.b Parfit - an impersonal account 
 
‘Personal identity is not what matters.’105   
 
In this section I outline Parfit’s reductionist view and his use of thought 
experiments, namely those involving Replicas and teletransportation, in 
establishing his conclusions. I also outline the implications of these views for 
personal identity and the first personal perspective. I briefly outline Parfit’s own 
psychological account and solution to the thought experiment; however, my main 
aim is to outline his reductionist methodology which proposes an impersonal 
description of psychological continuity, in which the first-person perspective is not 
required.  
 
Parfit proposes a reductionist or impersonal approach to questions of personal 
identity. This approach claims that we can give a complete description of the facts 
of a person’s life - whether relating to a psychological or bodily criterion, without 
explicitly claiming that persons exist. For Parfit, the unity of a person’s life is 
constituted by impersonally describable causal interrelations. Parfit argues that a 
reductionist view makes two claims:  
[T]he fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain 
more particular facts … [and] these facts can be described without either 
presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that the 
                                            
103 Although, as Mackenzie notes, and as I will be discussing in this section, this assumption is 
not shared by Parfit, who argues that numerical identity does not matter. Mackenzie, “Practical 
Identity and Narrative Agency,” 24 fn.4. 
104 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 3-4. 
105 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 217. 
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experiences in this person’s life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming 
that this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal way.106 
For Parfit what makes for continuity over time is not numerical identity, but 
the causal connections between distinct temporal parts or stages of the person, 
whether or not brought about by numerical identity. Moreover, these connections 
can be explained from a third-personal perspective, without reference to the first-
personal perspective.  
 
Parfit argues that the only alternative to his reductionism is non-reductionism, 
which assumes a “further fact” about identity. This further fact is a Rationalist 
commitment to the self or person as some kind of special entity, something over 
and above one’s body and brain. This assumption is compared by Parfit to the 
notion of a Cartesian ego or a spiritual substance. Parfit writes: 
Many Non-Reductionists believe that we are separately existing entities. On this 
view, personal identity over time does not just consist in physical and/or 
psychological continuity. It involves a further fact. A person is a separately 
existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences. On the best-
known version of this view, a person is a purely mental entity: a Cartesian Pure 
Ego, or spiritual substance.107 
Using a Kantian inspired critique Parfit argues that this rationalist notion of 
the self is an illusion, that there is no ‘I’ over and above our experiences. So, 
argues Parfit, Reductionism follows: 
On the Reductionist View, each person’s existence just involves the existence of a 
brain and body, the doing of certain deeds, the thinking of certain thoughts, the 
occurrence of certain experiences, and so on.108 
 
Whilst Parfit argues the Reductionist view is shared by proponents of both the 
biological and psychological criterion approaches, he endorses a psychological 
continuity approach. Parfit writes:  
Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R—psychological connectedness and/or 
psychological continuity—with the right kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does 
not take a branching form, holding between one person and two different future people.109 
  
Parfit’s solution involves denying that numerical identity matters110, he argues 
that it is qualitative identity that matters to survival, and not numerical identity.111  
                                            
106 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210. 
107 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210. Parfit also distinguishes the ‘Further Fact View’, another 
Non-Reductionist view which whilst it denies that we are separately existing entities, still asserts 
personal identity as a further fact, which does not consist in ‘just physical and/or psychological 
continuity.’ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210. 
108 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 211. 
109 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 216. Parfit argues both psychological and physical criteria 
approaches share the same reductionist assumptions, as set out the two reductionist claims above. 
‘On the Physical Criterion, personal identity over time just involves the physically continuous 
existence of enough of a brain so that it remains the brain of a living person. On the Psychological 
Criterion, personal identity over time just involves the various kids of psychological continuity, 
with the right kind of cause. These views are both Reductionist.’ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 209-10. 
  52 
Qualitative identity is achieved through strong connectedness of overlapping 
psychological states. Parfit’s thought experiments aim to show that numerical 
identity is not what matters to personal identity, and so personal identity is not 
what matters, but survival is what matters to us. Parfit argues that this conclusion 
has moral implications, namely the renunciation of the moral principle of self-
interest and the adoption of a sort of ‘quasi-buddhist’ effacement of identity. 
 
Parfit illustrates his argument with the use of thought experiments, which he 
says highlight some of the ways we commonly think about personal identity and 
our continued existence, as well as reveal the incoherence of those beliefs.112 These 
are beliefs about the self which presuppose a further assumption about persons. 
Here, I outline Parfit’s teletransportation and replication thought experiment.   
When I press the button, I shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at what 
seems a moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious for about an hour. 
The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the 
exact states of all of my cells. It will then transmit the information by radio. 
Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach the 
Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out of new matter, a brain and body 
exactly like mine. It will be in this body that I shall wake up.113 
Parfit describes this example as ‘simple transportation’. In order to test our 
intuitions concerning numerical identity further, Parfit modifies the example. In 
the modified narrative a new Teletransporter is built which does not destroy my 
brain body at each time of teletransportation, but rather sends a blueprint to Mars 
for assembly. This allows the protagonist to see and speak with his Replica on 
Mars. A problem develops, however, when the scientists realise that the machine 
on Earth, whilst allowing for perfect replication, is destroying the person on 
Earth. The protagonist learns he will soon die from organ failure, but is told not to 
worry, because his Replica is fine.  
Since my Replica knows that I am about to die, he tries to console me with the 
same thoughts with which I recently tried to console a dying friend. It is sad to 
learn, on the receiving end, how unconsoling these thoughts are. My Replica then 
assures me that he will take up my life where I leave off. He loves my wife, and 
together they will care for my children. And he will finish the book that I am 
writing. Besides having all my drafts, he has all of my intentions. I must admit 
that he can finish my book as well as I could. All these facts console me a little. 
Dying when I know I shall have a Replica is not quite as bad as, simply, dying.114 
 
The question which arises here, in both cases of teletransportation is whether I 
survive as my replica; that is, whether, because we share a set of memories, 
experiences, desires and so on, I would invest in my future self (the replicant) the 
                                                                                                                           
110 Schechtman recognises that this move by Parfit solves problems of transitivity. We shall see 
in the following chapter that this is also Parfit’s way of addressing the charge of the extreme claim; 
a move which Schechtman argues fails. 
111 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201. 
112 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 200. 
113 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 199. 
114 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201. 
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same degree of concern that I would in my own future.115 Parfit’s view is that these 
thought experiments create puzzlement, for it is impossible to tell if I survive or 
not. As Ricoeur explains: 
The question at issue is whether in either case I survive in my replica. Clearly, the 
function of these puzzling cases is to create a situation such that it is impossible to 
decide whether I survive or not. The effect of the undecidability of the answer is 
to undermine the belief that identity, whether in the numerical sense or in the 
sense of permanence in time, must always be (able to be) determined. If the 
answer is undecidable, says Parfit, that is because the question itself is empty. The 
conclusion then follows: identity is not what matters.116 
If it is impossible to determine this is problematic for numerical identity which 
must be determinate. This puzzlement belies a faulty logic in our thinking about 
personal identity.117 And this stems from the further fact view - the assumption 
that the person or self is some kind of special entity, something over and above 
one’s body. The further fact view is untenable because it allows for the possibility 
of the duplication of my identity in another body.  From this it follows that the 
belief in a determinate identity, or self, is an illusion (the first-personal self is ‘no 
self’). So, for Parfit, the question of personal identity is empty, and therefore 
‘identity is not what matters’.  
2.2.c Korsgaard - the irreducibility of the first-person perspective  
 
Korsgaard argues, in contrast to Parfit’s reductionist conclusion, that the first-
person perspective is irreducible and for the necessity of the practical standpoint. 
Korsgaard provides an agency-based response to Parfit which argues that the 
unity of a person’s life is constituted by the activity of one’s agency. For 
Korsgaard the question of personal identity is a practical and not a metaphysical 
matter, and it concerns what a person (as an agent) does, and not what she is. In 
contrast to Parfit, Korsgaard draws on Kant’s conception of practical agency to 
explain the unity and continuity of life.  
 
Korsgaard argues that Parfit’s presentation of a mutually exclusive 
methodological choice between reductionism and Cartesianism (the further fact 
view) is a false binary that only holds sway if we assume we must give a 
metaphysical account of identity118, that is in terms of discrete time-slices. 
                                            
115 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201-02. 
116 Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, ed. David 
Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), 194. 
117 Hume also argues that numerical identity is not the issue, rather it is our sense of 
psychological continuity that is important to personal identity. Parfit and Hume both argue that 
there is no such thing as personal identity, we just happen to be psychologically prone to attribute 
an enduring ‘I’ as the experiencer of the series of sensations and experiences that we have. As such, 
both Parfit and Hume reject the “further fact” view of personal identity. 
118 Korsgaard, Christine. “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to 
Parfit.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 101–32. See Cassam who argues that Parfit fails to 
distinguish two irreducible questions: “What, within a given mental life, underpins experience”? 
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Korsgaard agrees with Parfit’s critique of the ‘further fact view’; however she 
notes that whilst Parfit adopts Kant’s critique of Rationalism, he fails to follow 
through with Kant’s conclusions about the reflective nature of consciousness. So, 
although Parfit may show the further fact view (or rationalism) is problematic, he 
fails to establish the truth of reductionism.  
In contrast, Korsgaard adopts Kant’s claims about the reflective bi-
perspectival nature of consciousness to establish the necessity of a practical 
identity. Korsgaard’s understanding of the reflective bi-perspectival nature of 
consciousness follows Kant in distinguishing two different standpoints from which 
we can view ourselves: a theoretical standpoint or third person perspective, and a 
practical standpoint or first-personal perspective. From the theoretical standpoint, 
or third-personal perspective, we adopt an ‘outside’ perspective and ask about 
what something is - we view ourselves as objects of theoretical understanding, for 
example, by asking for a causal explanation of things. From the practical 
standpoint, or first-person perspective, we adopt a perspective from the ‘inside’ 
and ask what it is to be a self. From the practical standpoint, we view ourselves as 
agents, that is, as the originators of our actions. As Mackenzie explains: 
Although we can take up a theoretical standpoint from which we regard ourselves 
from the outside, as merely natural phenomena whose behavior can be explained 
and predicted in causal terms, in order to live a life we must, as matter of practical 
necessity, view ourselves from the inside, or from a first-personal perspective. 
From this practical, first-personal standpoint we cannot view ourselves as bundles 
of experience. Rather, to live a life we must view ourselves as agents, capable of 
choice, deliberation, and practical reason.119 
Korsgaard argues that Parfit’s reductionism reduces the internal perspective to 
the external perspective, then takes the external to be the primary explanation and 
dismisses nonreductionism and so also the first-personal perspective as important 
to questions of continuity in personal identity. However, my sense of myself as an 
agent, in Korgsaard’s nonreductive sense does not constitute a ‘further fact’. 
Rather, this perspective of ourselves necessitates the thought of “I” as agent. As 
Korsgaard explains: 
This does not mean that our existence as agents is asserted as a further fact, or 
requires a separately existing entity that should be discernible from the theoretical 
point of view. It is rather that from the practical point of view our relationship to 
our actions and choices is essentially authorial: from it, we view them as our own.120 
 
The necessity of the deliberative standpoint is practical and not metaphysical 
because we cannot avoid making choices in our lives, and so think of ourselves as 
                                                                                                                           
and “What does the unity of a given life consist in?”. Quassim Cassam, “Kant and Reductionism,” 
Review of Metaphysics 43 (1989). 
119 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 8. 
120 Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to Parfit,” 19. 
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agents without reference to metaphysical facts.121 As agents we must act and so 
make choices about what to do, and what not to do. This characterises the 
practical standpoint as a deliberative standpoint, by which I mean it is a 
standpoint that contributes to our reasoning and decision making. From this 
agential starting point, Korsgaard argues that in order to act we must conceive of 
ourselves as unified agents. And through deliberation, argues Korsgaard, we 
constitute ourselves as unified agents.122 On Korsgaard’s account the necessity of 
the practical standpoint derives from the fact that as embodied beings we have 
only one life to lead. This conception of ourselves gives us reasons for actions 
which necessarily project one into the future. For example, considering the effects 
of alternative choices we may make now on ourselves at a time in the future.  
 
 To establish the argument that in order to act we must conceive of ourselves 
as unified agents (that is, have a sense of ourselves as a unified chooser with 
reasons), Korsgaard begins with the agent in a given moment and argues there are 
two elements to this unity. Firstly, the need for unity is forced upon us because we 
have one body (and only one body) and if we are conflicted or divided about what 
to do, we need to overcome this conflict in order to act coherently. Korsgaard 
writes: ‘You are a unified person at any given time because you must act, and you 
have only one body with which to act’.123 Secondly, this unity is implicit in the 
standpoint from which one deliberates and chooses. From the deliberative 
standpoint one must choose the action that properly expresses her will, that is her 
reasons for action, and not just the strongest of one’s desires. Korsgaard writes:  
[I]t may be that what actually happens when you make a choice is that the 
strongest of your conflicting desires wins, but that is not the way you think of it 
when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over 
and above all your desires, something that is you and chooses which one to act on. 
This sense of choosing necessitates that we have reasons for choosing, and 
these reasons are expressive of your will. So, you must have a sense of yourself as 
a unified chooser with reasons in order to act. This agential unity is not the 
stipulation of a “further fact” in the sense of the Parfitian charge, qua an object 
‘over and above one’s brain and body’. Rather, Korsgaard is setting out the 
deliberative standpoint as a process which brings about a pragmatic unity.124 
                                            
121 Susan Wolf argues similarly that our interest in selves is not diminished in the least by the 
strength of metaphysical arguments, such as Parfit’s. See Susan Wolf, “Self-interest and Interest in 
Selves,” Ethics 96 (1986). 
122 Christine Korsgaard, “Self-constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” The Journal of 
Ethics 3 (1999), 1. 
123 Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to Parfit,” 9. 
124 Kennett and Matthews note this point as follows: ‘Acting merely on the basis of one’s 
strongest desires fails to meet the standards of rational deliberation. The rational process is, thus, a 
creative one; one wills it that this or that desire should come to be operative in action. The agent is 
pragmatically unified in virtue of the fact that the rational process of decision-making requires 
invoking a principle that can regulate one’s choosing. And, as Korsgaard puts it, “such a principle 
or way of choosing is to be a ‘law to yourself’, and to be unified as such”.’ Jeanette Kennett and 
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Korsgaard further argues that this agential unity (unlike the unity of 
consciousness) can be seen as stretching over time as well as holding at a time. 
That is, when an agent acts for reasons she both constitutes herself at a time and 
projects herself into the future. Korsgaard writes:  
The sort of thing you identify yourself with may carry you automatically into the 
future … Indeed, the choice of any action, no matter how trivial, takes you some 
way into the future. And to the extent that you regulate your choices by 
identifying yourself as the one who is implementing something like a particular 
plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even 
now.125 
 
For Korsgaard, as far as living a life is concerned, metaphysics is secondary to 
our practical concerns:  
I must still decide whether the consideration that some future person is “me” has 
some special normative force for me. It is practical reason that requires me to 
construct an identity for myself: whether metaphysics is to guide me in this or not 
is an open question.126  
For Korsgaard we must assume, as a matter of practical necessity, the 
numerical identity of past, present and future selves.  
 
For Korsgaard, then, identity is a practical rather than a metaphysical matter 
(and one that is central to our normative concerns about agency). This recognises 
the irreducibility of the first-person perspective, the necessity of the practical 
standpoint and the role of agency in constituting practical identity - the 
relationship to our actions is authorial. Agency shifts the focus from what a person 
is to who a person is (and what she does) - to those characteristics that make her 
the particular self-consciousness she is or first-personal perspective that she is. As 
Mackenzie writes:  
Korsgaard’s emphasis on the activity of agency shifts the focus of reflection on 
personal identity from the question “What am I?” to the question “Who am I?” To 
ask “who?” is not merely to enquire after the person’s memories, experiences and 
identifying features and their causal interrelations, but to ask about the activities 
of self-constitution in virtue of which of those features belong to someone.127 
 
2.2.d Ricoeur - the irreducibility of mineness  
  
Ricoeur also draws attention to the question of ‘who one is’ with the concept of 
‘mineness’ and the sense of belonging that accompanies this sense of identity. Like 
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Korsgaard, Ricoeur critiques Parfit’s methodology of reductionism, by drawing a 
distinction between the third- and first- personal perspective and stressing the 
irreducibility of the first-person perspective. Ricoeur distinguishes two senses of 
identity - that associated with the concept of ‘mineness’ or ‘selfhood’ (ipseity) and 
that associated with the concept of  ‘sameness’ (idem). In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur 
argues that personal identity should be understood as a dialectic between 
sameness and selfhood, wherein sameness refers to identity from a third-personal 
perspective, including numerical and qualitative identity, and selfhood refers to 
the first-personal perspective at a time and over time. As Mackenzie explains: 
Sameness refers to both numerical and qualitative identity; to those dimensions of 
our identity that can be described from a third-personal terms, such as our 
biographical histories, traits of character and temperament, social roles, bodily 
attributes and so on. Selfhood (ipseity) refers to the first-personal 
phenomenological perspective of an embodied subject both at a time and 
extended over time; to the sense of “mineness” or “belonging” that characterizes 
one’s own experiences, memories, body, and characteristics.128 
Ipse identity, and idem identity, can both refer to our characteristics - values, 
embodiment etc - but it is the stance we take towards those characteristics, first-
personal or third-personal, that is important.   
 
Ricoeur argues that Parfit’s reductionism erases selfhood or mineness and the 
characteristic sense of one’s memories and body as one’s own by reducing it to 
sameness qua numerical identity. Ricoeur writes: 
But which identity — identity in what sense of the term — are we asked to 
renounce? Is it the sameness that Hume held impossible to find and little worthy 
of our interest? Or mineness, which, in my opinion, constitutes the core of the 
nonreductionist thesis? Actually, everything leads me to think that Parfit, by 
reason of not distinguishing between selfhood and sameness, aims at the former 
through the latter. This is far from uninteresting, for the sort of Buddhism 
insinuated by Parfit’s ethical thesis consists precisely in not making any difference 
between sameness and mineness.129 
 
Ricoeur argues that the vehicle for effecting this erasure is Parfit’s thought 
experiments and that the reductionist assumptions are built in, from the 
beginning. This is similar to Korsgaard’s claim as noted in the sub-section above. 
Ricoeur writes:  
Parfit’s puzzling cases are imaginative variations which reveal as contingent the 
very invariant condition of a hermeneutic of existence. And what is the 
instrument of this circumvention? Technology — not actual technology, but the 
dream of technology. … [T]he Imaginative variations of science fiction bear on a 
single sameness, the sameness of this thing, of this manipulable entity, the brain. 
An impersonal account of identity thus seems to be dependent on a technological 
dream in which the brain has from the start been the substitutable equivalent of 
the person. The real enigma is whether we are capable of conceiving of alternative 
possibilities within which corporeity as we know it, or enjoy it or suffer from it, 
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129 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 137, cf 
Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” 193.  
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could be taken as a variable, a contingent variable, and without having to 
transpose our earthly experiences in the very description of the case in 
question.130 
 
Thought experiments ask us to make contingent what is invariant, namely, our 
corporeal condition, as well as our relation to others.131 Up to this point I have 
focussed on the first personal emphasis of Korsgaard, whereas here, with the 
introduction of Ricoeur, I include relationality as part of an individual’s identity. 
The focus or emphasis on relationality stresses that relations with others are 
important in constituting our identities. Mackenzie agrees with Ricoeur’s analysis 
arguing also that thought experiments ask us to strip away and treat as contingent 
those features which we cannot normally separate. Mackenzie writes:  
These thought experiments work … by dissociating those aspects of ourselves 
that ordinarily we cannot dissociate or disconnect—the interconnections between 
psychological and corporeal continuity and connectedness, and the 
phenomenological distinctiveness of one’s own experience—inviting us to regard 
these as merely contingent.132  
However to make sense of Parfit’s thought experiments, Ricoeur notes, we 
must assume at the same time as we are required to deny, that our continuing 
connection to the ordinary conditions of human life and what matters to us as 
human persons, will survive. And we must also assume, at the same time as we are 
invited to deny it, the importance of selfhood and the first-person perspective. 
In doing this, does he not risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater? For, as 
much as I am willing to admit that imaginative variations on personal identity lead 
to a crisis of selfhood as such … I still do not see how the question “who?” can 
disappear in the extreme cases in which it remains without an answer. For really, 
how can we ask ourselves about what matters if we could not ask to whom the thing 
mattered or not? Does not the questioning about what matters or not depend 
upon-self concern, which indeed seems to be constitutive of selfhood?133 
 
However, rather than adopt Parfit’s impersonal response to this type of 
question, (properly configured) Ricoeur argues that the question still remains: to 
whom does identity matter?, and is in fact more pressing in this indeterminacy of 
identity or identity crisis.134 Ricoeur argues that sameness and selfhood come 
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together in the question of permanence in time and at the moment when we 
recognise that the self does not have determinate permanence in time. The fact 
that the question remains, as there is someone who can ask it, is Ricoeur’s 
springboard for arguing that narrative identity mediates this dialectic. I will turn 
to the distinction between selfhood and sameness in the following section in 
discussion of Atkins’ approach to numerical identity, and to Ricoeur’s narrative 




In this section I have argued against metaphysical reductionist approaches to 
personal identity which argue that identity can be reduced to a set of distinct, 
causally related time-slices that explain a person’s identity without reference to the 
individual. In contrast, using Korsgaard’s and Ricoeur’s critiques of Parfit, I have 
demonstrated that questions concerning the first-personal perspective cannot be 
reduced to the third-personal perspective. Therefore, we cannot straightforwardly 
assume that identity questions concerning change always and only concern 
numerical or metaphysical identity. Rather, questions of practical identity, 
concerning the ‘who’ of identity, are fundamental. Moreover, metaphysical 
approaches, by stripping away these relations from the first-personal perspective, 
obscure and occlude what is at issue in these accounts of first-personal change.  
 
2.3. Practical Identity: Embodied and Relational 
 
I have argued for the irreducibility of the first-personal in questions of 
personal identity and for the necessity of the practical deliberative standpoint qua 
agential unity. I now turn to developing an approach to practical identity. I start 
with Korsgaard’s definition of practical identity and explain how our practical 
identities are both a source of reasons and obligations. I identify two issues in 
Korsgaard’s account: the role of embodiment in her account and the strong 
connection between practical identities and normative commitments. I address 
these issues by drawing on Atkins’ embodied relational approach to practical 
identity.  Korsgaard’s overly rational approach to agency and connection between 
practical identities and normative commitments is mediated by Atkins’ approach 
to practical identity as embodied and situated, involving an interplay of three 
perspectives - first-, third- and second-personal - which also clarifies the 
relationship between identity, agency and embodiment. 
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2.3.a Korsgaard and practical identity    
 
In the previous section I outlined the reflective bi-perspectival nature of 
consciousness, arguing for the irreducibility of the first-personal perspective and 
the necessity of the practical standpoint. I outlined Korsgaard’s argument that we 
must conceive of ourselves as unified agents. Here I outline Korsgaard’s 
normative concept of practical identity and what’s involved in acting on reasons, 
qua constituting our practical identities.  
 
Korsgaard’s account of practical identity qua self-constitution aims to explain 
how we integrate the first- and third- personal perspectives through reflective 
agency. Korsgaard argues that the self is a self-constituting agent and compares 
this constitution making to the way a political entity constitutes itself, i.e. the agent 
constitutes/unifies herself through adopting normative reasons for action.135 What 
is normative about one’s reasons is that the actions they recommend unify the 
person both at a time and over time. Korsgaard writes: ‘[D]eliberative action by 
its very nature imposes unity on the will … whatever else you are doing when you 
chose a deliberative action, you are also unifying yourself into a person … action 
is self-constitution’.136 So, unity is a pre-condition for taking any action.  
 
Korsgaard sets out her account of practical identity in the context of a theory 
of normativity (i.e. in terms of explaining the source of our reasons and 
obligations). Korsgaard argues that the reflective nature of self-consciousness both 
sets up the problem of the normative, as well as providing a solution. The 
reflective structure of consciousness both provides us with distance from our 
mental activities, such that we need a reason to act, as well as forcing on us to 
adopt a ‘conception of ourselves’. Korsgaard writes: 
The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it 
forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argued, this is a fact about 
what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a 
metaphysical self. From a third-person point of view, outside of the deliberative 
standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that 
the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you 
when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over 
and above all your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire 
to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your 
actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself.137 
 
 On Korsgaard’s account, the reflective structure of human consciousness both 
forces us and enables us to make laws for ourselves and these give us authority 
over ourselves. ‘Reflection gives us a kind of distance from our impulses which 
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forces us, and enables us, to make laws for ourselves, and it makes those laws 
normative’.138 Korsgaard argues that when we make a law for ourselves we at the 
same time invoke or give expression to a practical conception of ourselves.139 This 
practical conception of ourselves is what Korsgaard calls our ‘practical identity’. 
Our practical identity determines which of our impulses will count as reasons, in 
this way it is a normative self-conception.   
 
 Korsgaard describes practical identity as a normative self-conception, a 
description under which you value yourself and think the things you do are worth 
doing. These practical identities are complex and made up of and dependent on 
one’s abilities, commitments, relationships and embodied situation.140 This is 
contrasted with a theoretical conception of one’s identity - ‘a view about what as a 
matter of inescapable scientific fact you are’. Korsgaard writes:  
The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view 
about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better 
understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under 
which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical 
identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of 
such conceptions, You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a 
certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, 
someone’s lover or friend, and so on.141 
 
 On Korsgaard’s account, reasons are normative for us; this allows us to 
explain actions third-personally and also to justify them first-personally. For 
example, I am writing a thesis. I work evenings and weekends because I value the 
project of completing a thesis in philosophy. Writing a PhD is part of my identity 
and structures my time, as well as my discussions and interactions with others. 
Moreover it provides reasons for my actions. 
 
Korsgaard explains that practical identities are both found and constructed. 
So, practical identity is both a condition for and a product of our agency. As 
Mackenzie writes: 
[O]ne’s practical identity is both discovered and constructed. On the one hand, 
many aspects of one’s practical identity are not matters of choice but arise from 
the material and practical constraints that define one’s situation and the 
nonvoluntary aspects of one’s identity, such as one’s individual bodily and 
intellectual capacities, one’s sexual, racial, linguistic and cultural or ethnic 
identity, one’s family relationships. … On the other hand, by virtue of the 
reflective structure of human self-consciousness, as agents we have the capacity to 
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call into question whether certain aspects of our identities, and the beliefs, desires, 
and motives to which they give raise, constitute reasons for us. So even if aspects 
of our identity may not be a matter of choice and even if the different aspects of 
our identity may give rise to conflicting demands and values, through processes of 
reflective endorsement we can construct a self-conception that then comes to have 
normative authority for us.142 
 
Korsgaard argues that these practical identities give rise not only to reasons to 
act but are also a source of obligations.143 For Korsgaard ‘[a]n obligation always 
takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of identity’.144  
It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to 
unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your 
identity, and to no longer be who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to 
think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find 
your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. It is to be 
for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead. When an action cannot be 
performed without loss of some fundamental part of one’s identity, and an agent 
could just as well be dead, then the obligation not to do it is unconditional and 
complete. If reasons arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from 
reflective rejection.145 
This invokes an understanding of integrity in terms of living up to one’s 
standards, that is, by acting according to those reasons, by acting out of our 
practical identities.146 
 
Further, Korsgaard argues that practical identities are mainly contingent; we 
can choose to drop or alter them. In her account however, practical identity 
depends on a conception of moral identity. Moral identity stands behind all our 
practical identities.147 
 
Korsgaard’s account shows us that agency is reflective (integrated agency) and 
through the exercise of reflective endorsement, a person gives expression to their 
practical identity. A person constitutes her identity through living a life and 
acting; it is not given in a metaphysical account. Therefore identity is not given; 
rather identity is a project, one that takes work and that can fail. On Korsgaard’s 
account failure is not living up to one’s identity. This account draws out further 
the relationship between agency and identity and autonomy. Korsgaard’s account 
of practical identities is an autonomy-based view. For Korsgaard autonomy is our 
capacity to give ourselves obligations to act based on our practical identities. For 
my account of personal identity, the relationship between identity, agency and 
autonomy will be significant. I further discuss the relationship between autonomy 
and identity in the fourth and fifth chapters. 
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Here I identify two problems with Korsgaard’s account. First, Korsgaard’s 
conception of agency is overly rational, there’s not enough about the first-personal 
sense of embodiment and the importance of embodiment to our self-conception 
and practical identities. Whilst Korsgaard recognises the practical necessity that 
comes from being embodied, in one body, she does not develop an account of the 
impacts and constraints of embodiment on our practical identities. Second, the 
connection between our practical identities and normative commitments in 
Korsgaard’s account is overly strong, because on Korsgaard’s account if one 
doesn’t live up to one’s commitments, or acts against them, one is at risk of losing 
one’s identity. As Mackenzie and Walker recognize this suggests that Korsgaard’s 
conception of practical identities tends towards rigidity and as such is not as well 
suited to explaining personal change over time.148 Thus, Korsgaard’s account, 
while it recognises the role of others in generating a conception of our practical 
identities, does not develop an account of the role of others in the constitution and 
negotiation of our practical identities. Both these problems need to be addressed in 
order to adequately explain the accounts of apparent change in who a person feels 
she is after a neural implant.   
2.3.b Atkins and selfhood  
 
 Atkins draws on and critically develops Korsgaard’s approach to practical 
identity by adopting a phenomenological approach to embodiment that is 
fundamentally intersubjective. This allows us to understand the role of 
embodiment in constituting the first-personal perspective. It also draws out the 
social and bodily conditions of agency. 
 
Atkins, like Korsgaard, challenges Parfit’s reductionism by rejecting the false 
methodological choice between reductionism and Cartesianism dualism through 
reference to the Kantian thesis of the bi-perspectival nature of consciousness.149 
However, Atkins extends Korsgaard’s critique to apply to the role of the body in 
Parfit’s account (as well as in Kant’s). She argues for the importance of one’s body 
in the constitution of personal identity and selfhood. Atkins argues that Parfit’s 
approach incorrectly dismisses the importance of embodiment for identity, and 
articulates the consequences of severing identity from persons, their experiences 
and their bodies. Atkins, in a similar way to Ricoeur, argues that whilst Parfit, and 
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the Kantian critique of rationalism, might demonstrate that there is no ‘I’ over and 
above our experiences, it does not do away with the question of the relationship 
between a person’s identity and subjectivity.  
Atkins argues that these are the failings of the sceptical thrust of the Kantian 
view that excludes a framework in which to articulate the ‘I- body relation’.150 
Atkins argues that without an account of the connection between one’s body and 
subjectivity, the concept of “person” remains problematic in Kant’s work.151 Atkins 
argues that  
[H]uman consciousness defies reduction in the manner Parfit proposes. I propose 
a conception of selfhood (or personhood) as “bodily perspective” … On this view, 
perception and thus consciousness, is not simply an abstract intellectual act, but 
an expression of a world articulated through one’s body; the expression of a lived 
world. Here, the apparatus of perception is not a supersensible intellect, but one’s 
body itself; consciousness is expressive of one’s bodily participation in the world, 
in the broadest sense.152 
Thus, Atkins’ critique of Parfit involves a critique to Kant’s scepticism, which 
involves bringing the body into our perspectives on the self. 
 
Atkins, like Korsgaard, identifies the first- and third-personal perspective and 
their irreducibility to one another. Atkins argues that these perspectives arise from 
our embodiment and so an account of identity must adequately explain embodied 
consciousness, which is irreducibly first-personal and more complex than causal 
accounts suggest.153 Drawing on phenomenological accounts from Merleau-Ponty 
and Marcel, Atkins argues that we have reflective self-awareness because we are 
beings with bodies; we are not Cartesian egos but corporeal beings. On this view, 
Atkins explains:  
[C]onsciousness is a function of our bodily powers of perception. We perceive, 
not with an abstract intellect, but with our sensory-motor capacities. This 
encompasses such things as a sense of one’s muscular power, the position of one’s 
limbs in space, and the auditory and motor apparatus of language. As the 
expression of a bodily individual, perceptual-based consciousness is always 
perspectival; the features of objects and experiences are articulated against the 
backdrop of the sensory-motor capacities of one’s body.154 
Our embodied situation engenders an ambiguity because our bodies are both 
objects of experience for us, as well as the subjects of experience - we experience 
the world with the perception of one’s own body. On this understanding, my body 
is something I am and something I have; it is not transferable property.  
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To be precise, rather than a relation between body and self, there is a mutual 
presupposition between oneself as subject (I) and oneself as object (body). This 
structures subjectivity with a series of dialectical oppositions: subjective/objective; 
self/other; active/passive; personal/impersonal; mental/physical. Irreducible to any 
single component in the dialectic, “I” is to be understood as a dynamic bodily 
perspective. Consequently, “I” and “body” are always in an inseparable tension with 
one other. “I” and “body” are not two distinct components of a single person, but 
a single, irreducibly ambiguous structure, a “my body”, or, as Marcel and 
Merleau-Ponty have described it, a “body-subject.”155 
 
It is this understanding of subjectivity as embodied consciousness that renders 
the first-personal perspective irreducible for logical reasons. As we saw in 
Korsgaard, that we can take a perspective on ourselves is a matter of practical 
necessity, and not a theoretical fact. In this way, Atkins’ account shifts the focus 
on continuity in identity to continuity of a bodily perspective. This also redefines 
our understanding of numerical identity in a way reminiscent of Korsgaard’s 
statement that we must just assume numerical identity, but Atkins’ account give us 
the grounds or substance for doing so. Atkins’ framework informs and clarifies the 
discussion in Ricoeur earlier about the dialectic of selfhood and sameness (2.2.d). 
It is the ambivalent condition of our embodiment or bodily perspective that means 
that the numerical identity of one’s body is different from - takes a different logical 
form to - the numerical identity of objects, while at the same time this dialectic 
necessitates and guarantees the numerical identity of my bodily perception over 
time. The coherence of my first-personal perspective logically presupposes the 
numerical identity of my body when I regard my body from the third-person 
perspective, as an object while at the same time the bodily basis of consciousness 
ensures that my first-personal perspective implies the same, numerically identical 
body. This Atkins describes as a form of “self-constancy”.156  
 
This attention to embodied identity is incredibly important for our discussion 
about the impacts of neural implants on identity. It shows that I relate to my body 
as mine, my own; it is not something that we can transfer, or make a major change 
to, without there being an impact on our way of experiencing the world and 
making sense of ourselves. Moreover, the embodied basis of reflective selfhood 
explains why a change in embodiment can impact on one’s identity so forcefully. 
Atkins explains this through reference to victims of torture and violence:  
If we were not constituted by this integrated but tensive bodily continuity the 
pain of losing a sense of one’s body as one’s own—as well as one’s capacity to 
rebuild one’s life as one’s own—could not arise, as it does for victims of torture 
and violence.157 
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In chapter 4.1.a, I explain further the processes of self-constancy and 
secondary reflection in securing our practical identity. The important thing to 
draw out of Atkins’ approach at this point is the difference between the body of 
the first-person embodied account of agency and the body conceived as a 
biological given. On Atkins’ account we can express (and fail to express) agency 
in and through our interaction with other bodies; the experience of agency is 
always already embodied. As Merleau-Ponty writes, we experience life as 
embodied or as engagement in the world - we do not experience our body as just a 
biological object, but rather our perception of our bodies, our ways of engaging 
with the world, as well as other’s people’s responses to our bodies, all shape the 
way, from a first-personal perspective we experience our bodies, our embodiment. 
This contrasts with accounts, like Korsgaard’s, which favour descriptions of 
agency as rational, in terms of conscious activity or a particular set of cognitive 
capacities. Letitia Meynell notes that much feminist work on agency and 
embodiment has been conducted parallel to one another.158 A striking contribution 
of Atkins’ work is that it brings these concepts together. It thus addresses the 
concerns raised about Korsgaard above. Practical identities have to be negotiated; 
it can’t just be a matter of fidelity to values. Note that whilst Korsgaard does 
discuss social relationships as contributing to some of our most important practical 
identities, her account does not go far enough to explain the role of others in how 
I come to understand, and others come to understand, who I am. Moreover, as we 
will see in future chapters, this account of embodiment provides a necessary 
corrective to Marya Schechtman’s approach to narrative agency and her solution 
to the relationship between questions of reidentification and characterisation.  
 
Atkins adds a further perspective to our embodied subjectivity, the second-
personal relational perspective - that ‘of the communicative situation of social 
existence’.159 Atkins argues that selfhood is developmental and fundamentally 
inter-subjective. We are born and grow up through the bodies of others. 
According to Atkins that we are able to regard ourselves from the first- and third-
personal perspective implies or presupposes that we are able to regard ourselves 
from a second-personal perspective also.160 On this account agents are constituted 
by their bodies in a social context.  
The double perspective of embodied subjectivity is further complicated by a 
second-person perspective, which arises from and expresses the social—that is, 
intersubjective—mediation of one’s sense of self. The second person mediation is 
related to the developmental nature of embodied consciousness. … Born 
immature and enduring a long period of juvenile dependency, we learn about our 
own bodies and capacities through our involvement with the bodies of other 
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people, for example, directly through the communication of touch and 
vocalisation in being cared for (or abused), and indirectly through 
representations, observation and instruction, as well as through the complex 
processes of cultural encoding of differently sexed, coloured, aged or abled 
bodies. Through the communicative processes of socialisation we come to acquire 
concepts, emotional schema and behavioural repertoires through which we 
develop our self-conceptions.161 
 Selfhood is a mediation of these perspectives and this mediation structures 
and unifies our life, so that we can ask and answer the question ‘Who am I?’. This 
means we have achieved coherence in our perspectives and that a coherent 
identity is an achievement.  
[O]ur identities are formed socially and communicatively. We each form our self-
understandings in relation to a community of interlocutors, either directly through 
interpersonal dialogue or indirectly through the communicative networks implied 
in the meanings that constitute our languages. Understanding who a person is, 
then, requires coherence and continuity in the psychological, physical, social, 
cultural and historical aspects of a person’s life. Furthermore, this must be a 
coherence that can be grasped and endorsed in the first-person. I come to 
understand myself (and likewise, others understand who I am) as the subject of a 
certain life, for example, as someone who was born at a specific date and place 
into a certain family; who has lived at certain places in certain ways; who has 
particular physical and character traits, weakness and abilities, hopes and fears; 
who has acted and suffered in certain ways; and who enjoys or is denied certain 
social and political status. In other words, who a person is is the named subject of 
a practical and conceptual complex of first, second and third-person perspectives 
which structure and unify a life grasped as it is lived.162 
 
The relational aspects of Atkins’ approach are important because they draw 
our attention to the fundamentally intersubjective nature of selfhood and the 
importance of others in how our identities are achieved and mediated (and 
valued). The thoroughly relational nature of Atkins’ approach also provides a 
further corrective to Korsgaard’s approach. I will be building on this 
understanding of relationality in the following chapters on narrative agency and 
relational autonomy.    
 
 Practical identity is a project. It is messy, perspectival, situated and embodied.  
On a practical approach the focus changes to who I am - it’s about how I can 
practically be the person I, and others, understand myself to be. To be a self is to 
act in the world, to be agent. To be a self is to constitute oneself as a self (it is a 
project), selfhood is not given, but an activity, an activity which involves ourselves 
and others in the embodied spaces we find ourselves - a self in the middle of 
things. These approaches explain the connection between identity, agency and 
embodiment.  
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In this section I have developed an approach to embodied relational practical 
identity, firstly drawing on Korsgaard, then on Atkins.  This has drawn attention 
to the role of agency in constituting our practical identities. With this account I 
have also provided a refiguring of numerical identity, in terms of self-constancy. I 
now turn to applying this approach to the accounts of self-change consequent 
upon neural implants. 
 
2.4 Practical Identity and Neural Implants   
 
With this approach to practical identity in hand, I revisit the accounts of first-
personal change discussed in the first section (of this chapter). I argue that the 
issues and challenges related to self-change consequent upon neural implants are 
best understood as concerns about practical identity. Threats to practical identity 
can challenge one’s sense of who one is, in the sense of the identity crisis identified 
by Schechtman. These manifest as threats to agential continuity, as an inability to 
act out of one’s self-conception. By locating the domain of the potential threat to 
personal identity consequent upon neural implants in practical identity, potential 
threats to identity are understood in terms of a threat to the unity of one’s psycho-
bodily agential continuity and not in terms of the metaphysical threat of going out 
of existence. This shifts the focus to shifts and breaks in identity and to  restoring 
or integrating self-change. A practical approach to identity clarifies how changes 
might be seen from a first- or third-personal perspective as potential threats to 
identity, as well as explaining how change consequent upon neural implants can 
be seen as both dissociating and liberating.  
 
The proponents of these stories of first-personal change following neural 
implants discuss aspects of themselves, their normative self-conception and 
embodiment and capacities for agency. The accounts of first-personal change raise 
issues related to practical identity - they discuss changes in characteristics, such as 
those discussed by Schechtman’s characterisation questions. Moreover, identity 
and the four features - concerns related to our survival, moral responsibility, self-
interested concern, and compensation - come in degrees, so a practical account 
can make sense of claims to more or less survive, for example. They raise 
discussion of people’s self-conceptions and their understandings of who they are, 
in terms of reflective selfhood. In Korsgaard’s terms they raise discussion of a 
person’s practical conception of who she is. A challenge to practical identity 
concerns how you understand yourself and your ability to act on these 
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understandings (and to integrate these things). These accounts do not discuss 
threats to numerical identity, in the sense of going out of existence.  
 
If practical identity is a condition for agency, who we understand ourselves to 
be in part determines what we do, and if our practical identities are also a product 
of our agency, then what we do, in part constitutes who we are. An embodied 
relational approach to practical identity allows as to make sense of how changes to 
our body, as well as our embodied engagement in the world, and our social 
relations with others, can affect our self-understanding. Our sense of who we are 
and what matters to us can be affected by the changes in our sense of embodiment 
in both gross and more subtle ways. For example, it can be affected by the 
difference between walking and not walking, but also having something inside us, 
as well as how others relate to us.  
 
If identity isn’t given, but an activity (including one of integrating perspectives 
into a unified self-conception), this is a project that can come apart; one could 
become a different self, or lose oneself. Trauma, illness, disability, can all impact 
on our practical identities.163 From this, we see that a practical identity approach 
shows that a coherent identity is an achievement, and therefore, also, something 
that can fail. Conditions and interventions can challenge our integrated self-
conception or ability to form one. Atkins writes that a coherent identity can fail for 
a variety of reasons:  
[P]hysiological pathology (for example, brain or metabolic disease), psychological 
pathology (for example, the trauma of personal violence), or social pathology (for 
example, political or religious persecution), all of which interfere with the afflicted 
person’s capacity to form an integrated and positive self-conception, or to 
integrate his self-conception with his situation such that he can form meaningful 
and accurate practical expectations and appropriate intentions to act.164 
 
On some approaches, practical identities might also only ever achieve a partial 
unity or coherence, as will be explored further in the treatment of the first-person 
accounts in the following chapters. In contrast to metaphysical identity, practical 
approaches preserve the first-personal perspective and so can make sense of 
claims like “I am no longer the same person”. These are claims about changes in 
characteristics and not in terms of numerical identity. These claims make sense 
with a practical conception - if these characteristics change radically, these claims 
                                            
163 Poltera notes that ’While the cause and nature of an identity crises varies dramatically from 
person to person, the nature of an identity crisis is that there is a sense in which we no longer know 
who we are and we find ourselves feeling estranged from aspects of ourselves and our lives.’ 
Jacqui Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic Listeners,” Practical Philosophy 10 
(2010), 66. Brison also argues that the cause of such an identity crisis can result from trauma. See 
Susan J Brison, “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity,” in Feminists Rethink 
the Self, ed. Diana Tietjens Meyers (Colorado: Westview, 1996); Susan J Brison, Aftermath: Violence 
and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
164 Atkins, “Narrative Identity, Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity,” 347. 
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about being different, as Schechtman argues, could literally be true.165 That is, to 
the person, and/or perhaps others around her, the change in her characteristics 
and orienting values might be so great so as they are to themselves, and/or to 
others, a different person. 
 
As discussed through Ricoeur and Mackenzie, thought experiments build in 
reductionist assumptions and so strip away, or ask us to treat as contingent, what 
they argue is invariant - the embodied and social aspects of identity. Atkins’ stress 
on the second-personal perspective again demonstrates the paucity of these 
reductionist approaches.   
The second-personal perspective and the social context exercise a significant 
constraint upon the formation of practical identity. Understanding the role of the 
second-personal perspective makes clear why the kind of transfer of minds and 
identity between persons, as it is commonly depicted in philosophical thought 
experiments, is simply not credible. ‘I’ is anchored not in a bodily organ that is 
transferable between individuals but in a complex and (partly) socially 
constituted dynamic and temporally extended self-aware existence. My attributes 
and the processes of attribution that constitute who I am exist, not simply ‘in’ me 
but also ‘in between’ me and other people, in the form of relationships with 
different people and the regard in which we hold each other. My identity is not 
analogous to a piece of information that can be abstracted from my body and 
transferred to another person but rather is dynamic and discursive, a 
collaboration that is continually renewed and reformed through my relations with 
other people and by my internalisation of and response to the regard of others. In 
short, who I am is partly constituted by forms of social recognition.166 
 
Reductionist approaches occlude what’s at issue in identity change. 
Metaphysical accounts deny the importance/ignore the role of the first personal 
perspective and the practical dimensions of living the life of a particular person. 
This is what makes thought experiments so troubling, but on a practical approach 
we have the resources to illuminate why these cases are troubling in terms of 
changes in characteristics from the perspective of selfhood and inquire into the 
impacts of neural implants on practical identity and agency.  Rather than looking 
at threats to identity on the basis of challenges to metaphysical sameness, the 
practical approach directs our focus to whether we integrate our experiences of 
change. 167 
 
If we compare metaphysical to practical approaches to identity, we see that the 
focus in terms of ‘threats’ is differently conceived. On a metaphysical account the 
focus is on identity qua sameness. If there is a change in identity that is extreme, 
                                            
165 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 86-89. 
166 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 67. 
167 Brison notes whilst philosophers use thought experiments ‘that slice and splice the self, they 
seldom consider real trauma. She argues that if they were to consider trauma, their focus would 
change questions such as can the soul survive the death of the body to the issue of whether the self 
can reconstitute itself after ‘obliteration at the hands of another’, see: Brison, “Outliving Oneself: 
Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity.”; Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. 
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one literally goes out of existence and/or becomes a metaphysically distinct entity. 
This focuses the philosophical discussion on the wrong plane. Rather we should 
focus on the practical domain as posing ‘threats’ to our practical identity and 
agency. In contrast, on a practical account the focus is on agency which, like 
survival, comes in degrees, and so the stress falls on integration. Our focus is on 
the change and articulating this change in identity with an understanding of 
embodied agency (and not on whether you have become a metaphysically 
different human being).  
 
Moreover, practical identity approaches illuminate why changes consequent 
on intervention can be perceived as challenging. The shift to agency and the first-
personal perspective and an understanding of our lives as authorial provides a 
perspective on why change brought about by others (or intervention) can be seen 
as challenging. Korsgaard notes that agential continuity is what makes up 
practical identity and so changes that are brought about by factors other than our 
own agency can present a challenge to our practical identity. So, what is 
concerning about the thought experiments used by reductionists is that the 
changes are brought about by agencies other than our own. 168 She writes:  
Where I change myself, the sort of continuity needed for identity may be 
preserved, even if I become very different. Where I am changed by wholly 
external forces, it is not. This is because the sort of continuity needed for identity 
essentially involves my agency.169 
Korsgaard’s account thus shows how changes not from our agency, for 
example from medical intervention and neural implants, can be seen as a potential 
threat as such changes challenge our identities as the author of our actions. 
 
Drawing on Korsgaard’s work on the connection between practical identities 
and agency - that one’s practical identity involves expectations about how we 
should act, for what we are responsible and to whom we are accountable - Hilde 
Lindemann Nelson argues that bodily illness and injury can (force) a change in 
our conception of ourselves that challenges our ability to act out of our primary 
practical identities, that is out of our sense of who we are.170 Nelson examines 
Margaret Edson’s play Wit, and describes the change in identity of the main 
character with a diagnosis of cancer, from ‘a witty, imperious, and articulate 
woman with a passion for the English language and an affection for her students 
that is tinged with contempt’ to ‘dying patient’.171 Nelson argues that the impact of 
                                            
168 Mackenzie makes this point in her discussion of Korsgaard’s understanding of our 
relationship to our actions and lives as authorial and first-personal: see, Mackenzie, “Practical 
Identity and Narrative Agency,” 9. 
169 Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to Parfit,” 21.  
170 Hilde Lindemann Nelson, “Damaged Bodies, Damaged Identities,” Philosophy in the 
Contemporary World 11 (2004). 
171 Nelson, “Damaged Bodies, Damaged Identities,” 7. 
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the illness is a challenge to her practical identity, because it challenges her agency 
- her ability to act out of her conception of who she is.  
 
By applying a practical identity approach to the first-personal accounts we see 
that claims about identity change - that there’s something about themselves that’s 
been affected by the neural implant, even though their condition might be ‘fixed’ - 
aren’t nonsensical. Even if a condition is ameliorated by the treatment, there may 
be a change in my practical identity. Our concern should be not just for 
unexpected clinical outcome, such as mania from DBS, but also with respect to 
whether can make sense of, and integrate, these changes.172  
 
As reasons are normative for us, they allow us to explain actions third-
personally and also to justify them first-personally. A threat to our practical 
identity would mean not valuing being the kind of person whose actions are 
guided by these attitudes. For example, the female journalist who says “I don’t 
recognise myself anymore” is explaining that fighting the symptoms of Parkinson’s 
provided the justification for, or made sense of, many of her actions and 
commitments, and now this identity no longer exists, she feels alienated from the 
person she was - who was a ‘Parkinson’s fighter’. And as Mackenzie and Walker 
note this also clarifies how changes from a third person perspective may be seen as 
potential threat. For Mr Garrison’s wife, and the wife of the ‘awakened’ DBS 
patient, her practical identity as care-giver is called into question - all of a sudden, 
her actions don’t seem to be meaningful.173  
 
However it is not just the responses in terms of perceived threats that practical 
identity can make sense of. This account of practical identity shows how changes 
from neural implants may provide opportunities for people to constitute their 
chosen practical identities that were unavailable due to some cognitive or physical 
impairment. For example, Mike Robbins identifies with the implant as allowing 
him to engage in activities that represent a sense of who he is. Similarly, Michael 
Chorost describes his new found confidence and ability to engage in activities that 
he finds meaningful. 
 
This account still leaves us with unresolved issues concerning whether the 
change is good or bad independent of whether the first-person accounts describe 
them as alienating or self-fulfilling. In this analysis I have focussed on the unity of 
practical identity; however, the analysis I have presented so far has been more 
appropriate to unity at a time - synchronic identity, in contrast to unity of a life 
                                            
172 Note, agential unity (and an integrated sense of embodied self) may already be damaged or 
partial due to impairment from the condition which is being treated. I will be taking up these issues 
more directly in chapters 6. 
173 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 379. 
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over time - diachronic identity. That is an account of the importance a person 
attaches to being the same experiential subject over time in response to the 
contingency inherent in living a human life over time. 
 
As noted above, Korsgaard argues that her account of the unity of agency 
provides for identity at a time, and identity over or across time. That is, her 
account explains both synchronic agency and diachronic agency. This claim has 
been criticised by several philosophers - Schechtman, Mackenzie and Atkins - all 
of whom argue that Korsgaard’s account explains synchronic agency (very well), 
but fails to give an adequate account of diachronic agency. These philosophers all 
argue that we need to move to a narrative account of identity in order to explain 
diachronic agency. Below, I outline these criticisms as a way of justifying the claim 
that in order to explain change over time we need a narrative account of identity.  
 
Mackenzie and Walker note that a problem with Korsgaard’s account ‘is that 
her analysis of self-constitution is primarily synchronic; that is, it focuses on 
moments of deliberation and decision but not on the constitution of our identities 
over time’.174 And so, Korsgaard’s account is not adequate to explain changes in 
selfhood over time. In contrast to Korsgaard’s primarily synchronic account of 
practical identity, Mackenzie and Walker argue that narrative accounts aim to 
explain ‘the diachronic constitution and reconstitution of identity’ and so are 
better able to explain how we construct our identities over time, in the face of the 
‘flux, fragmentation and contingency’ that characterise human lives.175 
 
As noted in the section above, Atkins draws heavily on Korsgaard’s approach 
to practical identity. However, Atkins argues that we need to move beyond this 
approach and stipulate that the kind of unity required for human agency is 
specifically narrative unity - narrative integrates and unifies the tri-perspectival 
nature of selfhood and so explains continuity of practical identity over time (in 
temporally extended, human selfhood). 
Given this developmental, intersubjective, practical, conception of selfhood, what 
is required for personal identity—that is, the unity of a single life such that it 
could be one’s own life—a model that can mediate and synthesise the diverse and 




In this section I have shown that the sense of identity raised in the first-
personal accounts of self change is practical identity. Changes from interventions 
                                            
174 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 379. 
175 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 380. 
176 Atkins, “Narrative Identity, Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity,” 347. 
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can challenge agential unity and given the role of agency in constituting personal 
identity – these changes can challenge our ability to act out of our self-
conceptions. The understanding of selfhood as integrating different or multiple 
perspectives shows that unified agency or identity is an achievement, one which 
can fail and is subject to changes from social and embodied conditions of agency. 
We see that changes in characteristics, including our embodiment, can challenge 
the practical identities of ourselves and others and directs the focus to how change 
can be integrated. This is in contrast to reductionist metaphysical approaches 
which in denying the role of the first-person perspective and practical dimensions 
of our lives are not only unhelpful for our accounts of self change consequent 
upon neural implants, but if used to understand the claims of identity change at 
issue, obscure what is at issue in identity change, and unhelpfully configure the 
threat to identity in terms of going out of existence. Thirdly, by drawing on 
critiques of Korsgaard, I motivated the need to adopt a narrative approach to 
agency, in order to explain identity and identity change over time. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have shown that the sense of identity raised in the first-
personal accounts of self change from neural implants is practical identity. Further 
I have argued that any adequate account of identity of persons requires an 
adequate account of characterisation across change in order to address the 
concerns raised by the accounts on implant recipients’ experiences. Using 
critiques by Korsgaard and Ricoeur I argued for the irreducibility of the first-
person perspective and the practical necessity of agential unity. I argued that the 
unity of a person is achieved through agency or self-constitution and cannot be 
explained solely through reference to the unity relation of causal interrelations. 
Building on Korsgaard’s approach to practical identity, using the work of Atkins, 
I showed that an embodied relational approach to practical identity understands 
selfhood as tri-perspectival and agency involves integrating these perspectives. 
The relational embodied approach to selfhood and the account of numerical 
identity as body constancy provides a corrective to metaphysical approaches to 
personal identity. I have also developed a relational concept of practical identity, 
outlining the relation between agency, embodiment and identity. The 
understanding of selfhood as integrating different or multiple perspectives shows 
that unified agency or identity is an achievement, one which can fail and is subject 
to changes from social and embodied conditions of agency. We see that changes in 
characteristics, including our embodiment, can challenge the practical identities of 
ourselves and others and directs the focus to how change can be integrated. 
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Understanding potential threats form neural implants in terms of practical 
identity gets us some way to seeing what’s at issue in understanding the impacts of 
neural implants on personal identity  - that is, an understanding of practical 
identity illuminates what matters to us from our first-personal perspective in 
identity change, and also the concerns we have when that change is not caused by 
the agent herself. This, however, does not resolve the question concerning the 
impacts of neural implants on personal identity. Any approach to practical identity 
must give an account not just of the unity of agency at a time, but must provide an 
explanation as to what gives unity or coherence to our agency over time. In the 
following two chapters I argue that narrative provides the structure by which we 
unify our practical identities over time and that the narrative approach illuminates 
threats to personal identity consequent upon neural implants in terms of one’s 
ability to meaningfully author one’s life. In the fifth chapter I argue that a 
relational approach to autonomy can make sense of changes from intervention, 
understanding these not in terms of an (external) threat per se, but as parallel to 










  76 
3. Narrative Agency & the Unity of 
Practical Identity  
 
In this chapter, I inquire into what explains the continuity of a person’s 
practical identity over time. I argue that narrative structures our experience and 
self-understanding and can account for the deeply unified and persisting subject of 
experience over time. In doing so, narrative approaches can explain what’s at 
stake in identity change. Change can threaten narrative coherence, thus 
challenging our self-understanding and sense of being a continuing person, who is 
able to meaningfully author our lives. My argument builds on the critique of 
reductionism prosecuted in the previous chapter. Here my focus is on 
demonstrating that psychological reductionist approaches cannot account for the 
deep unity of a person’s life over time and so cannot explain what matters to us in 
identity change and so what’s at stake in changes consequent upon neural 
implants. This further develops my argument that a relational embodied approach 
to narrative agency and autonomy provides resources for understanding the 
impacts of neural implants on a person’s identity.  
 
In the first section I outline Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution approach 
to practical identity as an answer to the characterisation question, an approach 
which can explain the deep unity of person’s life. I contrast this approach with 
Schechtman’s critique of psychological continuity approaches which fail to 
account for unity over time by addressing their answers about personal identity to 
the reidentification question. In doing so I set out the basic features of a narrative 
self-constitution approach, showing that it is concerned with practices of life 
organisation, including the role of constraints on what counts as a self-constituting 
narrative, and so further develop the relationship between identity and agency.  
 
In the second section I address criticisms to the claim that narrative 
approaches assume a self as distinct from the human being and assume falsely that 
there is a deep diachronic unity to our lives. I introduce Galen Strawson’s critique 
of narrative as consisting of a false empirical claim and as an ethically pernicious 
claim. I then respond to these criticisms by first drawing on the role of “narrative 
emplotment” to show that the claim about narrative unity is not an empirical 
claim, but a conceptual claim that narrative is a necessary organising principle of 
our lives, a principle which makes our lives ours. Moreover, by arguing that 
narrative synthesises time, it provides the ground for the claim that narrative is 
dynamic and can explain both continuity over time, as well as address the question 
of change over time. I then respond to Strawson’s second, ethical criticism by 
drawing out the importance of narrative coherence for unified agency. I discuss 
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accounts of people suffering from narrative disruption to show the importance of a 
coherent self-narrative and unified agency for personal flourishing.   
 
3.1 Personal Identity and the Extreme Claim 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the first-personal accounts are best 
illuminated as claims about practical identity (and not theoretical claims about 
metaphysical identity). In so doing I argued for the irreducibility of the first-
personal perspective and an understanding of personal identity in terms of self-
constitution and (self-reflexive) agency. I drew on and developed Korsgaard’s 
approach to practical identity as about acting for reasons which unify agency and 
establish a character over time. I also raised concerns by Atkins and Mackenzie 
that Korsgaard’s approach, whilst explaining unified agency at time, accounts less 
well for unified agency, or the persistence of an agent, over time. Korsgaard’s 
discussion of self-constitution and that reasons project one into the future and 
thereby impose unity on the self does provide the direction for developing an 
account of the persistence of an agent over time. This connects with a narrative 
approach to self-constitution, wherein it is argued that the unity of a person’s 
practical identity is understood as structured by narrative. This also provides a 
basis for seeing what was missing in the analysis of first-personal accounts of self-
change consequent upon neural implants (2.4) - that we need to incorporate 
narrative structures as making sense of a life as my life over time. Narrative self-
understanding is how we organise our experience and constitute the self as 
continuous and persistent in the face of the flux, contingency and change of 
everyday experience. In contrast to psychological and biological continuity 
approaches outlined in the previous chapter, the central claim of narrative is that 
personal identity should not be thought of in terms of discrete events or time-
slices, but rather personal identity, and a person, should be understood in terms of 
the narrative structures which unify their lives. As Mackenzie writes:  
The central claim of narrative approaches to identity or agency is that the lives of 
persons cannot be thought of as a series of discrete, disconnected experiences or 
events. Rather, to be a person is to exercise narrative capacities for self-
interpretation that unify our lives over time.177 
 
In this section I provide an account of the general features of Schechtman’s 
narrative approach of self-constitution and how such an approach can explain the 
persistence or continuity of the agent over time.  I build on Schechtman’s 
distinction between questions of reidentification and characterisation outlined in 
the previous chapter (2.1.b & 2.2.a). I present Schechtman’s argument that 
contemporary psychological continuity approaches are vulnerable to the extreme 
                                            
177 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 11. 
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claim – the objection that identity as defined by psychological continuity theorists 
‘is not sufficient to bear the importance we attach to it’.178 Schechtman argues that 
because psychological continuity approaches attempt to explain identity through 
addressing the reidentification criterion, in terms of the sameness of consciousness 
of independent time-slices, this is an insufficient account of the persisting subject 
of experience. Without such an account psychological and biological continuity 
approaches are unable to explain the practical importance we attach to identity, 
nor the relation between identity and the four features - survival, compensation, 
self-interested concern and moral responsibility.179 I then present Schechtman’s 
argument that the narrative self-constitution approach, by addressing the 
characterisation question, can account for an enduring subject of experience and 
explain the relation between personal identity and the four features. As such the 
narrative constitution view can account for the importance we attach to personal 
identity and is not vulnerable to the extreme claim. Schechtman’s argument turns 
on refiguring the understanding of ‘the sameness of consciousness’ from a causal 
relation of discrete time slices to a relation of attribution, which is structured by 
narrative and creates a temporally extended, single subject of experience.  
3.1a Reidentification and the extreme claim  
 
In this section I set out Schechtman’s argument that psychological continuity 
approaches are vulnerable to the extreme claim; that is, they fail to account for the 
practical importance we attach to identity, because they cannot account for the 
unity of a single persisting subject of experience.  
 
Schechtman argues that we have pre-philosophical intuitions about the 
relation between personal identity and the four features of existence - survival, 
compensation, moral responsibility, and self-interested concern. Schechtman 
argues that we have intuitions that a persisting subject must endure in order to 
explain the set practices surrounding the four features.180 Schechtman argues that 
any adequate account of personal identity must be able to express this relation to 
the four features in order to adequately explain what matters to us in claims about 
identity change - it must account for the unity of the experiencing subject.181 As 
Schechtman states: 
Survival involves the continuation of the same experiencing subject; moral 
responsibility requires that the experiencing subject who commits a crime be the 
one to experience the punishment; self-interested concern requires that the person 
having an experience in the future be the one who anticipates it, and 
                                            
178 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 62. 
179 Whilst the aim of biological continuity approaches may not be to explain the practical 
significance of the first-person perspective in identity, Schechtman’s point is that any 
approach to identity should explain this significance. 
180 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 51. 
181 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 78, cf 158. 
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compensation demands that the same experiencing subject who suffers a sacrifice 
enjoy the later benefits. In order to capture the connection between personal 
identity and the four features, then, we need a view according to which personal 
identity implies sameness of experiencing subject.182 
Schechtman argues that psychological continuity approaches have been 
attractive because they implicitly draw upon the importance to us of practical 
continuity in survival, compensation, self-interested concern and moral 
responsibility. However, whilst psychological continuity approaches take it as 
their task to explain this relation, the form of the reidentification question forces 
their responses in a direction that makes this impossible and makes them 
vulnerable to the extreme claim.183 And so, Schechtman’s critique strikes these 
approaches where they claim to be the strongest.184 
 
Schechtman sets forth the original formulation of the extreme claim as 
follows.185 The first premise claims that numerical identity is required to explain 
the relation to the four features, that qualitative similarity between the 
psychological lives of distinct individuals is not a deep enough relation to account 
for a persisting subject of experience and so to underlie the four features.  
Schechtman writes:  
[T]he first premise tells us that qualitative similarity of the psychological life of 
two distinct individuals, A and B, is not sufficient for A to survive as B, or for B 
to be held morally responsible for A’s actions, or for A to have self-interested fear 
regarding B’s pain, or for B to be compensated by rewards to A.186 
When unpacking this claim in terms of compensation, Schechtman draws on 
the example of Sally and her twin sister – whilst it may be appropriate to expect 
Sally to work overtime to pay for her college expenses, it is not appropriate to 
expect Sally’s twin sister to work overtime to pay for Sally’s college expenses.187 
The second premise claims that on the psychological continuity view all that 
identity amounts to is psychological similarity between distinct individuals’ - this 
collapses the distinction between being me and someone being like me.188 On the 
psychological continuity approach all it is for some future person to be me is for 
that person to have a psychological life qualitatively like mine. Schechtman argues 
                                            
182 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 149. 
183 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 91-92. 
184 In the previous chapter I outlined Schechtman’s argument that the logical form of the 
reidentification demands an all or nothing response, and to account for the fact that psychological 
continuity comes in degrees, psychological continuity theorists are forced to adopt either a 
reductionist or a four-dimensionalist view of persons to avoid problem cases like fission. Here, I set 
out her claim, that in doing so this makes them vulnerable to the extreme claim, that is, they 
construe psychological continuity in terms of the relation between two distinct temporal person-
slices. This understanding of identity s too weak to explain the relation to the four features, and so, 
psychological theories are vulnerable to the extreme claim.  
185 Schechtman notes that this objection was originally raised against Locke by Reid and 
Butler, see Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 52. 
186 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 52. 
187 For a fuller discussion of the motivation for the first premise, see Schechtman, The 
Constitution of Selves, 52-53. 
188 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 53. 
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that this position is forced upon the psychological continuity approach because it 
defines personal identity in terms of causal relations between temporal parts that 
are really distinct from one another.189 These two premises establish the conclusion 
that the psychological continuity theory cannot explain the relation between 
identity and the four features, because it cannot account for the sameness of the 
continuing subject, and so fails to account for the importance of identity. 
 
Schechtman argues that the extreme claim, whilst historically set forth as a 
general problem for psychological approaches to identity, can also be applied to 
contemporary psychological continuity approaches, including both reductionist 
and four-dimensionalist variants.190 This happens because they address the 
relation to the four features in terms of the reidentification question and so are 
forced to treat the sameness of consciousness in terms of the logical form of the 
reidentification question - in terms of the relation between person-stages at two 
different times.191 The structure of the reidentification question ‘draws a wedge’ 
between the person at t1 and t2. Schechtman describes this wedge in terms of the 
inability of psychological approaches to account for the deep persisting subject 
and so for moral responsibility, thus demonstrating their vulnerability to the 
extreme claim. 
The phrasing that is forced on reidentification theorists draws a wedge between 
the criminal and the recipient of the punishment which is not easily bridged. It 
requires that we first attribute the crime to one person (or person time-slice) and 
then attribute the punishment to an independently definable person (or person 
time-slice) and then ask whether these two persons are the same (or whether 
these two person time-slices are slices of the same person). The problem is that 
this means we can only attribute the crime to the person receiving the punishment 
indirectly—it must first be attributed to a past subject and then attributed to the 
present subject only via its connection with the past one. The need to define these 
two subjects independently, which reidentification theorists must do to avoid 
circularity, makes it impossible to attribute the past crime directly to the presently 
existing subject. … [H]owever, if the crime is not attributed directly to that 
subject we cannot define a strong enough relation between the subject to whom it 
is attributed and the subject we plan to punish to make the punishment justifiable 
(the same argument holds, of course, for self-interested concern, compensation, 
and survival).192 
 
Schechtman notes that there have been many attempts by proponents of 
psychological continuity approaches to respond to the extreme claim, but argues 
none are satisfactory, because the form of the reidentification question prohibits 
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an answer that can capture the relation between the four features and identity.193 
Here I outline Parfit’s response to the extreme claim and Schechtman’s analysis of 
it. Recall in the previous chapter that Parfit concluded that ‘identity is not what 
matters’ in survival - what matters in survival is psychological connections. 
Schechtman considers two ways that Parfit’s claim might undercut the force of the 
charge of the extreme claim: directly, by denying identity matters, i.e. that identity 
is not as important as we thought it was,194 or indirectly by denying the first 
premise that numerical identity is required for personal identity and to explain the 
relation to the four features, and so avoid the conclusion.195 Schechtman rejects 
both, the first carries no weight against the charge of the extreme claim, just 
claiming that it is not a problem does not actually meet the objection contained in 
the extreme claim, and the second only serves to demonstrate that psychological 
continuation is itself unimportant and so the affect we feel concerning the four 
features requires some other sort of explanation.196 
 
Parfit’s response however takes a different, counterintuitive, tack. Parfit would 
be non-plussed or unconvinced by Schechtman’s arguments, for he takes the 
conclusion that numerical identity does not matter, not to be a refutation of his 
theory, but rather as an interesting result, in the face of which Parfit urges us to 
revise our pre-philosophical intuitions concerning the relation of identity to the 
four features and so reject our common sense conceptions about survival, 
compensation, self-interested concern and moral responsibility and revise our 
practices accordingly. Schechtman writes: 
Parfit … does not suggest that his claim that identity is not what matters refutes 
the extreme claim. Instead, he acknowledges that his psychological criterion has 
the consequence that we are mistaken in some of our most fundamental beliefs 
and practices. He is willing to admit that a person’s relation to himself in the past 
and future is no different in kind from his relation to others, and that there is no 
reason why we should attach the affect and importance we do to either identity or 
psychological continuity. Parfit’s ingenious move is to refuse to see this 
consequence as a reductio of the psychological continuity theory, claiming it 
instead as an interesting result.197 
 
Whilst counterintuitive, Schechtman recognises Parfit’s response is consistent, 
but questions ‘why we should be willing to accept it’.198 If we started out wanting 
to explain the relation identity bears to the four features and common practices, 
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and psychological continuity approaches argue we should be convinced by their 
accounts precisely because they can explain this relation, when they fail to do so, 
why shouldn’t we reject psychological continuity approaches, rather than abandon 
our aim? Just because psychological continuity approaches are presented as ‘our 
best hope’ of capturing our intuitions about personal identity, if they cannot 
explain the phenomena, why should we then reject our pre-philosophical 
intuitions and so accept that there is no deep unity throughout the course of a 
person’s life, i.e. no deep connection between different parts of a person’s life. 199 
Just because reidentification theorists have failed to show that there is a deep 
unity throughout the course of a person’s life it doesn’t mean that no account of 
identity can capture the relation to the four features, only that there is no 
reidentification criterion that can. Schechtman argues that rather than abandon 
our pre-philosophical intuitions we should give up the goal of attempting to 
explain these intuitions using the reidentification criterion. Instead we should 
address ourselves to answering the characterisation question with a different kind 
of theory of identity, which is narrative self-constitution.  
3.1.b Characterisation and narrative self-constitution 
 
Schechtman argues that the characterisation question is the appropriate 
context in which to investigate the relation between personal identity and the four 
features – i.e. our intuitions linking identity to the four features arise in the 
context of questions of characterisation. Recall, the characterisation question 
understands identity as ‘the set of characteristics that make a person who she is’, 
in contrast to the reidentification question which understands identity as ‘the 
relation that every object bears to itself and to nothing else’.200 Schechtman further 
argues that as narrative self-constitution addresses the characterisation question it 
can account for the persistence of the subject over time and as such can explain 
the relation between identity and the four features and so is not vulnerable to the 
extreme claim.  
 
In contrast to the reidentification question, the characterisation question asks 
‘which actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on … 
are to be attributed to a given person’.201 Schechtman contrasts the differing 
logical forms of the two questions and the answers they require as follows:  
The reidentification question seeks to define a relation between two distinct person-
time-slices that makes them slices of the same person. The characterization 
question, on the other hand, seeks to define a relation that holds between a person 
and particular actions, experiences, or characteristics that are hers.202 
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As such, Schechtman argues, the form of the characterisation question, which 
defines connections between persons and their actions, and not between two 
independent time-slices, is in harmony with the four features and not 
automatically vulnerable to the extreme claim - that is, we can attribute actions 
and experiences directly to a subject.203  
In the context of the characterization question we define connections between 
persons and the actions, experiences, and characteristics which are theirs, and so 
the question, “Is this the person who committed the crime?” can be seen quite 
simply as the question, “Is this past action attributable to the person/subject we 
plan to punish?” There is nothing in the form of the characterization question that 
prevents us from attributing past actions and experiences directly to present 
persons, and so providing them with a strong enough relation to those actions and 
experiences to justify our judgments of moral responsibility, self-interested 
concern, compensation, and survival.204 
 
Moreover, the logical form of answers to characterisation are in harmony with 
psychological continuity which comes in degrees - a characteristic can be central 
to one’s actions, one can have a belief to certain degree, unlike the demands of the 
reidentification criterion that understands identity as an all-or-nothing affair.  
When we ask whether a person at t2 is the same as a person at t1 the answer 
should be quite simply “yes” or “no.” … With many questions of characterization, 
however, the requirement of all-or-nothingness does not apply. If, for instance, 
we ask whether P1 believes X or desires Y, the answer might be a simple “yes” or 
“no,” but it might also be a longer story. We could be told “he believes X, but only 
half-heartedly” or “she says she wants Y, but she certainly doesn’t seem to be very 
actively pursuing it” or “he believes X, but I bet if you pressed him he would be 
willing to give it up” or “her desire for Y is the driving force of her existence, it is 
what her whole life is about.”205  
 
Schechtman notes that the characterisation question is most often framed in 
terms of which characteristics are ‘truly’ those of some person, in contrast to those 
which just occur in her history.206 Relations of attribution answer the 
characterisation question and these can come in degrees.  
The degree to which an action expresses a person’s identity is, moreover, 
precisely what the characterization question seeks to determine. An account of 
characterization should tell us whether a particular action is something that 
merely occurs in a person’s history …, something that is quite solidly hers, or 
something that flows naturally from features absolutely central to her character.207 
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It is not just whether an action occurs in a person’s history, but whether and to 
what degree one identifies with it. Further, the four features admit of degrees. 
Looking at the centrality of an action to a person’s identity, in the characterisation 
questions sense of identity, is relevant to moral judgments, questions of self-
interested concern, compensation and survival, all of which come in degrees. For 
example, one can be more or less responsible for a given action that occurs in 
one’s history and the degree to which an action is central to her identity links to 
how responsible we hold her to be. With respect to self-concern a person has an 
interest in the fulfillment of her desires, but more importantly not every desire, 
rather her considered desires; that is, the question as to which desires and goals a 
person takes to be important (important enough to sacrifice others desires or 
goals).208 With respect to compensation we ask about the degree to which an 
individual is compensated for something and ‘the degree to which a given 
individual is compensated by something obviously depends (at least in part) on 
how internal the goal it allows him to fulfill’,209 that is, rewards can be more or less 
his, and compensate him, more or less. Survival also admits of degrees and 
survival is linked to identity in the sense of characterisation rather than 
reidentification. As Schechtman notes a person is alive, that is, survives, to the 
degree to which her characteristics, actions and experiences are her own - to the 
degree to which they are expressed in her life.210 To demonstrate this claim, 
Schechtman cites a continuum of cases, including irretrievable loss of 
consciousness (literal psychological death), and changes in personality 
experienced by victims of trauma, addicts, or cult members.  
[W]hat the addict, prisoner of war, or abused spouse is being robbed of is, in a 
very real sense, his or her life. 
… There is a clear sense in which it is reasonable to say that those living under 
such extreme duress and coercion that their lives are in no way self-expressive are 
indeed less alive than a person in ordinary circumstances.211 
On this understanding, Schechtman claims we can make sense of the 
statements that people have “lost their identities” and “are no longer the same 
person” or “that the person we knew is gone” - these types of statements should 
not be understood as merely or entirely metaphorical, but as statements that can 
be taken literally and as such can be taken as literally true. 
 
Having argued that questions of characterisation are not automatically 
vulnerable to the extreme claim, Schechtman proposes the narrative self-
                                            
208 Schechtman recasts self-interested concern from a concern with pain and pleasure to a 
concern to fulfill desires and pursue goals. Schechtman similarly recasts compensation, for 
example we forgo some desire to be better able to fulfill others. See Schechtman, The Constitution of 
Selves, 85-86. 
209 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 86. 
210 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 89. 
211 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 88. Poltera notes that survivors of trauma often say 
that they are not the same person they were before, see Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and 
Empathetic Listeners,” 71. 
  85 
constitution view as the adequate theoretical response to the characterisation 
question concerning personal identity. Narrative self-constitution can account for 
a deeply unified and persisting subject of experience and so can illuminate our 
intuitions concerning the relationship between identity and the four features and 
so can explain the sense of a life as mine and why things matter to me.212 
The formation of an identity-constituting narrative creates a single, temporally 
extended subject of experience, and any two actions or experiences attributed to 
the same person by this view are necessarily attributable to the same subject of 
experience. It is thus fairly clear, at least in general terms, that the narrative self-
constitution view is able to avoid the extreme claim and to illuminate our 
intuitions concerning personal identity and the four features.213 
 
 I now explain on Schechtman’s account how narrative creates a persisting 
subject of experience. Schechtman argues that ‘a person creates his identity by 
forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life’.214 On this approach, 
‘[a] person’s identity is created by a self-conception that is narrative in form’.215 
Schechtman writes: 
At the core of this view [the narrative self-constitution view] is the assertion that 
individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as 
persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and will continue to have 
experiences in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs. … On this view a 
person’s identity (in the sense at issue in the characterization question) is 
constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and 
experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers.216 
 
Through narrative structures individuals organise their experience which 
establishes the individual’s subjective relation to her actions and experiences. 
Schechtman argues that narrative self-conceptions have the logic and form of a 
story, that is, of a conventional, linear narrative.217 A narrative is a form of self-
conception that involves holism - individual events become intelligible when their 
place in the broader story is articulated.218 The claim about holism, that actions are 
only intelligible in the context of the whole of a person’s life, contrasts with those 
approaches that understand the lives of persons in terms of discrete time-slices.219  
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To say that a person’s life is narrative in character, then, is at least in part to claim 
that no time-slice (if you will) is fully intelligible—or even definable—outside the 
context of the life in which it occurs. To say that a person’s self-conception is 
narrative is to say that she understands her own life in this way—interpreting the 
individual episodes in terms of their place in the unfolding story. A person’s self-
conception is a narrative self-conception, then, insofar as the incidents and 
experiences that make up his life are not viewed in isolation, but interpreted as 
part of the ongoing story that gives them their significance.220 
 
Narrative form is both intelligible and coherent. Moreover, Schechtman 
argues that our self-conception must take this form i.e. the form of a narrative but 
more specifically the form of the story of a person’s life. And, being a person 
involves recognising that it should be so, that is, in order to be a person one must 
have a ‘particular type of subjectivity and orientation towards one’s life’ and that 
is, to see one’s life unfolding ‘according to the logic of a story’.221 As Schechtman 
writes: ‘The narrative self-constitution view thus demands that a person’s self-
conception take the form of a traditional linear narrative because it is this kind of 
self-conception which underlies the attitudes and practices that define the life of a 
person’.222 On Schechtman’s approach, a narrative self-conception is not a 
‘luxury’, but rather is a principle by which we organise our lives: 
The sense of one’s life as unfolding according to the logic of a narrative is not just 
an idea we have, it is an organizing principle of our lives. It is the lens through 
which we filter our experience and plan for actions, not a way we think about 
ourselves in reflective hours.223 
 
A narrative is intelligible in degrees, varying from an extreme of perfect 
intelligibility in which there is a strong or high degree of cohesion between the 
aspects in a person’s life story in to a random sequence of experiences (which bear 
little relation to one another). Narratives can be mostly intelligible, conflicted, 
such as in an identity crisis, and disjointed, such as a person with advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease.224   
Personhood and attribution, like coherence, admit of degrees, and the degree of 
personhood and attribution varies with the degree to which a person’s narrative 
coheres. This is true in two senses. First the degree to which a person’s identity is 
well-defined overall depends on the degree of cohesiveness of his narrative as a 
whole. This fits nicely with our pre-philosophical intuitions—the more the 
different elements of a person’s life hang together the more definite she is as a 
character, and so the better defined her identity. Second, the more a particular 
action, experience, or characteristic coheres with the rest of a person’s narrative 
(that is, the more in character it is), the greater the degree to which it contributes 
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to the overall intelligibility of that narrative and so the greater degree to which it 
is attributable to him.225  
 
So, for a narrative to be self-constituting, narrative must be intelligible and 
coherent, and the more intelligible and coherent, the more well defined the 
character of the person. However, not all personal narratives are identity-
constituting (and not all are autonomy enhancing, as well shall see in chapter 5). 
According to Schechtman, a self-narrative must be intelligible, to oneself and to 
others, at least in part and to some degree.  A self-narrative is identity-constituting 
if it satisfies two constraints - the articulation constraint and the reality constraint. 
As Schechtman writes: 
A view that held that any narrative self-conception was identity-constituting 
would be committed to the obviously false claim that persons cannot be mistaken 
about themselves. The narrative self-constitution view avoids this result by 
placing constraints on the kind of narrative that can constitute a person’s identity. 
Only narratives that fall within these constraints are taken to be identity-defining, 
and what we commonly take to be mistakes in self-conception are, on this view, 
places where a person’s self-narrative violates these constraints.226 
 
These constraints introduce the idea that a person’s self-conception must 
cohere with others’ expectation of what a self-constituting narrative is, as well as 
their understanding of her narrative. With these constraints on narrative, 
Schechtman introduces a relational understanding of narrative identity. Not just 
any story I tell is identity-constituting; rather, others play a role in the constitution 
of my narrative identity.227 If a self-narrative is to be identity-constituting, the 
articulation constraint requires that one’s self-narrative is capable of articulation. 
That is, one should be able to give an account of one’s history and motivations. As 
Schechtman writes: ‘[t]he narrator should be able to explain why he does what he 
does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels’228, in response to others’ 
requests for an explanation of his actions, motives and so on. Whilst one need not 
be able to self-consciously narrate their whole life, on Schechtman’s account, one 
must be able to narrate parts of it. Further, Schechtman draws a distinction 
between “implicit” self-narratives and “explicit” self-narratives. An implicit self-
narrative includes a person’s underlying ‘psychological organization’, one may not 
be able to explain one’s implicit self-narrative, but should be able articulate, or 
render explicit, a self-narrative.229  On Schechtman’s account, those self-narratives 
that I explicitly endorse are more identity-constituting than those that are not. 
Below a minimal level of self-articulation one becomes incapable of directing and 
taking responsibility for one’s actions. 
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The reality constraint requires that one’s self-narrative cohere with reality if it 
is to be identity-constituting. Schechtman explains that whilst a self-narrative 
need not be accurate in every regard, to be identity-constituting it must cohere 
with basic observational facts about the world. Schechtman writes: ‘This is not to 
say that a narrative must be totally accurate in every regard or contain no trivial 
mistakes, but it should exhibit a fundamental grasp of what the world is like’.230 
This constraint rules out self-narratives that are delusional, based on large or 
obvious factual errors, or at odds with others’ views about oneself. 
 
These constraints on narrative underscore the importance of these activities 
for identifying and constructing patterns of meaning. As Atkins’ notes: ‘Behind all 
these constraints on identity is the same principle, namely, that elements of a 
narrative identity must stand in relations of mutual implication and explanation’.231 
So, constraints on narrative work to explain the interplay between the first and 
third perspectives. This is where challenges to a person’s identity arise, causing a 
disjunction between first- and third-personal perspectives. Schechtman’s approach 
here recognises that self-constitution requires objective reference.  
 
Schechtman argues that these constraints on narrative explain the four 
features and yield the kind of subjectivity that allows for the life of a person.232 
Schechtman draws on a rereading of Locke’s “sameness of consciousness” in terms 
of attribution to support her account of what it is to have an identity-constituting 
self-narrative and so her argument that narrative avoids charges of the extreme 
claim. This rereading argues that Locke’s discussions about identity and reward 
and punishment (i.e., forensic personhood) address the characterisation question - 
the ascription of particular actions and experiences to a particular person, in terms 
of a relation of attribution, and that Locke is not meaning to address the 
reidentification question in terms of memory connections. Schechtman argues that 
with this phrase ‘personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness’ Locke is 
talking about the extension of consciousness, stressing the affective (and not so 
much cognitive) side of consciousness.233 Locke describes consciousness in terms 
of pleasure and pain and happiness and memory, as Schechtman writes: ‘it is in 
consciousness that we experience the affect that underlies self-interested concern, 
compensation, and justice and punishment’.234 Locke makes a connection between 
the affective aspects of consciousness and the appropriation of particular actions 
and experiences and so explains how certain present experiences become part of 
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present consciousness, as well as past experience, i.e. consciousness extending 
back in time.  
Present actions are made part of a person’s present consciousness by affecting his 
well-being or causing him pleasure or pain. Locke tells us that persons make past 
actions and experiences theirs on just the same grounds, so on his view past 
actions and experiences become those of a present person if they affect present 
consciousness, causing the person pleasure and pain in the present. On this reading 
we extend consciousness back in time to some past action or experience by caring 
about it in the appropriate way—by feeling its effects.235 
 
With this argument, Schechtman argues that narrative creates a single 
persisting subject of experience over time. As Schechtman writes:  
The formation of an identity-constituting narrative alters the nature of an 
individual’s experience in a way that extends consciousness over time, producing 
a persisting experiencer who is the primary experiencing subject.236 
Schechtman argues that consciousness and subjectivity should be conceived as 
spread out over time rather than made up of a series of independent time-slices, 
and that the incorporation of actions and experiences into one’s narrative alters 
subjectivity. This shows that the experience of a person is had by an extended 
narrative subject and not by a time-slice.237 Schechtman uses a set of analogies to 
draw out the difference. Whilst substantialist accounts view the continuity of 
persons in terms of beads on a string (where the string is the person and the beads 
their distinct experiences)238 and reductionist views in terms of a river (where the 
flow of the river indicates the unity of a person, i.e. ‘persons consist in the steady 
stream of different experiences’),239 narrative self-constitution views the 
composition of the person in terms of a ‘complicated soup or stew’240 - whilst made 
up of separate ingredients, they interact and influence one another. On this 
analogy the ingredients are understood as a complex whole and not as a ‘collection 
of ingredients laid out in some particular arrangement’.241 As Schechtman writes: 
The narrative is like the soup into which experiences are thrown, seasoning and 
altering one another—the past is reinterpreted and experienced in a new light in 
virtue of the present; the expectation of the future gives a different taste to 
current experience; and future experiences will have their character within the 
context of the whole.242 
 
This process creates a subject who is conceptually prior to experience (i.e. 
conceptually prior to its temporal parts). As Schechtman writes: 
[T]he organization of experience into a narrative self-conception actually changes 
the nature of subjectivity in a way that is reasonably described as the creation of a 
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temporally extended experiencing subject who is conceptually prior to 
experience.243 
Further, with narrative self-constitution we attribute actions to the same 
narrative self.  
The formation of an identity-constituting narrative creates a single-temporally 
extended subject of experience, and any two actions or experiences attributed to 
the same person by view are necessarily attributable to the same subject of 
experience. It is thus fairly clear, at least in general terms, that the narrative self-
constitution view is able to avoid the extreme claim and to illuminate our 
intuitions concerning personal identity and the four features. 
Schechtman argues that, with an account of the persistence of a single, 
experiencing subject, we can further make sense of the attitudes and practices 
surrounding the four features.244 In this analysis, again, the relevant unit is 
narrative as a whole (and not a time-slice) 
Since the relevant unit of concern on this view is the narrative as a whole, and 
since a person has an interest in the character of the whole of her life story, it 
makes sense that just punishment must take questions of identity into account. On 
the narrative self-constitution view, that the person who committed the crime is 
the one who is punished for it is saying that the crime and punishment occur in 
the same narrative.245 
 
Thus, for Schechtman, narrative self-constitution creates a single persisting 
subject which acts as the basis for the four features. This subject has an interest, 
or concern for, not just the present moment, but in the whole of her life story. As 
such the narrative self-constitution can explain why personal identity matters and 
the role of our pre-philosophical intuitions and practices surrounding the four 




In this section I have outlined Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution 
approach to practical identity as an answer to the characterisation question, an 
approach which can explain the deep unity of person’s life in relation to the four 
features grounding our concerns about identity over time. I have contrasted this 
approach with her critique of psychological continuity approaches which fail to 
account for unity over time by addressing their answers about personal identity to 
the reidentification question. In doing so I set out the basic features of a narrative 
self-constitution account, showing that it is concerned with practices of life 
organisation, including the role of constraints on what counts as a self-constituting 
narrative, and so the relationship between identity and agency. 
 
                                            
243 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 145, cf 157. 
244 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 161. 
245 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 160. 
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3.2 Defending Narrative 
 
The claim that persons constitute their identity through the construction of 
self-narratives has been subject to a number of criticisms. These can broadly be 
grouped into ‘metaphysical’ and ‘ethical’ criticisms. These criticisms are 
recognised in Strawson’s well-known arguments against narrative approaches - 
that they present a false descriptive thesis and a pernicious ethical thesis. In this 
section, drawing on the role of constraints on narrative for identity-constituting 
narrative, I defend Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution approach against 
these criticisms.246 This draws out the importance of narrative as an organising 
principle of people’s lives that can explain both the unity (or stability) and 
contingency and flux of human lives, as well as the importance of narrative 
coherence or unity for an integrated self-conception and leading the life of a 
person. In doing so, I also distinguish Schechtman’s narrative approach from 
other approaches to narrative self-constitution.247 
 
I firstly introduce Strawson’s critique of narrative as both a false empirical 
claim and as an ethically pernicious claim. I then respond to these criticisms by 
first discussing the role of narrative emplotment and temporality using Ricoeur to 
show that narrative unity is not a claim about an empirical unity, rather it is a 
claim about a necessary organising principle of our lives which make our lives 
ours - that is, a conceptual claim about the necessity of practical unity and the role 
of narrative in structuring subjectivity. I then respond to the ethical criticism by 
drawing on accounts of people who suffer incoherence in their lives to show the 
importance of self integration to our flourishing and that narrative coherence is a 
claim about the practical importance of diachronic unity in a person’s life.  
3.2.a Strawson’s critique of narrative  
 
Strawson argues for a metaphysical materialist account of the synchronic unity 
of the (mental) self which he uses as the basis for critique of narrative approaches 
to personal identity. Narrative approaches, Strawson argues, rely on a mistaken 
understanding that self continuity is diachronic, which Strawson thinks rests on 
the mistaken assumption that the self is a distinct entity from the human being. 
From this position Strawson argues that narrative is a false descriptive thesis and 
a pernicious ethical thesis.  
                                            
246 In the following chapter, I critically engage with, and extend on, Schechtman’s self-
constitution view of narrative. Here, my aim is to show that Schechtman’s narrative self-
constitution can meet Strawson’s objections. 
247 See Schechtman for a discussion of differing approaches to narrative in personal identity. 
Marya Schechtman, “The Narrative Self,” Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University 
Publishing, 2011). Also, see Anthony Rudd, “In Defence of Narrative,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 17 (2007). 
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Strawson argues that the problem of the self arises from the phenomenological 
experience of a “sense of self”, and as such, the problem of the self is not an 
illusion which arises from an improper use of language. Strawson writes:  
Most people believe in the self, conceived of as a distinct thing, although they are 
not clear what it is. Why do they believe in it? Because they have a distinct sense 
of, or experience as of, the self, and they take it that it is not delusory. This sense 
of the self is the source in experience of the philosophical problem of the self.248 
Strawson argues that a metaphysical account of the self must start with the 
phenomenological experience of the self; the factual metaphysical question - is 
there such a thing as a self? - requires an answer to the phenomenological 
question, what is the nature of the human sense of self? Strawson defines the 
phenomenological as experience/conception of a mental self249 - ‘a distinctively 
mental phenomenon’ or ‘distinct mental thing’.250 This he distinguishes and 
separates from consideration of the human being as a whole. 
What, then, is the ordinary, human sense of the self, in so far as we can generalize 
about it? I propose that it is (at least) the sense that people have of themselves as 
being, specifically, a mental presence; a mental someone; a single mental thing 
that is a conscious subject of experience, that has a certain character or 
personality, and that is in some sense distinct from all of its particular 
experiences, thoughts, and so on, and indeed from all other things.251 
Strawson lists eight properties that the sense of the mental self is ordinarily 
conceived or experienced as, including: as a single, distinct mental thing, both at a 
time and over time, as the subject of experience, an agent and as a personality. 
Strawson writes:  
[T]he mental self is conceived or experienced as (1) a thing, (2) a mental thing, a 
single thing that is single both (3) synchronically considered and (4) diachronically 
considered, (5) a thing that is ontically distinct from all other things, (6) a subject of 
experience and (7) an agent that has (8) a certain personality.252 
From this list of properties Strawson rejects properties (4), (7) and (8) and 
argues that the sense of the mental self (SMS) should be thought of as a single 
thing which has a strong unity of internal connectedness (and its principle of unity 
is taken to be mental).253 Strawson argues that the phenomenological experience 
                                            
248 Galen Strawson, “‘The Self’,” in Models of the Self, ed. Shaun Gallagher and Jonathon Shear 
(Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2002), 2. 
249 This is phenomenology understood as a form of bracketing with direct experience of the 
object (a kind of empirical phenomenology), i.e. we can establish a metaphysical self in abstraction 
from thinking about the complex embodied human being considered as a whole. This is in contrast 
to the phenomenological approach I draw on in the previous chapter and develop throughout this 
thesis. The phenomenological approach I develop takes psyhco-corporeal holism as its starting 
point. On this account embodiment grounds agency, which precedes, and enables, a unified self-
conception. Strawson denies the importance of agency to the question of selfhood. 
250 Strawson here perpetuates the mind/body distinction as he connects, or motivates, our 
sense of ourselves a distinct mental thing with ‘the feeling that one’s body is just a vehicle or vessel 
for the mental thing that is what one really or most essentially is.’ Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 3. 
251 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 3. 
252 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 8. 
253 As my concern here is more with criticisms of narrative, I do not address Strawson’s 
arguments for materialism. 
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of self yields a synchronic unity of self, as a thing existing at a given time - ‘an 
experientially unitary or unbroken or hiatus-free period of thought or 
experience’.254 This sense of self exists momentarily for a small duration of time, a 
few seconds of thought or experience. According to Strawson, the 
phenomenological experience does not reveal a sense of self as a diachronic unity - 
of a single thing that persists through time, having long-term continuity.255 ‘[O]ne 
can have a full sense of the single mental self at any given time without thinking of 
the self as something that has long-term continuity’.256 Strawson finds ‘no direct 
phenomenological warrant in the moment-to-moment nature of our thought 
processes’257 for long-term continuity and concludes that a sense of self is complete 
without it.  
 
Strawson argues for a metaphysical “pearl theory” of momentary successive 
mental selves - selves which follow each other one at a time like pearls on a string. 
Strawson writes:  
I will call my view the Pearl view, because it suggests that many mental selves 
exist, one at a time and one after another, like pearls on a string, in the case of 
something like a human being.258 
Strawson concludes that diachronic unity across time is not necessary for an 
account of the self (as mental and metaphysical), despite the common conviction 
to the contrary, and explains that the sense of any long term continuity is derived 
from indirect sources such as through memory.  
I have been arguing … that the sense of the mental self as something that has 
long-term continuity lacks a certain sense of direct phenomenological warrant in 
the moment-to-moment nature of our thought processes. It is not supported at the 
level of detail by any phenomenon of steady flow. If there is any support for belief 
in the long-term continuity of the self in the nature of moment-to-moment 
consciousness, it is derived indirectly from other sources — the massive 
consultancies and developmental coherencies of content that often link up 
experiences through time, and by courtesy of short-term memory, across all the 
jumps and breaks of flow.259 
 
Diachronic self-experience involves an extended experience of the self over 
time. Strawson states that ‘[t]he basic form of Diachronic self-experience is that 
one naturally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that was there in 
                                            
254 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 9. 
255 As we saw in 2.2.b, Parfit also denies the possibility of any kind of real extension of 
consciousness over time, beyond that of overlapping connections. Strawson goes a little further 
than Parfit in his denial that there no diachronic unity. 
256 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 19. 
257 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 19. 
258 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 20. Strawson further explains and defends this view in Galen 
Strawson, “The Self and Sesmet,” in Models of the Self, ed. Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear 
(Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2002). Strawson distinguishes his “Pearl view” from Hume’s “bundle 
theory” and Dennett’s view of the self as an abstraction, both of which propose a diachronic unity 
of differing sorts. See Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 21. Strawson also argues that his account is not 
reductionist, as he rejects both thick and thin psychological continuity conditions. 
259 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 19. 
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the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future’.260 In contrast, Episodic 
self-experience is characterised as the negative of Diachronic self-experience. 
Whilst Episodics are aware from the human perspective that they are continuous, 
qua self: ‘If one is Episodic, by contrast, one does not figure oneself, considered as 
a self, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
(further) future’.261 Diachronics, in contrast to Episodics, thus experience their 
lives as structured, far more so than Episodics.  
 
Strawson connects this conclusion to people having different characters, as 
episodic or diachronic, and claims that certain differences, such as a good 
memory, (or a narrative sense of their lives), might encourage a sense of the 
mental self that has long-term diachronic continuity, that is, in thinking of one’s 
past, or in anticipating one’s future.  
One can be fully aware of the fact that one has long-term continuity as a living 
human being without ipso facto having any significant sense of the mental self or 
subject of experience as something that has long-term continuity. One can have a 
vivid sense of oneself as a mental self, and strong natural tendency to think that 
this is what one most fundamentally is, while having little or no interest in or 
commitment to the idea that the I who is now thinking has any past or future.262 
 
Strawson further links these claims about episodic and diachronic personality 
types to narrative ways of thinking, arguing that episodic personality types are 
non-narrative, whereas diachronic personality types are narrative.  
 
Strawson takes most narrative theorists to be committed to two claims: a 
descriptive, empirical claim and a normative, ethical claim. The ‘psychological 
Narrativity thesis’, is that human beings ‘see or live or experience their lives’ in 
narrative terms.263 Strawson characterises the psychological narrative thesis as ‘a 
straightforwardly empirical, descriptive thesis about the way ordinary, normal 
human beings experience their lives’.264 ‘This is how we are, it says, this is our 
nature’.265 Strawson cites examples of this thesis in formulations of narrative by 
Oliver Sacks, Jerry Bruner and Daniel Dennett.266 The ‘ethical Narrativity thesis’ 
claims that ‘we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story’.267 It ‘states that 
experiencing or conceiving of one’s life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly 
Narrative outlook is essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood’.268 
Strawson cites examples of this thesis in formulations of narrative by Charles 
                                            
260 Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 17 (2004), 430. 
261 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 430. 
262 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 14. 
263 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428. 
264 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428. 
265 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428. 
266 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 435. 
267 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428. 
268 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428. 
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Taylor and Marya Schechtman. Strawson further notes that some approaches 
combine both the descriptive and normative claims, such as Schechtman’s 
formulation. Strawson argues that both theses are false, but whilst the descriptive 
thesis is straightforwardly or trivially false, the ethical thesis is also destructive. 
Strawson writes: 
It’s just not true that there’s only one good way for human beings to experience 
their being in time. There are deeply non-Narrative people and there are good 
ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative. I think the … views [that the 
normative thesis is true (only) or that both the descriptive and normative theses 
are true] hinder human self-understanding, close down important avenues of 
thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and wrongly 
dismiss those who do not fit their model, and are potentially destructive in 
psychotherapeutic contexts.269 
 
Strawson’s argument against the descriptive and normative thesis turns on the 
distinction between ‘Episodic’ and ‘Diachronic’ self-experience and types of 
persons noted above.   
 
According to Strawson, the distinction between Diachronics and Episodics 
shows that the descriptive and narrative claims are false. Many people, including 
Strawson himself, do not experience their life in the structured form of a 
narrative.270 Strawson describes these two types as follows: 
Some people live deeply in narrative mode: they experience their lives in terms of 
something that has shape and story, narrative trajectory. Some of them are self-
narrators in a stronger sense: they regularly rehearse and revise their 
interpretations of their lives. Some people, again, are great planners, and knit up 
their lives with long-term projects.  
Others are quite different. They have no early ambition, no later sense of 
vocation, no interest in climbing a career ladder, no tendency to see their life in 
narrative terms or as constituting a story or a development. Some merely go from 
one thing to another. They live life in a picaresque or episodic fashion. Some 
people make few plans and are little concerned with the future. Some live 
intensely in the present, some are simply aimless.271 
Strawson argues that those (many) people who are Diachronic are also 
Narrative in their approach to life, and whilst Episodics are ‘perfectly well aware 
that one has long-term continuity considered as a whole human being. Episodics 
are likely to have no particular tendency to see their life in Narrative terms’.272 So, 
whilst narrative identity, with its stress on temporally extended self-experience 
may well characterise the experience of Diachronics, it does not characterise the 
                                            
269 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 429. 
270 Strawson describes himself as Episodic, claiming he has no sense of his life as narrative in 
form, nor any sense of it being his, in anything but an ‘utterly remote and theoretical sense’. 
Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 16. Strawson also describes these dispositions, or personality types, as 
genetically determined. 
271 Strawson, “‘The Self’,” 15. 
272 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 430. 
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experience of all people, most notably, Episodics. Moreover, Strawson claims, as 
an Episodic, leads a flourishing life.273 
 
On this basis of this argument, Strawson argues that narrative is a false 
descriptive thesis which mistakenly understands the self as an enduring entity 
which exists distinct from the human being and mistakenly posits a deep or real 
diachronic unity in our lives. So, the narrative claim that people constitute their 
identities through the constitution of narrative is accordingly false. Strawson’s 
criticism of narrative self-constitution as a false descriptive thesis draws attention 
to a set of associated charges: that the concept of self-narrative suggests that we 
have more authorial control over our lives and identities than we in fact do - our 
lives are rather ones characterised by contingency and change in unpredictable 
ways;274 that the stress on authorship suggests that we must try to act like a 
character in a novel or make our lives fit the form of a literary genre - rather than 
living our lives we are constantly reflecting on them;275 and, that as narrative self-
constitution concerns interpretation and not just representation, narrative self-
constitution approaches cannot adequately distinguish truthful from deceptive or 
delusional self-narratives.276  
 
On the basis of this argument, Strawson also argues that narrative is an 
ethically pernicious feature, because it encourages the view that only some types 
of self-narratives are socially valuable. Because of the stress that narrative places 
on unity, as well as the social context, this leads to charges that narrative views 
tend towards the conventional, and so can be conservative and limiting.277  
 
Below I demonstrate that both of Strawson’s claims fail against Schechtman’s 
self-constitution approach. Schechtman’s focus on narrative as a necessary 
organising principle, which presupposes a “conceptually prior” subject, as well as 
the formulation of narrative constraints, meets Strawson’s objections.278 I firstly 
                                            
273 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 430. 
274 For an example of this line of criticism, see John Christman, “Narrative Unity as a 
Condition of Personhood,” Metaphilosophy 35 (2004). 
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278 Schechtman does respond to Strawson’s criticisms, see Marya Schechtman, “Stories, Lives, 
and Basic Survival: a Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View,” Royal Institute of Philosophy 
60 (2007). I do not engage directly with Schechtman’s response, as my concern here is to defend 
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respond to the argument that narrative is a false descriptive claim and then the 
charge that narrative is an ethically pernicious claim. 
 
3.2.b The synthetic powers of narrative 
 
In this section I respond to Strawson’s claim that narrative is a false 
descriptive or empirical thesis, which assumes a self as distinct from the existence 
of the human being and a deep diachronic unity in identity. I firstly draw on 
Schechtman’s arguments that narrative shapes subjectivity and creates an 
enduring subject, that is conceptually prior to experience. This draws attention to 
the fact that Schechtman is making a conceptual claim that narrative is an 
organising principle, and as such, is not an empirical claim about how individuals 
experience their lives. I then develop this argument by drawing on Ricoeur’s 
arguments that “narrative emplotment” synthesises and organises our experiences. 
Ricoeur’s arguments, like Schechtman’s, stress that narrative synthesis is a 
conceptual claim about how our practical identities are structured over time, and 
neither an empirical claim about experience is organised, nor a metaphysical claim 
about an ontologically prior subject. I then demonstrate that this understanding 
provides a “full blooded”, or thick, account of agency, which sets out the 
relationship between identity and agency. 
 
Schechtman argues that narrative shapes subjectivity which creates a 
conceptually prior subject. Narrative structures integrate our experience (an act 
of self-constitution) and thereby constitute the self as temporally extended. This 
stresses the point that narrative self-constitution is not an empirical claim, but a 
conceptual claim about narrative as an organising principle. According to 
Schechtman, the continuity of our lives should not be conceived as a string of 
pearls, as Strawson describes it. Rather the recognition that narrative is an 
organising principle which processes experiences, so that actions and events are 
understood holistically, means the continuity of our lives is better understood 
through analogy with a complex soup, a combination of ingredients that flavour 
one another. This addresses Strawson’s claims that narrative explanations are 
descriptive or empirical claims; moreover it addresses the argument that narrative 
is merely some reflective activity and so the charge that narrative implies that we 
must live our lives as if there were a narrative, trying to make them fit some genre. 
Recall, on Schechtman’s account a narrative self-conception is not a ‘luxury’, but 
rather is a principle by which we organise our lives: 
The sense of one’s life as unfolding according to the logic of a narrative is not just 
an idea we have, it is an organizing principle of our lives. It is the lens through 
                                                                                                                           
the general contours of Schechtman’s view against Strawson’s objections. In the following chapter 
I critically engage with Schechtman’s view, extending on it to more adequately account for the role 
of embodiment and others in the constitution of our self-narratives. 
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which we filter our experience and plan for actions, not a way we think about 
ourselves in reflective hours.279 
 
As noted in section 3.1:  
The central claim of narrative approaches to identity or agency is that the lives of 
persons cannot be thought of as a series of discrete, disconnected experiences or 
events. Rather, to be a person is to exercise narrative capacities for self-
interpretation that unify our lives over time.280 
 
Ricoeur argues that narrative thinking deploys structures, forms of practical 
reasoning (that is, reasoning directed towards action), which coordinate two 
orders of time: cosmological time - our linear time span from birth to death - and 
phenomenological time - how we experience time in terms of past, present and 
future. Ricoeur argues that mainstream philosophy has tended to treat these two 
conceptions of time in opposition to one another, understanding cosmological time 
as pertaining to physical objects and phenomenological time to psychology. In 
contrast, narrative structures bring these two orders together and it is through 
these organising and interpretative structures the unity and continuity of identity 
is articulated.281 This responds to the complexity of the human experience of 
temporality.  
 
Ricoeur draws on the mediating role of the plot in Aristotle’s Poetics to explain 
how narrative understanding renders our lives intelligible, through a process of 
“emplotment”.282 Just as a story’s plot configures the characters, motives and 
actions into a unified whole, rendering the elements of the story meaningful, so 
narrative emplotment creates a temporally, continuous, conceptual whole, thus 
rendering elements of our lives meaningful. Ricoeur writes of narrative 
understanding, that narrative is dynamic ‘synthesis of the heterogeneous’.283 
Narrative emplotment ‘extracts a configuration from a succession’284 of events, 
incidences, agents, goals, and so on; that is, narrative converts contingency to 
causality by ordering the elements of a life chronologically.285 As Atkins writes: 
The central feature of narrative is emplotment. … In a narrative, the 
schematisation of characters, objects, motives, places, circumstances, events, and 
times within a chronological order, defined by a specified beginning and end, 
brings about a cognitive affect in the reader. It converts “one thing after another” 
to “one thing because of another.” This effect is produced when the plot organises 
the connections between characters, agents, motives, objects, consequences, and 
so on, in a way that provides answers to questions of ‘who?,’ ‘with whom?,’ 
‘how?,’ ‘when?,’ and so on. When the plot provides answers to these questions it 
                                            
279 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 113. 
280 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 11. 
281 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 
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282 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 65ff. 
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simultaneously delineates the sphere of action and constitutes the internal logic of 
the narrative.286 
 
Emplotment and narrative understanding render events intelligible and 
meaningful.287 Emplotment structures our understanding of our lives in terms of a 
beginning, middle and end, as well as allowing us to ask Who, What, Why, and 
When? Narrative is the product of a protagonist’s process of emplotment. The 
relevance of the structure of emplotment is that it demonstrates that agency has a 
narrative template, and so is narrative agency. As Meyers writes: 
Intentional agency—schematically, a purpose moves someone to act in order to 
bring about an outcome—coincides with the most familiar, barebones narrative 
template—beginning/purpose, middle/act, end/outcome.288  
 
On Ricoeur’s account, narrative solves the problem of change through time, 
and thereby constitutes a continuing self, because it mediates between idem – 
sameness - and ipse - selfhood, senses of identity. Recall, this distinction was set out 
in 2.2.d to distinguish between two senses of identity and was also used by Atkins 
to motivate a contrast between the numerical identity of objects, from a third-
personal perspective, and the self-constancy of our first-personal sense of 
embodiment. Idem is concerned with identity of a person as an object in time and 
space and ipse identity is concerned with the identity of a person in terms of 
reflective selfhood. They respond to the questions: “What am I?” and “Who Am 
I?”, respectively. Ricoeur argues that there is a dialectical tension between these 
two senses of identity; ipse recognises that people change but idem identity 
requires sameness.  Narrative structures experience, mediating between 
concordance and discordance - that is, unexpected events - to create a permanence 
within change. Like the plot makes sense of change and creates permanency, so 
narrative can explain why we change over time (our ipse identity changes), yet 
remain the same (idem identity) over time. Narrative thus solves this problem by 
mediating between these two senses of identity. Through emplotment narrative 
synthesises reality and so unifies actions and events. This thereby creates unified 
patterns of meaning out of what would be random, or chaotic series of events. 
Whilst narrative emplotment creates a permanency of narrative and character, 
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Ricoeur notes that narrative identities are not closed or static but rather change 
over time. As Atkins writes: 
Narrative emplotment … is a configurational act that articulates the experience of 
permanence in time proper to selfhood—a permanence that is not the immortality 
of an extramundane ego, nor the indifferent endurance of an object, nor the 
ephemeral existence of a punctual ‘I.’ The permanence in time of selfhood is a 
mixed temporality that combines the first-personal experience of 
phenomenological time with the objective succession of cosmological time within 
the discursive structures of society and culture.289 
 
Narrative structures organise and interpret our experiences and make sense of 
our lives. Through these we forge patterns of coherence in our lives, making our 
lives intelligible to ourselves. As Mackenzie explains, in engaging in these 
activities of practical reasoning we develop a self-conception that brings about the 
integration of the self over time, giving a degree of permanence and coherence in 
our lives.  Mackenzie writes: 
Narrative theorists of identity argue that we deploy these same organizing and 
interpretative structures of practical reasoning in order to make sense of the 
experience of living a human life over time. Even if what makes us persons is a 
capacity for the first-personal perspective, our temporally extended first-personal 
experience is often of change, fragmentation, contingency. Narrative self-
interpretation is a response to this experience of change and fragmentation. 
Narrative identifies and forges patterns of coherence and psychological 
intelligibility within our lives, connecting our first-personal perspectives to our 
history, actions, emotions, desires, beliefs, character traits, and so on. By 
appropriating our past, anticipating our future actions and experiences, and 
identifying with or distancing ourselves from certain characteristics, emotions, 
desires, and values, we develop a self-conception that brings about the integration 
of the self over time.290 
 
With this understanding of emplotment I have provided an argument against 
Strawson’s objection that narrative is a false descriptive thesis. The discussion of 
narrative emplotment and having a narrative self-understanding is not concerned 
with the empirical question and that of deciding what one should include in one’s 
narrative understanding, rather it describes the structures that make having a 
narrative self-understanding possible. Narrative is not a description in the 
empirical domain that can be tested against evidence, i.e. whether you or I 
experience our lives in terms of narrative, rather it is a conceptual claim about 
what it is to live the life of a person and have the subjectivity of a person. As the 
discussion of emplotment above shows, and Schechtman’s discussion in the 
previous section argues, narrative is a ‘configurational act’ that creates 
permanence of the subject in time (to use Ricoeur’s language), or the enduring 
subject of experience (in Schechtman’s language). Atkins writes: 
The processes I am describing [emplotment] are not concerned with the empirical 
question of selection, that is, of which experiences or representations of action are 
                                            
289 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 77. 
290 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 12. 
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selected for inclusion or exclusion from a narrative. Rather, it is a description of 
the underlying processes that make a narrative a narrative as such. Our 
reflections and recollections are inevitably incomplete and subject to selective 
pressures conscious or otherwise. This is for at least two reasons - the inherent 
limitations of memory and the contextualised nature of acts of reflection. This 
account says nothing of the veridicality of any narrative. False narratives or true 
narratives share the same basic structures in order to be a narrative.291  
 
Drawing on the role of narrative as a way of making sense of the contingency 
and flux through identifying and constructing patterns of meaning, we can 
address the charge that the concept of self-narrative suggests that we have more 
authorial control over our lives and identities than we in fact do. Noting the role of 
the articulation constraint as underscoring the importance of these activities for 
identifying and constructing patterns of meaning and that in order to self-
constituting a narrative must be articulable to only some degree, Mackenzie and 
Walker argue that this shows that a narrative self-constitution approach does not 
entail that narrative self-interpretation must take the form of a tightly structured 
or articulate literary narratives or even stories. 
The concern that narrative identity is inconsistent with acknowledging the extent 
to which human lives are subject to randomness and contingency is, therefore, 
misplaced. Narrative understanding is a way of making sense of flux, 
contingency, and temporal change. Contingency — illness, accident, trauma, and 
bereavement — can derail even the most carefully planned life and challenge our 
self-narratives. To reconstruct our lives and reconstitute our identities in the face 
of such contingency, we need to find ways of incorporating it into our self-
understandings and life stories. Thus narrative coherence is dynamic and 
provisional. The patterns within a person’s identity shift and change over time, in 
response to contingency, or changes to a person’s commitments and values, 
intimate relationships, or sociopolitical environment.292 
 
Mackenzie and Walker draw attention here to the point that embodiment, as 
well as the social context, can threaten the coherence of our lives. To the extent 
that my self-narrative and your narrative about me cohere, that helps to ensure 
that my self-narrative coheres with the basic facts and constructs (for good or ill) 
a social scaffolding for my identity. This underscores the point made above, and 
quoted in Atkins: whether an individual actually experiences her life as narrative 
is an empirical question, and nor can narrative self-understanding guarantee that 
lives are always lived coherently, but the extent to which a life is coherent is so 
because it deploys narrative strategies. Therefore coherence is crucial to agency, 
an argument that I will be taking up in the following sub-section (3.2.c). 
                                            
291 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 74. For other defences of 
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Perspective.”; Velleman, “Narrative Explanation.”; Walker, “Neuroscience, Self-understanding 
and Narrative Truth.” 
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This understanding also distinguishes Schechtman’s (and Ricoeur’s) narrative 
approach from those that do not adequately distinguish between narratives and 
life, arguing that we are literally the authors of our lives.293  
 
Furthermore, Schechtman’s formulation of the reality constraint allows her 
approach to distinguish between truthful and delusional narratives. Whilst false 
narratives and true narratives share the same structure, through application of the 
constraints on narrative, we can distinguish between them. Delusional and false 
narratives are narratives that do not cohere with the basic facts of reality and so 
are not identity-constituting. The constraints that Schechtman’s imposes on 
narrative distinguish her approach to narrative self-constitution from accounts 
that may suggest that narrative identity consists of ‘telling a good story’ and is 
solely about ‘self-creation’, for example accounts by Daniel Dennett and Richard 
Rorty.294 These types of approaches may be vulnerable to Strawson’s criticisms; 
however, Schechtman’s approach to narrative self-constitution is not. 
 
Atkins explains that narrative emplotment offers ‘a “full-blooded” account of 
who I am ‘by coordinating the first-, second-, and third-personal perspectives in a 
practical, temporal unity according to a semantics of action.’295 Atkins writes: 
When we give an account of ourselves we provide a narrative: a report from a 
first-personal perspective to a second-person (implicitly or explicitly) that links 
together third-personal objects, actors, times, and places in a temporally extended, 
causally related coherent whole, with a beginning, a middle, and an end.296 
According to Atkins, on this account, continuity of identity is agential 
continuity.  
A full-blooded first-personal perspective is not simply a point of view, in the sense 
of an imagined seeing, but is an “agential orientation,” a perspective which has 
built into it the subject’s sense of herself as an agent, an ‘I can,’ and not merely an 
‘I think.’ A full-blooded first-personal perspective is reflective, affective, 
evaluative, and agential. Sameness of consciousness, then, involves not simply 
memory but full-blooded first-personal recall. … A full-blooded first-personal 
memory is one in which a person understands herself as the same agent of her past 
thoughts and actions, on the basis of which she can own and impute to herself and 
her thoughts and actions, past and present. … Continuity in identity holds when 
someone constitutes the continuity in her understanding of herself as the same 
agent at different times by having a first-personal perspective that is epistemically, 
affectively, and evaluatively continuous in such a way that the agent can regard 
herself (and be regarded by others) as the author of, and accountable for, her 
thoughts and deeds, past and present.297 
                                            
293 For an example of such an account, see MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. 
294 See for example, Daniel Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” in Self and 
Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, ed. Frank S Kessel, Pamela M Cole, and Dale L Johnson 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1992). 
295 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 73. 
296 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 76. 
297 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 80-81. 
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This contrasts with both Strawson and Parfit’s accounts of the self. This full-
blooded account demonstrates the practical basis of human selfhood, in contrast to 
a metaphysical account of the self, which draws on Schechtman’s attention to 
forensic personhood in Locke, and fills out Schechtman’s claim that the narrative 
posits a conceptually prior subject. 
 
The claim that persons constitute their identities through the constitution of 
self-narratives is not a descriptive claim but is a conceptual claim about narrative 
as an organising principle which helps us make meaning or patterns of meaning 
from chaotic events. Moreover, narrative creates a persisting subject and a 
coherent subject at a time. This account of narrative selfhood, as a perspective we 
take towards ourselves, also provides a response to Strawson’s metaphysical 
reductionism, which draws out the claims about the status of agential unity in 
these accounts. The conceptual claim about unity is that narrative thinking 
provides agential unity (a perspective form which to act, a self conception), this is 
not a metaphysical claim about the self.  Furthermore with this understanding in 
hand we can see that narrative makes sense of the flux and contingency in our 
lives. This further underscores the role of embodiment and socialisation in 
selfhood and further fleshes out the relationship between identity and agency on a 
narrative self-constitution account. 
 
So, by applying this account of narrative as structuring of experience, we see 
that the claim about narrative unity is not an empirical claim. Rather, the claim 
about narrative unity is a claim about how experience comes to be unified, what 
counts as a unified life and that this unity cannot be reduced to discrete elements 
given in experience. Human understanding takes a narrative form which is not 
given in experience, but rather is an activity of self-constitution.  
 
Here, my intention has been to show that Strawson’s charge that narrative is a 
false descriptive or empirical claim is false. I have argued, rather, that the 
necessity of narrative form is a conceptual thesis about how experience is 
organised, and must be so organised, in order to live the life of a person. There is a 
further claim that this creates an understanding of a coherent, enduring subject of 
experience, and that this understanding does not presuppose a metaphysical self 
as distinct from the existence of the human being. I will take up this discussion, 
and critically engage with Schechtman’s understanding of the enduring subject of 
experience, and whether to instantiate this claim Schechtman implicitly relies on a 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘ontological’ self as distinct from the existence of the human 
being, in the following chapter (section 4.1).  
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3.2.c The significance of narrative coherence and integration 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.a, Strawson’s charges against narrative – that it 
involves false empirical and normative theses – are related. Both charges rely on a 
distinction between episodic and diachronic forms of self-experience and the 
argument that diachronics are mistaken about the existence of deep synchronic 
unity in their self-experience, relying on an understanding of an ontologically 
distinct self from the human being. Drawing on the understanding of narrative as 
an organising principle, I address Strawson’s charge that narrative is a pernicious 
ethical claim. Strawson’s sees the ethical question being addressed as: What have I 
made of my life? - and that seeking the good life requires one to take up a 
narrative perspective.298 I argue that rather the aim is about the practical necessity 
of a unified perspective in order to understand one’s life as one’s life, that without 
this coherence it’s very difficult to live a life. The narrative ethical claim should not 
be understood as a claim about a particular ethics, but rather, as a claim about the 
practical necessity of narrative coherence for personhood - an appreciation of the 
significance of narrative coherence for personal integration, as well as for a 
flourishing life. Narrative integration is a fragile achievement of agency, rather 
than a given of experience. Without a coherent unified perspective and attendant 
sense of an enduring self, fragmentation of narrative can result making it difficult 
to engage and access the goods of personhood. Without a coherent narrative a 
person’s effective agency is compromised.299  
  
I draw on Schechtman’s arguments that narrative is necessary for personhood 
to show that claims about narrative coherence and the requirement for a coherent, 
linear narrative are claims about what it is to have a narrative per se. I draw on 
Mackenzie and Poltera’s argument that Strawson’s presentation of the episodic is 
incoherent which presupposes that the unity of a life is given in experience. I 
make reference to their discussion of the impacts on selfhood from schizophrenia, 
drawing attention to the distress caused by narrative fragmentation. 
 
Schechtman’s claim that narrative must take the form of a conventional linear 
narrative is a claim about what it takes to be a ‘person’ at all, not what it takes to 
be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ person and the associated claim that people with narratives are 
good and those without narrative are bad - that is, that only certain types of self-
narrative count as socially and morally valuable. This is not a conservative and 
                                            
298 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 437. 
299 Brison describes the impacts on her narrative self-understanding and agency following a 
sexual assault and attempted murder. She describes how the trauma shattered her self-narrative 
and left her unable to engage in activities she had previously found meaningful, such as setting 
goals and making plans. See Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. For a discussion of 
the impacts of trauma on survivors’ narrative and agency, see Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-
telling and Empathetic Listeners.” 
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limiting (narrow and repressive) claim; rather, the claim is that in order to be a 
person at all one must provide a narrative of this form, or one would have a 
subjectivity very different from that of persons, and the corollary claim that this 
self-conception provides the basis for the four features (as we understand persons 
and the surrounding practices around personhood). Recall Schechtman’s claim 
that: 
The narrative self-constitution view thus demands that a person’s self-conception 
take the form of a traditional linear narrative because it is this kind of self-
conception which underlies the attitudes and practices that define the life of a 
person.300 
This approach does argue that individuals without a narrative sense of self are 
not persons, for it is narrative that allows people to engage in practices that are 
definitive of personhood, and also problematises Strawson’s claim that there are 
deeply non-narrative people. Further, Schechtman’s claim about narrative linear 
form is accused of being chauvinistic. Schechtman addresses this by arguing that 
whilst her approach requires narrative form for identity-constitution, it allows that 
a range of narrative styles can count as standard. 
 
In response to the claim that narrative is conservative, Schechtman draws 
attention to examples of people who have consciousness without narrative 
capacity. There is a related and significant claim however that people with 
fragmented narratives do suffer and their abilities to lead a flourishing life, that is, 
self-directed engagement in the activities and practices of personhood, are 
impaired. Schechtman argues that the significance of emplotment is that one cares 
for one’s life as a whole – unified agency is challenged if one does not develop or 
loses this ability. In support of this claim, Schechtman cites examples of people 
who for various reasons cannot develop a coherent narrative of their lives or lose 
narrative capacity (and as such cannot integrate memories or have a sense of 
themselves as an extended subject), for example, people suffering from 
Alzheimer’s or dementia,301 individuals with conditions, such as schizophrenia, but 
also in contrast to these non-chronic states, developing infra-lingual infants.302 
Schechtman describes dementia as the losing of a kind of organisation of 
experience (a phenomenological change) as well as bringing about a change in 
capacities. As Schechtman explains, such a person is unable to participate (fully or 
at all) in the practices surrounding personhood - they fail to recognise others, are 
unable to anticipate the implications of their actions, and in significant ways are 
unable to project themselves into the past or future.  As Schechtman writes in the 
context of the relationship between narrative and survival:  
The loss of a self-narrative puts a stop to the kind of experience, action and, 
interactions uniquely enjoyed by persons, and so the end of a self-narrative ends 
                                            
300 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 105. 
301 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 147. 
302 Schechtman notes that infancy seems more like a case where we might think of 
consciousness in terms of discrete time-slices, see Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 146. 
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the experiencing subject and agent who was the person. An individual who has 
lost her narrative is no longer able to lead the life she was leading, and the loss is 
severe in the extreme.303 
 
The cases Schechtman refers to entail gross developmental challenges. 
Psychological conditions which are episodic provide an interesting case study. 
Elyn Saks autobiographical memoir, The Centre Cannot Hold, describes her 
experiences of living with schizophrenia. She writes of how her condition 
fractures her sense of an enduring coherent self, what Saks labels the experience 
of ‘disorganisation’. Saks writes: 
Consciousness gradually loses its coherence. One’s center gives way. The center 
cannot hold. The “me” becomes a haze, and the solid center from which one 
experiences reality breaks up like a bad radio signal. There is no longer a sturdy 
vantage point from which to look out, take things in, assess what’s happening. No 
core holds things together, providing the lens through which to see the world, to 
make judgments and comprehend risk. Random moments of time follow one 
another. Sights, sounds, thoughts, and feelings don’t go together. No organizing 
principle takes successive moments in time and puts them together in a coherent 
way from which sense can be made.304 
Mackenzie and Poltera provide a response to Strawson’s rejection of narrative 
conception of the self through a discussion of Saks’ experience with schizophrenia. 
Saks, they argue, exhibits a lack of narrative coherence in her life that narrative 
approaches argue is necessary for a unified sense of self. They argue that 
reflection on the breakdown of the self-narrative in schizophrenia calls into 
question the coherence of Strawson’s notion of the Episodic self. In order to have 
an episodic self in the way that Strawson describes it, is to already have an 
integrated understanding of oneself. Mackenzie and Poltera argue that Strawson’s 
description of himself as episodic, relies on, or presupposes, some underlying or 
overarching diachronic identity. This underscores the point made in the previous 
section that narrative is a necessary organising principle of experience.  In order 
to be able to describe the experiences he does, Strawson relies on a unified sense 
or structure of self - he has a ‘centre’ from which to speak, understand, interpret, 
experience and temporalise his experiences. This is presumed as a condition of his 
critique of diachronic identity and with it, narrative approaches to identity - 
Strawson’s experience is not fragmentary. Reflection on the personal experience 
of the breakdown of a unified self experience, which Saks’ experience of 
schizophrenia documents, reveals that the claims made by narrative approaches 
that narrative self-understanding is essential for a flourishing life, are similarly, 
not claims about a ‘morality’ but rather about the normative pre-conditions for 
unified self-experience.  As Mackenzie and Poltera argue: ‘the suffering caused by 
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304 Elyn R. Saks, The Centre Cannot Hold (London: Virago Press, 2007), 12. 
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such breakdown provides evidence for the view that narrative self-understanding 
is essential for a flourishing life’.305 
 
Mackenzie and Poltera argue that Strawson’s claim to be episodic presupposes 
a unified perspective, given in experience, and does not recognise that the 
integration of selfhood is an achievement of agency. Elsewhere Mackenzie argues 
that Strawson slides between a metaphysical claim about the duration of the self 
and a phenomenological claim about self-experience as following from Strawson’s 
claim that one’s self-experience is episodic. The metaphysical claim is that there is 
no enduring metaphysical entity, the self, just a succession of selves, lasting about 
three seconds in duration. So, at best, Diachronics are deluded in their experience 
of a temporally extended self. The phenomenological claim is that Episodics lack 
affective access to their past and future and don’t care too much about them, 
whilst recognising that they are part of the same human life. Mackenzie notes that 
because Strawson views the continuity of the self as related to how much one 
identifies with actions, goals and commitments to past and future events, he takes 
it that continuity of the self is (just) about a commitment - some of us are less 
committed, less connected, and some of us more committed and more connected. 
Mackenzie points out that a narrative approach does not rule out that at times we 
are more connected, and at others disconnected, and alienated, from our actions 
and the commitments of our past selves, that: 
To talk of the practical necessity of narrative integration does not entail that this 
integration is seamless: there are degrees of integration and disintegration. It is 
because we can feel disconnected from our emotional commitments, alienated 
from the actions of our past selves, unable to project ourselves into the future, that 
the integration of selfhood across time is fragile, an achievement of agency rather 
than a given of experience.306   
So, what Strawson is describing is not something that (many) narrative 
theorists would disagree with. Rather, he is describing the achievement of unified 
selfhood, but attributes this as given in experience, rather than as a capacity, even 
he, has achieved.  
 
Kennett and Matthews make a similar point about unified agency and 
flourishing. They argue that unified agency on a self-constitution or narrative 
coherence model is not an all or nothing achievement and that the elimination of 
deliberative conflict is a struggle for many.  
[W]e claim that significantly unified agency is necessary to access a range of 
central normative goods and that unified agency is largely constituted by the 
capacity to act in accordance with normative reasons. In support of this, we turn 
to cases of DID, where it is certain we have a failure of unified agency, and there 
what we find is an inability to access the normative goods we have spoken of. 
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These cases also make it quite clear that the disunity of agency corresponds to the 
lack of persistence of normative reasons.307 
 
The significance of cases of fragmented selfhood shows that integrated 
selfhood is an achievement of narrative agency, not a given in experience. This 
points to the fragility of the integrated self and the fact that changes can threaten 
or fragment the integrated self, for example through illness or trauma. On 
commenting on narrative emplotment, Atkins writes:  
[Narrative] cannot guarantee coherent identity because it is a tensive, 
collaborative effort that can fail. Identity can fail precisely because it is composite 
and intersubjective, requiring the integration of heterogeneous elements: organic 
and physical factors, psychological, emotional, interpersonal, and sociopolitical 
factors. A deficit or failure of any one of these factors can incapacitate the 
network: a brain tumour, schizophrenia; ostracism; domestic violence; sexism, 
religious or racial persecution; and so forth. In the face of these constant and 
pervasive threats to the unity of our lives, telling, hearing and emplotting our own 
and each other’s stories are necessary components of the fundamentally human 
endeavour to live a good life.308 
 
The claim that persons constitute their identities through the constitution of 
self-narratives is not a pernicious ethical claim but rather is conceptual claim 
about the necessity of narrative integration for personhood and the related 
practices and normative goods we attribute to persons. These normative claims are 
not claims that people with narratives are good people or lead good lives and those 
without are bad or lead bad lives. The focus on narrative integration as an 
achievement of agency brings into view the fragility of this achievement which is 
developmental but also vulnerable to changes in embodiment and from our social 
embededness, such as those from illness and trauma.  
 
Strawson does point to the issue, though, that Schechtman’s formulation of 
narrative form is too strict. I argue that Schechtman’s constraints on narrative are 
too strict and do exclude persons with fragmented, disjointed or disrupted 
narratives from being agents and in turn from participating in narrative repair and 
achieving integration. I take up this criticism in 4.2.   
 
The charges of chauvinism that I have addressed here, that only certain types 
of narrative are valuable, focuses on the conventional aspect of narrative self-
constitution approaches. In this section I have drawn attention to the creative 
form of narrative emplotment. In order to properly address this criticism though, 
and further demonstrate the innovative or creative aspects of narrative, an account 
of autonomy and realising self-directed agency is needed. I will do this in the fifth 
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chapter. For the moment, my aim is to demonstrate the importance of narrative 




In this section I have argued that narrative understanding is an organising or 
structuring principle that renders human experience intelligible. Narrative allows 
one to connect events, to connect the past to the future in one’s life, and thus 
provide unity of agency over time; it works not by connecting two time slices but 
by providing a unified perspective from which to make sense of one’s life. I have 
thus shown that narrative can explain the diachronic constitution and 
reconstitution of identity (i.e., the dynamic nature of identity), and so can make 
sense of change over time. Narrative unity (integrated selfhood) is an achievement 
of narrative agency and so crises, for example, can challenge patterns of 
coherence. Further, I have shown that narrative coherence (integrated selfhood) 
is important to living the life of a person. 
 
In so doing I have addressed a number of objections to narrative and shown 
that Strawson’s own claims about being an ‘episodic’ are incoherent. I have 
demonstrated that both Strawson’s claims are misplaced - narrative is not a 
descriptive thesis, it is a conceptual claim about how selfhood is integrated. 
Understood this way we see that narrative understanding is neither a claim that 
we have excessive authorial control over our lives, nor that we must live our lives 
as if they were a narrative, or some literary genre, but rather a sense-making 
activity that we bring it our everyday lives. Nor is narrative a pernicious ethical 
claim; it is a claim about the necessity of integration for living the life of a person; 
without self-integration, people find it difficult to connect their experiences. I have 
also developed a narrative self-constitution view in contrast to narrative accounts 
that are solely about self-creation, and that do not include constraints on identity-
constituting narratives.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
3.5.a. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have set out Schechtman’s narrative approach to self-
constitution, as well as, the constraints on narrative to count as a identity-
constituting narrative. I have argued that narrative structures our experience and 
self-understanding and can account for the persisting subject of experience over 
time. In doing so, narrative approaches can explain what’s at stake in identity 
change. Change can threaten narrative coherence, thus challenging our self-
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understanding and sense of being a continuing person, of being able to 
meaningfully author our lives. In this chapter I have argued that this narrative 
approach can explain continuity over time, as well as being appropriate for 
explaining change over time.  
 
In the first section I showed how Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution 
approach can account for the deep unity of a person’s life over time, in contrast to 
psychological continuity approaches. In the second, I outlined the general shape of 
the narrative approach by addressing Strawson’s criticisms, arguing first that 
narrative synthesises the temporal - a necessary structuring of our experience, and 
secondly, that narrative is a normative account demonstrating the importance of 
narrative coherence or unity for a life and for flourishing life.  
 
3.5.b Embodied, relational narrative agency 
 
Whilst I have argued that Strawson’s arguments against narrative as a false 
empirical thesis and/or a false normative thesis fail – the claim that narrative is an 
organising principle of experience is a conceptual thesis – this does not mean that 
Schechtman’s account of narrative self-constitution and her conception of the 
enduring subject of experience is without problems. In the following chapter I 
critically engage with Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view. I argue that 
Schechtman’s view fails to adequately explain the role of embodiment in 
constituting the first-person perspective and narrative self-understanding the 
approach to narrative, and draw on Atkins’ discussion of embodiment (2.3.a) to 
demonstrate that narrative unifies experience because it syntheses two 
perspectives of time which arise from our being embodied beings in time. I further 
argue that Schechtman’s view fails to adequately explain the role of others, and 
social understandings, in the constitution of our first-personal perspective and our 
identity-constituting narratives, and draw on Baylis to show that who we are is 
not just up to us, but rather requires uptake by others. These arguments further 
strengthen the claims made in this argument that an adequate account of narrative 
self-constitution can account for the deep diachronic unity in our lives and that 
disruptions to narrative coherence can challenge our self-understanding and our 
sense of ourselves as continuing persons. With this understanding in hand, I apply 
the narrative view I have developed to demonstrate that narrative can explain 
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4. Narrative Identity & Agency  
Illuminating the threat to identity from neural 
implants 
 
‘I don’t feel like myself anymore’; ‘I haven’t found myself after the operation’; ‘I feel like 
an electric doll’; ‘I feel like a robot’; ‘She’s no longer the same person’   
 
In this chapter, drawing on Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution approach 
set out and defended in the previous chapter, I develop an approach to narrative 
that I think best explains what’s at stake in change following neural implants. I 
argue that an adequate account of narrative agency must take account of the role 
of embodiment and the social context in integrating or threatening narrative 
agency.  
 
I show that this approach illuminates potential threats to personal identity that 
neural implants may engender in terms of changes, or disruptions in, in the 
narrative structures that give meaning to our lives. Neural implants can challenge 
narrative coherence and frustrate unified agency.  
 
In the first section I expand on Schechtman’s narrative approach to self-
constitution by arguing for an embodied, relational approach to narrative. I 
identity two criticisms with Schechtman’s approach and extend her account by 
firstly discussing the role of embodiment in narrative, drawing on Kim Atkins to 
show how narrative integration explains continuity over time, and the importance 
of a thoroughly relational account of narrative, drawing on Hilde Lindemann 
Nelson and Françoise Baylis, to adequately account for the role of others in the 
constitution of our self-narratives.  
 
With this approach to narrative in hand, in the second section I turn to debates 
amongst proponents of narrative self-constitution to questions of the impacts of 
neural implants on identity. I demonstrate that a narrative approach is well-suited 
to explaining the impacts of changes consequent upon neural implants. I also 
review the question concerning potential threats to narrative identity from neural 
implants. I survey the responses of Schechtman and Françoise Baylis concerning 
whether Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) treatment for Parkinson’s Disease poses 
a threat to narrative identity. I show that whilst Schechtman concludes that DBS 
poses a threat to narrative identity, Baylis argues that this conclusion is incorrect. 
In contrast, Baylis, argues that biographical disruption is not equivalent to a threat 
to identity and that the impacts of DBS are better understood in terms of potential 
threats to agency, which in turn may impact on one’s ability to meaningfully 
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author one’s life. I conclude that this approach to narrative identity is not yet 
enough to answer the question about threats to identity consequent upon neural 
implants. In order to do so, we must first direct our attention to the social context 
and ask how we can direct (realise, construct and revise) our self-narratives. I 
develop an approach to relational autonomy in the following chapter to 
demonstrate this. 
 
4.1 What type of narrative approach? Embodied and 
relational  
 
In the previous chapter I set out Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution 
approach and its focus on narrative constraints and defended this approach from 
charges by Strawson and others. Here I develop further the type of narrative I 
think best addresses my question concerning the impact of neural implants on 
personal identity by developing an embodied and relational approach to narrative. 
In this chapter, I expand on Schechtman’s approach by identifying two 
shortcomings. Although Schechtman’s approach acknowledges the role of 
embodiment and relationality in identity, it does not develop these two factors 
deeply enough. I argue that Schechtman’s approach fails to adequately account 
for: the role of the body as constitutive of our first-personal perspectives as well as 
the role of others in both shaping and frustrating our identity-constituting 
narratives.  
 
Firstly I draw on Atkins to show that Schechtman’s approach treats the body 
as passive with respect to questions of characterisation and to argue for the role of 
embodiment in the constitution of our first-personal narratives - that embodiment 
is the ground of narrative. This provides a refiguring of the understanding of the 
first-person significance of sameness in terms of bodily constancy and provides a 
necessary corrective to Schechtman’s understanding of sameness in terms of 
questions of reidentification. Secondly, I draw on work by Baylis and Nelson to 
show that Schechtman’s account understands the role of others as limited to 
historical influence on the individual and treats the social context as ‘objective’. 
This critique motivates the importance of recognising the relational mediation of 
identity. These arguments again draw attention to the point that any adequate 
account of selfhood needs to take account of the importance of the role of 
embodiment and intersubjectivity in the formation of identity-constituting 
narratives.  
4.1.a Narrative and bodily perspective 
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Here I draw on Atkins’ approach to practical identity as embodied and multi-
perspectival, as developed in the previous chapter in section 2.3, to demonstrate 
Atkins’ argument that narrative synthesises these perspectives. In the previous 
chapter I set out Atkins’ argument that narrative coordinates two senses of time 
and so articulates the unity and continuity of one’s identity (that is, how narrative 
emplotment secures identity). Here I focus on Atkins’ argument that embodiment 
is the ground of narrative and the role of self-constancy in explaining the 
constitution of selfhood over time. This discussion also builds on Ricoeur’s 
discussion of the role of the dialectic of sameness and selfhood in explaining self-
constancy over time as the appropriate model for understanding the unity and 
continuity of embodied selfhood. It critically engages with Schechtman’s argument 
in section 3.1 that only narrative can account for the persisting subject of 
experience by noting that without a model of identity that can account for 
embodied continuity, narrative fails in this task. 
 
 Atkins argues that Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution approach 
addresses the characterisation question well (and that her critique of psychological 
continuity approaches is convincing). However, Atkins also argues that 
Schechtman’s approach relies on an inadequate understanding of the role of the 
body in constituting our first-personal perspective. This is seen in Schechtman’s 
rendering of the solution to the relationship of questions of characterisation and 
reidentification in which Schechtman argues that questions of characterisation 
involve psychological narrative identity and questions of reidentification concern 
biological numerical identity (2.2.a).  
 
Schechtman argues that there are two dominant intuitions with respect to 
questions about what makes for the continuity of personal identity : that the 
continuation of personal identity consists in continuity of the body - the brain (or 
bits of the brain); and, that the continuation of personal identity consists in 
continuity of our psychology. Arguments for psychological continuity note that 
just because we normally experience identity in terms of the same body, identity 
and the body can come apart, for example, in arguments that the soul survives the 
body, or in practical cases such as advanced dementia. Schechtman argues that 
the solution to understanding the relation between the reidentification and 
characterisation question is to see that each question, once properly understood, 
speaks to one of these two intuitions. Questions of reidentification properly 
inquire into bodily continuity and the bodily criterion for identity - for example, 
fingerprints, DNA etc. In contrast, questions of characterisation inquire into 
psychological continuity, understood narratively, and the relation to the four 
features.309 So, the two questions speak to the two dominant intuitions that we 
                                            
309 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 68. 
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have concerning personal identity - that both our relation to our bodies and our 
psychological relations are important to explaining who we are over time. 
Schechtman argues that the thought experiments, as discussed in the second 
chapter, reveal that it is psychological survival that matters in questions of 
characterisation and that biological survival is parasitic on psychological survival. 
 
Atkins notes that this solution belies an understanding of the body as passive 
in contributing to our first-personal perspective; that is, it ignores the role of 
embodiment in the constitution of narrative identity. This is demonstrated through 
Schechtman’s reliance on examples drawing on the body from the third-person 
perspective. Atkins writes:  
Schechtman’s account in The Constitution of Selves can take us only so far, because 
she continues the long tradition of representing the body in impersonal terms. To 
this extent, she overlooks the significance of the body in the constitution of 
selfhood and practical identity. While the narrative view of identity is necessitated 
by the constitutive role of the first-personal perspective, it is also necessitated by 
the constitutive role of embodiment in the first-personal perspective.310 
 
Mackenzie also criticises Schechtman’s passive treatment of the body in her 
solution to the relation between questions of reidentification and characterisation 
and her reliance on examples of third-person reidentification when discussing the 
role of the body in claims about identity. Mackenzie draws attention to the 
distinction between mind and body and thought-experiments. Like Atkins, 
Mackenzie argues that embodiment is constitutive of our first-personal 
perspective and our practical identities.   
The problem with this solution is that it reproduces, in a different guise, the 
stand-off between psychological and bodily continuity theories, treating questions 
of characterization as entirely psychological and representing the body in 
impersonal terms. This impersonal conception of the body, which pervades the 
literature, provides a foothold for the idea that we can make sense of science-
fiction thought experiments such as teletransportation, bodily transfer, and 
fission. Schechtman’s solution does not challenge such views because she 
conceptualizes our practical interests in the body almost entirely as an interest in 
reidentification. However, our practical interests in the connections between 
embodiment and personal identity are not just focused on questions of third-
person reidentification but lie at the heart of many of our first-personal subjective 
concerns about identity, including, importantly, the first-personal significance of 
one’s own body in the constitution of one’s practical identity.311 
 
As Mackenzie notes, Schechtman’s solution does not address the dualism 
between mind and body that is assumed in the debates between biological and 
psychological continuity theories. Without an adequate account of the role of the 
                                            
310 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 64. 
311 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 4-5. Cf. Catriona Mackenzie, 
“Personal Identity, Narrative Integration, and Embodiment,” in Embodiment and Agency, ed. Sue 
Campbell, Letitia Meynell, and Susan Sherwin 2009), 112-14. And cf. Atkins, “Narrative Identity 
and Embodied Continuity.” 
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body in constituting our first-personal perspective, Schechtman’s self-constitution 
view is unable to adequately account for the persisting subject of experience 
which she argues is necessary to avoid charges of the “extreme claim”. This lack 
might further raise the spectre of a reliance on a metaphysical posit to justify this 
claim. Rather, we need an approach that challenges the separation of mind and 
body and the attendant conception of the body as passive with respect to 
constituting the first-personal perspective and our narrative self-understanding. 
 
Note, Schechtman’s commitment to the mind/body dualism means that we 
cannot just build the body into the first-person perspective without undermining 
the solution she gives to questions of characterisation and reidentification. What is 
required rather to challenge this dualism is a refiguring of our conceptual 
understanding of numerical identity. This is done by Atkins through her use of the 
concept of psycho-corporeal holism and the process of self-constancy and 
secondary reflection, as I set out below. 
 
In the second chapter (2.3.b), I set out Atkins’ argument that selfhood is a 
practical unity of three perspectives - the first-, second- and third-personal 
perspectives, which are grounded in embodiment. I showed that Atkins argues 
that the continuity our bodily perspective is a dynamic process of “self-constancy” 
(the model for “ipseity” in Ricoeur’s terminology) and that this is a process of 
reflective self-awareness which presupposes the numerical identity of our body.312 
Here, I connect these claims with Atkins’ argument that narrative self-
understanding arises from the ‘multi-perspectival character of embodied human 
understanding’313 and her argument that narrative synthesises these perspectives 
through a process of ‘secondary reflection’ - a mode of reflection that ‘forces one 
to question oneself about who one is’ and so ‘secures continuity in my practical 
identity.314 With this account, Atkins makes good on Schechtman’s argument that 
narrative can account for a persisting subject of experience (as set out in 3.1.b) by 
both accounting for the continuity of our bodily perspective and by arguing that 
narrative presupposes this structure. As such, with Atkins’ account we can 
adequately explain how narrative can explain what matters to us in identity and so 
fulfill Schechtman’s argument that narrative is not is subject to the extreme claim. 
 
                                            
312 On Atkins’ account our awareness of our self-constancy and the presumption of numerical 
identity, qua personal continuity, are dependent on our first-personal perspective. So, for example, 
in a case of severe dementia wherein one may lose the first-person perspective, the person may well 
lose their sense of personal continuity but retain biological continuity over time. Others may serve 
the role of identifying the person from a third-person perspective. This further underscores the 
irony in claims made about people with the dementia by their significant others, such as: “She’s no 
longer there”. 
313 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 70. 
314 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 64. 
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Atkins extends Korsgaard’s account of practical identity by specifying that the 
kind of unity required for human agency is specifically narrative unity. Drawing on 
the understanding of narrative emplotment (as set out in 3.2.b) Atkins argues that 
narrative understanding unifies the perspectives of selfhood thus creating a 
temporally extended, human selfhood. 
Narrative provides the means to unify the first-, second-, and third-personal 
aspects of human selfhood because it deploys strategies that integrate different 
characters, actors, motives, places, events, perspectives, and even different orders 
of time. … I argue that this semantic web has its basis in human embodiment, and 
that narrative understanding is a second-order intelligibility built upon, and 
expressive of, the practical competencies of the lived body.315 
As the quote above points out, these narrative structures arise from human 
embodiment, a bodily-perspective that is lived in time. 
 
Atkins draws on the concept of “secondary reflection”, as well as “self-
constancy”, to support the claim that narrative is necessitated by the constitutive 
role of embodiment in the first-personal perspective and the role that narrative 
plays in securing my identity. Both concepts are invoked in questions of “Who am 
I?” - secondary reflection ‘secures continuity in my practical identity’ and self-
constancy continuity in my embodied selfhood.316 The success of secondary 
reflection in securing who I am relies on establishing continuity in one’s first-
personal perspective, secured through self-constancy.  
 
Atkins distinguishes two modes of reflection in self-consciousness – primary 
and secondary reflection, which arise from interruptions to our engaged 
experience and promote reflection.317 It is the latter mode, engaging in secondary 
reflection, that ‘forces one to question oneself about who one is’ and through the 
process of responding to this question ‘secures continuity in my practical 
identity’.318 In moments of secondary reflection one experiences ‘an interruption to 
my sense of myself that provokes in me a question about who I am’.319 Atkins 
explains the difference between these modes of reflection by distinguishing an 
interruption which is external to our sense of sense, from which we can remain 
detached, from an interruption which provokes in us an internal questioning 
concerning who one is. Primary reflection might be provoked by a loud noise, 
which breaks my concentration disrupting my current activity, for example, 
reading a book. Once I locate the source of the interruption, a noise outside, I can 
return to my activity. Secondary reflection, in contrast, arises in moments when I 
question my own behaviour: Atkins gives the example of telling a colleague that 
                                            
315 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 4. 
316 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 64. 
317 Atkins’ discussion of “secondary reflection” draws on Gabriel Marcel’s work on the role of 
reflection in embodied subjectivity. For Marcel’s discussion, see Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of 
Being: 1. Reflection and Mystery (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965). 
318 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 64. 
319 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 64. 
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you will join her reading group when you have no intention of doing do so. In 
these moments, in contrast to interruptions provoked by primary reflection, I 
cannot take the same detached perspective, I cannot readjust my sense of self as I 
do, returning to my book once I’ve located the interruption from an unexpected 
(external) noise, because in cases of secondary reflection, ‘I am both the object 
and the subject of the disturbance’.320 Atkins writes: 
 I, the questioner, constitute the domain under enquiry. In changing my 
perspective to reflect on who I am, I simultaneously mobilise a third-personal 
detached point of view and first-personal subjective point of view in a kind of 
dialogue with myself in the second person. When I attempt to answer the question 
“Who am I?,” I reflectively appropriate my third-personal attributes as my own 
from my first-personal perspective to myself in the second person—to myself as 
someone who I recognize as having the moral authority to ask this of myself.321 
 Secondary reflection involves a kind of mutual dialogical engagement of my 
self-perspectives wherein I apply a second-personal perspective which mediates 
my first- and third-personal perspectives. I ask of myself how I should mediate or 
balance this third personal perspective in relation to my actions and how I acted at 
the time. Atkins notes that I may respond in different ways to the question, in the 
case of the insincere response to my colleague – I may see it as a recurrent 
character flaw requiring action, an isolated break in my usual behaviour or a 
predictable response to social pressure, but the response aside, what is important 
is that by ‘responding to the question of who I am, I strive to reconstitute the unity 
in my sense of who I am by integrating my first-, second-, and third-personal 
perspectives’.322  
 
Atkins notes that moments of secondary reflection can also arise from other 
people’s actions, as well as events; that is, causes which are external to oneself, for 
example, ‘as an effect of psychological persecution or physical trauma, which 
causes one to doubt one’s competence or convictions’.323 Atkins account shows 
how changes following neural implants might provoke moments of secondary 
refection concerning ‘Who am I’? So, for Atkins, when I take up the question, 
‘Who am I?’, I engage in secondary reflection which is a ‘response to the need to 
maintain the continuity in my relation to myself by restoring the unity of my 
conscious life’.324 If my reflection is successful I secure the continuity of my sense 
of who I am.325 
                                            
320 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. 
321 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. 
322 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. 
323 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. 
324 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. This is an integrative 
process which Atkins notes is indicative of the recuperation engaged in by Susan Brison. See 
Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. 
325 Note, success here means re-establishing continuity in one’s sense of oneself. This act does 
not guarantee that my sense of myself is not mistaken - I might be deluded about my motives, for 
example. Rather, the contrasting understanding of failure here would be to fail to establish 
continuity in one’s identity, which would mean fragmentation in one’s sense of self. As Atkins 
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Atkins argues that the success of secondary reflection turns on the process of 
self-constancy; that is, my success in securing the continuity of my identity in 
secondary reflection turns on establishing continuity in my first-personal 
perspective, the process of ‘self-constancy’. This process creates constancy of 
character over time.326 
Continuity in one’s identity is a self-constitutive process of self-constancy—
backwards- and forward-looking processes through which I integrate my past, 
present, and anticipated future into a chronological order, from my first-person 
perspective, in such a way that those aspects are intelligible to and normative for 
me. The backward- and forward-looking processes of self-constancy mobilise and 
coordinate two different experiences of time, which themselves coordinate the 
first-, second-, and third-personal perspectives: phenomenological and 
chronological (or cosmological) time. These two orders of time—and the need for 
their coordination—again arise from the structure of embodiment. Because the 
psychological perspective is a bodily perspective, and because the body lives—
that is to say, exists and is experienced over time—selfhood is inherently 
temporal, and identity is inherently historical. Because the integrative processes of 
self-constitution are embodied, they operate over time and thereby constitute the 
self as temporally extended.327 
Our experiences arise from our embodied subjectivity which is lived in time. 
Secondary reflection relies on bodily continuity and bodily continuity on 
secondary reflection.  
 
On Atkins’ approach the relationship between psychological and bodily 
continuity is understood as psycho-corporeal holism, and not in terms of a mind 
body dualism. Returning to the question of sameness, and in contrast to 
Schechtman’s solution, Atkins argues that ‘what makes a bodily perspective the 
same bodily perspective’ is the model of permanence suggested in time by 
Ricoeur’s formulation of ipse identity. This model is proper to embodied selfhood, 
whereas the language of numerical identity is not well suited to this conception of 
selfhood. Atkins, following Ricoeur, argues that mainstream accounts fail to 
differentiate two conceptions of permanence in time: one belonging to numerical 
identity (idem) and the other belonging to self-constancy (ipse).  On this account 
‘the numerical identity of my body (idem identity) presupposes continuity in my 
first-personal perspective (or ipse identity), while the continuity in my first-
                                                                                                                           
writes ‘[E]ven if I am deluded about myself, insofar as I have a reflective sense of who I am, the 
continuity in my identity is secured through the kind of appropriation that belongs to secondary 
reflection.’ Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 65. 
326 Atkins notes that the unity of self-constancy is similar to Korsgaard’s discussion of the unity 
necessary for practical identity. Yet, on Korsgaard’s account reflective endorsement structures the 
will and incorporates only attributes that have been reflectively endorsed, and so alienates 
attributes that are deemed undesirable. In contrast Atkins’ secondary reflection includes all 
attributes and seeks a means of resolving them. For this discussion, see Atkins, Narrative Identity 
and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 55-56. 
327 Kim Atkins, “Re Alex Narrative Identity and the Case of Gender Dysphoria,” Griffith Law 
Review 14 (2005), 70-71. 
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personal perspective likewise presupposes the numerical identity in my body’.328 
And with it, Atkins sets out a model of permanence suitable to embodied selfhood, 
self-constancy underpins the continuity of the four concerns.  
 
With this argument Atkins concludes that narrative interpretation is 
presupposed by the reflective nature of embodiment,329 and so both responds to 
the criticism that Schechtman adopts an impersonal approach to the body and so 
does not adequately account for the persisting subject of experience. By 
explaining the role of self-constancy, as well as the process of secondary reflection 
built upon this, Atkins is able to explain both the persisting subject of experience, 
without an additional metaphysical posit, as well as provide an argument as to 
why it is narrative that unifies our practical identities. And so, Atkins provides us 
with an account of narrative that is able to account for the ways that practical 
identity matters to us. It can explain how changes to embodiment can impact on 
narrative self-understanding and threaten integrated identity. An understanding of 
psycho-corporeal identity, and the significance of agential unity, illuminates how 
changes in embodiment can affect this unity, threatening our psycho-corporeal 
unity which narrative synthesises.  
 
Atkins’ approach not only illuminates the role of embodiment in narrative 
identity, but also the role forms of social recognition play in constituting who I am, 
particularly the emphasis on the second-personal perspective. I discuss the 
importance of the second-personal perspective in accounts of relational autonomy 
in the following chapter. Here, I turn to the importance of accounting for the 
social context in constituting my identity, so further developing Schechtman’s 
narrative self-constitution approach. 
4.1.b The role of others in identity-negotiation  
 
Here I draw on relational approaches to narrative identity, in the work of 
Baylis and Nelson, focussing on their formulation of constraints to narrative 
which recognise the role of others in narrative self-constitution. This discussion 
builds on Schechtman’s recognition that in order to be identity-constituting 
narratives are subject to objective constraints, and so on the narrative self-
constitution approach, not just any story counts as identity-constituting. However, 
whilst both Nelson and Baylis recognise that Schechtman’s account is relational, 
                                            
328 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 69. 
329 Atkins writes: ‘Narrative, however, provides strategies that coordinate these two orders of 
time and through which the unity and continuity of one’s identity can be articulated. Narrative can 
have this effect because it deploys structures presupposed in our experience of time.’ Atkins, 
Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 70. And, ‘What is striking about narrative 
emplotment is the ability to convert contingency to causality through the chronological ordering of 
its elements. This ordering allows narrative to imitate—in fact, articulate—the temporality of 
human action and, of life.’ Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 74. 
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they challenge Schechtman’s view that identity-constituting narrative are in the 
main constituted by an individual’s subjective self-understanding. Nelson and 
Baylis draw attention to the need to negotiate first- and third-personal ascriptions 
of personal identity. Nelson introduces a “credibility constraint” and Baylis an 
“equilibrium constraint”. Whilst Nelson recognises that narratives must be 
evaluated against the criteria of strong explanatory force, correlation to action, 
and heft, to see which is the more credible narrative, Baylis argues that narratives 
are always subject to uptake, and not just credibility. Whether an identity-
constituting narrative can be enacted is matter of achieving equilibrium between 
our self-understanding and what others allow us to be. This draws our attention to 
the role of inter-subjective relations in both shaping our self-understandings, and 
to the fact that others my frustrate our ability to perform or adopt our chosen self-
narratives, as well as limit the range of identity-constituting narratives available to 
us. Our identity-constituting narratives are not solely up to us (personal identity is 
only partly constituted by the self), and so we need an account of the role others 
play in defining who we are. 
 
I firstly discuss Nelson’s formulation of a “credibility constraint” and her 
criticism of Schechtman’s reality constraint as failing to adequately account for the 
social environment. I then turn to Baylis’ criticism of Nelson’s credibility 
constraint and Baylis’ formulation of the “equilibrium constraint”. I endorse 
Baylis’ approach over Nelson’s. 
 
For Nelson, personal identity depends on recognition and acknowledgement 
by others. As Nelson argues ‘identity is a lever for agency’. Here Nelson draw 
attention to both how others can constrain the exercise of our agency, and also to 
how the role of others in shaping our self-understanding can constrain our agency.  
[P]ersonal identity, understood as a complicated interaction of one’s own sense of 
self and others’ understanding of who one is, functions as a lever that expands or 
contracts one’s ability to exercise moral agency. The way in which others identify 
us establishes what they will permit us to do; if they identify us as morally 
defective, they will perhaps humor us or hospitalize us, or else treat us with 
suspicion, contempt, or hostility. This restricts our freedom to act. How we 
identify ourselves establishes our own view of what we can do; if our self-
conception marks us as morally defective, we will mistrust our own capabilities 
and so treat ourselves with suspicion or contempt, or exempt ourselves from full 
responsibility for our actions. This too restricts moral agency.330 
 
Nelson explains that personal identities consist of narratives told from the 
first- and third-personal perspectives. Stories from the first-personal perspective 
feature the things that a person most cares about - their experiences, 
characteristics etc. In contrast, in stories from the third-personal perspective what 
                                            
330 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, xi. 
  121 
features is those things which matter most to others about the person. As Nelson 
writes:  
Personal identities consist of a connective tissue of narratives … which we weave 
around the features of our selves and our lives that matter most to us. The 
significant things I’ve done and experienced, my more important characteristics, 
the roles and relationships I care about most, the values that matter most to me—
these form the relatively stable points around which I construct the narratives 
that constitute the sense I make of myself. … But my identity is also constituted 
by the stories other people construct around the things about me that seem most 
important to them.331 
 
Nelson notes that these first- and third-personal stories can come into conflict. 
Nelson advocates a “no trump” view which recognises that a person’s own stories 
are not automatically taken to be authoritative. Nelson argues that there are 
epistemic, practical and conceptual reasons why other people’s stories may 
sometimes be more authoritative. This draws attention not only to the fact that 
self-knowledge can be deceptive, but also to the role of others in both letting us 
be, as well in shaping our understandings of, who we are. As Nelson writes: 
The credibility constraint suggests a number of reasons why my own self-
constituting stories don’t automatically trump other people’s stories about me. For 
one thing, self-knowledge is fallible, so there are gaps and distortions in my 
understanding of who I am. This is an epistemic consideration. But there are also 
practical reasons why other people’s stories about me are sometimes more 
authoritative than my own: who I am depends to some extent on who other 
people will let me be. And finally, there are conceptual grounds for denying that I 
hold trumps: my identity is always contingent in part on others, because personal 
identities are necessarily social or interpersonal. … I espouse a “no-trump” view 
of personal identities, arguing on epistemic, practical and conceptual grounds that 
I cannot be the sole arbiter of the stories that constitute me.332 
Nelson argues that when first-person stories come into conflict with third-
person narratives, we can adjudicate between these stories through use of the 
credibility constraint to assess which is the ‘better story’, i.e. which should be 
regarded as identity-constituting.333 As Nelson notes in the quote above, the 
credibility constraint introduces three criteria for adjudication: strong explanatory 
force, correlation to action and heft.334 For Nelson when a narrative has strong 
explanatory force it best explains a person’s characteristics, such as why someone 
behaves as they do: ‘Identity-constituting narratives are those that don’t just take 
the evidence into account—they’re the ones that fit the evidence best’.335 A 
narrative has correlation to action when it relates to the person’s actions. ‘[S]ince 
acts express a person’s identity, we have reason to believe a story is identity-
constituting only if there is a strong correlation between it and the person’s 
                                            
331 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 72. 
332 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 99. 
333 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 101. 
334 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 93. 
335 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 93. 
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actions’.336 A narrative meets the criteria of heft when it is about important 
features of a person’s story, or of others’ stories of her. ‘[A] story is credibly a 
contribution to a person’s identity if it possesses the right amount of heft. The 
criterion of heft underscores the idea that identity-constituting narratives are 
woven around the features of people’s lives that they, or some of the rest of us, 
care about most’.337 With these three criteria, Nelson argues we can decide 
between contending or conflicting narratives to assess the merits of two (or more) 
contending narratives. Nelson further notes that if both stories meet these criteria, 
then the first-personal narrative should be taken as identity-constituting.  
 
Nelson contrasts her formulation of the credibility constraint with 
Schechtman’s articulation and reality constraints, arguing that both constraints, as 
formulated by Schechtman, privilege self-knowledge, as well as fail to adequately 
account for our relation to others. Nelson argues that Schechtman’s articulation 
constraint, which argues that if someone cannot articulate her actions then the 
relevant trait is not fully identity-constituting, treats identity solely as a function of 
one’s knowledge, where in fact, what we do not know about ourselves, and 
perhaps what others know about us, can be identity-defining.338 Nelson also 
criticises the reality constraint by questioning the standard Schechtman proposes 
for evaluating how closely one’s self-conception coheres with reality - checking 
‘whether my self-concept is in synch with the view held of me by others’ fails to 
acknowledge that the view of others may be ‘mistaken, bigoted or hostile’.339 As 
Nelson writes: 
The reality constraint as Schechtman understands it seems to suppose that the 
question of who gets to say what is real about me has already been settled, by 
majority vote, but that implies that others’ understandings of me could never be 
challenged.340 
Schechtman’s formulation of the reality constraint does take account of the 
role of others in assessing whether a self-narrative is identity-constituting. 
However, this is not an understanding in terms of the role of others in shaping or 
determining our identities; rather, it is a recognition of an ‘objective’ reality to test 
a narrative. Nelson’s criticisms of Schechtman’s constraints recognise that 
personal identity is only partly constituted by the self.  
 
Baylis also proposes a relational approach to narrative identity in contrast to 
Schechtman’s. Like Nelson’s account, Baylis argues that Schechtman’s approach 
fails to properly account for the role of others in our self-constitution and criticises 
Schechtman’s formulation of the constraints on narrative. Baylis’ approach differs 
from Nelson’s however. According to Baylis, Nelson’s approach fails to 
                                            
336 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 95. 
337 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 96. 
338 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 91. 
339 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 92. 
340 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 92. 
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adequately account for the role of others in a relational context because Nelson 
still conceives that narratives can be weighed up against each other (to see which 
is the most credible). In contrast, Baylis argues that narratives must get uptake 
and that in order to be identity-constituting narratives must achieve equilibrium.   
 
On Baylis’ relational approach to narrative identity, our identity-constitution is 
understood as a form of negotiation involving others, both intimate relations with 
others, as well as public interactions, in which persons are constituted through 
these relationships. Baylis writes that according to the relational approach to 
personal identity: 
 [M]y identity is neither in my body (viz., the somatic or biological account of 
personal identity) nor in my brain (viz., the psychological account of personal 
identity) but, rather, in the negotiated spaces between my biology and psychology 
and that of others. These others include those who are a part of my familial, 
social, cultural, and political clusters of meaning and belonging, those who know 
me from a distance, and still others, near strangers, who do not know me.341 
This is a dynamic account of identity, which Baylis argues is a balance 
between self-ascription and ascription by others - between ‘how we see and 
understand ourselves and how others see and understand us’.342 And like Atkins, 
Baylis argues for a non-dualistic understanding of embodiment, and so differs 
from both biological and psychological continuity approaches to personal identity 
a well as from Schechtman’s understanding of the relationship between mind and 
body and their connection to narrative. 
 
In explaining her relational approach to personal identity, Baylis contrasts her 
approach with Schechtman’s. Baylis, like Nelson, recognises that whilst 
Schechtman acknowledges the role of others in the formation of identity-
constituting narratives (i.e. they must meet the reality constraint and the 
articulation constraint), Schechtman views personal identity as in the main 
constituted by the self, as understood in terms of the subjectivity of the individual 
and self-constitution through acts of self-creation.343 In contrast, a relational 
approach takes as important the attitudes of others, and they role they play, in 
shaping our self-narratives. For Baylis, our identities are ‘co-creations’. Baylis 
writes:  
Family members, friends, colleagues, community or tribal members, 
acquaintances, and even strangers play an active role in shaping the self-
narratives of others not only by contributing to, but also by endorsing, 
questioning, and in some cases, actively contesting, another’s self-narrative. With 
                                            
341 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 110. 
342 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 117. 
343 Baylis further notes that Schechtman recognises the role of others in the development of 
our self-constitution primarily in terms of the past conditioning the present (for example a well-
nurtured child in their formative years). Baylis argues that the present role of others is just as 
important. Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 118. 
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relational identity, persons are (and only can be) dynamic complex co-creations 
informed by the perspectives and creative intentions of others.344 
 
Baylis argues that given the dynamic nature of self-narratives and the role of 
others in their formation,345 others not only contribute to the shaping of our 
identities, but are actively involved in endorsing, questioning and contesting these 
self-narratives. According to Baylis, narratives require uptake by others in order 
to be identity-constituting, and this requires a balance or equilibrium between 
how a person sees and understands herself and how others see and understand 
her.346 In order for a self-narrative to be identity-constituting it must achieve 
equilibrium - ‘only self-narratives capable of equilibrium are identity-defining’.347 
Baylis argues that our self-narratives can be endorsed, as well as dismissed or 
challenged. When the self-narrative is challenged the individual will need to 
achieve equilibrium348 and has a number of options available in order to do so, 
including to re-project the narrative, revise the self-narrative, adopt the self-
understanding of others, dismiss the views of others, or to change one’s 
community to one more accepting of one’s projected self-narrative.349 Importantly, 
for Baylis, relational identity is dynamic and identity-constituting narratives shift 
over time. Whilst narratives are more or less stable, achieving equilibrium is 
temporary; we move in out of periods of equilibrium and disequilibrium.350 As 
such, Baylis argues that stability is not the ‘end game’ of identity formation and 
nor do periods of equilibrium reveal an insight into one’s true self.351 As Baylis 
writes:  
[I]t is important to insist on the fact that all self-narratives are always more or less 
stable. The nature of the equilibrium varies depending upon the complexity of the 
self-narrative, how many of the narrative details are subject to multiple 
interpretations, and the social, cultural, political, historical, and other context(s) 
in which the self-narrative is projected. For example, a seemingly robust and 
stable self-narrative in one socio-political context may become a very fragile and 
unstable self-narrative in another. … In addition, it is expected that over a 
lifetime, there will be interludes of disequilibrium, the frequency and intensity of 
which will vary.352 
 
                                            
344 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 118. 
345 Nelson too recognises that narratives are dynamic, that some are constant, whilst ‘others 
shift over time’. See Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 72. 
346 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 119. 
347 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 119. 
348 As Baylis writes: ’[E]quilbrium is crucial for identity constitution. A self requires minimal 
uptake by others. This uptake may be granted or withheld based upon judgments about “reality,” 
“coherence,” “unity’” “consistency,” “credibility,” “plausibility,” or the like, but what crucially 
matters given that we are constituted through our personal and public relations is the prospect of 
“equilibrium”’.Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 124. 
349 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 120. 
350 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 128. 
351 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 123. 
352 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 123. 
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Baylis contrasts her formulation of the equilibrium constraint with Nelson’s 
credibility constraint. Whilst Nelson recognises the role of others in our self-
constitution, and the importance of recognition by others, the credibility 
constraint implies that we just need to choose between stories - to see which is the 
most credible.353 Nelson’s formulation fails to recognise the necessity of uptake in 
the performance and projection of our self-narratives.  Baylis contrasts her 
account with both Schechtman and Nelson as follows: 
With the equilibrium constraint, unlike the reality constraint (advocated by 
Schechtman), there is neither care nor concern with what others “objectively” 
believe to be true, except insofar as others’ perceptions are invitations to practise 
one’s narrative and performance skills. Further, with the equilibrium constraint, 
unlike the credibility constraint (advocated by Nelson), there need be no effort to 
identify the “better” of two or more competing stories. Again, at most, there is an 
invitation to revise one’s projected self-narrative or one’s community of belonging 
to achieve a certain balance through minimal uptake of one’s projected self-
narrative.354 
 
Baylis’ (and Nelson’s) relational approach to personal identity shows that 
identity and (autonomous) agency are not co-extensive. Identity is not just about 
self-creation or self-understanding, but rather, identity, in some part, relies on 
others. This draws attention to the fact that not all identity-constitutive narratives 
are morally good for us. In circumstances in which a person is able to project a 
narrative that she values and there is uptake from others, we may attribute 
autonomy to them ‘as opposed to mere agency’.355 However, in other 
circumstances, such as when a person is constrained by the narrative 
understandings of others and is unable to contribute meaningfully to their own 
self-narrative, this may be a case of oppression, and as such a threat to autonomy.  
This approach recognises that others can both assist with the formation of 
valuable self-narratives as well as constrain our ability to do so, so others shape 
our identity-constituting narratives and so our agency, in ways that both facilitate 
and hinder identity construction and the exercise of autonomy. I further develop 
the distinction between identity and autonomy in the following chapter on 
relational autonomy.  
 
Both Nelson and Baylis provide a necessary corrective to Schechtman’s 
understanding of the role of others in identity-constitution. I endorse Baylis’ 
response because her account more adequately accounts for how social 
understandings can threaten identity. As I show in the following section, this 
recognition illuminates that threats to identity may not be the result of implant, 
but rather from social understandings of people with disabilities and illness.  
                                            
353 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 119. In this way, 
Nelson’s credibility constraint operates in a similar to Schechtman’s reality constraint, that is, 
comparison against an objective standard. 
354 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 121. 
355 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 123-24. 




In this section I have developed an approach to narrative identity as embodied 
and relational. This approach to narrative can explain the complexity of selfhood 
and practical identity established in the previous two chapters. Firstly, drawing on 
Atkins I argued that contrary to Schechtman, we need an embodied approach to 
narrative identity in order to adequately explain both continuity and change in 
narrative identity over time and so properly meet any objection concerning the 
extreme claim. Secondly, drawing on Nelson and Baylis, I argued that contrary to 
Schechtman, we need a thoroughly relational approach to narrative in order to 
adequately explain the role of others in the constitution of our narratives. In doing 
so, I have further articulated the relation of the concepts of identity, agency and 
identity, as well as the role of embodied and social constraints on (and constitution 
of) our identities. 
 
4.2 Narrative Identity & Neural Implants 
 
‘I don’t feel like myself anymore’; ‘I haven’t found myself after the operation’; ‘I feel like 
an electric doll’; ‘I feel like a robot’; ‘She’s no longer the same person’   
 
In chapter 2.4, I argued that the sense of identity at stake in the claims about 
self-change consequent upon neural implants is practical identity - which concerns 
my sense of “who I am”. I showed how changes in behaviour, characteristics, and 
desires consequent upon neural implants might be seen as a potential threat to our 
self-understanding and sense of who we are by challenging our ability to act out of 
our self-conceptions, by disrupting one’s projects and the reasons for one’s 
actions, from a first- and third-personal perspective. I argued that the strength of 
the practical identity approach is that it takes the first-personal perspective as 
irreducible and so illuminates the practical importance to us, that is, what is at 
stake in identity change. In this section, I show that narrative identity approaches 
to practical identity and the question “Who am I?”, which explain self-constitution 
(and reconstitution) over time (diachronic identity), and posit a dynamic 
understanding of selfhood, are able to explain how we construct our identities 
over time (patterns out of change), in the face of the contingency of human lives. 
Because narrative can account for a persisting subject it can explain identity over 
time and the importance of being the same experiential subject through time. It 
can also explain why narrative breaks matter; these change our subjective 
relations to our identity-constituting characteristics. As such, narrative provides a 
normative framework through which we can better understand what’s at stake in 
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identity change and whether and how neural implants might threaten identity.356 
Disruptions to narrative self-understanding can challenge the patterns of 
coherence and meaning through which we make sense of our lives over time. 
Some people find it difficult to see their lives as continuous pre and post-
treatment. I show that neural implants may challenge and disrupt patterns of 
narrative coherence and in some cases narrative integration, and make self-
understanding difficult. A narrative account offers practical resources for 
responding to these changes, that is, in the form of narrative repair, if persons are 
to achieve and sustain a temporally-extended sense of their identity.  
 
Below, I engage with, and analyse, the responses from Schechtman and Baylis 
concerning whether Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) treatment for Parkinson’s 
Disease (as well as for psychiatric conditions) poses a threat to narrative identity. 
I focus on Schechtman and Baylis because each develop narrative accounts 
independently of issues related to neural implants, and whilst they come to 
differing conclusions, comparing the two responses draws out the need to 
distinguish more fully between identity, agency and autonomy, as I do in the 
following chapter. Both Schechtman and Baylis discuss the self-changes as raised 
by Schüpbach and colleagues. I show that whilst Schechtman concludes that DBS 
poses a threat to narrative identity, Baylis argues that this conclusion is incorrect. 
Rather, argues Baylis, the impacts of DBS are better understood in terms of 
potential threats to agency, which may hinder one’s ability to meaningfully author 
one’s life, and so in turn threaten one’s identity. I conclude that an account of 
narrative identity is not yet enough to answer the question about threats to 
identity consequent upon neural implants, because as yet we have no way to 
determine whether the changes consequent upon DBS are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, except 
in terms of whether the person identifies with, or likes, the changes or not. In 
order to do so, we must direct our attention to understanding autonomy as a 
competence that is acquired developmentally, with recognition that we exercise 
this capacity in an embodied social setting.  
 
Firstly I set out Schechtman’s response to self-change consequent upon neural 
implants - that DBS can disrupt the narrative thread and can threaten personal 
identity. I outline Schechtman’s analysis that DBS threatens Mr Garrison’s 
identity because of his inability to meet both the articulation and reality 
constraints. Secondly, I review, and criticise, Schechtman’s response through 
firstly comparing Baylis’ application of constraints to the case of Mr Garrison. I 
show that the issue is one of whether Mr Garrison can achieve uptake of his 
narrative (and so achieve narrative integration) and that whether he can achieve 
uptake will be up to others (as well as the success of the treatment and the 
                                            
356 A similar claim is made by Mackenzie and Walker, see Mackenzie and Walker, 
“Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of Authenticity.” 
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progression of his illness). This shifts the ethical discussion from a concern with 
whether he is the same person to what options are present for narrative 
integration of self-change and a narrative sense of self-continuity. 
4.2.a Schechtman - DBS and threats to narrative identity  
 
Schechtman applies her narrative approach to identity to explain changes in 
characteristics, mood and behaviour following DBS as identified in cases by 
Schüpbach and colleagues.357 Schechtman argues that because the narrative 
approach to identity is formulated within a “dynamics of change”, and views 
selfhood as tied to our ability to understand ourselves and others in narrative 
terms, it is well placed to explain the theoretical challenges posed by DBS, that is, 
how identity can be maintained through change (even when mechanically caused), 
as well as to provide practical direction for therapeutic responses by suggesting 
we can mitigate this change through helping patients construct and maintain a 
coherent narrative of change.  
 
A narrative approach, Schechtman claims, provides a straightforward way of 
explaining the perceived threats to identity from DBS - psychological changes 
consequent upon DBS disrupt the narrative flow, or coherence, of our lives. 
Schechtman writes: 
The narrative view … places identity in the dynamics of psychological change. 
This makes it especially useful as a framework for thinking about the 
psychological changes that sometimes occur with DBS. … [I]t gives us a 
straightforward way of describing the kinds of threats to identity that DBS can 
seem to raise. According to the narrative approach, a threat to selfhood or identity 
stems from a disruption of the narrative flow of a life, and the resolution of that 
threat comes from repairing the narrative thread.358 
 
Schechtman argues that responses of self-alienation and perceived negative 
changes from DBS quoted in Schüpbach and colleagues reveal a loss of the 
organising principles which structured the patient’s self-narrative, which involve 
the patterns of meaning and projects formed around these self-understandings, 
including, for example, around a patient’s illness. As such, patients may become 
confused about how to proceed and may have difficulty seeing their lives post 
DBS as continuous with their lives before DBS.359   
                                            
357 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed 
Mind in a Repaired Body?”; Schüpbach and Agid, “Psychosocial Adjustment After Deep Brain 
Stimulation in Parkinson’s Disease.” 
358 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 137. 
359 This understanding of the role of illness in figuring one’s self-understanding and providing 
meaning to one’s projects helps to explain the difficulties identified by Wilson et al that some 
patients treated for epilepsy with DBS have problems adjusting to being symptom or seizure free, 
what Wilson et al. label “the burden of normality”. See: Wilson, Bladin, and Saling, “The “Burden 
of Normality”: Concepts of Adjustment After Surgery for Seizures.”; Wilson, Bladin, and Saling, 
“The Burden of Normality: a Framework for Rehabilitation After Epilepsy Surgery.” For an 
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The range of problems patients can face in their lives after their symptoms 
improve can be understood as a problem in picking up and continuing one’s life 
story after the changes brought abut by DBS. Patients whose illnesses gave them 
a sense of drive or purpose may not know what to do with themselves now or how 
to structure their activities when the symptoms are gone. Relationships that had 
formed around their illnesses can now come undone, and professional goals 
change. In general, patients who report adjustment problems seem to have a hard 
time seeing the life they were living after treatment as the continuation of the life 
they were living before, and so find themselves having to reinvent themselves. 
The metaphor of “second birth,” while it can signify new beginnings, also signifies 
the loss of one’s identity.360 
 
This theoretical understanding points to directions for therapeutic responses in 
order to mitigate these disruptions, which involves ways to preserve narrative 
integrity, or to repair the narrative thread. Schechtman argues that a focus on 
narrative continuity can help patients understand these disruptions to self-
understanding by providing a broader perspective on one’s life. By taking a 
broader perspective on the events and changes, one is encouraged to see these 
events not as isolated but as part of an unfolding self-narrative.  
A longer term narrative perspective will thus provide a viewpoint from which 
what may look like a narrative break, up close, can be seen as a small segment of a 
continuous and self-expressive life narrative. … The longer term adjustment 
problems can be addressed by helping patients and their close associates see their 
lives as a continuation of the lives they were living before.361  
And 
[T]he narrative approach suggests encouraging a long view of a life in a way that 
allows for moments of radical change or anomalous circumstances to be 
appropriated into an ongoing story, finding a way into one’s life narrative, rather 
than allowing them to disrupt it.362 
Through this process patients would be encouraged to try to understand 
events and changes as part of unified or coherent narrative, that is, to construct a 
story that articulates a single ongoing self. Pre-treatment might involve 
anticipating changes to narrative, such as the role of illness as an organising 
principle, and helping patients to construct a story of how their projects and 
relationships, for example, pre-treatment might be continued post-treatment. 
Ideally, notes Schechtman, this should be a process, and narrative, which the 
patient actively takes towards their self and which they see as self-directed.363 This 
                                                                                                                           
application of the narrative approach to this question in DBS patients, see: Frederic Gilbert, “The 
Burden of Normality: From ‘chronically Ill’ to ‘symptom Free’. New Ethical Challenges for Deep 
Brain Stimulations Postoperative Treatment,” Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (2012). See also Gisquet 
who raises similar issues concerning the difficulties patients face in adapting to a lack of symptoms 
following treatment for DBS. Gisquet, “Cerebral Implants and Parkinson’s Disease: a Unique 
Form of Biographical Disruption?” 
360 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
361 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
362 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 139. 
363 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
Notably, Schechtman argues that what support is appropriate will depend on the individual 
person. The narrative approach proffers a particularism - some may need little support, in part 
depending on how important narrative coherence is for an individual. With this statement, 
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might allow patients to see their lives pre- and post-treatment as continuous and of 
their making. I will return to this point in discussions of autonomous agency in the 
following chapter.  
 
Schechtman also analyses shorter term adjustment problems experienced by 
some patients who have used DBS for treating psychiatric disorders, wherein the 
changes from DBS can be immediate and acute, such as when prior to the 
stimulation the patient was depressed and immediately upon stimulation, happy. 
Schechtman argues that in these cases the threat to identity comes from the 
anomalous nature of the change, that is, from stimulation of the brain. This causal 
or mechanical explanation challenges our conception of ourselves (and others) as 
agents, as the cause of the changes in the agent’s actions and values post DBS 
does not seem to be the product of the person themselves. As Schechtman writes, 
this explanation ‘seems more in place in the chronicle of an object’s history than in 
a personal narrative’.364 This understanding views the threat to identity as flowing 
from the cause of the changes and not so much from disruption to the long-term 
narrative coherence. The response that Schechtman suggests though, is similar to 
that advocated in the cases of longer-term adjustment problems - urging patients 
to take narrative, long-term perspectives on these changes which occur in the 
short time span after stimulation. If we focus on that short period we will indeed 
see narrative discontinuity, but if we take a broader perspective, we might see this 
time span as part of a broader coherent life story. In contrast to the mechanical 
explanation, Schechtman argues that by taking a narrative perspective, the patient 
can see their role in choosing the DBS as a cause of the changes also, and so be 
the author or protagonist of the subsequent changes. As Schechtman writes: 
If we take a broader perspective, however, we can see that time span as a 
coherent part of an ongoing story — the story, for example, of someone battling 
depression who has tried a variety of treatments without success and who has 
decided, maybe with some trepidation or maybe with great hope, to try DBS. The 
change that occurs may have direct stimulation to the brain as its most proximate 
cause; we can understand it more broadly as being caused also by patients’ desire 
to rid themselves of depression and their willingness to be treated in this way to 
do so. This allows a description of the change in terms of the plans, projects, and 
relationships that make up patients’ lives and that they cannot pursue their lives 
as fully as they wish because of their depression.365 
And so, from this longer-term narrative perspective what might appear as a 
break in the narrative can be understood as a part of a continuous, and ideally, 
self-expressive narrative.366 I address the connection between narrative identity 
and autonomy further in the following chapter, here my aim has been to draw 
                                                                                                                           
Schechtman indicates a response to Strawson and his claims that Episodics are less concerned with 
narrative in their lives. Given Episodics live with a fairly loose narrative structure they may need 
very little support of this type. Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep 
Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
364 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 137. 
365 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
366 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
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attention to the role of narrative perspective in understanding changes from neural 
implants.    
 
As noted at the start of this section Schechtman argues that narrative identity 
is well-placed to explain threats to identity because it presents a dynamic 
understanding of identity and psychological change. Schechtman contrasts this 
understanding of threats to narrative coherence, with a more “traditional” 
understanding of personal identity in terms of a collection of core psychological 
traits or commitments that are thought to define the true self. This traditional 
approach views DBS as a threat to identity through the ‘removal or diminishment’ 
of these core traits.   
One standard way of thinking about identity is in terms of a collection of core or 
key psychological traits that define the true self. Threats to identity are thus 
envisioned as involving the removal or diminishment of these traits. According to 
this understanding, DBS threatens identity in the case of acute changes by 
undermining a fundamental sense of oneself as an agent with defining core traits, 
and, in the case of longer term changes, by altering core feature of personality.367  
This type of approach, according to Schechtman, understands selfhood and 
identity in ‘static’ terms, unlike the ‘dynamic’ terms of the narrative approach, and 
so provides little direction for therapeutic care, and so little guidance as to how to 
avoid these threats.   
 
In some cases, Schechtman argues that the disruption of the narrative thread 
can be so dramatic, such that it can break off one narrative and start a new one, so 
that the pre- and post-DBS selves may be seen as different people. In the previous 
chapter (3.1.c) I outlined Schechtman’s view that when narrative is disrupted, 
identity is decreased. Narrative disruption challenges agency per se - a person 
needs a narrative self-conception in order to be an agent at all, and also, with 
respect to particular actions - if actions don’t stem from a person’s coherent and 
stable pattern of values, and the source of actions is viewed as external to the 
person, this also mitigates agency368 with respect to those values or actions. When 
this connection is lacking, it can compromise one’s narrative capacity so 
decreasing the degree of forensic personhood. A failure to meet narrative 
constraints will compromise forensic personhood, forensic personal identity, or 
possibly both.  
There are, of course, many different degrees of narrative cohesion and many 
different degrees to which either of these constraints on an identity-constituting 
narrative can be met. … The more fully developed and cohesive someone’s 
                                            
367 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 136. A 
similar argument is made by Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal 
Identity From Deep Brain Stimulation.”; DeGrazia, “Enhancement Technologies and Human 
Identity.”; Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity.”; Maartje Schermer, “The Mind and the Machine: on the Conceptual and Moral 
Implications of Brain-machine Interaction.,” Nanoethics 3 (2009). 
368 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 159. 
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narrative, the more fully a forensic person she is. To the extent that her narrative 
is compromised, so is her forensic personhood. … A person’s forensic identity is 
determined by her narrative, so when a narrative is disrupted or discontinuous, 
the degree of identity is correspondingly decreased.369 
 
On Schechtman’s approach a person survives if the unity of their agency 
persists. For Schechtman this unity is provided for by narrative, so as long as the 
narrative persists, then so does the person; narrative defines the bounds of the 
person. Moreover, one’s narrative identity can change so much that one can 
become a different person both because of a changed, destroyed narrative or an 
inability to form a coherent narrative. To demonstrate this point I turn to 
Schechtman’s analysis of the hypothetical case of Mr Garrison, who, following 
treatment for Parkinson’s Disease with DBS, demonstrates radical changes in his 
personality, commitments and desires which impact on his professional, as well as 
his social and family, ties.  
 
Schechtman argues that Mr Garrison’s narrative identity is threatened because 
his post and pre DBS self-narratives do not conform to the constraints required 
for a narrative to be identity-constituting. Schechtman argues that Mr Garrison’s 
post DBS self-narrative cannot adequately meet the articulation constraint 
because Mr Garrison cannot tell a story of how these new values and motivations 
are related to his actions, ideas etc, without acknowledging that the cause of these 
values and motivations is the DBS. That is, Mr Garrison cannot provide an 
explanation of why he does what he does such that we understand his actions as 
flowing from his own values.  
If Mr. Garrison articulates his history without running afoul of the reality 
constraint, he will have to acknowledge that his current passions and interests—
the things he takes as reasons—were caused by manipulation of his brain. It is not 
because he learnt something important about the defects of his previous 
commitments that he gave them up; it is because he had electrodes implanted in 
his brain. Having acknowledged this, however, Mr. Garrison will have difficulty 
taking his current commitments seriously as reasons for action. Knowing that his 
enthusiasm for the Democrats and the environment is brought about by direct 
stimulation of his brain should make him suspicious of these passions as genuinely 
reason-giving.370 
 
This is because Mr Garrison’s actions post-DBS do not flow from his own 
intentions, projects and goals, that is from his reflected-upon reasons, but rather 
are caused by the DBS. Furthermore, Schechtman argues that if Mr Garrison 
ignores the role of DBS in causing his new commitments and interests (ignores 
meeting the articulation constraint), then he would fall foul of the reality 
constraint, because the story he might tell would not accord with the objective fact 
                                            
369 Schechtman, “Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity,” 83-84. 
370 Schechtman, “Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity,” 85. 
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of the role of DBS in his change of characteristics.371 Schechtman concludes that 
the disruption to Mr Garrison’s narrative thread poses a threat to his personal 
identity because of his inability to meet the constraints on identity-constituting 
narrative - this diminishes his personhood and identity. Mr Garrison cannot see 
himself as the protagonist of an identity-constituting narrative, because he is not 
an agent acting for reasons of his own. Seeing oneself as the protagonist of an 
identity-constituting narrative requires that one consider oneself as an agent, 
acting for reasons.372 The relevant factor here for Schechtman is the cause of Mr 
Garrison’s changes, that is, that they were caused by the DBS.373 Schechtman 
argues that this is the case anytime when the cause of changes in commitments, 
desires, or projects does not lie in the agent. As Schechtman writes: 
When there is a change in personal commitments caused by illness, medical 
treatment, accident, or brainwashing, there is no narrative solution that does not 
result in a decreased degree of narrative coherence and so a decreased degree of 
forensic personhood and/or identity.374 
On this reading Mr Garrison is a different (forensic) person following the 
DBS, than he was prior to the treatment with DBS.  
The post-DBS Mr. Garrison has interests, enthusiasms, and passions. He is able 
to make commitments to causes and to people and make important decisions. The 
passions and commitments that guide him after DBS, however, are very different 
from those that guided him before. It is thus easy to see him as a forensic person 
post-DBS, but hard to see him as the same forensic person as before DBS.375 
 
The moral implications of this claim are significant because it becomes unclear 
whether we are able to hold Mr. Garrison, or many people (given that life is full of 
so many changes that are not caused by the agent), accountable for, nor 
responsible for, his actions and choices.376 Nonetheless Schechtman does suggest a 
way forward for Mr. Garrison, a suggestion which recognises the cause of his 
values as a result of the DBS, but the price of this suggested solution is that it 
lessens his connection to the person he was prior to the DBS.  
Mr. Garrison is thus in something of a bind with respect to his self-narration. If 
he is to consider himself as an agent, take his current reasons seriously, and act 
accordingly, he will need to start anew—with the passions he finds himself with 
after DBS and not questioning too hard how he came to have them. This will 
impede his ability to fully meet the articulation constraint. If he does articulate the 
source of these passions realistically, he will either have to feel his agency 
compromised by their anomalous origins or will have to ignore them and act on 
his previous commitments, even though he is alienated from them. In either of 
these cases, his narrative will be compromised because he does not fully consider 
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himself an agent. … The best solution seems to be … taking the newfound 
enthusiasms as a starting point and critically evaluating them from where one 
stands now, without much attention to one’s earlier views and commitments. This 
will maximize one’s degree of forensic personhood but decrease forensic identity 
with one’s earlier self.377 
 
Schechtman’s application of her narrative account of identity does help to 
explain the significance of changes following DBS, as well as accounting for why 
these changes, even though sometimes expected, as well as unexpected, might be 
perceived by patients in terms of a threat to their identity. As Schechtman notes, 
DBS can cause a disruption to the narrative thread, to the degree of narrative 
coherence, and thus on her account diminish both personhood and identity over 
time. Further, her account provides resources for responding to this disruption, in 
terms of attempting to preserve narrative integration and narrative coherence.  
 
Schechtman’s argument that questions of characterisation and narrative 
identity are under discussion in cases of self-change consequent upon neural 
implants has been highly influential. Much of the neuroethics literature that 
discusses the cases in Schüpbach and colleagues argues that it is narrative identity 
that is under discussion when considering changes from neural implants, and 
other types of neurotechnologies, and not numerical identity, in statements such as 
“I am no longer the same person”.378 However, although there is agreement that 
DBS can cause narrative disruption, as well as about suggested therapeutic 
directions for attending to narrative disruption, there is disagreement as to 
whether these changes should be understood in terms of threats to narrative 
identity, as Schechtman maintains. Whilst Schechtman (and others) argue that the 
psychological changes consequent upon DBS can be understood as threats to 
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identity,379 several authors disagree with this conclusion. These authors emphasise 
the dynamic nature of identity and argue that it is static notions of identity that 
conceive of change as presenting threats to identity.380  
 
Would Schechtman’s approach be useful in all circumstances though? There 
are cases in the literature, in which it may be impossible for the patient to ‘repair’ 
their narrative thread, due to diminished agency. These are cases in which the 
changes consequent upon either the illness or the treatment are so great, that such 
a direction (or set of strategies) is just not possible. Glannon cites the case of a 
patient who received treatment with DBS for advanced Parkinson’s Disease.381 
The treatment with the DBS however caused mania in the patient, such that he 
was admitted to a psychiatric ward. When the stimulator was altered and his 
rational judgement restored, the symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease returned, 
leaving him bedridden. This left the patient with an unenviable dilemma and 
without the requisite resources to restore the narrative thread. Glannon writes:   
This left the patient and his healthcare providers with a choice between two 
mutually exclusive options: to admit the patient to a nursing home because of a 
serious physical disability, despite intact cognitive and affective capacities; or to 
admit the patient to a chronic psychiatric ward because of a manic state, despite 
restoration of good motor function.382 
Glannon concludes that sometimes the change in mental states can be so great, 
such that disruption to the narrative is too great.383 
 
Further, I argue that the inadequacies, which I identified in Schechtman’s 
narrative self-constitution approach in the previous section (4.1) - to the role of 
embodiment in constituting the first-personal perspective and self-constancy in 
articulating who I am, and recognition of the role of others in narrative self-
constitution, constrain the theoretical resources of Schechtman’s approach in 
explaining the changes consequent upon DBS; these appear as points of tension 
and difficulty in her account of the changes consequent upon DBS and detract 
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from the ability of her account to explain both the theoretical challenges as well as 
to offer practical directions for therapy.   
 
Firstly, as Atkins noted, Schechtman’s solution to questions of characterisation 
and reidentification relies on an impersonal understanding of the role of the body 
in constituting our first-personal perspective. Therefore, Schechtman’s approach 
fails to account for continuity properly, focussing on psychological change (at the 
expense of self-constancy). Because Schechtman views narrative identity 
predominantly in terms of psychological change, like psychological and biological 
continuity approaches to personal identity, Schechtman’s focus in evaluating 
questions of psychological change consequent upon DBS tends to focus on 
questions of survival, that is change in terms of whether someone is (literally) the 
same or different person post DBS treatment and so casts change in terms of 
threats to identity. A focus on embodied continuity, on self-constancy, would 
instead direct our attention to how we integrate of our embodied bodily 
perspective.  
 
Secondly, as Baylis and Nelson argue, Schechtman’s constraints on narrative 
fail to adequately account for the role of others in self-constitution. Schechtman’s 
analysis concluded that it was difficult to see Mr Garrison as the same person 
following the DBS; she demonstrated this claim by arguing that Mr Garrison was 
unable to meet either the articulation or reality constraint. Baylis questions 
Schechtman’s conclusion that DBS threatens Mr Garrison’s narrative identity and 
Schechtman’s analysis of the role of constraints on Mr Garrison’s ability to form 
an identity-constituting narrative. Baylis asks why the DBS cannot be 
incorporated into an explanation of the changes consequent upon DBS.384 
Further, whilst Baylis does not apply her own relational approach to the case of 
Mr Garrison, a focus on relational narrative identity and Baylis’ formulation of the 
equilibrium constraint points to an alternative reading of what determines whether 
Mr Garrison’s narrative is identity-constituting.385 It is not determined which 
stories or self-narratives will be identity-constituting independent of the context of 
uptake by others.  
 
Mackenzie and Walker apply Baylis’ understanding of relational identity and 
the equilibrium constraint to the conflicting narratives of the husband and wife in 
Schüpbach and colleagues, in which the husband describes himself as having been 
asleep prior to the treatment, yet his wife finds it difficult to adjust to, and see as 
valid, these ‘new’ or post-DBS desires. On Baylis’ approach the husband has a 
                                            
384 Though, this is a point that Schechtman recognises in her discussion of the short term 
changes following from DBS, see Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep 
Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
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number of options: to try to project his self-narratives more successfully, to revise 
his projected self-narrative in response to others’ reactions, to defer to others’ 
perceptions, to reject others’ interpretations of his character or actions, or to seek 
recognition of his preferred identity within a different community of belonging.386  
As such, Baylis’ approach offers a more nuanced analysis of such cases. 
Mackenzie and Walker offer such an analysis using Baylis’ relational approach: 
In the case described by Schüpbach and colleagues, the patient seems both to 
reject his wife’s interpretation of who he is and to want to seek out a different 
community of belonging in which he will be recognized for who he takes himself 
to be. This is what Baylis refers to as his “preferred self-narrative”. But whether 
he will be able to enact or “perform” this self-narrative and achieve a temporary 
stability will not be entirely up to him, since it will be subject not only to uptake 
by others but also to the progress of the disease and the success of the DBS in 
treating it. This is why achieving equilibrium requires finding a balance between 
how a person perceives and understands himself, how others see and understand 
him, and the constraints of his lived embodiment.387 
On Baylis’ relational approach, the husband’s wife will need to engage in a 
similar process.  
 
Mackenzie and Walker draw our attention to the question of whether Mr 
Garrison might get uptake of his story in a different context, but whatever his 
approach it will be a performative (relational) negotiation. Baylis’ relational 
approach and equilibrium constraint focus our attention on whether Mr Garrison 
would get uptake, and the role of his wife, and perhaps others, in this negotiation. 
Schechtman views identity-constitution primarily in terms of self-constitution 
conceiving of the articulation constraint in terms of self-understanding, so, on 
Schechtman’s account what is peripheral is less constituting. Schechtman’s 
constraints on narrative reveal an overly individualistic approach to identity in 
terms of self-creation, and so fail to acknowledge that whether Mr Garrison can 
achieve narrative self-constitution is not entirely up to him, but will involves 
others; that is, as a project of co-creation.  
 
These criticisms problematise Schechtman’s claim that her narrative self-
constitution approach is well suited to explaining change, and change following 
from neural implants. This conclusion that DBS can pose a threat to narrative 
seems as odds with Schechtman’s other claims that a narrative self-constitution 
account of personal identity is well placed to account for radical changes in 
narrative continuity. Whilst Schechtman’s account constrains her from fully 
establishing her claims, Schechtman’s proposed solution to the threat posed by 
DBS does point to the importance of self-direction and self-realisation in terms of 
achieving integration. So whilst Schechtman discusses changes in terms of 
                                            
386 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 389. 
387 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 389. 
  138 
narrative threats, her advice for therapeutic responses points in the direction of 
establishing narratives that are autonomous (as does her analysis that DBS 
challenges autonomous agency, which I return to in the following chapter).  
 
Baylis argues that Schechtman’s conclusions concerning threats to identity are 
in part driven by her failure to follow through with the implications of a dynamic 
account of narrative identity in terms of incorporating the role of relationality. I 
now turn to Baylis’ critique of Schechtman’s analysis of the potential threat posed 
by DBS to narrative identity.  
4.2.b Baylis - DBS and threats to narrative agency 
 
Baylis applies her ‘dynamic, narrative, and relational’ account of personal 
identity to the first-person descriptions of self-alienation, for example, “I don’t 
recognize myself” to argue that the ‘claim that DBS is a threat to identity is deeply 
problematic’.388  Baylis concludes that when ‘DBS dramatically disrupts the 
narrative flow, this disruption is best examined through the lens of agency’.389 This 
shifts the focus of discussion to looking at the social and embodied aspects of 
identity and in doing so shifts our focus to what’s involved in autonomous agency.  
 
Baylis argues that whilst Schechtman’s conclusion - that DBS threatens 
identity by disrupting the narrative flow - is initially appealing, it is incorrect and 
at odds with her more fundamental claims about identity and change - that ‘since 
narrative is a dynamic notion, continuity of narrative is thoroughly compatible 
with even quite radical change’.390 Rather, according to Baylis, we should 
understand change as constitutive of identity, and not as a threat to identity. 
Baylis interprets Schechtman’s claim as equivalent to the claim that DBS 
constrains how a person sees and understands herself - but for the DBS, Mr 
Garrison would still be the shy Republican.  
On a relational account of personal identity, “but for” the DBS the identity-
constituting narrative would be quite different (perhaps even radically different). 
On this view, DBS for PD distorts the dialectical process of identity formation 
and, for this reason, is a threat to personal identity. DBS for PD limits how a 
person sees and understands herself; as such DBS limits what the protagonist of 
an autobiographical narrative can project for minimal endorsement by others. A 
person with PD who has been treated with DBS cannot successfully project a 
self-narrative that is impervious to the fact of DBS. This constraint on what can 
be projected, acts as a constraint on what can be perceived. In turn, the interplay 
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between constrained projected and perceived self-narratives gives rise to a 
different identity-constituting narrative.391 
The problem with this answer is that it renders any and all disruptions, not 
just those from DBS and illness, to narrative, a threat - all and any change could 
turn out to be threatening, argues Baylis, including, for example, marriage, a 
change in jobs, perhaps even submitting a thesis. Rather, biographical disruption 
does not in itself constitute a threat to identity.  
A problem with this perspective on DBS for PD as a threat to personal identity, 
however, is that it renders any and all life events and experiences (whether 
initially considered positive or negative) potential threats to identity. If DBS for 
PD is a threat to personal identity because it constrains how a person sees and 
understand herself, which in turn constrains the dialectical process of identity 
formation, then so too PD is a threat to identity, and so too is potentially every 
other life event or experience integrated into an identity-constituting narrative 
including graduation, promotion, job loss, marriage, birth of a child, tsunami, 
divorce, death of a loved one, earthquake and so on.392 
Moreover, Schechtman’s conclusion cannot account for the significance of 
personal change - why for some change may be disruptive, but for others 
liberating or ‘the making of the man’.393  
Consider another example—onset of a severe neurodegenerative disease such as 
PD. For some this will be a devastating occurrence, for others this may prove to 
be ‘the making of the man’. In either case the narrative flow will be disrupted.394 
On Baylis’ account, changes do not pose a threat per se - regardless of whether 
or not they are caused by the agent; rather, changes are constitutive of, and so 
compatible with, identity. What is important is whether and how the change is 
integrated into one’s self-narrative. Rather, we need an account that explains both 
the ways that impairments and treatments might promote, as well as frustrate, 
narrative coherence and integration. 
 
Baylis concludes that framing the impacts of DBS in terms of threats to 
identity is thus deeply problematic. Rather, the challenges posed by DBS to 
narrative identity are better understood, from the perspective of relational 
identity, through ‘the lens of agency’. Baylis explains that challenges or threats to 
agency from DBS arise when a person’s actions do not flow from her intentions or 
beliefs, but rather are the result of direct brain manipulation; and if the threat to 
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agency is significant, the person may longer be able to meaningfully author their 
lives and thereby cannot contribute to the process of identity formation (and in 
this way may give rise to a threat to identity). 
A … plausible response to the question “Is DBS for PD a threat to personal 
identity?” suggests that DBS is such a threat but only insofar as it is a threat to 
agency—the ability to make informed and rational choices—as when a person’s 
actions do not flow from her intentions or beliefs but rather are the result of direct 
brain manipulation.395 
And 
There is one sense, however, in which it may be accurate and not trivially true to 
describe DBS as a threat to personal identity. This is when DBS undermines 
agency to such an extent that the person is no longer able to meaningfully 
contribute to the authoring of her own life (i.e., to contribute to the cyclical and 
iterative process of projecting, defending and revising a self-narrative). Without 
the ability to contribute to the process of identity formation, a person loses the 
ability to hold on to a sense of self.396 
 
Baylis draws on the evidence that DBS may lead to gambling in patients as an 
example of how DBS might threaten autonomous agency and in turn interfere 
with narrative self-constitution. If the person didn’t choose to gamble, but the 
intervention made them do it, then Baylis concludes that the DBS poses a threat 
to that person’s agency. This is still conceived as a threat to identity, but not in the 
sense that someone might be a different person, and not in terms of a threat to the 
narrative thread per se (as in Schechtman), but in the sense that they may not be 
exercising self-directed choice concerning the activities they engage in and the 
consequences that ensue. If their agency is compromised, and there is a serious 
threat to agency, then this might in some circumstances also present a threat to 
identity. Baylis notes that in addition to making claims such as ‘I feel like a 
different person’ and ‘I don’t feel like myself anymore’, patients also report 
feelings of alienated agency following DBS treatment, such as: ‘I feel like a robot’ 
and ‘ I feel like an electric doll’.397 
 
Schechtman views DBS as a threat to identity which results in compromised 
agency. Baylis, in contrast, argues that DBS can threaten autonomous agency, 
which in turn impacts on the ability to meaningfully author one’s life. How do we 
adjudicate between these responses; is DBS a threat to identity or to agency or 
both, and how? In both instances, Schechtman and Baylis when discussing threats 
to identity are concerned with the mechanism of change, as arising from the DBS 
and not the agent.  
 
                                            
395 Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity From Deep Brain 
Stimulation,” 524. 
396 Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity From Deep Brain 
Stimulation,” 525. 
397 Baylis, “'I Am Who I Am': on the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity From Deep Brain 
Stimulation,” 524. 
  141 
The move from conceiving changes as a threat to identity to a focus on 
autonomous agency is a helpful one.  This is why we need a relational conception 
of autonomy to fill out some of these claims further and so normatively adjudicate 
the ethical significance of change, which does not solely rely on whether the 
patient identifies with the changes or not.398 In the following chapter I will argue 
that if we turn to an account of relational autonomy, with a focus on autonomy 
competences, we are able to articulate on the basis of the impact of neural 
implants on autonomy competences how neural implants may in turn threaten 
identity. By being relational, this approach allows us to distinguish between 
autonomy, agency and identity - identity is not just up to us, and nor is it just a 
matter of self-identification. This discussion further draws out the distinction 
between identity and autonomy. 
 
Whilst Baylis argues that the conclusion that DBS poses a threat to identity is 
deeply problematic, she argues there are legitimate concerns of threats to identity 
caused by social assumptions about disability, including discriminatory attitudes 
and negative stigmatisation. In these cases, it is not DBS that threatens identity; as 
Baylis argues, such claims mislocate the potential threat to identity. These 
negative assumptions constrain or limit the types of identity-constituting 
narratives available to those with illness and impairments and an agent’s ability to 
actively contribute to authoring their own lives, and also can become integrated 
into one’s self-understanding.  
Consider, for example, the scope of possible identity-constituting narratives 
available to persons with PD (with or without DBS) in a society that is not 
welcoming of persons with physical and psychological disabilities. In such a 
society, person’s experiences will be significantly affected by stories others have 
constructed to restrict the range of narratives that can be appropriated and 
successfully enacted. ... In such a society, discriminatory attitudes towards 
persons with disabilities, not DBS or PD, would be a serious potential threat to 
personal identity. … The threat, such as it is, are the beliefs and attitudes of 
others that result in stigmatization and alienation, which in turn may result in 
negative experiences and feelings being integrated into one’s identity-constituting 
narrative.399 
I take up Baylis’ claims about threats from social understandings about 
disability in the following chapters, which will also discuss how not all identity-
constituting narratives are self-directed, and hence narrative integration isn’t 
always positive as integration might be indicative of the internalisation of negative 
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stereotypes400; I also investigate how we might challenge negative-identity 
constituting narratives. This, like Baylis’ conclusion that DBS can threaten 
agency, points towards autonomy and the need to distinguish between agency, 
identity and autonomy. An account of autonomy can answer the question of 
whether narratives are our own and whether we value them; this helps us 
distinguish between autonomy and mere agency. So Baylis locates both 
embodiment and our social embededness as twin constraints or concerns. 
 
Mackenzie and Walker nicely sum up Baylis’ argument, drawing attention to 
Baylis’ argument that we should not view deep brain stimulation (nor disability) 
as presenting threats to identity. Rather, by focussing on agency, Baylis sets out 
the twin constraints of embodiment and the social context that contribute to self-
alienation. As Mackenzie and Walker write: 
In social contexts in which the beliefs and attitudes of others towards physical 
and psychological disability are stigmatizing and negative, achieving equilibrium 
will be a fraught and difficult process (with or without neurotechnological 
intervention), often resulting in feelings of self-alienation. Baylis argues, however, 
that this sense of self-alienation should not be understood as the result of a threat 
to identity caused by disability or neurotechnological intervention. Baylis does not 
deny that life-changing disruptions to a person’s narrative identity “undeniably 
constrain[s] the dialectical process of identity formation (and thereby alters a 
planned and anticipated narrative)” (2011). However, in her view such 
experiences of self-alienation are usually either the result of internalization of 
social stereotypes or social relations of misrecognition, or the effect of direct brain 




Schechtman often uses language about self-direction or self-expression as 
important to narrative coherence and integration, and this is an issue for Mr. 
Garrison also. This leads us in the direction of having to provide an account of 
autonomy. Baylis also leads us in this direction with her discussion of threats to 
agency and the impacts on being able to ‘meaningfully author one’s life’. Whilst 
Schechtman and Baylis disagree in their analysis and locus of threats consequent 
upon DBS, both point in the direction of autonomy as the salient theoretical issue, 
as well as the salient domain for therapeutic interest.   
 
Viewing the impacts of DBS in terms of narrative disruption is helpful. 
However, the impact of neural implants cannot be understood in terms of threats 
to narrative identity per se. In order to address these questions more satisfactorily, 
                                            
400 For an account of challenges to moral agency in the context of identity-constituting 
narratives, see Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings: a Feminist Study in Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
401 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 389. 
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we will need to explore the relationship between identity, agency and autonomy 
further in order to adequately respond to the question and understand the claim 
about threats to narrative. In the next chapter I argue that we need an account of 
relational autonomy to adjudicate these issues. However, it is also clear that there 
can be threats to identity in the social context, that is, the social understanding of 
disability. This is something I will also discuss in the following chapter as a central 
concern of relational approaches to autonomy. 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
4.3.a. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have developed an embodied relational narrative approach to 
practical identity and agency. This approach does not privilege intellectual 
reflection and rationality over embodiment. It also seeks to incorporate the social 
context in the constitution of our identities. I further demonstrated that a 
narrative approach can explain the significance of self-change consequent upon 
neural implants for personal identity, by showing how these changes can alter the 
patterns of coherence in our lives and impact on our agency. 
 
In the first section I developed a specific approach to narrative - a dynamic 
relational and embodied account which can explain continuity over time, as well 
as account for the role of others in our identity-constituting narratives. In the 
second section, using the work of Schechtman and Baylis, I demonstrated the 
explanatory force of this approach for explaining the significance of self-change 
consequent upon neural implants for personal identity. I showed that changes can 
impact on the patterns of coherence, as well as impact on our agency and on one’s 
ability to meaningfully author one’s life. I concluded however that a narrative 
account alone is not enough to fully explain the significance of these changes for it 
is not enough to assess for the normative significance of self-change, that is, why 
some people might find changes liberating and others alienating. The raises the 
question of whether neural implants intervene on an agent’s choice process and 
abilities for self-governance that is sufficient to undermine autonomous agency 
and so interfere with narrative self-constitution. 
 
4.3.b Relational Autonomy 
 
In the following chapter I argue that in order to fully and adequately address 
the significance of self-change consequent upon neural implants we need an 
account of autonomy. In order to understand the type of agent I can be (over 
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time), we must first look at how I can govern my life and my options for self-
realisation and self-direction.  
 
The embodied relational approach to narrative identity developed in this 
chapter has implications for how we understand autonomy as well as the role of 
others and the social context in the development and exercise of autonomy. This 
understanding of narrative identity leads us to ask about autonomy as it is 
exercised in a relational context. I set out an understanding of autonomy in terms 
of competences; competences which can be both hindered and fostered by neural 
implants and by others. I argue that a relational approach to autonomy focusses 
our attention on the impact of neural implants on our autonomy competences as 
the salient issue, with attention to the role of neural implants in fostering or 
hindering these competences. In recognition of the social understandings of people 
with illness and disability, I further argue that in addition to autonomy 
competences we need to pay attention to self-referring attitudes, that is normative 
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5. Relational Autonomy & The Project 
of Selfhood  
Refiguring threats to identity from neural implants - 
autonomy competency and narrative integration   
 
‘I’m part cyborg’; ‘Now I’m going to turn myself on’; ‘He and I no longer value the same 
things’, ‘I no longer value the same things’ 
 
In this chapter, in order to further develop my argument that a relational 
embodied approach to narrative agency and autonomy provides resources for 
understanding the impacts of neural implants on a person’s identity I inquire into 
what it means to be autonomous, understood as being self-governing. An 
autonomous agent is one who is able to express herself - her values and projects - 
through her actions and choices; that is, she is able to express actions and chooses 
as part of becoming a self - as a project of selfhood. I shift from an account of what 
constitutes narrative agency to how we exercise autonomous agency; that is, I 
argue that there is a difference between my actions having a narrative structure 
and the reasons for my actions being structured by a narrative that engages with 
what I value. This shifts consideration of the impacts of neural implants to making 
sense of the claim of whether a neural implant may in some sense take away a 
person’s autonomous choice and interfere with their narrative self-constitution. 
 
I argue that autonomy must be understood in relational terms, recognising the 
embodied and intersubjective nature of practical identity or selfhood. I develop an 
approach to autonomy as the exercise of a set of skills, or “autonomy 
competences”, for self-realisation, self-determination and self-evaluation. These 
competences are developmentally acquired through relation with others and 
intersubjectively exercised and it is through the exercise of these competences that 
authentic selfhood emerges. I further argue that relational autonomy must 
understood in constitutive terms, and not solely in causal terms; that is, an 
approach which takes intersubjectivity and relationality as part of the defining 
conditions of autonomy, and not just a concern for the impacts of intersubjectivity 
on an agent’s capacity to exercise autonomy competency. I argue that an adequate 
approach to relational autonomy is one that in addition to the exercise of 
autonomy competence, includes recognition of the need to value one’s own 
judgement and capacity to act in accordance with what one values; that is, one 
must have a specific normative commitment to oneself. This draws attention to the 
role of “normative competences”, such as self-referring attitudes like self-trust and 
self-respect, in facilitating, or undermining, autonomous agency. 
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In doing so I argue that a weak substantial approach to relational autonomy, 
and embodied narrative agency best addresses questions about self-change and so 
best illuminates concerns related to the impacts of neural implants on identity and 
autonomy. This approach builds on the account of selfhood developed in the 
previous chapters and further develops the “full-blooded” account in terms of 
autonomous agency. This further sets out the concepts of identity, autonomy and 
agency, including their interrelation in the project of selfhood (and how they 
might come apart). I show that this full-blooded account addresses deficiencies in 
mainstream approaches to personal identity, as well as meets postmodern 
objections concerning the possibility of autonomous agency. Further, this account 
adjudicates between the analyses concerning the impacts of DBS on identity, as 
set out by Schechtman and Baylis in the previous chapter (4.2).   
 
This approach has the resources to explain how neural implants and their 
availability can support or undermine autonomy. Adopting this relational 
approach to autonomy and identity shows that the salient issue in accounts of 
first-personal change is how neural implants might either foster or hinder one’s 
development and/or exercise of autonomy competences (for example, controlling 
one’s tremors to allow one to pursue what one wants to do) and/or the exercise of 
one’s normative competences (for example, by leaving one feeling unconnected o 
one’s actions it may undermine my capacity for self trust). These impacts on our 
autonomy competence may in turn affect our capacity for narrative self-reflection 
and coherence (and so our sense of being a unified enduring self over time). 
Further, this approach draws our attention to the role of social understandings of 
disability and those seeking treatment, and how these can be undermining of 
autonomy; for example, if one internalises negative stereotypes which indicate the 
disabled as incapable. A relational competency approach opens up and refigures 
the question concerning the impacts of neural implants originally posed in terms of 
‘threats’ to identity. It is not the implant itself that is threatening per se, or that the 
narrative thread itself is threatened; rather, the relational approach understands 
the impacts of implants on autonomous agency as similar in kind with many other 
significant events or causes that are in some sense external to the agent. By 
drawing our attention to how such neural implants may both hinder and foster 
autonomy and narrative integration, this approach focusses on how people 
respond to and integrate change. 
 
In the first section I demonstrate the need for a more nuanced account of 
autonomy than is often employed in the neuroethics literature to understand what 
is ethically at stake with changes from DBS and neural implants. Drawing on the 
experiences of the recipient’s of implants in the first-personal accounts, as well as 
criticisms of hierarchical procedural approaches to autonomy, and to procedural 
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approaches more generally, I show that approaches that understand neurological 
intervention as a threat to authenticity per se are mistaken and that the application 
of a test for authenticity in terms of identification with one’s desires is inadequate 
for illuminating the ethical significance of neurological interventions on selfhood.  
 
In the second section I set out a weak substantial relational approach to 
autonomy. I draw on Meyers’ procedural approach to set out an understanding of 
autonomy in terms of the exercise of a suite of competences, through which 
authentic selfhood emerges. Drawing on the constitutive role of embodied 
relationality I have developed throughout this thesis, I supplement this approach 
with the claim that relationality should be understood constitutively and that 
further constraints on autonomous actions and choices. Drawing on Mackenzie I 
argue for the importance of normative competences of self-trust, self-esteem and 
self-respect for the exercise of autonomy. I further argue that autonomy 
competences are narratively structured. This shows that the salient issues in times 
of self-change are how our autonomy competences and narrative competences are 
fostered or impaired and the role of these competences in establishing and 
restoring narrative coherence.  
 
In the third section I demonstrate the practical and theoretical resources of 
this type of relational approach to autonomy to the question of the significance of 
first-personal change consequent upon neural implants. Returning to the first-
personal accounts I demonstrate that this approach can explain how neural 
implants can support or undermine autonomy and narrative competences, in turn 
affecting narrative self-understanding and coherence. Further, I show that this 
approach articulates the relation between identity, autonomy and agency, and can 
accord practical identity to individuals whilst recognising that their autonomy 
might be impaired. 
 
5.1 Autonomy and Neural Implants 
 
‘I’m part cyborg’; ‘I feel like a robot’;  ‘Now I’m going to turn myself on’; ‘I no longer 
value the same things’ 
 
In what follows, I demonstrate the importance of the concept of personal 
autonomy for understanding change consequent upon neural implants. I show 
that whilst self-change consequent upon neural implants raises concerns that 
neural implants may threaten personal autonomy, as changes are understood as 
the result of the implant and not the agent, it is also the case that the first-personal 
accounts challenge this interpretation of the changes, as often neural implants 
assist people’s abilities to exercise self-governance and so set their own ends. 
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Drawing on accounts in neuroethics concerned with DBS and authenticity, I 
show that we need a more nuanced account of autonomy to understand what is 
ethically at stake with changes from DBS and neural implants, one which 
recognises that threats to autonomy arise not merely from external interference 
qua brain manipulation and which further recognises the role of others in the 
constitution of our autonomy. An adequate approach must clarify the discussions 
as well as account for autonomous (in contrast to, mere) agency consequent upon 
neural implants.  
 
First, I situate these discussions in terms of contemporary philosophical 
approaches to autonomy which understand the central aspects of personal 
autonomy to include the capacity to self-govern through critical reflection 
according to one’s own values and that the exercise of autonomy should be free 
from external interference. I focus on procedural approaches to autonomy, 
particularly those which specify identification conditions for authenticity, and set 
out criticisms to these approaches. Second, I discuss how autonomy arises in the 
first-personal accounts of self-change consequent upon neural implants. Third, I 
review the treatment of questions relating to autonomy and neurological 
intervention in the neuroethics literature. I draw on Neil Levy’s and others 
arguments against the claim that neurological intervention poses a threat to 
authenticity. I then identify shortcomings in approaches that argue that whether 
an action is authentic post DBS can be settled by a process of identification. 
 
5.1.a Philosophical approaches to autonomy 
 
‘Autonomy’ literally refers to self-rule or self-governance. Personal autonomy 
is concerned with the authority individuals have of self-governance - that is, 
‘autonomy’ refers to an individual’s capacity for self-determination or self-
governance. Joel Feinberg catalogues four senses or conceptions of autonomy in 
moral and political philosophy: as a capacity to govern oneself, the actual condition 
of governing oneself, as an ideal of character and as the authority to govern 
oneself.402 The capacity to govern oneself is often thought of in terms of basic 
capacities, such as cognitive abilities, and also on a continuum from agents who 
lack autonomy to those who instantiate it as a full ideal. The second sense of 
autonomy, actual autonomy, recognises that one may possess the capacity to 
govern oneself in the first sense (dispositional autonomy), but lack the external 
conditions for its instantiation, perhaps due to social oppression, and so lack 
                                            
402 Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy,” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John 
Christman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 28. 
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effectual actual autonomy (occurrent autonomy).403 On this second sense, one must 
possess the internal capacities as well as the external opportunities to exercise 
autonomy. The third sense of autonomy is as a moral ideal of character, the 
achievement of fully autonomous agency is something to be promoted and valued 
(the other end of the continuum described above in the first sense of autonomy). 
There is disagreement as to whether this state is achievable. However, there is a 
shared understanding that autonomy is a valuable concept; self-government is 
understood as central to ethical life. The fourth sense of autonomy, the sovereign 
authority to govern oneself, understands autonomy as the right to have one’s 
autonomy respected. Autonomous agents have normative authority over their 
decisions. 
 
John Christman notes that central to theories of personal autonomy is a 
concern with the exercise of autonomy and what it means to say that one’s values, 
desires and choices are “one’s own”; that is, a conception of the person as ‘able to 
act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are somehow her own’.404 
Natalie Stoljar makes a similar claim, that to be autonomous is to act on motives, 
reasons, or values that are one’s own.405 Further, Christman states that individual 
autonomy is ‘generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, 
to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and 
not the product of manipulative or distorting forces’.406 Schechtman makes a 
similar claim when she argues that the narrative self-constitution view aims to 
identify those characteristics that are truly one’s own and not the result of 
coercion or brainwashing. Broadly autonomy contains the idea that it matters to 
be me that I act on values that are mine - rather than accepted blindly what is 
given to me or imposed upon me. Autonomy is thus connected to the idea of 
authenticity - in addition to the capacity to critically reflect and act on my desires 
and values, I need also to identify, ‘own’ or ‘accept’ them as mine. I need to ask 
whether they are my values or choices. Christman notes ‘[p]ut most simply, to be 
autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, 
but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self’.407  
 
Contemporary discussions of personal autonomy in moral psychology focus on 
how to understand when an action is one’s own in terms of establishing 
                                            
403 This is sometimes cached out in terms of a difference between de jure autonomy - the right to 
self-government, and de facto autonomy - which includes both the competence and opportunities 
necessary to exercise the right to self-determination. 
404 John Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2015). 
405 Natalie Stoljar, “Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014). 
406 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” 
407 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” 
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authenticity conditions by which an action can be said to be autonomous. A 
number of contemporary approaches argue that the conditions necessary for 
autonomy should be understood procedurally and as content neutral. On these 
approaches autonomy is achieved when the agent engages in a process of 
reflection on her desires, values or beliefs and revises her desires, values or beliefs 
in light of the process of reflection. This process is content neutral because it is the 
process by which the desire or value is deemed autonomous and not via the 
content. These approaches do not specify any particular values or principles that 
must be endorsed; that is, they make no claims about what values, principles or 
motivations an autonomous agent must have. 
 
Below I set out Frankfurt’s procedural approach to autonomy in terms of 
hierarchical identification with one’s desires. I then present arguments against this 
approach, including that it is ahistorical and fails to account for occurrences of 
manipulation. Moreover, I present criticisms to procedural approaches in general, 
that in addition to procedures, there must be additional specification of the 
normative constraints on the contents of our desires, values and motives; that the 
conditions for autonomy must be understood substantively; that is, procedural 
approaches must be supplemented by some non-neutral conditions. 
 
Frankfurt argues that autonomy requires second-order identification with 
one’s first-order desires.408 This is a hierarchical model wherein the process of 
critical reflection is secured through a process of hierarchical identification with 
one’s desires.409 For Frankfurt, my actions are autonomous if I reflect upon and 
endorse a first-order desire and then take that desire as the motive for my actions. 
Autonomous actions are those that are the result of reflective identification with 
one’s desires; that is, when I take the second-order desire as the cause of my 
actions. Inauthenticity on Frankfurt’s account arises when one does not identify 
with one’s desires but acts on them anyway. Dworkin’s hierarchical model places 
importance on being able to ask whether I do, in fact, identify with my desires or 
whether I might overrule those desires.410   
 
Frankfurt’s theory and the hierarchical model have been subject to a number 
of objections. “The problem of manipulation” is concerned with the ahistorical 
nature of Frankfurt’s model - it does not ask how the individual came to have her 
second order desires, so it cannot distinguish between a mind-controlled agent and 
an autonomous one. Jane Dryden expresses the problem as follows:  
                                            
408 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person.” 
409 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 68 (1971). 
410 Gerald Dworkin, “The Concept of Autonomy,” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual 
Autonomy, ed. John Christman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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[T]he Problem of Manipulation criticism points out that because Frankfurt’s 
account is ahistorical, it does not protect against the possibility that someone, such 
as a hypnotist, may have interfered with the agent’s second-order desires. We 
would hesitate to call such a hypnotized or mind-controlled agent autonomous 
with respect to his or her actions under these circumstances, but since the 
hierarchical model does not specify where or how the second order volitions 
ought to be generated, it cannot adequately distinguish between an autonomous 
agent and a mind-controlled one. The structure of autonomous agency therefore 
seems to have a historical dimension to it, since the history of how we developed 
or generated our volitions seems to matter.411 
 
Further, and related objections, concern the threat of an infinite regress of 
conditions. If first-order desires are tested against second-order desires, what is 
the test for second-order desires? This seems to introduce the need for third-order 
desires and so on. Similarly, what is the source of second-order desires? If they 
rest on third-order desires, this presents a regress in how to determine the source 
of autonomous identification. If a person is manipulated then her second-order 
volitions could be inauthentic, thus, it is unclear that higher level judgements have 
any greater claim to authenticity than first-order ones.412 A further objection 
concerns ambiguities in the concept of identification.413  
  
In response to criticisms of Frankfurt’s theory and the hierarchical procedural 
model of autonomy, Christman argues that autonomous agency has a historical 
character. Christman’s procedural approach stresses the importance of the 
personal history of the agent whereby a person acquired a given desire in 
determining his or her status as autonomous or not. Christman argues that we 
should impose further conditions on critical reflection, that the process must be 
free of distorting elements and must reflect an adequate causal history. In this 
case, a person must reflect on the genesis of a desire414 and not be alienated from 
the process of the formation of one’s desires.415  
 
The criticism above notwithstanding, Christman’s approach, like Frankfurt’s is 
a procedural approach which argues that the conditions necessary for autonomy 
should be understood procedurally and as content neutral. Procedural models in 
general have been challenged as to whether procedural independence is sufficient 
for autonomy. As procedural approaches do not stipulate the content of desires, 
they fail to take account of the role of others and the social context in the 
                                            
411 Jane Dryden, “Autonomy,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
412 For a formulation of this objection, see Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 
72 (1975). 
413 Christman argues that on Frankfurt’s model it is unclear whether identification is a process 
one merely acknowledges (without judgement) or a process which one must approve. For a 
formulation of this objection, see: Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” 
414 See John Christman, “Autonomy and Personal History,” 1 (1991). 
415 For an outline of this model, see Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority 
and Perfectionism.” 
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formulation of our desires - simply looking to the process of reflection on our 
desires or choices fails to capture more subtle effects of socialisation on our 
autonomy and so may accord autonomy to people in oppressed situations. For 
example, we might hesitate to identify as autonomous a woman from an 
oppressive culture who has internalised the negative stereotypes that shape her 
choices: ‘we cannot choose to be enslaved’. 416 If she has internalised others’ 
understandings of herself and these restrict and shape her choices and values, 
whilst she may undergo a process of critical reflection, if she fails to critically 
interrogate these values, and she acts in accordance with those values, one might 
argue these values are not truely or authentically hers, but are set externally. It is 
impractical to think that we can become people who make choices without 
engaging with others. As such, procedural approaches do not adequately capture 
the complexity of what’s involved in autonomous action because they fail to 
distinguish between those processes that help develop autonomy and those that 
frustrate it.  
 
In response to these criticisms, proponents of substantial approaches to 
autonomy reject content-neutrality and argue that procedural approaches must be 
supplemented with some non-neutral conditions in order for an action to count as 
autonomous. In addition to critical reflection, one must value one’s own 
judgements and have the capacity to act and choose in accordance with what one 
values. Substantive approaches thus require critical normative reflection by the 
agent in addition to procedures of self-reflection. 
 
In section 2.3.a I noted the importance of autonomy to Korsgaard’s account of 
practical identity. Korsgaard argues that normativity comes from our practical 
conception of our identities. Recall Korsgaard argued that as human beings we 
must act, and as reflective beings we need reasons to act and these arises from our 
conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us; that is, our practical 
identities. On Korsgaard’s approach an action or motivation is authentic if it is 
reflectively endorsed. One is alienated from one’s action when one does not 
engage in a process of critical reflective endorsement with respect to them.  
 
Korsgaard argues however that the conditions necessary for autonomy should 
be understood substantively and that the content of our values is subject to some 
normative constraints. In addition to a process of critical reflective endorsement, 
Korsgaard argues for a moral identity that stands behind our practical identities. 
Korsgaard’s approach is referred to as a strong substantial approach because it 
                                            
416 For accounts which argue that agents subject to oppressive socialisation may not be 
autonomous see: Paul Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Social Theory and Practice 
17 (1991); Wolf, Susan. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” In Responsibility, Character, 
and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, edited by Ferdinand David Schoeman, 46-62. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
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rejects content neutrality requiring some particular value that must be included 
within autonomous decision-making.  
 
Strong substantial approaches argue that socialisation can threaten autonomy 
by impeding an agent’s ability to identify false norms in an oppressive culture.417 
These approaches have been criticised for requiring specific content on the 
autonomous preferences of agents. As Christman notes:  
This claim, however, threatens to rob the attribution of autonomy of any claim to 
value neutrality it may otherwise carry, for if, conceptually, one is not 
autonomous when one (freely, rationally, without manipulation) chooses to enter 
conditions of severely limited choice, then the concept is reserved to only those 
lifestyles and value pursuits that are seen as acceptable from a particular political 
or theoretical point of view.418 
This has led to charges that strong substantial approaches require too much 
for an action to count as autonomous; that is, are too stringently normative, and so 
put autonomy out of reach for many if not most people. Substantial approaches 
have also been criticised for conflating personal and moral autonomy, for 
advocating perfectionism.419  
 
Weak substantial approaches mediate between strong substantive and 
procedural approaches by setting conditions on the agent’s normative 
competences – they stipulate further necessary conditions on autonomy that 
operate as constraints on the contents of an agent’s desires and values. For 
example, Paul Benson’s weak substantial account does not state any particular 
content but does argue that an agent must regard herself as “worthy to act”, and to 
do so must have normative competences, such as self-trust, self-worth and self-
respect.420 This side steps the objection made above by linking oppression to 
psychological impairment; that is, to impairment of one’s self-referring attitudes 
which undermines autonomy. 421 I will take up this discussion further in the 
following section where I argue for adopting a relational approach to autonomy 
that is weakly substantial. 
 
                                            
417 Examples of strong formulations include those by Susan Wolf who argues for the 
importance of normative competences and Paul Benson who also stresses normative competences 
and how socialisation can threaten autonomy by impacting on these normative competences. See: 
Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Paul Benson, 
“Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization”. 
418 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” 
419 See Mackenzie for a characterisation and defence against this charge: Mackenzie, 
“Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism.” Also see: Paul Benson, “Free 
Agency and Self-Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994). 
420 See Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization.” 
421 These approaches must still demonstrate that they can account for feminist intuitions 
regarding choice in oppressive cultures; that is, the concerns motivating strong substantial 
approaches. For a discussion of this claim, see: Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist 
Intuition,” In Relational Autonomy - Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, edited 
by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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These contemporary discussions draw attention to the connection between 
autonomy as a capacity for self-reflection and the conditions by which an action 
counts as autonomous. An agent’s motives are not her own when they are in some 
sense external to her. How a motive is understood as external to the agent is 
explained differently on procedural and substantial accounts. On procedural 
approaches external motives are those that are not identified with or critically 
reflected upon and endorsed. If the agent acts on these, then it is the desire and 
not the agent that is in control. Procedural approaches further stipulate conditions 
such as that the desires were not acquired by mind control, brainwashing or the 
like. On substantive approaches, in contrast, a desire is external to the agent if the 
agent lacks self-trust or self-respect to form a viewpoint that can be thought of as 
her own. As Buss notes: 
If an agent's point of view does not reflect her respect for herself and for her 
ability to set her own ends and assess the reasons relevant to pursuing some ends 
and not others, then the direction her reasoning takes cannot be attributed to 
her.422 
 
In this subsection I have sketched out the central features of the concept of 
autonomy as including both a competence or capacity as well as including 
conditions for authenticity, when an action is one’s own and free of manipulative 
external forces. Actions and desires that arise from ends not set by the agent 
herself raise questions about whether those actions and desires can be considered 
autonomous. I also set out the distinction between procedural and substantive 
approaches to autonomy and how weak substantial approaches attempt to mediate 
between these. Where do neural implants fit it? How do we understand the 
impacts of these devices on autonomy? What if the neural implant interferes with 
or actively gives me my values, would this undermine my autonomy? A 
procedural approach would suggest that if I identify with the values then I am 
autonomous. However, if the implant interferes this process of critical reflection 
then the implant would be a cause for concern, whether or not I identify with the 
implant. In addition to the concern of whether a neural implant might interfere 
with or distort the capacity to engage in a process of critical reflection, substantial 
approaches share a concern with whether the implant might change my values or 
desires. A substantial approach would suggest that consideration must also be 
paid to how the implant affects my self-referring attitudes and would direct 
attention to social understandings of those with disability and seeking treatment. 
Below I return to and draw on the first-personal accounts to situate and continue 
the investigation.  
 
                                            
422 Sarah Buss, “Personal Autonomy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (2014). 
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5.1.b Accounts of first-personal change  
 
Michael Chorost raises issues related to autonomy when he describes himself 
as “part-cyborg” following the implantation of his Cochlear. He describes how his 
experience of reality following the implant is in part determined by the Cochlear 
technology. Chorost argues that the Cochlear is “cyborg” technology because the 
software selectively transmits information to his brain; it makes if-then-else 
decisions and then acts on the body to carry them out. These are decisions that are 
“algorithmic and automated” and do not involve the individual’s choice or 
awareness. Chorost distinguishes cyborg technology from artificial body parts, 
such as the artificial hip or hearing aid, which are not cyborg, because the artificial 
hip, (unlike a pacemaker, or Cochlear for example), is passive, it does not make 
choices that shape what the individual experiences.423 Within cyborg technologies, 
Chorost draws a contrast between those that act on the brain and fundamentally 
alter one’s experience of reality, such as the Cochlear, and those that act ‘solely’ on 
the body, such as a pacemaker. Chorost writes:  
A pacemaker regulates the pump that keeps your body going, and as long as it 
works, your life is what it was before. You can forget about it (although I don’t 
doubt that people with pacemakers may be profoundly affected by the knowledge 
that their life is dependent on a computer). When the control is over your senses, 
however, you can never forget about it. You are living in a new version of 
reality.424 
 
What should we make of Chorost’s claim that he is “part-cyborg”, and that his 
experience of reality and perceptual experience is “controlled by a device”. If 
Chorost is controlled by the device in the way he describes, should we view his 
actions as autonomous? Whilst Chorost strongly puts the point that the Cochlear 
controls his version of reality it does not seem to interfere with his ability to be 
self-directed according to his own values. Chorost seems to exercise autonomous 
choices and to pursue projects that matter to him, including a PhD, a career and 
indeed choosing to have a Cochlear. In his autobiographical novel he describes his 
plans and his reasons for his actions. In day-to-day activities Chorost describes 
how having the Cochlear has allowed him to participate in conversations on the 
telephone and has been integral in him meeting new people, including forming 
intimate relationships. Whilst Chorost does list frustrations involved in making the 
                                            
423 Chorost also contrasts his understanding of implants which give cybernetic control with use 
of the concept “cyborg” by cultural theorists to describe people or societies that use technological 
modification. Chorost also distinguishes his use of the term cyborg from Donna Haraway’s use to 
indicate that people have multiple and conflicting perspectives. See Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey 
Back to the Hearing World, 42-43. 
424 Chorost, Rebuilt: My Journey Back to the Hearing World, 41. Jean-Luc Nancy describes the 
impact on his self-understanding after undergoing a heart transplant. Francine Wynn notes that 
Nancy describes ‘the temporal nature of an ever-increasing sense of strangeness and fragmentation 
which accompanies his heart transplant’, see Francine Wynn, “Reflecting on the Ongoing 
Aftermath of Heart Transplantation: Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’intrus,” Nursing Inquiry 16 (2009), 3. 
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Cochlear work, he broadly describes adapting to the Cochlear as a self-conscious 
project of transformation.  
 
Chorost, however, also describes how, despite the Cochlear, he at times feels 
alienated from the hearing community, as well as the deaf community. He explains 
how the device connects him to others, yet sometimes puts distance between 
himself and others. He describes the impact of the realisation that Cochlear 
hearing is not hearing in the usual sense, and that he will always engage in an act 
of guessing when it comes to understanding speech. Chorost also muses about 
what his life might have been like had he been educated in using sign language 
and attended a signing school. 
 
The control that Chorost describes is over his senses, and whilst he 
distinguishes this form of control from mere control over his body, what if the 
control was directly over his brain? Mike Robbins’ video, in which he turns the 
DBS device off and then on again, demonstrates the efficacy of the device in 
controlling his tremors from Parkinson’s Disease. With the device on, Robbins 
discusses clearly and forcefully his condition and the role of the DBS device in 
allowing him to manage the tremors associated with Parkinson’s; the device allows 
him to get on with his own actions and projects. With the device off, and within 
seconds, Robbins finds it increasingly difficult to maintain his dialogue, it takes all 
his intentional focus to control the tremors. Mike identifies with the device, saying 
“Now I’m going to turn myself on”. 
 
Robbins’ video demonstrates the role of the DBS in giving him control over 
his life. He sees the implant as providing him with a degree of control to facilitate 
his self-governance and so engage in the activities that he values. Whilst Chorost’s 
and Robbins’ actions and experiences are caused or shaped by their implants, they 
still demonstrate capacities for self-governance. In what sense wouldn’t their 
actions be theirs? Clearly they are exercising their capacities for autonomy. What 
role should we give to the fact that these capacities are in part caused by the 
device? 
 
Robbins’ account stresses the role of the DBS in helping him engage in 
activities that matter to him, and he seems to identify with the device when it is on,  
However, I have discussed contrasting patients’ accounts which report feelings of 
estrangement or alienation from their DBS selves, including feelings of 
mechanisation and bodily-alienation, despite amelioration in their symptoms from 
Parkinson’s Disease. The first-personal accounts following DBS in Schüpbach 
and colleagues raised divergent responses concerning self-change consequent 
upon DBS. Whilst some patients reported newfound confidence and a desire to 
engage in more activities, for example the wife of the man who described himself 
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as being asleep prior to DBS, others reported feeling no longer oriented by their 
previous values and projects. For example, the journalist who is no longer 
interested in her professional life or the patient who describes feeling like a 
machine post DBS. 
 
In contrast, the case of the fictional Mr Garrison involves someone who 
seemingly feels no estrangement from his new orienting values post DBS, 
however his wife seems to see them as inauthentic, as not originating from him but 
the DBS. Following DBS for treatment of tremors associated with Parkinson’s 
Disease, Mr Garrison displays radical changes in his behaviour, beliefs and 
character traits. Mr Garrison, prior to the DBS treatment, was shy and 
introverted, whereas post treatment he became gregarious and extroverted, 
seeking to dominate conversation and be the centre of attention. Previously a loyal 
Republican party member, post-DBS treatment, Mr Garrison became a Democrat 
member, attaching himself to various social movements and causes. He later quits 
his job without consulting his wife and directs their charity donations, without her 
consent, to the various environmental and social causes to which he now commits 
most of his time. Mr Garrison’s wife expresses dismay at these changes, seeing 
them as the product of the DBS and not Mr Garrison’s own values. 
 
What then of Mr Garrison? If his values and motivations are the result of the 
DBS implant, in what sense, if any, are Mr Garrison’s actions which are 
motivated by ‘DBS’ autonomous?  Mr Garrison’s case raises questions concerning 
autonomy and authenticity. Is Mr Garrison an autonomous agent with respect to 
his new values? If the change in values is caused by the treatment, is he acting 
from his own direction? Is he acting autonomously? Are those values authentic 
(has he lost touch with his authentic self)? Should his wife respect his choices and 
actions as his? If the source of the value change is direct manipulation of the brain 
then Mr Garrison’s actions could be interpreted as inauthentic given an 
autonomous action is one in which my values are mine and not influenced or set 
by something external to me. Recall Schechtman concluded that Mr Garrison’s 
identity was compromised because he could not comply with the articulation and 
reality constraints for narrative agency; that is, he could not tell an identity-
constituting narrative story about his new values post DBS in which DBS does 
not feature as the cause of them (section 4.2.b). Schechtman argued that the 
personal changes were caused by the neural implants and did not arise from his 
agency. Baylis was also concerned with autonomy in terms of autonomous agency, 
she argued that if changes in behaviour were a result of the neurotechnologies and 
not the agent (for example compulsive gambling as a result of DBS) then the 
agent is not autonomous with respect to them (section 4.2.b). Baylis argued that if 
neurotechnologies do pose a threat, it is to autonomous agency. 
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The first-personal accounts draw attention to: descriptions of being controlled 
by a machine; of having increased self-control; as well as feelings of identification 
with, and alienation from, their values; as well as, concerns about changes in 
values caused by the neural implant. As set out in section 5.1.a above, in 
contemporary philosophical approaches autonomy is understood as both a 
capacity for self-governance as well as acting on motives, reasons, or values that 
are one’s own. Acting on values that are one’s own is to operate without external 
interference, including from brainwashing, manipulation and on substantial 
approaches, concern for the influence of socialisation. How should we understand 
the impacts of neural implants on autonomy given these understandings and in the 
light of first-personal reports? It appears that neural implants could be seen as 
both increasing options for self-governance by increasing bodily control (e.g., in 
the case of DBS) or sensory capacities  (e.g., in the case of the Cochlear implant) 
and hence autonomous bodily agency. However, it appears that neural implants 
might also challenge autonomy - for example, is it the device driving the agent’s 
choice and preference formation, and not the agent? How do we understand the 
nature of external interference to autonomy? Can we exercise autonomy if our 
actions result from a neural implant, such as the Cochlear or DBS? Further, how 
do we understand my sense of “mineness” or “ownness” over my actions? And 
what weight or role do we give to others’ assessment of our autonomy? What’s the 
difference between an autonomous and nonautonomous action from a neural 
implant, such as the Cochlear or DBS? Do neural implants threaten autonomy, 
and if so how?  
 
An adequate approach to autonomy will need to account for the role of the 
implant, as well as others’ understandings of the agent, on an agent’s autonomy, as 
well as provide resources for explaining why some may find the device enabling, 
whilst others report feelings of alienation and estrangement (despite improvement 
in the symptoms for which they sought treatment).  
 
5.1.c Accounts of first-personal change, autonomy and neuroethics 
 
Here I discuss how questions concerning autonomy arising from the first-
personal accounts are treated in the neuroethics literature and the characterisation 
that neural implants pose a potential threat to authenticity. I show that positions 
that argue that neurological intervention per se threatens authenticity are 
mistaken; neural implants are not a special case of threat. Rather, the impacts of 
implants on autonomy should be understood as parallel to those from other events 
in our lives where the source of changes may be external to the agent; that is, not 
of the agent’s making. I argue that in order to adequately explain the impacts of 
neural implants on autonomy, we need to move beyond assessments in terms of an 
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ethics of authenticity and individualism. I further show that an adequate account 
must also take into consideration substantial concerns about stipulating normative 
constraints on autonomy to account for the internalisation of ideas about people 
with disability and seeking treatment as well as to adequately account for feelings 
of self-estrangement that patients report. 
 
First, I look at the claim that neurological intervention per se threatens 
authenticity. I draw on arguments by Neil Levy and Felicitas Kraemer to argue 
against the charge that change from direct intervention is ‘automatically’ a threat 
to authenticity. This conclusion, however, leaves open the question of which 
changes are problematic or might threaten autonomy. I then review and critique 
the use of procedural theories of identification, as adopted in assessments of 
whether an action is authentic post DBS by Kraemer, and Matthis Synofzik and 
Thomas Schlaepfer, to argue that some normative constraints on the content of 
actions and desires needs to considered for a value or action post DBS to be 
considered autonomous. I then take up Kraemer’s concern that neuroethics needs 
to take into account both felt authenticity and competence when assessing the 
impacts of neurotechnological intervention on autonomy.  
 
In the neuroethics literature, some take the view that any personal change, 
even if intended, caused by external or artificial means, is a threat to authenticity, 
even when it is intended. One approach argues that neurological intervention per 
se threatens authenticity because it directly manipulates people’s brains, in contrast 
to traditional means of indirectly influencing people’s minds through reasoning or 
the like. Recall, in previous chapters, I have discussed the claim that neural 
implants, including DBS, may threaten identity (section 4.2.b). Often claims that 
neural intervention threatens identity are linked to claims about threats to 
authenticity. Levy and DeGrazia argue these claims assume a mistaken conception 
of authenticity understood in terms of discovery of one’s “true self”.  
 
Levy cites examples of the view that authenticity is threatened by direct 
manipulation of people’s brains in debates about the ethics of pharmaceutical 
intervention, namely Prozac. The view that pharmaceuticals threaten authenticity 
is put by forward by Carl Elliot425 who frames the concern about authenticity in 
terms of a threat to identity, of becoming a different person - ‘I am no longer the 
person I was’.426 Elliot argues that if I am changed by the intervention, and even if 
the change might be perceived as resulting in a better personality, this new 
personality is not mine. Levy cites Elliot’s worry as follows:  
                                            
425 Carl Elliot, Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the America Dream (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2003). 
426 Levy, Neuroethics, 130. 
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It would be worrying if Prozac altered my personality, even if it gave me a better 
personality, simply because it isn’t my personality. This kind of personality change 
sees to defy an ethics of authenticity.427 
Levy notes that this conclusion is puzzling in the light that some users of 
psychopharmaceuticals see this project (of self-transformation) as authentic.428 
Levy dismisses Elliot’s concern as based on a static conception of the self and a 
mistaken notion of authenticity as being ‘true to oneself’ which emphasises self-
discovery. One discovers their real self, most deeply who they are. In contrast, Levy 
promotes a conception of authenticity in terms of self-creation. This draws on work 
by David DeGrazia who argues that once we understand that the relevant 
questions in these cases concern our narrative identity, which DeGrazia 
understands in terms of projects of self-creation, we see that there is no “true self” 
to be discovered. As such, changes in personality do not make someone a different 
person and so do not threaten authenticity by interfering with their neural state. 
For DeGrazia the crucial question is whether the intervention was autonomously 
chosen, which he understands in terms of whether a person identifies with or 
endorses the changes that follow from intervention. Levy concludes that: 
Once we realize that selves are continually recreated and transformed, 
throughout life, we shall lose the urge to accuse someone of inauthenticity on the 
grounds of character change alone.429 
As such, Levy dismisses the view that direct (or neurological) interventions 
automatically result in threats to autonomy. Rather, Levy argues that 
interventions should be assessed ‘one by one’ in the context of their application.430  
 
Kraemer applies a similar argument to emotional changes consequent upon 
DBS to argue that self-change achieved through artificial means is not necessarily 
inauthentic. Kraemer argues against writers who distinguish between the origin of 
change as natural or artificial and who conclude that artificial means necessarily 
lead to an inauthentic result. Kraemer, like Levy, draws on cases where people 
have understood self-change consequent upon pharmaceuticals as authentic and 
concludes that ‘authenticity or inauthenticity cannot be inferred from the 
naturalness or artificiality of the devices employed’431 and ‘the authenticity of an 
emotion seems to be independent of its natural or artificial origin’.432 
                                            
427 Carl Elliot, “The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic Psychopharmacology,” in 
Enhancing Human Traits. Ethical and Social Implications, ed. Erik Parens Georgetown University 
Press, 1998), 182; Neil Levy, “Enhancing Authenticity,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2011), 309. 
428 Peter Kramer notes examples of patients who identify with the self they are on 
antidepressants and report not feeling themselves when they are not taking the antidepressants. 
See Peter D. Kramer, Listening to Prozac (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), ch1. For discussion of 
this topic, see DeGrazia, “Enhancement Technologies and Human Identity,” 268; Levy, 
Neuroethics, 108. 
429 Levy, Neuroethics, 108. 
430 Levy, Neuroethics, 131. 
431 Felicitas Kraemer, “Authenticity Anyone? the Enhancement of Emotions Via Neuro-
psychopharmacology,” Neuroethics 4 (2011), 63. 
432 Kraemer, “Authenticity Anyone? the Enhancement of Emotions Via Neuro-
psychopharmacology,” 63. 
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Lipsman and Glannon describe this worry concerning direct manipulation in 
terms of free will and agency. They discuss a patient, an accountant, who 
undergoes DBS for a Major Depressive Disorder. This treatment is successful in 
that the patient’s symptoms of depression are reduced and he returns to work and 
resumes his family life. After a period of time the patient reports that the 
symptoms of depression have returned. When it is discovered that the implant has 
a faulty lead stopping it from functioning properly to treat the patient’s 
depression, the patient remarks: ‘I’m just happy it wasn’t me, that it was the 
battery’.433 Lipsman and Glannon note that the patient appears to be identifying 
with the implant. However he is controlled by the device, which raises the 
question, whether ‘the will is really his’. They write:  
It appears that he retains a full sense of agency and free will when the stimulator 
is functioning properly, and that these capacities are significantly diminished 
when it malfunctions or ceases to function. His will is free only because DBS 
regulates the affective and motivational capacities that constitute a major 
component of his agency and will. But this raises the question of whether this will 
is really his.434 
Lipsman and Glannon describe this problem in terms of establishing whether 
the patient can be described as being the genuine source or author of his actions. 
With cases involving DBS, it could be the stimulator that is the source of (some 
of) the patient’s thoughts, moods and behaviour, and not the agent. So, 
paradoxically whilst the patient might have improved control over his body or 
affect, that control is from the implant and not the patient. They write: 
The implanted device may threaten his conviction that he can control how he 
thinks and acts. It seems that it is not the accountant but the device implanted in 
his brain that is the real agent. The modulating effects of DBS suggest that the 
device does not merely supplement his impaired agency and will but supplants 
them.435 
 
Lipsman and Glannon, however, question this conclusion on the grounds that 
some people perceive the device as an enabling tool, similar to Chorost and 
Robbins whose self-understanding appears to integrate the device. They argue 
that, by modulating his mood, and alleviating his depression, the DBS allows the 
patient to attain a degree of control over his thoughts and behaviour so as to be 
                                            
433 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 467. 
434 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 468. 
435 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 468. Lipsman and 
Glannon note a similar point as that made by Chorost when he states that the nature of ‘control’ is 
very different when the control is over your senses from ‘cyborg technologies’. Lipsman and 
Glannon explain that unlike technologies, such as like pacemakers and defibrillators, DBS directly 
modifies moods by altering the neural bases of mental states. See Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, 
Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of 
Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 468. 
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‘the author and genuine source’ of his thoughts and behaviour.436 As such the 
device might strengthen rather than impede his autonomous agency and so the 
patient might perceive the device as integrated into his identity and not something 
that replaces him as an agent.437 They conclude ‘a device implanted in the brain 
that operates outside of our conscious awareness need not threaten our experience 
of ourselves as effective agents’.438 
 
These arguments challenge the view that interventions may pose a threat to 
autonomous agency per se. The point that neural implants do not threaten 
authenticity per se parallels claims made throughout this thesis that the impacts of 
neural implants on selfhood are not special, or rare cases, rather the impacts of 
neural implants should be understood as of a kind with changes experienced in 
everyday life that do not arise from the agent herself. Once we move away from 
the understanding that neural implants are ipso facto external threats to identity, 
we can start to view the impacts of neural implants as parallel to many other 
experiences that affect the agent’s sense of self; cases in which the agent is not the 
initiating cause, such as through trauma or illness. Nonetheless, this does not 
settle the issue of how neural implants might impact on a person’s autonomy and 
nor does it explain how an action or end might be external to an agent. If neural 
implants are not a threat per se, we still need an account of when an action or 
motive is truly reflective of the agent and expresses her identity.  
 
A common approach in the neuroethics literature to settle the question is to 
apply a procedural approach which tests for authenticity via a process of 
identification, similar to Frankfurt’s hierarchical identification approach (as 
discussed in 5.1.a). For example, Synofzik and Schlaepfer argue that once we 
understand that neural implants do not threaten authenticity per se, the key 
question is whether the intervention alters a person’s behavior in a way that the 
person identifies with, in a way that they like. They write: ‘[T]he ethically decisive 
question is not whether DBS alters personality or not, but whether it does so in “a 
good or bad way” from the patient’s very own perspective’. 439 Kraemer also relies 
on an understanding of authenticity in terms of hierarchical identification when 
making her assessment of the impacts of DBS on authenticity. For Kraemer, 
                                            
436 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 470. 
437 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 469. 
438 Lipsman and Glannon, “Brain, Mind and Machine: What Are the Implications of Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will?”, 469. 
439 M Synofzik and TE Schlaepfer, “Stimulating Personality: Ethical Criteria for Deep Brain 
Stimulation in Psychiatric Patients and for Enhancement Purposes,” Biotechnology Journal 3 (2008), 
4. Schermer makes a similar point when she notes the salient point is how the patient perceives the 
changes; that is, whether the person welcomes the changes caused by DBS. Schermer, “Ethical 
Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation,”  Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 5 (2011), 2-3. 
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authenticity is a felt characteristic of the person’s own emotions, desires and 
values; an emotion or desire is authentic if the person recognises it as such. 
Kraemer writes an emotion is ‘authentic if the individuals experiencing it 
recognize their own feelings really as their own and identify with them’.440 
Kraemer applies this understanding to argue that some individuals might find 
their DBS selves authentic. Drawing on the case of the Dutch patient treated with 
DBS who following treatment became manic (discussed in the previous chapter 
4.2.a), Kraemer argues that in choosing the mania the patient was choosing 
authenticity over competence; the latter term she uses interchangeably with 
autonomy. In the switched on state Kramer argues that the patient has a feeling of 
authenticity, much like cases cited in the literature of Prozac induced felt 
authenticity. This interpretation, Kraemer argues, contrasts with Glannon’s 
reading in which the patient chooses mania not for any felt reasons of authenticity, 
but a preference for a reduction in the motor symptoms of Parkinson’s; Kramer 
describes Glannon’s reading as the patient deciding for his well-being (in terms of 
reducing the Parkinson’s symptoms) over his mental competence.  
 
In these analyses the central ethical issue is understood in terms of whether the 
person identifies with the change, and this is seen to settle the question of the 
impacts of direct intervention on autonomy. As long as the implants do not 
interfere with the process of critical reflection on one’s desires and values, neural 
implants pose no threat to autonomy. But is this enough? Lipsman and Glannon 
argue that a procedural approach that tests for authenticity on the basis of 
whether the patient identifies with, or likes, the change is inadequate for 
theorising the impacts of DBS on autonomy. Recall criticisms made to procedural 
accounts, particularly those that rely on identification, from both proponents of 
other procedural approaches, as well as those that argue for further specification 
on the content, or constraint on the content, of desires and values (section 5.1.b). 
As discussed in the previous section this procedural approach is unable to account 
for the problem of manipulation and so cannot account for interference in the 
formation of desires. In terms of being an approach to the question of the role of 
direct manipulation in autonomy, this approach is empty from the start as it is 
precisely the question of how to understand the role of external interference that is 
at issue. Moreover, procedural approaches in general, by requiring content 
neutrality, fail to account for the possible impact of neural implants on a person’s 
normative competences, either via interference with the content of their values or 
desires, or by undermining their capacities for self-trust, self-esteem or self-worth. 
As noted in 5.1.a a key concern with any procedural approach to autonomy is 
whether further conditions for authenticity are necessary for a desire or action to 
count as autonomous. Further, as discussed above, Levy and DeGrazia set out an 
                                            
440 Felicitas Kraemer, “Authenticity Anyone? the Enhancement of Emotions Via Neuro-
psychopharmacology,” Neuroethics 4 (2011), 57-58. 
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approach to authenticity in terms of self-creation in contrast to self-discovery. 
Whilst this approach challenges understandings of a static self, this approach 
relies on an individualistic understanding of autonomy. Further, it does little to 
challenge the understanding of the distinction between, and relationship of, 
autonomy and identity. I will take up these points further in section 5.3.b. 
 
Recall in the previous chapter (4.2.b) I set out Baylis’ claim that the real threat 
to identity comes not from the device but from people’s attitudes towards people 
with illness and disabilities. These attitudes constrain the identity-defining 
narratives available to people and may result in self-alienation due to either 
internalisation of negative stereotypes or social relations of misrecognition. Baylis’ 
critique draws our attention to the role of social and psychological forces, as well 
as the role of others, in the frustration of capacities for autonomy, as well as our 
experiences of ourselves, and our choices. This further underscores the 
importance of recognising and accounting for social understandings of recipient’s 
of neural implants as they might indicate that a person does not merit self-esteem, 
or is incapable of making judgements or is deviant. These ideas can be internalised 
and so also hinder the exercise of autonomous agency. For example, choices might 
be shaped by social understandings of illness, and for those seeking treatment this 
might impact both on their ability to exercise her autonomy competence – if one is 
constrained by illness defining narratives which cast the patient as passive or 
defective – but also, if these understandings are internalised they can impact on 
normative competences such as self-trust. Whether an action is autonomous 
cannot simply be up to individual choices without consideration of the social 
factors shaping those choices, and nor can we adequately assess the normative 
implications with an approach that says the ethical issues comes down to whether 
someone likes the changes, that is, identifies with the changes, or not. Wardrope, 
in his criticism of Kraemer’s analysis of the Dutch patient, makes a similar claim 
when he argues that on Kraemer’s account there is little consideration given to 
threats to autonomy beyond consideration of the impacts of the intervention.441 He 
writes ‘challenges to autonomy extend beyond the rare cases discussed by 
Kraemer; they occur wherever an individual’s social political ad cultural context 
can undermine development of capacities necessary for its exercise’. 442 
 
Whilst drawing on a process of identification as a test for authenticity, 
Kraemer’s broader concern is that the neuroethics literature on DBS has not paid 
                                            
441 Wardrope makes a related claim when he draws on Baylis’ relational insight concerning the 
stigma attached to disability and illness. Wardrope writes ‘that attending solely to the differences 
in perspective held by the treated and untreated patient in examining respect for autonomy may 
disregard the more salient threats to autonomy posed by the patient’s social context’. Alistair 
Wardrope, “Authenticity and Autonomy in Deep Brain Stimulation,” Journal of Medical Ethics 40 
(2014): 566. 
442 Wardrope, “Authenticity and Autonomy in Deep Brain Stimulation,” (2014): 566. 
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enough attention to considerations related to subjective issues of authenticity and 
alienation, instead paying more attention to issues related to autonomy understood 
as competence. Kraemer draws on Baylis and others to argue that the central issue 
here is one of alienation and authenticity, which is evidenced in the patients who 
see their DBS selves as authentic. Kraemer argues that responses from patients to 
DBS, such as those in Schüpbach and colleagues, show that these two dimensions 
of autonomy can come apart and point to the importance of taking account of both 
competence and authenticity conditions when considering the impacts of DBS.443 
This point arose in discussion on the first-personal accounts in the previous 
subsection (5.1.b). The accounts of first-personal change motivates these 
questions, which revolve around an interplay between understandings of 
autonomy in terms of capacity or competence and as actions being in some sense 
one’s own. As Kraemer notes, autonomy must encompass authenticity and 
capacity but that these can come apart. Kraemer’s analysis is instructive because it 
raises considerations related to both the impacts of neural implants on our 
capacities to exercise self-governance, but also draws attention to consideration of 
feelings of alienation that can arise from implants also. However in her approach 
these two dimensions of autonomy are set out as completely distinct, rather I 
argue we need an account that understands autonomy in terms of a set of skills or 
competency that arise in, and are assessed against, the practical context in which 
they are developed and exercised. On this approach authentic selfhood emerges 





In this section I have located the accounts of first-personal change in terms of 
philosophical concerns about autonomy. I showed that the accounts reveal 
different aspects of autonomy, for example, questions concerning the source of our 
values, beliefs, characteristics and desires and how we understand the role of 
heterogeneous causes as inimical to autonomy, as well as questions concerning the 
exercise of autonomy, as self-reflective competences or capacities. I argued that a 
procedural approach to autonomy in terms of identification is not sufficient to 
address the question of the impacts of neural implants on autonomy, particularly 
how social understandings of conditions and treatments might threaten autonomy 
and not just the treatments and conditions themselves might. Taking on board 
these relational insights about threats from the social context is compatible with 
                                            
443 Wardrope presents a critical analysis of Kraemer’s treatment of autonomy (understood 
primarily as competence) and authenticity as competing concepts, rather arguing that 
contemporary approaches understand autonomy to encompass both competence and authenticity 
conditions. I agree with Wardrope’s analysis I do not engage directly with Kraemer’s account of 
autonomy solely in terms of competence here. Wardrope, “Authenticity and Autonomy in Deep 
Brain Stimulation,” 566. 
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procedural and substantive approaches to autonomy. In the following section I set 
out the broad shape a relational approach should take – procedural in terms of 
competences and weakly substantive recognizing the importance of self-trust for 
autonomy; that is, of seeing oneself as a legitimate source of reasons for acting. 
  
5.2 Relational Autonomy – a constitutive approach to 
embodied autonomy competency 
 
The relational and embodied approach that I have developed throughout this 
thesis in terms of practical identity and narrative agency, whilst drawing attention 
to the irreducibility of the first-person subjective perspective, has also challenged 
understandings of the self in terms of individualism; that is, the understanding of 
the self as a self-contained abstract individual. Much feminist work in personal 
autonomy draws attention to, and critcises, the characterisation of autonomy in 
terms of a self-sufficient individual; that is, autonomy understood in terms of 
substantial individualism.444 As Atkins writes: ‘On the mainstream liberal view, 
autonomy is the exercise of rational, informed, and uncoerced choice by mature 
agents employing their individual free wills’.445 This view has been associated with 
adopting an atomistic conception of personhood and an ideal of autonomy as 
independence from others, which emphasises substantive independence and 
values rationality as a source of autonomy at the expense of emotions and 
embodiment. This conception of autonomy belongs loosely to the analytic tradition 
and is often explicitly linked to defences of liberalism.446  
 
As Mackenzie and Stoljar note this conception of autonomy has been subject 
to much critique, particularly salient in feminist responses, which identify a 
connection between the conception of autonomy and the promotion of 
“masculinist” ideals of personhood, such as presupposing a conception of the 
person as atomistic, self-sufficient, as unaffected/untouched by social 
relationships, or as an abstract reasoner stripped of distorting influences. A point 
that motivates feminist critiques is that traditional theories have excluded groups 
of people on the basis of their dependence and thus denied them the status of 
                                            
444 Mackenzie and Stoljar note that personal autonomy is a central concept employed in moral, 
legal and bioethical discussions. They further argue however that in these debates that autonomy is 
often reduced to a narrow conception, conceived in terms of libertarian individualism; that is ‘the 
caricature of individual autonomy as exemplified by the self-sufficient, rugged male individualist, 
rational maximizing chooser of libertarian theory’. Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 
5. This conception they argue contributes to confusion in these debates. This assessment of the 
nature of the disagreements echoes Mackenzie’s and others’ analysis of problems in discussions of 
personal identity as set out in 2.1.b, wherein different questions about personal identity are 
understood in terms of questions of reidentification.  
445 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 125. 
446 Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships,” in Feminists Rethink the Self, ed. 
Diana Tietjens Meyers (Boulder, Colorado: WestviewPress, 1996). 
  167 
autonomous agency. Mackenzie and Stoljar identify five categories of feminist 
critiques of the liberal or traditional conception of autonomy - symbolic (for 
example in the work of Lorraine Code), metaphysical (for example in the work of 
Annette Baier), care (for example in the work of Carole Gilligan and Nancy 
Chodorow), postmodern, and diversity.447 These critiques all challenge the 
metaphysical understanding of atomistic personhood and the value of autonomy as 
self-sufficiency by drawing attention to the complex social nature, or 
intersubjectivity, of selfhood. 
 
Relational approaches to autonomy share feminist concerns about conceiving 
autonomy in terms of abstract individualism and take as their starting point that 
autonomy needs to be understood in an embodied relational context of agency and 
raise concern about the impacts of socialisation on people’s ability and 
opportunities to lead an autonomous life.  As such, relational accounts do not 
argue that all and any formulations of autonomy are suspect, but rather, that any 
inquiry into autonomy must take on board that the agent is embedded in and 
constituted through relationships and that any adequate account must explain 
autonomy, and the relationship to selfhood, within this context. Relational 
approaches point to the necessity of taking a richer account of autonomous 
agency. They thus aim to ‘rehabilitate’ autonomy within a relational 
understanding.448 Here, I adopt an understanding of ‘relational’ in the sense of 
denying a metaphysical conception of atomistic personhood and not merely a 
denial that autonomy requires independence or self-sufficiency.449 On this 
understanding, intersubjectivity is primary to any account of autonomy. 
 
Mackenzie and Stoljar understand relational autonomy as ‘an umbrella term’ 
which groups a ‘range of related perspectives’ that focus on the implications of 
intersubjective dimensions of selfhood and identity for conceptions of autonomy 
and agency. They write: 
These perspectives are premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that 
persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the 
                                            
447 See  Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” in Relational Autonomy 
- Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie 
Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5-12. For another characterisation of feminist 
critiques of autonomy, see Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity.”; 
Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships,” 41-42. 
448 Meyers argues that in practice autonomy is an important concept for us, see Meyers, Self, 
Society and Personal Choice, 41. These claims echo Schechtman’s discussion set out in 3.1.a that not 
all theories of personal identity should be abandoned, we still have pre-philosophical intuitions and 
surrounding practices around identity that demand explanation. 
449 As Stoljar notes ‘relational’ can be understood in degrees of strength. ‘Relational’ may be 
used to mean ‘merely’ denying that autonomy requires self-sufficiency. A more robust 
understanding means denying the assumption of a metaphysically isolated subject of autonomy, 
which I have critiqued in the previous section. This latter account takes intersubjectivity to be 
primary to an understanding of autonomy. See Stoljar, “Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy.” 
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context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social 
determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.450 
Amongst these diverse perspectives, Mackenzie and Stoljar identify some 
shared assumptions: 1) a socially embedded conception of agency and as agents 
our practical identities and value commitments are constituted in and by our 
interpersonal relationships and social environment; and 2) autonomy is a socially 
constituted capacity and so its development can be impaired (and fostered) by the 
actions or omissions of others. These views stress the relationships of dependence 
and interdependence in the development of (and frustration of) autonomy.  
 
As Mackenzie and Stoljar note there is a range of related perspectives under 
the rubric of relational autonomy. These relational approaches to autonomy can 
most broadly be distinguished in terms of the distinction between procedural or 
substantive approaches (as set out in 5.1.a); that is, those approaches that argue 
that the conditions necessary for autonomy should be understood procedurally 
and as content neutral, and those approaches that reject content neutrality and 
argue that the process of critical reflection must be supplemented by some non-
neutral conditions. These latter substantial approaches are further distinguished as 
strong – those that require specific content of desires and values – and weak – 
those that suggest further conditions which act as constraints on the content of 
desires and values. 451 The approaches to autonomy set out in section 5.1.a are not 
incompatible with relational assumptions about autonomy, nor do they necessarily 
presuppose atomism.452 Clearly Korsgaard’s is a relational substantive approach, 
as is Benson’s. My aim here is to distinguish those approaches which take 
assumptions about relationality and the person as relational as their self-conscious 
starting point for any analysis of autonomy and this position is consistent with the 
argument I have put throughout this thesis that any account of selfhood must start 
with the agent in their embodied intersubjective context. In addition to the 
distinction between procedural and substantive, relational approaches may be 
classified as either causal - autonomy is understood as a social capacity mainly in 
the sense that social relationships contribute to its development - or as constitutive 
– social relations are understood as constitutive of autonomy. Stoljar sets out the 
distinction as follows:  
                                            
450 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 4. 
451 For an articulation of the difference between strong and weak substantive approaches, see 
Paul Benson, “Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance of Autonomy,” in Personal 
Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. James 
Stacey Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
452 There is disagreement as to whether the procedural and substantive approaches, as 
discussed in 5.1.a presuppose individualistic assumptions. Mackenzie and Stoljar argue that these 
approaches have relational assumptions and as such are ‘compatible’ with the notion that persons 
are relational, see Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured.” However, Friedman argues 
these approaches presuppose individualistic assumptions about persons, see Friedman, “Autonomy 
and Social Relationships.” 
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Causal conceptions acknowledge the impact of both social relationships and 
socio-historical circumstances in agents’ capacities. … Causal accounts investigate 
the effects of external “relational” factors on agents’ autonomy; they do not offer 
an analysis of autonomy using such external factors. On constitutively relational 
accounts, however, interpersonal or social conditions are part of the “defining 
conditions” of autonomy.453 
Stoljar further notes that the procedural/substantive distinction ‘cuts across’ 
the causal/constitutive distinction. 
 
 In this section I set out the broad shape that an approach to autonomy should 
take in order to best address questions concerning self-change and autonomy, and 
so questions concerning the impacts of neural implants. I recommend an approach 
that is not wholly procedural nor strongly substantive. This avoids the criticisms 
levelled at both procedural and strong substantive approaches and adequately 
captures what we should attend to in assessments of autonomous choice. I argue 
that autonomy should be understood as the exercise of a set of skills that are 
developmentally acquired in the context of others; through the exercise of these 
competences the authentic self emerges. Further to this procedural approach, in 
recognition of starting with primary embodied intersubjectivity in an analysis of 
autonomy I argue that relationality must be understood constitutively; that is, that 
social relations are constitutive of autonomy competence, and not just causally 
related to the development and exercise of autonomy competence. I argue that in 
addition to a process of critical reflection upon one’s values and desires, a person 
must regard herself as a worthy source of reasons which requires attention to the 
importance of normative competences, that is self-referring attitudes such as self-
trust, self-esteem and self-respect, as further requirements for autonomy. Thus, I 
set out and argue for a relationally constitutive weak substantial embodied 
approach to autonomy. 
 
First, in order to further underscore my argument that any adequate of 
autonomy must be based on a more complex notion of selfhood and one 
specifically that recognises the embodied intersubjective nature of selfhood, I 
draw on Annette Baier’s concept of “second persons” to show that persons are not 
atomistic, rather agency is intersubjective and on Mackenzie’s understanding of 
bodily autonomy in terms of integrated bodily perspective to show that the body is 
not just something we own, but rather is constitutive of our autonomy. I focus my 
critique on libertarian conceptions of autonomy because they have been influential 
in the development of approaches to autonomy relevant to health care ethics.  
Second I set out a weak substantial approach to autonomy which understands 
autonomy in terms of the exercise of a suite of skills, including autonomy 
competences of self-direction, self-definition and self-discovery and normative 
competences, including self-respect, self-esteem and self-worth. Drawing on 
                                            
453 Stoljar, “Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy.” . 
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Diana Meyers’ approach I set out an understanding of autonomy in terms of a set 
of competences which argues that the authentic self emerges through the exercise 
of autonomy competence. Meyers’ approach is procedural and relationally causal. 
In recognition that embodied primary intersubjectivity requires a constitutive 
relational approach to autonomy, I then draw on Mackenzie’s constitutively 
relational approach to autonomy that emphasises embodiment and the importance 
of normative competences; that is, self-referring attitudes such as self-trust and 
self-respect. This is a weak substantive approach that draws attention to the 
importance of social scaffolding as providing a framework for the development of 
autonomy competences. Third, I draw together claims about narrative agency and 
autonomy competence in the project of selfhood. Drawing on Atkins, I further 
develop the “full-blooded” account of selfhood in terms of the innovative 
capacities of an autonomous agent. I present the argument that autonomy 
competences are narrative competences: that is, autonomy competences are 
narratively structured and as such impacts on autonomy competences interfere 
with narrative coherence and agency. I show that the salient issue in 
circumstances of self-change is how our autonomy competences are fostered or 
impaired and how this affects narrative coherence. I show that such an approach 
can articulate the relation between narrative agency and autonomy, and autonomy 
and identity. In doing so I contrast my approach with both metaphysical 
(reductionist) and postmodern approaches, and further address criticisms 
concerning the conventionality of narrative (as set out in chapter 3.2.c).  
 
5.2.a Embodied intersubjective autonomy 
 
Baier presents a critique of metaphysical or atomistic conceptions of autonomy 
in terms of an argument against individualism. Against the claim that agents are 
causally isolated from other agents, Baier argues that persons are “second 
persons”. Baier’s argument turns on a reformulation of understandings of persons 
in Descartes. Baier describes four assumptions about mental states in 
understandings of Descartes (what Baier describes as a “Cartesian strawman”); 
that mental states are not bodily states, that they are private, that they are 
experiences, and that they are viewed in terms of time slices.454 In contrast Baier 
argues that Descartes’ approach recognises the embodiment of agents, the 
normative heteronomous character of thought, distinguishes between active and 
passive modes and temporal diversity. This reformulates our understanding of 
Descartes and provides a foothold for thinking about the intersubjectivity of 
agency. Baier links this Cartesian reformulation of persons to a recognition of self- 
or reflective-consciousness (a Cartesian consciousness as consciousness of 
                                            
454 Annette Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and 
Morals(London: Methuen, 1985), 79. 
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ourselves and our place in the world), as opposed to simple consciousness. This 
shift involves recognition of the second person perspective as primary and as what 
allows for the possibility of first- and third-personal ascription.455 As Baier writes 
‘we are second persons before we are first or third persons’.456 
 
Baier argues from the position that intersubjectivity is primary - that identity 
and agency are intersubjectively and socially constituted. This occurs in the 
context of relations of dependence and independence. Baier’s approach 
emphasises ‘the developmental facts about persons’. These relations begin with 
infancy. Baier’s approach recognises that language use and cultural activities 
depend upon human maturation, which are acquired through a ‘drawn-out’ 
dependency on other persons. As such, according to Baier, persons are essentially 
“second persons”. As Baier writes: 
A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough dependent upon 
other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons essentially are 
second persons, who grow up with other persons.457  
During infancy, childhood, youth (and throughout our lives) we learn the 
skills of personhood, these in turn generate ambitions. 
Persons are essentially successors, heirs to other persons who formed and cared 
for them, and their personality is revealed both in their relations to others and in 
their response to their own recognized genesis.458 
And:  
I have linked this emphasis on the second person with the fact that, in learning 
from other persons, we acquire a sense of our place in a series of persons, to some 
of whom we have special responsibilities. We acquire a sense of ourselves as 
occupying a place in an historical and special order of persons, each of whom has 
a personal history interwoven with the history of a community.459 
 
Mackenzie and Walker draw out Baier’s characterisation of second persons as 
follows:   
This primary intersubjectivity, which is rooted in corporeal interactions with 
caregivers, is subsequently layered by more complex forms of intersubjectivity, 
which are made possible by cognitive and linguistic development, and by our 
participation in the social world. This complex intersubjective layering includes 
the way our identities are shaped by familial and personal relationships; by our 
embodiment; by social identity categories, such as those relating to gender, race, 
ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and disability; and by the cultural, religious, 
political, and geographical communities into which we are born or to which we 
now belong.460 
                                            
455 Schechtman’s reformulation of sameness of consciousness in Locke has commonalities with 
Baier’s reformulation of persons and consciousness in Descartes. Whilst I do not go into these 
commonalities here, both motivate a reading of these early modern thinkers in terms of the 
relational constitution of agency and the social nature of the concept of personhood. 
456 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 90. 
457 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 84. 
458 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 85. 
459 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 90. 
460 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 387. 
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Part of maturation on Baier’s approach is moving from simple consciousness to 
self-reflective consciousness, and integral to this process is the development of the 
second-personal perspective. The second-personal perspective is primary or ‘key’, 
it allows for the development of the first- and third-personal perspectives, as well 
as articulating their interrelation. As Baier writes: 
Persons are self-conscious, know themselves to be persons among persons. 
Knowledge of this shows in the grasp of all the pronouns, none of which has sense 
except in relation to the others, but there are several ways in which the second 
person is the key person. My first concept of myself is as the referent of “you,” 
spoken by someone whom I will address as “you.” … The second person, the 
pronoun of mutual address and recognition, introduces us to the first and third … 
To get at the difference between second and third person uses the child must 
differentiate between persons and nonpersons, present and absent persons, 
participants and nonparticipants. The correct use of the second person pronoun is 
the test for that grasp of the concept of a person which is essential to persons.461 
To be a person, then, one must recognise oneself and others as persons. Baier 
further connects this claim to self-conscious agency: 
This grasp of the second person pronoun is vital for self-conscious action as well 
as for self-conscious thought. The standards by which our actions are judged are, 
like the standards by which thought is judged, interpersonal, and learned from 
others. … In action and thought about action, as much as in other thought, we are 
second persons before we are first or third persons.462 
 
So, according to Baier, ‘[p]ersons are not causally isolated from other persons; 
indeed, the development of persons requires relations of dependency with others’.463 
We do not form desires or values independent of others, but rather test whether 
we have understood things through other people. With the recognition of persons 
as second persons; that is, persons in a series of persons and that agents are 
socially and bodily embedded, Baier shows that attributing autonomy to agents 
that are atomistic, or separate or radically individualistic, is mistaken, and any 
concept of autonomy should attend to the fundamental intersubjectivity of agency 
and the social nature of the concept of personhood. 
 
Atkins also used claims about the second person perspective to ground the 
intersubjective nature of personhood, as embodied and relational (2.3.b and 4.1.a). 
Baier’s discussion provides background for, and strengthens, the discussion of the 
role of the second person perspective and the development and articulation of 
narrative agency, as outlined in the work of Atkins and others in the previous 
chapters. Thus, it further builds on the understanding of the intersubjective, and 
relational, nature of selfhood developed in this thesis.  
 
                                            
461 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 89-90. 
462 Baier, “Cartesian Persons,” 90. 
463 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 7. 
  173 
For Atkins embodiment is the ground of these perspectives and so the second-
person perspective arises from and is fundamentally shaped by our embodiment. 
Mackenzie also argues for an account of embodied intersubjectivity in her 
approach to bodily autonomy. Drawing on a critique by Ricoeur, Mackenzie 
develops an understanding of bodily autonomy in terms of integrated “bodily 
perspective”. Mackenzie contrasts this understanding with “maximal choice” 
conceptions of bodily autonomy (which take their justification from libertarian 
substantial individualism) and which understand bodily autonomy in terms of 
instrumental control and expanding the range of bodily options. Mackenzie claims 
this understanding conflates negative liberty - freedom from external interference 
- with autonomy. Mackenzie argues this understanding provides an inadequate 
account of the role of embodiment in autonomy and fails to provide for the social 
shaping of our ideas.  
 
Mackenzie characterises maximal choice conceptions of bodily autonomy as 
involving the view that bodily autonomy is enhanced when the range of bodily 
options available to a person are ‘maximised’ and that increasing bodily options 
and instrumental control over one’s body enhances bodily autonomy.464 Mackenzie 
notes that these views take their justification from libertarian conceptions of 
autonomy.465 These include: autonomy as the right to negative liberty - that as long 
as one’s choices do not harm others and the choice is non-coerced, then one should 
be free from interference to do with her body as she pleases; the view that a liberal 
society should remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good, that 
autonomy is best promoted by maximising choice; and, the understanding of 
bodily autonomy in terms of control over the body and bodily processes.466 
Mackenzie notes that on the libertarian view choice is equated with the expression 
of subjective preferences. Mackenzie writes: ‘The view of choice embodied in 
these conceptions is the view that a person is entitled to potentially unlimited 
scope in the range of bodily options available to her and that the more such 
options she has open to her the better’.467 On Mackenzie’s view, it is the equation 
of bodily autonomy with bodily control that provides support for the assumption 
that by expanding the range of options available to us we extend instrumental 
control over our bodies. As such, ‘[m]aximal choice conceptions construe bodily 
                                            
464 Catriona Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” in Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, ed. 
S. Kay Toombs 2001), 418. 
465 Mackenzie critiques maximal choice conceptions in a number of places. See: Mackenzie, 
“On Bodily Autonomy.”; Catriona Mackenzie, “Conceptions of Autonomy and Conceptions of the 
Body in Bioethics,” in Feminist Bioethics: At the Center, on the Margins, ed. Jackie Leach Scully, 
Laurel E. Baldwin-Ragaven, and Petya Fitzpatrick (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010); Mackenzie, “Autonomy.” 
466 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 419. 
467 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 419. 
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autonomy or bodily-self-determination as maximising control over one’s body and 
having the freedom to dispose of one’s body and body parts as one chooses’.468 
 
Mackenzie argues that maximal choice conceptions of autonomy are mistaken 
for a number of related reasons. Maximal choice conceptions conflate two senses 
of bodily control and mistake our normative relationship to our bodies - they 
mistake bodily integration for control over the body rather than viewing bodily 
integration as constitutive of bodily autonomy. Maximal choice conceptions of 
bodily autonomy, argues Mackenzie, ground the rights to respect bodily 
autonomy (the right to non-interference and to self-determination) with 
understanding bodily control in terms of the notion of bodily ownership.469 
Drawing on Ricoeur’s critique of Parfit (as discussed in the chapter 2.2.d). 
Mackenzie argues that grounding the rights to non-interference and bodily self-
determination in body ownership misunderstands the relationship our bodies have 
to our identity – rather than the idea that our bodies belong to us, like we might 
own a car, our bodies are constitutive of our identities. This mistakes two notions 
of belonging – qua ownership and qua selfhood. Mackenzie writes;  
Ricoeur’s critique of Parfit … helps to clarify the difference between two senses of 
belonging: belonging in the sense of what one owns or possesses or has, that is, ownership; 
and belonging in the sense of who one is, or identity. Following Ricoeur, I … argue that a 
person’s body belongs to her in this second sense of being constitutive of her identity, 
rather than in the sense of ownership. Ricoeur’s critique of Parfit … draws attention to 
one of the central tenets of a phenomenological approach to embodiment, namely that 
human corporeality is the invariant condition of our selfhood.470 
In this quote Mackenzie draws attention to the fact that understandings of 
bodily ownership illicitly abstract the person from her body. Via this process of 
abstraction the body is treated as something separate; that is, something separate 
over which a person can exercise proprietorial rights. It is this understanding that 
provides the foothold for conceiving of bodily autonomy in terms of instrumental 
control over the body and rights to non-interference and bodily self-
determination.471 
 
Mackenzie further argues that maximal choice theories of autonomy in 
bioethics view respect for autonomy in terms of informed consent.472 This 
understanding of bodily autonomy in terms of instrumental control, however, 
based as it is in a mistaken sense of bodily belonging, provides an inadequate basis 
                                            
468 Mackenzie, “Conceptions of Autonomy and Conceptions of the Body in Bioethics,” 73. 
469 Mackenzie notes that this understanding of bodily autonomy in terms of body self-
ownership has its origins in understandings of Locke. Mackenzie, “Conceptions of Autonomy and 
Conceptions of the Body in Bioethics.” 
470 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 421. 
471 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 424. 
472 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 420; Mackenzie, “Autonomy”. Mackenzie also 
critiques decisional conceptions of autonomy (as well as conscientious conceptions of autonomy) in 
bioethics, arguing that a relational conception of autonomy can better account for the intuitions of 
each. 
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for grounding those rights to non-interference and bodily self-determination.473 
Mackenzie uses her critique of maximal choice theories to criticise this 
understanding and argues that conceiving of threats or hindrances to autonomy 
solely in terms of freedom from coercion is not enough to secure autonomy.474 It 
fails to account for the embodied subjectivity of human experience, including the 
normative significance of the body in the exercise of autonomy. Rather, drawing 
on Ricoeur’s understanding of the body as constitutive of selfhood, Mackenzie 
argues that bodily autonomy should be recast in terms of integrated “bodily 
perspective”. On the basis of her arguments Mackenzie argues for a more 
‘nuanced’ understanding of respect for patient autonomy, which broadens respect 
for autonomy from ‘merely’ securing informed consent.475 
 
Further to this point, by reducing autonomy to negative liberty - that is, an 
understanding of autonomous actions as those that are freely chosen and that are 
not coerced – maximal choice theories of bodily autonomy fail to take account of 
the social shaping of ideas; that is, how our choices are shaped. Drawing on the 
examples cosmetic surgery and breast augmentation, Mackenzie argues that 
maximal choice conceptions cannot distinguish between aspects of socialisation 
that might impair autonomy and those that facilitate autonomy. For example, if a 
person undergoes cosmetic surgery to meet someone’s opinion about what would 
make her life better, this does not indicate autonomous choice. If she lacks self-
esteem, self-worth or self-trust, even though she goes through a process of critical 
self-reflection on her values and choices, these need not be viewed as autonomous. 
Much feminist work on cosmetic surgery and surrogacy raises these questions. 
For example, whether the internalisation of socially reinforced values may lead to 
conformity or conventionality.476 These arguments show that not all expansions in 
the range of bodily choices enhance autonomy, in fact some options may be unjust 
and entrench existing inequalities, further, oppressive social understandings can 
also be internalised. As such, these conceptions cannot say which choices are 
autonomy enhancing and which are autonomy impairing. On the basis of this 
conclusion, Mackenzie argues that we must include a requirement for normative 
reflection. Autonomous agency involves critical reflection both on the worth or 
value of one’s choices, and the desires guiding them, and on the historical and 
                                            
473 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy.” 
474 For critiques of respect for autonomy in terms of informed consent, see: Mackenzie, 
“Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism.”; Claudia McLeod and Susan 
Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy, Self-trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed,” in 
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475 For this account, see: Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy.”; Mackenzie, “Conceptions of 
Autonomy and Conceptions of the Body in Bioethics.” 
476 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 17-18. 
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social processes of formation of one’s choices and desires.477 Autonomy requires 
that the person values her own judgement and capacity to act and choose in 
accordance with what she values. I will take up discussion of this requirement in 
the following sub-section. 
 
These arguments show that conceiving of autonomy in terms of substantive 
individualism is inadequate, approaches which rely on this conception are unable 
to account for the importance and role of embodiment and our relation with others 
in the exercise (and development) of autonomy. Any adequate account of 
autonomy must be based on a more complex notion of selfhood and one 
specifically that recognises the embodied intersubjective nature of selfhood. An 
approach to autonomy must take account of the complex nature of the agent in 
her embodied, relational setting.  
 
Baier’s and Mackenzie’s arguments draw on, and give further support to, 
arguments for relational approaches to identity and agency made in the previous 
chapters. They draw out the significance of intersubjective embodiment to 
practical identity and agency, as well as for autonomy. Below I set out the broad 
shape of a constitutive approach to relationality that is weakly substantial, 
drawing on Meyers’ procedural causal relational approach to autonomy in terms 
of the exercise of a set of autonomy competences and Mackenzie’s constitutive 
weak substantial approach which recommends the inclusion of normative 
constraints on reflection.  
 
5.2.b A weak substantial relational approach to autonomy 
 
Meyers develops a relational approach to autonomy as acting according to 
one’s sense of personal identity. On Meyers’ approach ‘[a]utonomous people are 
in control of their own lives inasmuch as they do what they really want to do’.478 
This approach understands autonomy as a competence that is developed and 
exercised relationally. On Meyers’ approach, autonomy is understood as a set of 
complex competences or reflective skills that emerge developmentally, that can be 
exercised to a greater or lesser extent in different contexts and that are sustained 
and exercised in social situations.479 This is an approach which aims to explain 
both the enabling and impairing aspects of socialisation. Meyers’ approach also 
                                            
477 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 420. 
478 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 26. 
479 Meyers shifts the discussion of socialisation, drawing on Feinberg. She writes: ‘Feinberg’s 
view … reorients speculation about personal autonomy. Instead of asking how the prefabricated 
adult can gain control over a manufacturing process run wild, Feinberg’s insight encourages us to 
ask how the socialization process can be adjusted to promote the harmonious development of the 
individual.’ Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 41. 
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gives an account of the skills and competences necessary for autonomy and what 
kinds of socialisation are necessary to promote these skills and capacities (and so 
providing, in addition to the theoretical resources, a direction for therapeutic 
repair). On Meyers’ approach the function of competences is integration of the 
self and authentic selfhood emerges through the exercise of autonomy 
competence.  
 
Meyers proposes a relational procedural model to assess whether a desire or 
action is autonomous - autonomous desires are those that are developed through 
the exercise of autonomy competence. Meyers contrasts her relational procedural 
approach in terms of the exercise of autonomy competence with other procedural 
approaches, such as Frankfurt’s, which she argues regard social relations as causal 
conditions that promote self-sufficiency rather than as intrinsic to autonomy. 
Meyers targets Frankfurt’s procedural approach to autonomy, outlined in the 
previous section (5.1.a), for construing autonomy as a form of free will. 480 Meyers 
argues that this approach treats autonomy as subsidiary to free will, meaning that 
autonomy exists where an ontologically free agent can be found. This 
understanding treats a free agent as an ‘authentic’ self who is independent of, or 
‘untainted’ by socialisation. In contrast, Meyers argues that we should understand 
social relations as intrinsic to autonomy; we need a more sophisticated account of 
autonomy and one that can account for the social and not just devise ways to 
transcend it. On Meyers’ approach, socialisation is not inimical to autonomy; 
rather, developing autonomy competences depends on socialisation. 
 
Meyers outlines three specific skills that are essential to autonomous agency – 
skills in self-discovery (understanding oneself), self-definition (defining one’s 
values and commitments), and self-direction (directing one’s life). Meyers argues 
that there are three components to autonomy: reflection, revision, and action (that 
is, having opportunities to choose, control over the context, and the exercise of 
competence). As Meyers writes: 
Autonomous people must be able to pose and answer the question “What do I 
really want, need, care about, believe, value etcetera?; they must be able to act on 
the answer; and they must be able to correct themselves when they get the answer 
wrong. To perform these tasks, people must have autonomy competency—the 
repertory of coordinated skills that makes self-discovery, self-definition, and self-
direction possible.’481 
And, 
The skills that enable people to make this inquiry and to carry out their decisions 
constitute what I shall call autonomy competence.482 
                                            
480 Meyers also links this criticism to other procedural accounts as a shared methodological 
fault. Meyers includes procedural approaches which examine authenticity in terms of examining 
the socialization process (in Emmet, Young and Richards), in coherence (Frankfurt and Benn) 
and through identification (Frankfurt, Dworkin, Young and Watson).   
481 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 76. 
482 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 53. 
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As such this is a much more nuanced account of autonomy competence than 
that in terms of legal competence. Meyers’ conception of autonomy competences 
includes volitional, emotional, imaginative and evaluative skills of critical 
reflection. As Mackenzie and Walker note: 
Autonomy competence encompasses not just the minimal requirements of legal 
competence — understanding, minimal rationality, and the capacity to 
communicate one’s decision — but an array of complex competences. These 
include volitional skills, such as self-control and motivational decisiveness; 
emotional skills, such as the capacity to interpret and regulate one’s own 
emotions; imaginative skills, required for understanding the implications of one’s 
decisions and envisaging alternative possible courses of action; and capacities to 
reflect critically on social norms and values.483 
 
Because autonomy competences are a set of skills that can be acquired 
developmentally, the exercise of autonomy can be a matter of degree and varies in 
different domains. Meyers distinguishes between episodic and programmatic 
autonomy, in terms of one’s life plans. A life plan consolidates and unifies one’s 
decisions.  
People direct their lives episodically and programmatically. Autonomous episodic 
self-direction occurs when a person confronts a situation, asks what he or she can 
do with respect to it—the options may include withdrawing from it as well as 
participating in it in various ways—and what he or she really wants to do with 
respect to it, and then executes the decision this deliberation yields. Autonomous 
programmatic self-direction has a broad sweep. Instead of posing the question 
“What do I really want to do now?” this form of autonomy addresses a question 
like “How do I really want to live my life?” To answer this latter question, people 
must consider what qualities they want to have, what sorts of interpersonal 
relations they want to be involved in, what talents they want to develop, what 
interests they want to pursue, what goals they want to achieve, and so forth. Their 
decision about these matters together with their ideas about how to effect these 
results add up to a life plan.484 
 
 Programatically autonomous people have autonomous life plans. Life plans 
facilitate the harmony that autonomy requires. People’s self-concepts stand in a 
reciprocal relation to their life plans. On Meyers’ approach life plans set the 
‘parameters of autonomous spontaneous conduct’. 
A life plan is a comprehensive projection of intent a conception of what a person 
wants to do in life. Any life plan must include at least one activity that the agent 
consciously wants to pursue or a value that the agent consciously wants to 
advance or an emotional bond that the agent consciously wants to sustain, But 
most people want to enjoy a variety of goods, and their life plans must distribute 
their energy and time so as to satisfy these diverse desires.485 
 
                                            
483 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 388. For a discussion of these self-reflective skills, see Catriona Mackenzie, “Critical 
Reflection, Self-knowledge, and the Emotions,” Philosophical Explorations 5 (2002). 
484 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 48. 
485 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 49. 
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Two important points about life plans can be made. Firstly, these plans are not 
optional, but rather, are necessary for the exercise of autonomy.  As Meyers notes: 
‘From the standpoint of autonomy, however, the issue is not whether most people 
have life plans but whether anyone can be autonomous without one’.486 This is 
similar to the point made earlier in the thesis that narrative is a necessary 
organising principle (see 3.2). Secondly, whilst necessary, life plans can’t provide 
for all life’s contingencies; ‘there is a reciprocal and dynamic relation between the 
true self and life plans’.487  
In doing what they really want to do, autonomous people control their own lives. 
Of course, no one can control all of the circumstances that might help or hinder 
one’s projects. Strictly speaking, then, no one can dictate his or her own fate. But, 
inasmuch as autonomous people are able to match their conduct to their selves 
within the constraints of the opportunities that circumstances afford and are 
sometimes able to enlarge their opportunities to suit their selves, they exercise as 
much power over their destinies as anyone can.488 
Mackenzie and Stoljar point out that on Meyers’ approach self-realisation 
involves ‘the capacity to develop those potentialities that are central to the agent’s 
authentic self-conception, in the context of the agent’s life plan’.489 It does not 
require her to develop all her potentialities. Moreover, it requires the recognition 
that autonomy is relative to opportunities and circumstances, and as such, 
autonomy is a relative assessment and not made externally, as if one were free 
from all constraints.  
 
On Meyers’ approach, autonomy competences play a role in securing personal 
integration. Meyers explains that the overarching function of autonomy 
competency is self-governance understood as the use of autonomy competency to 
secure an integrated personality. This is autonomy competence in the exercise of a 
life plan, which in turn gives one control and spontaneity in one’s life.  
[A]utonomy competency has an overarching function that determines what skills 
people must have at their disposal and how they must use these skills in order to 
exercise the competency successfully … . That function, of course, is self-
governance—controlling one’s life by ascertaining what one really wants to do 
and by acting accordingly. … [T]he overarching function of the competency of 
autonomy is to secure an integrated personality. To have control over their lives 
and to be able to act spontaneously without compromising this control, people 
must have integrated personalities.490 
Given the function of autonomy competence is integration of selfhood, as the 
quote above makes clear, authentic selfhood, on Meyer’s account, emerges 
through the exercise of autonomy competence. Meyers writes: 
                                            
486 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 51. 
487 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 53. 
488 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 46. 
489 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 17. 
490 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 59-60. 
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 [P]ersonal autonomy is a way of living in harmony with one’s true self. 
Conceived as the exercise of competency comprising diverse self-reading and self-
actualizing skills.491 
This understanding of authenticity contrasts with those procedural approaches 
discussed in section 5.1.a which test for authenticity conditions, for example, using 
identification, endorsement and non-alienation. Meyers argues we should reorient 
autonomy away from a matter of desires competing to be reasons for action, to the 
idea of the integration of the self. We should address the question of how a person 
can live in harmony with his or her authentic self, ‘considering the characteristic 
unity and vigor of the autonomous life’.492 By understanding autonomous actions 
and desires as those that are developed through the exercise of autonomy 
competence – namely self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction – Meyers’ 
approach has the further virtue that it can account for both dimensions of 
autonomy as set out in section 5.1.a, that is as both a capacity and as involving 
authenticity. This further contrasts with a number of the procedural approaches 
set out in 5.1.a, which whilst they recognise capacity as important for the exercise 
of autonomy, tend to focus solely on authenticity dimensions. Further, on Meyers’ 
approach alienation or lack of endorsement does not undermine autonomy 
competence. One might fully exercise the skills comprising autonomy competence 
yet still experience a certain amount of alienation.  
 
On Meyers’ approach, because autonomy competences are conceived 
relationally, and developmentally, their development and exercise can also be 
frustrated or impaired by others. For example, the social context may impair an 
agent’s capacities to achieve autonomy by encouraging the development of some 
skills at the expense of others. For example, Western patriarchy tends to 
encourage women and girls to develop skills in self-discovery, but less so skills in 
self-direction and self-definition. This is because self-discovery is seen as more 
amenable to emotional abilities. Autonomous agency is not just the 
expression/realisation of our identity; rather exercising autonomy involves a set of 
skills, which necessarily involve negotiation with others. Clearly, on this account, 
self-determination is not solely up to the individual.493  
 
On this approach, whether a person is autonomous, or not, depends on 
whether the person possesses and successfully uses the skills comprised by the 
competency of autonomy. As Meyers writes: 
The difference between autonomous people and nonautonomous ones depends on 
the capabilities people have at their disposal and the way in which people go 
about fashioning their lives. Autonomous people … possess and exercise sills that 
maintain a fluid interaction between their traits, their feelings, their beliefs, their 
                                            
491 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 20. 
492 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 40. 
493 Jackie Leach Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 162. 
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values, their extended plans, their current possibilities for realizing these plans, 
and their conduct.494 
 
Whilst Meyers recognises that external factors can impede the development of 
autonomy competences, hers is a casually relational approach; whether an agent 
develops autonomy competence is a matter of social conditions (for example level 
and kind of education or the nature of the environment, for example growing up 
as a girl in a patriarchal society as referred to above). On Meyers’ approach once 
autonomy competences are developed, it is up to the individual. In recognition of 
the arguments put throughout this thesis I argue that social relations must be 
understood as constitutive of autonomy, and not just as causally relevant. The 
causal approach is inadequate for theorising primary intersubjective embodiment. 
It is not just that others can thwart the development or exercise of our autonomy 
competency, rather we need recognition of the social shaping of our ideas; that is, 
that social understandings can be internalised and that autonomy requires that a 
person values her own judgement and capacity to act in accordance with what she 
values.  
  
Recall, substantive approaches to autonomy argue that a procedural approach 
may yet include people that we might hesitate to call autonomous, such as those in 
oppressive environments. Mackenzie and Stoljar argue that despite Meyers’ aims, 
by failing to rule on the content, her procedural approach might yet still accord 
autonomy to nonautonomous people. As Mackenzie and Stoljar explain, the 
development of autonomy may be impaired in hostile environments and by 
practices of domination marginalization and social oppression.495 Furthermore, not 
being recognised as an autonomous agent can also impair autonomy by restricting 
the range of identity-constituting narratives available to an individual.496 Further, 
as Mackenzie and others argue, these oppressive stereotypes can be internalised, 
which further impair autonomy by undermining a sense of oneself as an 
autonomous agent. As Mackenzie writes: 
Relational autonomy theorists claim that the internalization of oppressive social 
stereotypes, and social relations of misrecognition that deny members of oppressed 
social groups the status of being autonomous agents, can further impair autonomy by 
undermining a person’s sense of his or her self as an autonomous agent. One way this 
can occur is by corroding self-evaluative attitudes of self-respect (regarding oneself 
as the moral equal of others, self-trust (the capacity to trust one’s convictions, 
                                            
494 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, 55. 
495 For examples of these claims, see the essays in Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds. 
Relational Autonomy - Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
496 As set out in the accounts by Nelson and Baylis in the previous chapter, 4.1.b. Also as 
Mackenzie and Walker note the intersubjective shaping of our identities can be understood as 
enabling if it supports a person’s capacities to exercise an autonomous self-narrative and can be 
understood as damaging if it constrains the range of identity constituting narratives available to her 
or interferes with the development or exercise of autonomy competence. See Mackenzie and 
Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of Authenticity,” 387. 
  182 
emotional responses, and judgments), and self-esteem or self-worth (thinking of 
oneself, one’s life and one’s undertakings as meaningful and worthwhile).497 
 
For this reason, (weak) substantive approaches, argue for a set of normative 
competences which involve self-trust, self-esteem and self-worth. This approach 
does not stipulate the content a desire should have. This is important because a 
strong substantive approach would seem to deny the possibility of autonomous 
action as the demands placed on autonomous agency are just too high. 
 
In summary, the relational approach I adopt is more than procedural, because 
it requires that the person values her own judgement and her capacity to act and 
choose in accordance with what she values. This requires that she must 
(substantively) view her actions as her own in the sense that her actions reflect the 
value she places on her standing as an agent worthy of respect (that she has self-
respect), that her projects are meaningful and worthwhile (that she has self-
esteem) and that she has the competence to make good decisions based on her 
convictions and judgements (that she has self-trust). So, this involves not only a 
process of reflection on one’s choices and values, but a specific commitment to her 
self and what she values. Neither is the view I propose a strong substantive 
account, it does not require any other substantive values, for example, valuing 
independence. Unlike strong substantive approaches it does not place too 
stringent commands on autonomy. However, on the view I propose a person 
cannot be indifferent to her own values; that is, she needs to, in some sense, 
endorse them to the extent that she thinks her values and judgements merit 
consideration, that her life and projects should count and that her judgement 
about actions or values matter. 
 
In the following section I set out how this account is relevant to understanding 
cases of self-change consequent upon neural implants. Firstly, I draw together 
arguments made in previous chapters to set out the relationship between the 
exercise of autonomy and narrative self-understanding. 
 
5.2.c Autonomy competences and narrative competences  
 
 Atkins builds on Meyers’ work on autonomy competences, life projects, and 
integration, by explicitly theorising the relationship to narrative. Atkins articulates 
the relation between (relational) autonomy competences and narrative structures - 
the exercise of autonomy competences deploys narrative competences. Meyers 
also connects narrative and autonomy competences - on Meyers’ approach, 
                                            
497 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 388. For such an account, see Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative 
Authority and Perfectionism.” 
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autonomous agency requires the same strategies that are employed in narrative 
understanding. As Atkins writes: ‘Self-knowledge is achieved, says Meyers, 
through communication with others where we test our explanations and receive 
feedback about them. In this way we self-consciously invoke the articulation and 
reality constraints on narrative self-understandings’.498 
 
Atkins extends on this understanding and argues that Meyers’ understanding 
of autonomy competences presupposes the view of human embodiment and 
narrative identity that Atkins develops, and which I have presented in the 
previous chapters. 
 
Atkins argues that: ‘A narrative model of identity requires an account of 
autonomy that integrates the first-, second and third-personal aspects of selfhood. 
This requires a theory in which the social and bodily dimensions of agency are 
explicitly theorized’.499 And that ‘[a]utonomy competencies unify the self by 
integrating beliefs, desires, dispositions, goals, and so on, to minimize inner 
conflict and to articulate a comprehensive agential perspective’.500 On Atkins’ 
approach a relational theory aims to unify the first-, second- and third-
perspectives of selfhood.501  
 Autonomy competencies presuppose narrative competencies, and so they effect 
narrative coherence by coordinating first-, second-, and third-personal aspects of 
agents’ lives. In this way autonomy integrates the self, making possible a coherent 
agential perspective and a unified sense of who one is and, thereby, making 
possible the life one really believes to be worth living.502 
So, the autonomous self is a narrative self, and personal autonomy turns on the 
deployment of narrative competences. Atkins, like Mackenzie, in recognition of 
primary embodied intersubjectivity, argues that relationality should be conceived 
constitutively, and not merely causally, and for the importance of inclusion of 
normative competences in considerations of autonomy. 
 
This approach articulates the relationship between narrative (identity) and 
autonomy – given the relational account of autonomy, autonomous agency is 
developed and exercised through narrative understandings with others. Factors 
that undermine autonomy can interfere with narrative integration. Further, the 
relational autonomy approach, by taking the developmental, embodied and social 
setting into account as primary, distinguishes between identity and autonomy - 
autonomous agency cannot simply be the realisation of one’s authentic desires or 
control over one’s desires and actions (will). Understanding autonomy is not done 
simply in terms of self-creation/freedom, nor in terms of a model of self-control or 
                                            
498 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 132. 
499 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 123. 
500 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 129. 
501 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 136-7, 141. 
502 Atkins, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 141. 
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strong identification, but is the exercise of competences within a context to 
achieve integration, and so autonomy comes apart from identity. Our identity and 
its constitution, rests in the development of skills in negotiation with others.  
 
This understanding builds on the “full-blooded” account of selfhood that I 
have been developing throughout this thesis. 503 In the second chapter I 
demonstrated the complex nature of selfhood involved in practical identity, as 
embodied and social. In the third and fourth chapters it was to show how 
narrative structures agency. With this approach to relational autonomy in terms of 
autonomy competences, we can see the role of autonomy and normative 
competences in integrating the multi-perspectival nature of embodied agency. 
Moreover, through understanding autonomy as a set of self-reflective skills that 
are exercised in development with others, this approach emphasises the innovative 
and creative nature of narrative synthesis. This draws on the account of agency 
developed through the chapters, building on Korsgaard, Ricoeur, Schechtman, 
Atkins, Baylis, Nelson and Mackenzie. The “full-blooded” account of agency as 
dynamic embodied perspectival selfhood I have developed, given its stress of the 
relational and developmental nature of selfhood, does not presuppose any self or 
unified entity that stands against or behind this activity of self-constitution. 
Rather, it sketches out a developmental account of selfhood in its practical stance 
and the effects of this stance on our self-understanding and human flourishing. 
 
With this understanding in hand, we can address postmodern critiques 
claiming that autonomy and agency are illusions, as well as provide a further 
response to criticisms that narrative is conventional. Like the criticisms of 
libertarian approaches presented in the second section of this chapter (5.2.a), the 
postmodern “critique of the subject”, which groups a number of theorists, 
criticises metaphysical assumptions implicit in this ideal of autonomy. These 
include assumptions that agents are self-transparent, psychically unified, and 
capable of achieving self-mastery. This includes psychoanalytic critiques of the 
agent as conflicted (and not as psychically unified), as well as Foucauldian 
critiques that agents are constituted by power relations (and that there is no 
metaphysical self). These critiques of the subject coalesce around the argument 
that autonomy, and so autonomous agency, is an illusion. Mackenzie and Stoljar 
identify this unifying theme underlying the postmodern critique of the subject.504  
                                            
503 Mackenzie and Stoljar note that substantive approaches, weak and strong, presuppose a 
richer account of agency than do procedural accounts, because they treat ‘autonomy as 
intrinsically relational and introduce necessary conditions of autonomy that derive from the social 
relations within which agents are embedded’. Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 20. 
This observation is consistent with my claim that the approach I develop is a theoretically rich 
account of agency and selfhood.  
504 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 11. 
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The theme is that the notion of autonomy is a kind of conceit or illusion of the 
Enlightenment conception of the subject. Thus it is charged that defenders of 
autonomy still cling to the Cartesian idea that consciousness can be transparently 
self-aware or to the Kantian view of persons as rational self-legislators, despite the 
fact that such views have been so decisively challenged since Nietzsche, Freud, 
and their heirs. Moreover, the persistence of such views is not just a harmless 
anachronistic hangover of the Enlightenment. It is complicit with structures of 
domination and subordination, in particular with the suppression of others—
women, colonial subjects, blacks, minority groups—who are deemed incapable of 
achieving rational self-mastery.505 
 
These critiques, like the relational critique of autonomy, are important because 
they also draw attention to the complex social nature, or intersubjectivity, of 
selfhood. However, I argue, following the theorists I have drawn on throughout 
this thesis, that demonstrating that there is no “metaphysical self” does not mean 
that there is no self to deal with.506 Moreover on the “full-blooded” account of 
selfhood in terms of autonomous agency that I develop, I have articulated how 
narrative can account for the continuity and permanence of self, and the role of 
autonomy competences in unifying agency, in terms of the innovative capacities of 
self-constitution. 
 
Narrative self-understanding contains a critical facility essential for 
autonomous agency, which further addresses the objection that because the 
narrative model places stress on unity and the social context, it has a strong 
tendency towards conventionality. By contrast, Ricoeur, Meyers, Nelson, Atkins 
and others, highlight the innovative aspects of autonomy. For example, Ricoeur 
emphasises the creative aspects of the self in the process of narrative synthesis, 
Meyers’ the interplay of socialisation and critical skills of autonomous agency, and 
Nelson, the emancipatory effects of counter narratives.507 Further, this approach 
allows us to explain how autonomy competences may be hindered or enabled. 
 
The approach I have developed recognises that identity and the project of 
selfhood is an integrative project and that the unity of agency is not given, contra 
metaphysical reductive approaches. Moreover, because it recognises the 
importance of integration to autonomous agency, it can account for the fragility of 
autonomous agency as well as the personal significance of self-disintegration, 
                                            
505 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 11. 
506 In this way my position is distinct from Dennett’s claim that the self is merely a ’center of 
narrative gravity’, see Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity.” My account is more 
similar to Velleman’s account of the multi-perspectival nature of selfhood and his understanding of 
agential agency in virtue of which a person is autonomous. For further discussion, including of the 
differences between Dennett and Velleman see J. David Velleman, “The Self as Narrator,” in Self 
to Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Goldie also disagrees with accounts that 
understand the self as a narrative fiction, see Goldie, “One’s Remembered Past: Narrative 
Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective.” 
507 I discuss Nelson’s arguments about counternarratives further in 6.2.b. 
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contra postmodern approaches. As such, throughout this thesis, I have developed 
an argument concerning the relation of the key concepts relevant to selfhood – 
identity, agency and autonomy – which address deficiencies in mainstream 
accounts, as well as meeting postmodern objections concerning narrative as 
conventional and autonomy as an illusion. The problem with metaphysical 
accounts of identity is that they assume the integrated or given self. The problem 
with postmodern accounts is that they downplay the practical force/experience of 
self-fragmentation. Recognition of the constraints of the relational context of 
identity formation - as social and embodied, also meets responses by postmodern 




My aim in this section has been to draw attention to three significant points 
raised by relational approaches which will in turn be helpful in illuminating my 
questions concerning self-change as raised in the first-personal accounts of neural 
recipients. These are: a recognition of the intersubjective shaping of our identities 
- an agent’s capacities for autonomy should be understood relationally; an 
understanding of autonomy as a suite of skills or competences which are 
developmentally acquired and constitutive of autonomy; that autonomy 
competences can be impaired or enabled in this social context; and, that autonomy 
further requires normative critical reflection. This approach connects autonomy 
and narrative, whilst also distinguishing between identity and autonomy in an 
account of autonomous agency. 
 
In this section I have argued for the broad shape a relational approach to 
autonomy should take in terms of autonomy competences that are 
developmentally acquired and so can be impaired or fostered. Drawing on the 
approach to autonomy in terms of the exercise of autonomy competence has the 
consequence that authentic selfhood emerges through the exercise of selfhood. As 
such, when understanding the impacts of changes in our lives, the emphasis is 
placed on the importance of self-integration. In recognition of embodied primary 
intersubjectivity I have argued for a constitutive understanding of relationality, 
which requires recognition that there should be some substantial conditions for 
autonomous actions. I argued for a weak substantial approach that recognizes the 
importance of paying attention to self-referring attitudes such as self-trust and 
self-respect. This approach sets out a rich account of selfhood which includes 
understanding agency, identity and autonomy as relational – as distinct yet inter-
relational, where none of the concepts is foundational.  
 
                                            
508 For an example of this approach see: Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990). 
  187 
This approach to autonomy competency has the further virtue that it addresses 
a twin concern - to explain how oppressive socialisation can impair autonomy, as 
well as, to explain how people subject to oppressive socialisation may be 
autonomous to some extent and exhibit autonomy in some areas of their lives 
(whilst perhaps not in others). The approach does not view socialisation as 
something to be transcended for authenticity, but works to theorise the 
interrelation of socialisation and subjectivity. Whilst these theories are aimed at 
explaining feminist concerns about socialisation, they are nonetheless useful for 
thinking through the effects of neural implants. The question is not whether we 
are in world without any external interference; the important thing for my 
autonomy is whether DBS (or socialisation) impedes my capacity for critical self-
reflection. What matters is whether I can take a critical stance and not whether 
changes are caused by the DBS (or the result of socialisation). Thus, the question 
of DBS is not different in kind from the question of socialisation; implants are not 
a threat to identity per se.  
 
The approach includes consideration of the broader social context in which 
medical treatment occurs and the status of people with conditions, which they 
seek treatment for with neural implants.  In a context where understandings of 
disability and illness are prevalent, this is an important point. I will take up this 
discussion in the following section in which I apply the embodied relational 
approach to narrative agency and autonomy to the first-personal accounts of 
implant recipients and neuroethics discussions concerning the impacts of neural 
implants on identity and autonomy. 
 
5.3 Relational Autonomy and Neural Implants 
 
In this section, with this embodied relational approach to narrative agency and 
autonomy in hand, I demonstrate the resources the approach I have developed for 
illuminating the claims about identity and autonomy in the first-personal accounts 
of neural implant recipients, as well as for clarifying claims in the neuroethics 
literature concerning threats to identity and autonomy from neural implants. The 
approach I have put forward puts emphasis on the exercise of autonomy 
competences and normative competences, that they are narratively structured, and 
developed and exercised in an embodied and intersubjective context in a project of 
integrating selfhood.  
 
The approach I develop shows that we must be attentive to the embodied 
dimensions of selfhood. I argue that this approach focuses our attention on the 
impacts of neural implants on a person’s autonomy competences. In addition to 
autonomy competence we must attend to the impacts of neural implants on 
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normative competences. This approach shows that the salient issue arising from 
changes consequent upon neural implants is their impact on fostering or impairing 
autonomy competences with an understanding of the role of autonomy 
competences in facilitating narrative coherence and the sense of an enduring self. 
Given the constitutive nature of embodied intersubjectivity it also shows the 
importance of paying attention to the social shaping of our identities and the 
importance of self-referring attitudes like self-trust and self-respect to autonomous 
actions. On a relational approach, autonomy is not an all or nothing capacity, nor 
is the issue whether the ‘cause’ of the value change is external to us. Rather the 
important area of focus is whether one can reflect upon and integrate the implant 
into one’s self-understanding; that is an integrated bodily perspective, through the 
exercise of autonomy competency. 
 
Further, the approach I develop clarifies the neuroethics literature concerning 
the impacts of neural implants on autonomy and identity. The focus on relational 
autonomy competences shifts the discussion away from an ethics of authenticity, 
which is based on individualist understandings of persons and also refigures these 
discussions concerning threats to concerns for self-integration. Further, by 
focussing on the conceptual relations of the concepts of identity, agency and 
autonomy, the approach illuminates the disagreement between Schechtman and 
Baylis concerning whether DBS threatens narrative identity or agency. 
 
First, I show that attention to relational competences provides theoretical 
resources for understanding the first-personal accounts of self-change. The 
approach shifts the focus to a more substantial account of selfhood which 
recognises the complexity of the project of selfhood in its relational ad embodied 
context and so whilst it acknowledges that practical identity is messy and 
(sometimes fragile) it allows for a more nuanced account of the impacts of neural 
implants. The approach can explain how neural implants might enable autonomy 
competency and facilitate narrative integration, but also how neural implants 
might impair autonomy competence and narrative integration and perhaps 
undermine normative competence. I argue that this approach shows the 
importance of taking the first-personal subjective response to implants into 
consideration when making assessments of impacts and that these assessments 
need to be made on a case-by-case basis. Second, I show how my approach 
clarifies the debates in the neuroethics literature (discussed in section 5.1.c). 
Drawing on arguments by Mackenzie and Walker I argue that the relational 
approach to autonomy competences redirects the debate about threats to identity 
away from an ethics of authenticity to a focus on the exercise of autonomy and 
normative competence and narrative integration. This approach allows us to 
ethically adjudicate about changes (without resorting to tests of identification and 
the like for authenticity). Further, the approach I develop in terms of setting out 
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the broad shape of a theory and the conceptual relation between autonomy, 
agency and identity, adjudicates between Schechtman and Baylis, who seemed to 
disagreed whether the focus of the impacts of DBS should be on impacts to 
identity or agency – it shows that each was concerned with a different, but related 
aspect of the project of selfhood and integrating change.  
 
5.3.a Returning to the first-personal accounts 
 
An embodied relational approach to agency and autonomy is helpful for 
understanding the impacts of neural implants because it focusses our attention on 
the role of embodiment and the social context in the development and exercise of 
autonomy, and conceives of autonomy as a set of competences; it focusses the 
attention of the impact of neural implants on these autonomy competences. More 
specifically, it focusses on how implants might both foster and impair the exercise 
of autonomy competences which in turn may facilitate or frustrate narrative 
coherence (narrative understanding and the skills of narrative self-revision). 
These are exercised in an embodied social context. Meyers’ approach, by 
conceiving of autonomy in terms of competences approach draws our attention to 
how neural implants might foster or impair these competences. By focussing on 
autonomy competence through which authenticity emerges, we see that the 
project of selfhood and the expression of autonomy are complex involving 
volitional, imaginative and self-governance skills; and so, the exercise of autonomy 
is not simply about expressing choice, assessed often, minimally in terms of legal 
competence. And given this complexity tests for identification simply cannot be 
adequate. Further as the weak substantive approach tells us, it is not just causal 
relations that are at issue, we must pay attention to some normative constraints 
also. Mackenzie’s approach to bodily perspective shows the importance of bodily 
integration in the uptake and alienation from implants, and her focus on normative 
self-concepts draws out attention to the subjective shaping of our desires and 
actions and the importance of understanding and engaging with the patient’s 
subjective perspective. 
 
For Mike Robbins, the DBS allows him to continue to exercise autonomy 
competences that allow him to be the practical identity he understands himself to 
be. Michael Chorost whilst he describes himself as part cyborg and that his 
identity has changed, is concerned with engaging in a thoroughgoing 
understanding of the Cochlear, how it works, and his interaction with it, drawing 
on his literary and computer science background, testing and pushing the implant 
and his engagement with it. This is a creative project for Chorost. Chorost 
integrates the Cochlear into his understanding of himself and acts autonomously. 
This is the aim of epilepsy prediction devices; one of the recognised impediments 
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is unpredictability of seizures, and by providing warning, epilepsy prediction 
devices can facilitate the exercise of autonomy competences.509 In the cases of 
Robbins and Chorost, the concern is not with whether the source or causes of 
these changes is externally caused (by the implant). Whilst the implant may 
impact on their agential continuity, they see the change as self-directed. The 
concern rather is with how they direct and integrate these changes. 
 
Chorost does however express feelings of alienation, at times he describes 
feeling alienated from the hearing world, and, also from the deaf community. 
These insights show that the neural implant may challenge Chorost’s trust in, and 
respect for, himself and his project of self-transformation. Chorost though engages 
in critical normative reflection and recognises that the implant does provide him 
with the ability to engage in projects that matter to him in the hearing world, yet 
can also act as a source of alienation in other ways, at other times, in other 
circumstances. As the relational approach attests autonomy is not an all or nothing 
concept, nor is it a global or pervasive concept, one might express autonomy in 
some parts of their life but not others, and in exercising autonomy competence one 
may yet still have feelings of self-alienation. 
 
Whilst Robbins and Chorost present cases of how implants might foster 
autonomy competences, facilitate narrative integration and assist self-directed 
agency, the approach I have put forward is also useful for understanding the cases 
of people who felt alienated from the changes consequent upon neural implants, 
cited in the first personal accounts of people treated with DBS. Chorost recalls his 
interaction with a fellow recipient of a Cochlear who doesn’t feel the same with 
the implant. Here the autonomy competences of these individuals have been 
hindered. This could be twofold: people might feel alienated and unable to engage 
in activities of self-definition, or self-revision, such as the journalist who become 
uninterested in work. This may further impair normative competence if this 
further damages competences of self-trust: for example, the couple whose 
marriage is in conflict following the implant. The impairment of autonomy 
competences impacts on narrative self-understanding and narrative-revision and 
narrative-continuation. Sometimes, as in the case noted by Glannon, the impact on 
autonomy competences is too severe for the person to engage in narrative self-
revision.  
 
                                            
509 Whilst epilepsy prediction devices are only in the early stages of first human trials, some 
recipients have reported increased autonomy. See Cook et al: “Prediction of Seizure Likelihood 
With a Long-term, Implanted Seizure Advisory System in Patients With Drug-resistant Epilepsy: 
a First-in-man Study.” For a discussion of the ethical implications of epilepsy prediction devices 
with a focus on autonomy, see Gilbert, “A Threat to Autonomy: the Intrusion of Predictive Brain 
Devices.” 
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So, this approach has the resources to explain how neural implants and their 
availability can support or undermine autonomy. Neural implants may support or 
undermine autonomy depending on whether the condition or treatment supports 
or undermines the individual’s autonomy competences in self-discovery, self-
definition and self-direction; that is the capacity to exercise procedural autonomy. 
As Robbins’ video so forcefully demonstrates the DBS stops his tremors from 
DBS so that he can engage in conversation and activities that matter to him. We 
might further imagine a case though where the implant has the effect of interfering 
with these competences. This approach also shows that that neural implants may 
support or undermine autonomy depending on whether the condition or treatment 
supports or undermines my self-evaluative attitudes of self-respect, self-trust or 
self-esteem. For example, if the treatment leaves me feeling that my desires are not 
connecting to my actions in the right way, I may feel like I cannot trust myself to 
do what I thought I wanted to do.  
 
Neural implants may be experienced as fostering autonomy and supporting 
normative competence, as such facilitating narrative integration and assist self-
directed agency. This may promote feelings of authenticity. Indeed, neural 
implants might act to facilitate and repair (for example, mitigate alienation caused 
by narrative disruption from the condition). Also, implants might impair 
autonomy competence and or normative competence and so frustrate narrative 
integration and may be accompanied by feelings of alienation. The approach I set 
out can explain why an individual might have increased competence yet still feel 
alienation at times. Furthermore, the first-person accounts show how individuals 
might suffer alienation in some parts of their lives, but not others. As such the 
approach I adopt shows how neural implants may be a source of repair – they may 
assist in the exercise of autonomy competence and foster narrative integration. 
Neural implants, however, may also frustrate the exercise of autonomy 
competence, or challenge our self-referring normative competences, such as self-
trust, and as such, neural implants might cause a need for repair. The approach I 
develop can account for the nuances and complexities that is the practical project 
of selfhood, it draws attention to the importance of the first-person subjective 
perspective in understanding self-change and shows that assessments of neural 
impacts on practical identity must be taken on a case-by-case basis.  
 
5.3.b Refiguring threats to identity from neural implants – 
returning to the neuroethics literature 
 
Mackenzie and Walker, in a discussion of the significance of 
neurotechnological interventions, argue that a relational approach to autonomy 
focusses attention on the impacts of neural implants on autonomy competences. 
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They argue that neurotechnologies may impair or foster autonomy competence 
which in turn bear on the ability to engage in the skills of narrative understanding, 
including narrative self-revision, both positively and negatively. Narrative self-
constitution requires exercising the skills of autonomy competence. 
Once this question [whether neurotechnological interventions impair autonomy 
competence] is brought to the fore, however, it is evident that it can only be 
answered case by case. In some cases, such as the tragic case discussed by 
Glannon …, an intervention such as DBS can disrupt a person’s autonomy 
competence to such an extent that he is unable to engage in narrative self-
revision. In other cases, neurotechnological interventions, by alleviating the 
physical or psychological effects of illness (including mental illness), may thereby 
restore some of the volitional, emotional, motivational, imaginative, and critically 
reflective capacities necessary for autonomous deliberation and action. In so 
doing, such interventions may make it possible for a person to reengage in the 
process of reconstructing or repairing an integrated narrative identity.510 
 
Mackenzie and Walker demonstrate the theoretical benefits of using a 
relational narrative approach to autonomy by contrasting it with much of the 
neuroethics literature which frames the ethical implications of neurotechnologies, 
and concerns about self-change or identity change, in terms of an “ethics of 
authenticity”. In section 5.1.c I set out Levy’s and DeGrazia’s claim that positions, 
such as Elliot’s, which argue that pharmaceutical intervention, and by extension 
direct neurological intervention, threaten authenticity by potentially changing 
someone into a different person without the person’s active agency, are mistaken. 
Levy and DeGrazia argue these positions are based on a mistaken assumption of 
the authentic self; rather than discovering our authentic selves, we create our 
authentic selves through our choices and actions (5.1.c). Mackenzie and Walker 
argue that understanding the normative implications of neurological intervention 
on the basis of an ethics of authenticity is conceptually flawed or misleading. They 
argue that both understandings of authenticity – as either self-discovery or self-
creation - are flawed. They argue that whilst notions of self-discovery rely on a 
static conception of identity, notions of self-creation are equally problematic 
because they conflate identity and autonomy; they are overly individualistic and 
take self-realisation to amount to self-determination,511 and so fail to properly take 
account of relationality and the role of others in self-determination. They argue 
that DeGrazia’s approach whilst narrative is not relational enough.  
DeGrazia’s account of the role of others in the construction of our self-narratives 
is, however, insufficiently relational and still adheres to a view of the self as the 
inner citadel, to which others may be admitted but only on one’s own terms. … 
However, we endorse a more thoroughly relational view of identity, according to 
which our self-narratives are not discrete and self-contained inner stories. Rather, 
                                            
510 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 390. 
511 This line of criticism appears to parallel Meyers’ argument that Frankfurt’s approach 
conflates self-realisation and self-definition. For Meyers’ discussion, see Meyers, Self, Society and 
Personal Choice, 26ff. 
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our self-narratives are constructed through interpersonal relationships and in the 
context of the larger social, historical, political, and cultural narratives within 
which we live our lives and seek to define and understand ourselves.512 
On Mackenzie and Walker’s view, whilst Levy and DeGrazia both criticise an 
understanding of authenticity based on self-discovery, their critique is still 
theoretically framed by understandings about the relationship between autonomy 
and identity that the ethics of authenticity presupposes.  
 
Baylis similarly criticises DeGrazia’s account from a relational perspective: she 
sees the source of the problem as the inability of his narrative account to 
sufficiently account for the conflict between first- and third- personal perspectives. 
DeGrazia’s analysis of delusional self-narratives uses the example of Mr Reilly.513 
Baylis argues that DeGrazia’s attempt to resolve the discordance between first 
and third person narratives and whether first-person narratives should be 
authoritative, indicates that on his account the first-person perspective ‘trumps’. 
Quoting DeGrazia in part, Baylis writes: 
DeGrazia suggests retaining the first person perspective on identity but qualifying 
its objects. In answer to the identity question “Who is Mr. Reilly?” DeGrazia 
describes him as “someone who, for example, is X years old, has such-and-such 
family, and went to these schools … [and] who deeply believes that.” In this way 
DeGrazia attempts to resolve the discordance between the first and third person 
narratives.514  
Whilst this might be an acceptable analysis if Mr Reilly is unaware of the 
discordance, if he is aware that his delusions are caused by extreme psychosis, 
however, Baylis argues this will not be a satisfying answer. This line of criticism is 
also directed to Schechtman’s narrative approach as it relies on the assumption 
that narratives are tested against a standard of objectivity to assess whether they 
are identity-constituting. Baylis demonstrates the significance of a thoroughly 
relational approach to identity: 
[W]ith my view of relational identity, all self-narratives (not only those that admit 
of delusions) are at risk of falling apart if others withhold their (most minimal) 
endorsement. They need not collapse, however, provided there is an opportunity 
to shift one’s narrative or community of belonging sufficiently for there to be the 
prospect of achieving some measure of equilibrium.515 
On Baylis’ account, there is evidence of autonomy, and not just ‘mere 
agency’516 when a person is able to project an identity-constituting narrative that 
she values, and for which she gets uptake. In such cases a person actively 
contributes to authoring her life. 
 
                                            
512 Mackenzie and Walker, “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity,” 387. 
513 For DeGrazia’s account see: David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
514 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 122. 
515 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 122. 
516 Baylis, “The Self in Situ: a Relational Account of Personal Identity,” 124. 
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Mackenzie and Poltera also draw a distinction between autonomy and identity 
in criticising Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution account. They argue that 
her account does not properly distinguish between autonomy and identity.517 This 
appears in the context of a reply to Strawson’s criticisms of narrative that draws 
on the experiences of schizophrenia and its effect on personal identity (referred to 
earlier at 3.2.c to demonstrate the importance of narrative coherence and the 
importance of a sense of an enduring self). Mackenzie and Poltera argue that 
Saks’ illness narrative – that is the narrative which includes her schizophrenia and 
its effect on her life and self-understanding - can be identity-constituting. Due to 
the fragmentary nature of her experience Saks’ ability to exercise autonomy 
competences has been hindered – at times Saks cannot engage in skills related to 
self-governance and the disconnection to her episodic states makes narrative 
integration difficult. Further it undermines her normative competences of self-
trust and self-respect. However, whilst schizophrenia fragments the nature of her 
experience, telling and sharing the illness narrative provides a sense of narrative 
coherence; with the illness narrative Saks is able to weave together (enough for) a 
coherent or enduring sense of self. Whilst recognising that her identity lacks a 
single narrative at times, this approach attributes to Saks’ practical identity, 
though it also recognises her autonomy is diminished. Saks’ autonomy qua 
authenticity is undermined by the alienation she experiences in response to the 
intrusive thoughts that characterise her illness. Saks’ illness narrative includes that 
she has schizophrenia and that this influences her actions and behavior at times. 
In this way Saks is able to incorporate her illness into her self-understanding as 
part of her identity. The role of neural implants on someone’s behavior and actions 
might be included as part of their identity in a similar way; that is, as a way of 
incorporating the effects of the DBS or neural implant as part of a person’s 
identity which acknowledges the implant as a source of behavior or actions, but 
includes this recognition as part of a person’s self-understanding providing a sense 
ownership and facilitating self-directed activity. This response makes better sense 
of Schechtman’s claim that by taking a longer-term perspective recipients of DBS 
might incorporate DBS as part of an identity-constituting narrative, whilst also 
showing that Schechtman’s other claim that DBS ‘automatically’ threatens 
identity is mistaken (section 4.2.a). Thus, the significance of Mackenzie and 
Poltera’s account is that it demonstrates the resources that a relational approach 
has by being able to distinguish between identity and autonomy; thereby a 
relational approach can both account for people with impaired autonomy, without 
dismissing their abilities to construct identity-constituting narratives.518 The work 
                                            
517 Mackenzie and Poltera, “Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy.” 
518 This distinction has been critiqued by Christman who suggests that their approach to 
narrative self-constitution presupposes a unified agent in addition to self-constitution, see John 
Christman, “Comments on Westlund and Mackenzie and Poltera,” Symposia on Gender, Race and 
Philosophy 7 (2011). Whilst I do not engage directly with this critique in this thesis, I’d suggest that 
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by Mackenzie and Walker and Mackenzie and Poltera stress the importance of 
others and social scaffolding in fostering autonomy competences and narrative 
understanding.519 
 
Further, recall Baylis argued that the real threat to identity is not neurological 
intervention, but rather from stigma surrounding disability and illness and the 
feelings of alienation that may arise if these are internalised. Wardrope 
summarises the point as follows:  
If the epistemic resources available for interpreting a given illness within a 
community construct it as entailing a certain identity—a physically disabled 
person as passive and invalid, for example, or a depressed person as unstable and 
dangerous—and a person internalizes such a narrative, but does not identify with 
it, then the very experience of symptoms of that illness may lead to their adopting 
aspects of that identity, though they feel alienated from it.520  
Wardope further explains how neural implants, if they alleviate these symptoms of 
the illness may assist with the feelings of alienation. He writes: ‘[t]he alleviation of 
symptoms of that condition may thus help the individual to feel less compelled to 
apply to themselves the identity constructed for those with that condition and so 
result in greater felt authenticity’.521 In this way, neural implants may function like 
illness narratives in bringing together a more coherent narrative though the 
exercise of competency, even though that competency might be impaired. 
However, as Baylis and Wardrope note, the threat to authenticity lies less with the 
disability or illness than with the discriminatory narrative surrounding disability 
and illness. This shows that the availability of neural implants might undermine 
autonomy if the treatment or condition is socially understood as indicating (or 
causing it to be the case that) the person does not merit esteem, is incapable of 
making judgements and this view is internalised by the patient. In this instance, 
the forging of a new narrative would model the role of the illness narrative. This 
notion of an illness narrative is helpful in illuminating the experiences of recipients 
of neural implants. It provides an explanation of how people might experience the 
implant as alienating even though their condition is treated, as well as providing 
an explanation of the connection between narrative coherence and autonomy. I 
will take up the role of narrative counterstories and repair in the following 
chapter.  
 
This focus on relational autonomy competences refigures the idea that 
(external) change automatically “threatens” identity or autonomy. Attention to 
relational autonomy competence shifts the focus away from conceptualising neural 
                                                                                                                           
the full-blooded account of selfhood that I have developed throughout this thesis meets 
Christman’s objection. 
519 See Poltera’s article On the Importance of Listening. Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling 
and Empathetic Listeners.” 
520 Wardrope, 566. 
521 Wardrope, 566. 
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implants as a threat to identity per se. Changes from neural implants are not 
understood as from the ‘outside’ (including understandings of not from our 
agency); rather, we assess autonomy within the situation we find ourselves in – 
within these embodied and social constraints. If we move to a ‘thoroughly’ 
relational account, we reframe or refigure the question of the impacts of neural 
implants from whether they constitute a threat to identity, to how they might 
foster or impair competence, with a focus on achieving self-integration. This 
provides us with an approach that allows us to normatively adjudicate the 
personal changes from neural implants (without resorting to limited tests of 
identification and the like for authenticity).  
 
This relational embodied approach to narrative agency and autonomy sets out 
conceptual relation between autonomy, agency and identity. We can now see the 
resources of this approach brought to bear on Schechtman and Baylis – that is, we 
can now revisit the conclusion of the previous chapter (4.2). Both Schechtman’s 
and Baylis’ conclusions can be seen as ‘correct’ if viewed through the lens of a 
relational approach to autonomy competences. Rather than providing competing 
explanations each is concerned with a different, but related aspect of the project of 
selfhood and integrating change. Schechtman and Baylis were emphasising 
different aspects of the problem - Schechtman focusses on the narrative aspect of 
selfhood and views threats in terms of narrative disruption – whereas, Baylis pays 
attention to the agency aspect of selfhood viewing threats in terms of diminished 
agency (as opposed to self-directed agency). Baylis’ insight that the ‘real’ threat to 
identity is the constraints on the available identity-constituting narratives for 
people with illness and disability, and how this impairs autonomy competence, 
further underscores this point. Both the social and embodied nature of selfhood 






In this section I have argued that a relational approach to autonomy focusses 
our attention on the development of autonomy competences and the role of social 
forces in their exercise and the choice of identity constituting narratives available 
to one. When applied to the question of the impact of neural implants on identity 
this approach has the following implications: it is not threats to identity per se, but 
impacts on autonomy competences that are significant - neural implants can 
impair autonomy competences (sometimes to the point that self-directed agency 
and the ability to meaningfully author one’s life is not possible). Neural implants 
may also foster autonomy competences, allowing people opportunities for self-
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In this chapter I have argued that the complexity of selfhood demands a 
relational approach to autonomy that starts with, and can account for, our 
embodied and intersubjective context.  I have set out the broad shape of the 
relational approach to autonomy which I think is best suited to addressing the 
question concerning self change consequent on neural implants. In doing so I have 
built on the embodied and relational approach to practical identity and narrative 
agency set out in the previous chapters. I have shown that the claims about 
changes to practical identity should be understood in terms of a relational account 
of autonomy which focusses attention on autonomy competence as the salient 
issue; this focus shifts attention to how neural implants may foster or frustrate the 
development of exercise of these competences and facilitate narrative integration. 
Further, I have argued that relationality should be conceived as constitutive and 
proposed a weak substantial approach which pays attention to the importance of 
normative competences. This approach provides a nuanced approach to the 
questions, being able to explain how people have different responses to the 
impacts of neural implants, how they may foster or hinder autonomy competency, 
but also, how whilst they may improve symptoms of illness may result in feelings 
of self-alienation. Further this approach clarifies and refigures the discussions 
concerning the potential threat to identity posed by neural implants. This 
approach understands impacts from neural implants as parallel to other events and 
focusses our attention to integration and away from concerns about threats from 
neural implants per se. Exercising autonomy competences involves integrating the 
perspectives of selfhood in an embodied social environment and this in activity 
that can be supported or frustrated.  
 
In doing so, I explained the relationship between agency, identity and 
autonomy and further developed the “full-blooded” account of selfhood in terms of 
narrative autonomous agency that I have been developing throughout this thesis. 
The relational autonomy approach, by including the developmental, embodied and 
social setting, distinguishes between identity, agency and autonomy - autonomous 
agency cannot be simply the realisation of one’s authentic desires or control over 
one’s desires/will. Our identity and its constitution, rests on the development of 
skills in negotiation with others.  
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There may, however, be a number of approaches within this theoretical space 
that can illuminate questions concerning how to understand the impacts of neural 
implants on personal identity, indeed I have drawn on Korsgaard, Schechtman, 
Baylis, Atkins, Mackenzie and others to show just this. Whilst I do not advocate a 
particular approach in this space; that is, put forward one theory, and only one, as 
providing a (definitive) answer to our questions, the (preliminary) approach I 
develop has the virtue that it argues for how we should understand the conceptual 
role of identity, autonomy and agency in structuring our moral psychology in 
order to be an answer to questions of self-change consequent upon neural 
implants. 
 
5.4.2 Theorising disability and directions in repair 
 
Now, with this full-blooded account of embodied relational narrative 
autonomy and agency in hand I turn to the concluding chapter which sets out the 
theoretical and practical implications of this account. That is, the focus on 
autonomy competences and an understanding of their role in facilitating narrative 
coherence in a relational context with others, sets the direction for a theoretical 
understanding of the subjective experience of the conditions which give rise to 
these treatments, as well as the social shaping of understandings of disability. The 
account also sets the direction for repair in terms of a focus on fostering autonomy 
competences and their role in narrative integration, as well as stressing the role of 
the care-giver, and others, in fostering normative competences, such as self-trust. 
 
I outline these theoretical resources by setting out a disability ethics, drawing 
on a phenomenological approach from Jackie Leech Scully and her use of the 
concept of “disabled habitus”. This approach sets out a way of understanding 
disability and the disabled experience not in merely negative terms; that is, as a 
lack. It can account for the ‘being’ of disabled in terms of way of being and 
(knowing), as well as recognising the embodied constraints of impairments. This 
approach cuts across the therapy/enhancement distinction both ontologically, as it 
does not rely on a normal type for comparison, and also normatively, by 
challenging the idea that disability is a condition that (automatically) needs 
‘fixing’. 
 
 I outline the practical resources by setting out a direction for repair. Narrative 
repair is a popular method in therapeutic approaches to understandings of self-
change. I address issues related to challenging identity-constraining narratives 
(such as those related to disability) in terms of counter-narratives, as well as, the 
resources for preserving continuity in the narrative thread (as we saw in the work 
of Schechtman, 4.2.a). 
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I conclude with the final point that the account I have developed has relevance 
not just for understanding self-change consequent upon neural implants, nor 
medical intervention, but for self-change consequent upon trauma, illness and the 
contingencies of life; that is, changes that result from incidents or experiences that 






  200 
6. Implications for Understanding 
Conditions & their Treatments 
Responding to threats from neural implants  
 
 
Theorising disability is difficult, in part, because the concept is used to include 
a diverse number of impairments, including sensory and cognitive conditions, 
chronic illness and disease. These impairments can arise from varying causes. 
They may be congenital or they may be acquired as the result of an accident or 
trauma, and others may be the result of human ageing. These conditions present 
differently also; some may be intermittent, some always present, others worsen 
over time. As Scully writes: 
[D]isablity is an organizing idea that has to hold together a daunting variety of 
body states, some universally agreed to be disabling, and others whose status is 
more contested: sensory impairments, mobility restrictions, missing or lost limbs, 
skeletal dysplasias (including restricted growth), morphological anomalies 
ranging from conjoined twins to extra toes, genetic syndromes with complex 
phenotypes, cognitive impairments and learning difficulties, mental illnesses, 
disablement due to chronic illness such as HIV/AIDS or metabolic dysfunction, 
and neurological disorders. The concept of disability also has to cover 
impairments with different origins: an arm can be missing because someone was 
born without it, lost it in an accident, or had it amputated to prevent the spread of 
cancer. It must also include impairments, like spinal cord lesion, that are present 
all the time; those that are intermittent, such as multiple sclerosis; and others that 
get progressively worse, like osteoarthirtis. And it has to account for the fact that 
there are people with the same bodily variation who disagree on whether they are 
disabled at all.522 
 
As Scully suggests at the end of this quote, there is also disagreement about 
whether, which and how impairments are disabling. Is it our bodily condition that 
is disabling, or our social responses to these bodily conditions, or some interaction 
of both? It is not just that disability is used to cover a diverse variety of conditions 
and impairments, but that the discourse of disability is ‘inevitably’ normalising and 
normative. ‘Disabled’ is conceived and described in contrast to ‘abled’ and this 
theorisation is itself contestable. As Scully notes, the language for theorising 
disability is inadequate, with ‘disabled’ framed as the negative contrasting term for 
‘abled’. Many ‘disabled’ people do not view themselves as ‘disabled’ even though 
they may be described as such, for example, someone with one leg who moves 
ably through space, or someone who is Deaf who ably communicates in sign with 
                                            
522 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 21. Wasserman et al also note 
problems with theorising disability as a common concept given the heterogeneity of impairment. 
See David Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). 
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others.523 As Scully notes this is further complicated by individual variance. People 
with the same ‘disability’ will disagree as to whether they are disabled. These 
issues are further complicated by perceived connections between capacities and a 
person’s autonomy, whereby people are taken to have less autonomy because they 
have reduced capacities, for example degrees of hearing impairment.524  
 
Philosophical theories have historically not directly attended to disabled 
experience and have tended to theorise disability in terms of defectiveness, as 
something to be transcended or overcome. As Silvers writes:  
The general culture usually associates disability with defectiveness, insufficiency, 
and imperfection, in other words, with states that philosophy throughout its 
history has mainly aimed to transcend or overcome. Traditionally, philosophers 
rarely mentioned the kinds of impairments that are identified with disabling 
conditions. And when they did mention disability, their purpose almost always 
has been to invoke a limiting case …, for example, babies so deformed as to vitiate 
the value of human life …, or adults too dependent and noncontributing to be 
parties to the social contract.525 
As Silvers notes philosophical approaches have tended to abstract the concept 
of disability. Scully notes a similar concern, that diverse impairments are treated 
as a common condition, when the lived experience of these conditions is so very 
different. As Scully writes: 
All this heterogeneity makes problematic the philosophical habit of invoking an 
abstract “disability” without saying exactly what kinds of body are involved. 
Indisputably, the lives of a paraplegic wheelchair user, a signing Deaf person, an 
adult with Down syndrome, or an infant with the metabolic disorder Gaucher 
syndrome are significantly different due to the specific nature of their 
impairment.526 
Silvers argues that disabled experience and disability resist abstraction. She 
demonstrates this by pointing to the limitations of traditional philosophical 
approaches in dealing with disabled bodies. According to Silvers these limitations 
illuminate their failure to adequately respond to disability. Silvers writes:  
Examples of the resistance of disability to being subsumed under philosophical 
theories turn up throughout the discipline's history, from Plato's uncharacteristic 
emphasis on fleshly ideals in settling the fate of infants with deformities … to 
Hume's setting aside the testimony of individuals with illnesses as pertinent to 
theories of perception …. to Rawls's declaration that justice for disability is a 
                                            
523 I capitalise ‘Deaf’ in these contexts to distinguish being ‘Deaf’ as a culture and way of life 
with which one identifies, from the use of ‘deaf’ to describe a person with a hearing impairment, 
which refers to a medical understanding of the condition. I discuss this issue in 6.2.a. 
524 And, Scully notes, we have ‘relatively little empirical or phenomenological knowledge of the 
experience of disability’. Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 21. 
525 Anita Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2012), 1. 
526 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 21. Scully makes the further point 
that such abstraction has relevance for judgements in bioethics. ‘At least some of these judgements 
will be relevant to the judgements that bioethics wants to make about their quality of life—whether 
other embodiments would be preferable, whether termination of a fetus with the condition is 
ethically justifiable, and so on’. Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 21. 
  202 
detour that cannot be addressed when basic principles of justice are formulated 
and therefore must wait for the later, legislative stage.527 
 
This critique of philosophical approaches to disability resonates with feminist 
critiques of philosophical approaches which conceptualise autonomy in terms of 
an abstract individual, as noted in the previous chapter. The critiques are 
structurally similar - they argue that the abstract claim is both descriptively false 
and conceptually unjustifiable. The feminist move to theorising bodily difference 
provides resources for theorising bodily variation.528  
 
In this chapter I demonstrate that the approach I have developed has 
resources for understanding disability which mirror the account I gave for 
understanding self-change consequent upon neural implants. It provides a positive 
approach to understanding disability that focuses attention on how impairments 
may hinder, as well as foster, autonomy competences and impact on narrative 
integration and agency. The approach I have developed addresses problems with 
the understanding of impairment and limitation which underlie the medical and 
social models of disability. By accounting for the role of bodily and social 
conditions in subjective experience, it can account for the body in disabled 
experience, as well as the social shaping of understandings of disability, and so 
offers a more adequate account of disability. Further, the approach has resources 
for understanding repair and the role of neural implants in repair. Neural implants 
are understood as one element of repair, amongst a suite of options. The approach 
I have developed addresses problems with understandings of repair offered by the 
medical model - as correction of biological impairment - and the social model - as 
the removal of barriers to participation. By focussing on integration, and the wider 
context of repair, it can account for individual responses which may involve 
intervention.  
 
6.1 Understanding Disability – theorising anomalous 
embodiment 
 
In this section I develop a model of disability in terms of the relational 
embodied narrative approach to autonomy and agency I have developed in 
previous chapters and draw out the implications for understandings of disability 
                                            
527 Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability,” 2-3. 
528 Whilst disability critiques of mainstream philosophical approaches share much in common 
with feminist critiques, feminist theory has been subject to criticism by disability theorists. One 
significant criticism is that feminist theories fail to attend to anomalous bodily difference, instead 
taking abled bodies as the norm. A related criticism is that feminist theory has ignored and 
marginalised disabled experience, see: Shelley Tremain, “Introducing Feminist Philosophy of 
Disability,” Disability Studies Quarterly 33 (2013). Also, for a theorisation of embodiment, disability 
and oppression, see Susan Wendell, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability,” Hypatia 4 (1989). 
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for autonomy and agency. I draw on arguments made concerning the 
irreducibility of the first person perspective to questions about personal identity 
and that embodiment is constitutive of first-personal experience (as advanced in 
this thesis by Ricoeur, Mackenzie and Atkins) to both criticise the dominant 
models for understanding disability and set out an alternative approach to 
theorising disability.  This alternative approach recognises the constitutive role of 
embodiment in first-personal experience and the importance of an integrated 
bodily perspective for autonomous agency, and also takes into account how social 
understandings of disability shape individual subjectivity and understandings of 
the disabled.  
 
In the first section I contrast two dominant models of disability - the medical 
and social models - and argue that both fail to account for the subjective 
experience of embodied disability. In the second section I draw and expand on the 
phenomenological approach to embodiment, using the concept of the “lived body” 
to demonstrate the importance of integrated bodily experience to agency. In the 
third, drawing on Scully’s account of a “disabled habitus”. I develop a deeper 
understanding of disability through an understanding of anomalous embodiment. 
This shows how the approach I have developed can account for both the 
embodied and social aspects of disability. In the last section, I sketch out 
implications for autonomy, agency and disability, drawing on the embodied 
relational narrative approach to autonomy and agency I have developed in this 
thesis.  
6.1.a Models of disability - Medical and Social 
 
There are two dominant yet opposed models for understanding the relation 
between impairment and limitation: the medical model of disability which 
understands disability as arising from biological impairments, and the social model 
of disability, which understands disability predominantly in terms of its social and 
environmental causes. The former takes its origin from the biomedical sciences 
and the latter from social and disability rights movements.  The medical model 
understands disability as arising from biological impairment and emphasises 
‘normal’ human functioning. The social model understands disability as arising 
from social and environmental barriers to participation and emphasises how these 
barriers limit individuals. Whilst both models aim to capture what’s involved in 
impairment and disability, both fail. Put in crudest form, the medical model fails to 
account for the social aspects of disability – those aspects of the social and built 
environment which limit social activity, such as stairs and the width of doorways 
for those with mobility issues. The social model, however, by focussing on the 
social factors of disability, fails to account for the very real, often debilitating 
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impacts of impairment. Neither can adequately account for the subjectivity of 
disabled embodiment.529  
 
On the medical model, disability is understood as an impairment (physical or 
mental) including its attendant consequences for the individual.530 On this model 
the limitations faced by people with disabilities arise primarily from their 
impairment. As such, disability is perceived to be an individual problem, as a lack 
or deficit in the person. This lack or deficit is further understood as a deviation 
from normal functioning. Scully writes: 
Broadly, the key feature of a medicalized view is that disability is a nominative 
pathology: a defect or deficit located in an individual. What counts as defect or 
deficit is determined by reference to a norm of physical or mental structure and 
function. The parameters of the norm are given by biomedical science, which 
since the eighteenth century has increasingly been concerned with quantifying 
deviation. So from a medicalized perspective, disability is an abnormality of form 
or function, the cause of which lies in the biology of the individual.531 
The aim of the medical model is to correct or fix the deficit, to restore normal 
functioning and normality. The medical model of disability conceptualises the 
body as a machine532 that needs to be fixed, because it is not operating normally. 
As Scully notes, whilst the medical model often gives a role to non-medical factors 
in contributing to causing disability, it generally does not implicate the 
environment or social-world in the constitution of disability.533 Wasserman et al 
note that the medical model of disability is adopted uncritically in bioethics and 
philosophy. They write:  
The medical model is rarely defended but often adopted unreflectively by health 
care professionals, bioethicists, and philosophers who ignore or underestimate the 
contribution of social and other environmental factors to the limitations faced by 
people with disabilities.534 
 
                                            
529 I recognise this is a ‘crude’ formulation which characterises and opposes ‘strong’ 
formulations of the medical and social models of disability. However, I think the characterisation is 
appropriate as it draws out the point that neither model accounts for the constitutive role of 
disability in shaping the first-personal perspective as well as social understandings of disability, nor 
their interaction. 
530 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” 4. 
531 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 23. Scully cites an example of this 
model at work in theoretical accounts of genetics and understandings of disability, in the 
‘reductionist and determinist paradigm of gene action’. See Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, 
Moral Difference, 24. 
532 For a discussion of the body as machine in medical sciences, see S. Kay Toombs, 
“Introduction: Phenomenology and Medicine,” in Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, ed. S. 
Kay Toombs (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 5; Drew Leder, “Medicine and 
Paradigms of Embodiment,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1984). 
533 Scully notes that whilst the medical model has been modified in the light of criticisms from 
the strong social model of disability, and so includes recognition of disability caused by the 
environment, this is not seen as ‘actively generating disability’. Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral 
Bodies, Moral Difference, 27. 
534 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” 4. Scully also notes that 
the medical model has been the dominant view in medicine and bioethics, see Scully, Disability 
Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 23. 
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As Scully’s and Wasserman’s comments suggest, the medical model of 
disability has been criticised for failing to account for the role of social and 
environmental factors in creating disability. In contrast to the medical model, 
others have advocated a ‘social model of disability’ which locates the source of 
disability in environmental and social factors, including the built environment and 
people’s attitudes towards people with impairments. The social model of disability 
argues that it is environmental and social barriers that cause disability, not 
physical impairments, and taken to its extension, if these barriers were removed, 
so would all the social limitations that cause disability. Proponents of the social 
model of disability argue that rather than expecting people with impairments to fix 
themselves (or be fixed) in order to fit in, the environment surrounding those with 
impairments should be changed (ramps, doors widened, access to braille or sign 
language), and that social attitudes towards people with impairments should be 
changed also. Early versions of the social model are drawn from the UPIAS 
(Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation) 1976 definition of 
disability which explicitly separates impairment - understood as the individual 
biological manifestation or condition - from disability - understood as the 
disadvantage caused by social and environmental features, and so separates 
disability from the body.535 
 
One can distinguish several variants of the social model. Scully notes there are 
number of alternatives to the medical model which are grouped under the label of 
“social models of disability”. Scully identifies the prominent model as “the strong 
social model” which tends to locate all disability in social and environmental 
factors, and “social-relational” approaches which ‘suggest that disability is a 
product of the interaction, at personal and structural levels, between physical or 
mental anomaly and the social world in which someone lives’.536 Wasserman et al 
distinguish between various social models of disability also: they distinguish 
between a “human variation model” and a “social minority model”.537 Scully 
describes the social minority model as a social-relational approach.    
 
Whilst the social model of disability is proposed in response to problems with 
the medical model, various critiques have been raised which question the ability of 
this model to adequately theorise disability.  Silvers raises the concern that the 
social model of disability is unable to account for cases where changing the body 
might be the chosen response of an individual. Referring to body dysmorphia, 
Silvers writes, ‘the experiences of transgendered people suggest that there are 
circumstances in which altering one’s body to better execute preferred social roles 
                                            
535 UPIAS, Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation, 1976). The social model of disability has explicitly become part of disability 
policy in many countries. 
536 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 25. 
537 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience.” 
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can be an affirming, rather than a degrading, choice’.538 Wasserman et al make a 
similar point when they argue that sometimes medical responses to correcting 
impairments might be appropriate. Wasserman et al write:  
 But claims about the causes of disadvantage do not always yield straightforward 
prescriptions for their remediation … . In some cases, medical or surgical 
“correction” may be the most effective way to escape discrimination; if correction 
is not appropriate, that is because it reinforces discriminatory attitudes and 
practices. The proper response to the disadvantages associated with disability 
depends not only on causal attributions but moral judgments about responsibility, 
respect, justice. The debates over cleft lip surgery and breast reconstruction after 
mastectomy are not only about the comparative importance of biological and 
social factors in making the treated conditions disadvantageous. They also 
concern whether those interventions are justifiable uses of scarce medical 
resources, and whether they are complicit with suspect norms …, as in the case of 
skin-lighteners for people of color.539 
However, as this quote from Wasserman et al suggests, articulating when and 
under which circumstances ‘correction’ may be appropriate is not straightforward. 
We need an approach to understanding disability that can advise or adjudicate in 
these cases. 
 
A further concern is that strong versions of the social model appear to deny 
any (causal) role to impairment in disability - that is, the model denies or 
understates the role of impairment itself as a source of disadvantage.540 If disability 
is conceived as entirely socially generated, we tend to lose sight of the body as a 
source of suffering, and as a source of social evaluations. The social disability 
model of disability is in real danger of discounting the pain and suffering that 
often accompanies impairment, as well as the impacts of some conditions on one’s 
self-understanding and abilities for self-direction. But also, the social model 
discounts the role that understandings of disabled bodies have in societies, that is 
the normative status of impaired or variant bodies.  
 
A common criticism levelled at the medical and social models of disability is 
that both rely on a problematic dichotomy between biological impairments and 
social disability; that is, a ‘binary split’ between impairment (as bodily) and 
disability (as social).541 Shelley Tremain argues that impairment is no less a social 
construction than disability. Tremain writes that impairments ‘must no longer be 
theorized as essential biological characteristics (attributes) of a “real” body on 
                                            
538 Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability,” 14. Nelson makes a similar point in her use 
of the example of transsexuals and sex reassignment surgery, see Nelson, Damaged Identities, 
Narrative Repair. I discus this example in the following section on repair (6.2). 
539 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” 8. 
540 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” 5. 
541 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 28. Both Scully and Silvers note that 
this criticism parallels the separation of sex and gender in feminist theory, and the conceptual claim 
that we can distinguish sex from gender on the ground that gender is socially constructed whereas 
sex is biological. See Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability.” 
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which recognizably disabling conditions are imposed’.542 Rather, being classified 
as impaired is an integral part of the social process of disablement.543 Silvers and 
Scully both raise the concern that models of disability dichotomise the natural and 
social dimensions of embodiment.544    
 
 These criticisms recall the problematic distinction between body and mind 
that has been the subject of critique in this thesis.  This was evident in the views of 
Ricoeur, Mackenzie and Atkins to the effect that reductionism erases 
embodiment. These critiques argued that psychological and bodily continuity 
approaches to personal identity rely on a dichotomy between body and mind that 
treats the body in third-personal terms, and as passive with respect to the 
constitution of, and so to questions of, personal identity.545  
 
Given problems with the social model of disability, Shakespeare and Watson 
argue that it is time to move beyond the social model of disability, to a social 
model which adopts an ‘embodied ontology’.546 Scully too criticises the social 
model and argues for a phenomenological approach to theorising embodiment in 
order to adequately theorise disability.547 
 
In this section I have argued that neither of the two dominant models of 
disability adequately account for the role of impairment and limitation. The 
medical model fails because it focusses on physical impairment as giving rise to 
disability and therefore cannot account for the social factors which contribute to 
disability, nor recognise the ‘normative’ underpinnings of the medical conception 
of disability. The social model fails because it focusses on the social and 
environmental factors which cause disability and therefore fails to account for the 
                                            
542 Shelley Tremain, “On the Government of Disability,” Social Theory and Practice 27 (2001), 
632; Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience.” 
543 Scully makes a similar claim that strong social models fail to take into account ‘the 
subjective experience of the impaired body, or its psychoemotional aspects, or the processes 
through which disability is constructed by cultural representations and language’. Scully, Disability 
Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 27. 
544 Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability.” 
545 Whilst it may look like biological continuity approaches take the body into consideration to 
answer questions of reidentification, this is not a first-personal understanding of the body as it 
contributes to subjectivity and personal identity, but rather the body as third personal object for 
the purposes of reidentification. 
546 Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson, “The Social Model of Disability: an Outdated 
Ideology?,” in Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go, 
ed. Sharon N Barnett and Barbara M Altman (Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2001), 9. 
Shakespeare and Watson argue that we’re all vulnerable, it’s not ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Whilst I think 
recognising shared vulnerability is correct, without a theoretical shift to phenomenology to explain 
how these differences or vulnerabilities impact on individuals, Shakespeare and Watson’s account 
runs the risk of ‘minimising’ the experience of the impacts of impairment. So, their account is still 
within a social model of disability, even though, as they argue, they are trying to move away from 
this model. 
547 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference. 
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role of bodily impairment in causing limitations, and nor for the role of the social 
valuing of bodies.  
 
I have located a common source of difficulty in these models - that both 
conceptualise the distinction between impairment and disability in terms of a 
distinction between mind and body, which casts the body as third-personal with 
respect to the constitution of first-personal perspective and subjectivity. The 
medical model reduces people to their bodies and the social model fails to account 
for the effects of the body altogether. In order to account for disability more 
adequately (and to address the associated question of when it might be 
appropriate to use medical intervention to address impairments) we need an 
approach that can account for the role of embodiment in constituting our first-
personal perspective, as well as the social shaping of our understandings of 
disability. A different understanding of embodiment needs to inform our 
understanding of impairment, one which can account for both the social and 
bodily aspects of impairment. In the next subsection I sketch out how the account 
I have developed provides these resources and so can better account for both the 
embodied and social aspects of identity and disability.  An adequate account will 
acknowledge that disability is variously experienced even within the same society, 
that different disabilities have different impacts on a person’s opportunity to 
pursue a life that they find valuable in the society in which they live and that 
different individuals with the same impairments have different understandings and 
experiences of their condition. 
6.1.b The lived body  
 
In this thesis I have argued for starting with embodied (and relational) aspects 
of practical identity. I have drawn on phenomenological accounts of relational 
embodiment in the work of Paul Ricoeur, Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Atkins. 
Each argues for the necessary role of embodiment in constituting first-personal 
continuity, as well as the role of others in the constitution of our first-personal 
perspective. Below I draw out facets of these accounts of embodiment which 
illuminate the relationship between bodies, impairment, disability and the role of 
others. I argue for the importance of recognising the constitutive role of 
embodiment in subjectivity and agency, the importance of an integrated bodily 
perspective for agency, and explain how the impacts of illness can be understood 
as ‘foregrounding the body’ and challenging this ‘integrated bodily perspective’  
 
In contrast to philosophers who adopt a third-personal or impersonal 
understandings of the body and who dismiss the body as important to questions of 
(change in) personal identity, phenomenological philosophers, like Merleau-
Ponty, recognise the dynamic role of the body in structuring perception and 
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subjectivity and the ineliminable role of the body in the constitution of human 
subjectivity. Phenomenology’s starting point is the thinking embodied subject in 
the social world.548   
 
Merleau-Ponty, in the Phenomenology of Perception, introduces the concept of the 
“lived body”. Merleau-Ponty makes the point that I do not (primarily) experience 
my body as an object among other objects in the world. Rather I experience my 
body as for me, as subject  – ‘my body as I live it represents my particular point of 
view on the world’.549 This understanding motivates a first person-perspective of 
my body, my body as I experience, or as I live it. This is in contrast with a third-
person perspective towards my body, as an object amongst others. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, we take different perspectives toward our embodied experience - 
we view our experience from the first personal perspective and from the third 
personal perspective. Seeing myself as both an object and an experiencer 
necessities a point of view on the world. Thus, our embodiment is not just a vessel 
through which we interact with the world; rather it is through our bodies that we 
experience the world and interact with others.550 This understanding motivates as 
sense of relationship to my body, not in the sense of ownership - that I posses my 
body, like I own a car or some other thing - but in a sense belonging, that I live in 
it551; one’s being in the world is as embodied.  
 
On the phenomenological account the lived body is my point of view on the 
world, my scheme of orientation and the locus of my intentions. The lived body 
enables my scheme of orientation in the world – things appear relative to where I 
am. As Kay Toombs writes in the context of theorising the lived experience of 
disability: 
Physical space is thus for my body oriented space. Points in space do not 
represent merely objective positions but rather they mark the varying range of my 
aims and gestures. For example, the narrow passageway through which I must 
pass represents a “restrictive potentiality” for my body, requiring a modification 
of my actions.552  
‘As orientational locus in the world, my body both orients me to the world 
around by means of my senses and positions the world in accord with my bodily 
                                            
548 The relationally situated phenomenology I outline here should be contrasted with an 
understanding of phenomenology as getting to direct experience that either reveals (or does not) 
reveal selfhood, such as the approach that Strawson adopts as discussed 3.2.a. 
549 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1962), 70. 
550 Recall Atkins’ argument that we learn develop and learn through the bodies of others 
(2.3.b) and Baier’s argument that we are second persons (5.2.a). 
551 This point was made by Mackenzie who distinguishes two relations we have to our bodies – 
relations of ownership and of belonging (5.2.a). 
552 S. Kay Toombs, “Reflections on Bodily Change: the Lived Experience of Disability,” in 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, ed. S. Kay Toombs (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), 248. Note as Toombs is describing being in a wheelchair in this paper, her use 
of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of narrow passageways has special resonance; Toombs cannot just 
turn sideways in order to make her way through. See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
143. 
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placement and actions’.553 Furthermore the lived body is the locus of my intentions 
– I engage with the world relative to my projects. The keyboard is for writing, the 
desk for sitting. ‘The surrounding world is always grasped in terms of a concrete 
situation’.554 Thus physical space is oriented space and functional space and 
agency is purposeful - embodiment structures perception and consciousness; 
agents are constituted by their bodies. 
 
Shaun Gallagher, drawing on phenomenology, as well as recent studies in 
neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology, explains the ways that the body 
shapes the mind (how embodiment structures consciousness).555 Gallagher 
develops Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of “body schema” and “body image”556 arguing 
that they play an essential role in understanding self-consciousness and personal 
identity.557 Gallagher describes the concept of “body image” as way of thinking 
about (or representing) the body to oneself. In contrast, the concept of “body 
schema” is one’s awareness of one’s body, of where one is in space. Body schema 
is linked to proprioception, the system by which the brain knows where the parts 
of the body are. Body schema functions as a background condition of movement. 
Gallagher writes: 
 A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining 
to one’s own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor 
capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual 
monitoring. This conceptual distinction between body image and body schema is 
related respectively to the difference between having a perception of (or belief 
about) something and having a capacity to move (or an ability to do something). 
A body image involves more than occurrent perceptions, however. It can include 
mental representations, beliefs and attitudes where the object of such intentional 
states (that object or matter of fact towards which they are directed, or that which 
they are about) is or concerns one’s own body. The body schema, in contrast, 
involves certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and 
constrain movement and the maintenance of posture. It continues to operate, and 
in many cases operates best, when the intentional object of perception is 
something other than one’s own body. So the difference between body image and 
body schema is like the difference between a perception (or conscious monitoring) 
of movement and the actual accomplishment of movement, respectively.558 
 
                                            
553 Toombs, “Reflections on Bodily Change: the Lived Experience of Disability,” 248. 
554 Toombs, “Reflections on Bodily Change: the Lived Experience of Disability,” 248. 
555 On Gallagher’s account embodiment physically structures the brain’s neural pathways.  
556 Gallagher notes that whilst Merleau-Ponty carefully distinguishes between the terms, 
translators of Merleau-Ponty, and authors that followed, often used the terms interchangeably. 
Gallagher further notes that the concepts have been used across a numerous disciplines and their 
use has been ambiguous. See Shaun Gallagher, “Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and 
Body Schema in Medical Contexts,” Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 148; Shaun Gallagher, 
How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 19-24. 
557 Gallagher also argues that these two concepts, mapping as they do onto the first-personal 
and third-personal perspectives, can negotiate the impasse caused by mind-body dualism. For 
further discussion of this claim, see Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind. 
558 Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 24; Gallagher, “Dimensions of Embodiment: Body 
Image and Body Schema in Medical Contexts,” 149-50. 
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Gallagher argues that various elements of the body-schema system are 
responsible for important aspects of self-reference and sense of personal identity, 
specifically involving a basic phenomenological differentiation between self and 
non-self, and the senses of agency and ownership’.559 Gallagher also argues that 
the concepts of body image and body schema can be ‘usefully employed in 
systematic explanations of certain pathological conditions (including aplasic 
phantoms and schizophrenia, as well as other conditions)’.560  The concepts have 
also been applied to explain the disruption of body image and can be used to 
explain gender dysmorphia and anorexia - this is when my body image doesn’t 
match given reality.561 
 
Drawing on Ricoeur’s understanding of the body as constitutive of selfhood, 
Mackenzie develops the concept of a “bodily perspective” and the importance of 
an integrated bodily perspective for agency. For Mackenzie a person’s bodily 
perspective includes the biological, social and individual dimensions of 
embodiment: ‘[o]ur bodily perspective incorporates both certain facts about our 
embodiment and the social and individual significance of our bodies for us’.562 For 
Mackenzie our bodily perspective is the meaning of one’s body to oneself and this 
meaning will change over time in response to changes in our own body, situation 
and relationships with others.563  
 
Mackenzie argues that this bodily perspective, that is a narrative of one’s 
embodied subjectivity, forms the background against which our characteristics are 
intelligible to ourselves, and to others,564 but that in times of impairment and 
illness our bodily perspective is foregrounded.  
The intimate connection between our bodies and our selfhood is usually 
immanent in our self-conceptions and in our interaction with others and the 
world. However, events that disrupt our everyday taken-for-granted bodily 
existence often make this connection very salient to us. Such events include 
illness, injury and trauma. They also include bodily changes, gradual or radical, 
and voluntary or involuntary. When these are sufficiently severe or disruptive 
they can induce a sense of loss of self that can have profound effects on an agent’s 
emotional responses, intimate relationships, and sense of the future.565 
 
Recall, Atkins argues that the success of secondary reflection in securing 
continuity in identity and integration turns on establishing continuity in one’s 
                                            
559 Gallagher, “Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in Medical 
Contexts.”; Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind. 
560 Gallagher, “Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in Medical 
Contexts.” 
561 Atkins demonstrates the conceptual resources afforded by these concepts in her analysis of 
gender dysmorphia, see Atkins, “Re Alex Narrative Identity and the Case of Gender Dysphoria.” 
562 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 425. 
563 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 426. 
564 Mackenzie, “Personal Identity, Narrative Integration, and Embodiment,” 102-03. 
565 Mackenzie, “On Bodily Autonomy,” 421. 
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first-personal perspective, a process that Atkins describes as ‘self-constancy’ 
(3.3.a). Atkins also argues that an integrated kind of bodily continuity can be 
threatened or lost, by trauma or accident. It is because we have an integrated 
perspective, itself a (developmental) achievement, that it be threatened; illness and 
disability foreground the body. On Atkins’ account this can be explained as an 
interruption to reflection which I cannot dismiss, as I would in primary reflection. 
Illness and disability may constantly interrupt my reflection, as in secondary 
reflection, (whether this be the impact on my body, self-understanding, from 
others or from myself), encouraging one to engage in secondary reflection, on who 
we are, and attempting to secure who we are.  
6.1.c Anomolous embodiment 
 
Kay Toombs describes how motor disorders resulting in loss of mobility 
engender a profound disruption of the “lived body”, by transforming the 
experience of the body in its orientational and intentional locus. Toombs describes 
how for someone like her, with multiple sclerosis, space becomes something that 
needs to be planned and negotiated and how she experiences her body in terms of 
its restrictions and limits. Toombs writes:  
[P]henomenology provides a powerful means to illuminate the experience of loss 
of mobility – a bodily dysfunction that is common in neurological and other 
degenerative diseases. In particular, in rendering explicit the dynamic relation 
between body and world, the phenomenological notion of lived body provides 
important insights into the disruption of space and time that are an integral 
element of physical disability. Furthermore, a phenomenological account of bodily 
disorder discloses the emotional dimension of physical dysfunction. In providing a 
window into lived experience, phenomenology gives invaluable information about 
the everyday world of those who live with disabilities.566 
  
These first-personal subjective accounts of living with illness and disability are 
at odds with the third personal mechanistic descriptions of disease and deviance 
prevalent in medicine and medical studies.567 Biomedical models of disease use a 
mechanistic description - for example such models describe motor neurone 
diseases in terms of central nervous dysfunction, brain lesions etc. However, as 
Toombs points out, this type of description captures little, if anything, of the 
actual experience of bodily disorder. In writing of her experiences as a person 
living with multiple sclerosis, Toombs’ writes: 
I do not experience the lesion(s) in my brain. Indeed, I do not even experience my 
disorder as a matter of abnormal reflexes. Rather, my illness is the impossibility of 
                                            
566 Toombs, “Reflections on Bodily Change: the Lived Experience of Disability,” 47-48. 
Toombs, like Scully, argues that inclusion of phenomenological accounts of disability is important 
in the clinical and bioethical setting. 
567 Silvers notes parallels in the way that medicine has treated women’s bodies with medicine’s 
approach to disabled bodies, see Silvers, “Feminist Perspectives on Disability,” 12. 
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taking a walk around the block, of climbing the stairs to reach the second floor in 
my house, or of carrying a cup of coffee from the kitchen to the den.568 
  
Nancy Mairs describes living with multiple sclerosis and the way her body 
intrudes into her daily life with a heaviness all of its own: 
haunted by … a mean spirited ghost … which trips you when you are watching 
where you are going, knocks glassware out of your hand, squeezes the urine out 
of your body before you reach the bathroom and weighs your body with a 
weariness no amount of rest can relieve … my body … is a crippled body … 
doubly other … by the standards of physical desirability erected for everybody in 
our world.569  
 
Whilst Toombs and Mairs describe bodily interruptions caused by their 
condition, they also describe becoming used to their changed embodiment. Both 
Toombs and Mairs say it is difficult to recognise the (walking) person of the past, 
in photographs, or in memory. This is reported to be often the case for people who 
have lived with an impairment or disability most of their lives.570 Phenomenology 
is useful not just for explaining the foregrounding of the body when a person 
experiences illness, trauma or impairment and consequent challenges to an 
integrated bodily perspective and agency, it is also useful for explaining continued, 
habituated ways of being in the world. The approach offers a way of thinking 
about impairment and disability as it is lived. However the phenomenological 
approach needs to be modified to include the experience of people with anomalous 
or impaired bodies. Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema has been 
criticised for not adequately taking into account differences in bodies and bodily 
abilities and their impact on how we experience the world.571 Merleau-Ponty’s 
account needs to be modified to include variant bodies. 
 
Scully draws on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “lived body” and Bourdieu’s 
concept of “habitus” to argue for an understanding of disability as a way of being 
in the world and as constitutive of identity. On Scully’s account, disability is 
constitutive of embodied subjectivity.   
                                            
568 Toombs, “Reflections on Bodily Change: the Lived Experience of Disability,” 247. 
569 Nancy Mairs, “Carnal Acts,” in Writing on the Body, ed. K Conboy, N Medina, and S 
Stanbury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Kathleen Lennon, “Feminist 
Perspectives on the Body,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014). Here 
Mairs also draws attention to social understandings of disability. I take this point up in the 
following section. 
570 ‘Individuals who ‘acquire’ disability later in life are likely to have stronger motivation to 
restore their ability. However, for many disabled individuals, if they were born with a disability or 
developed it at a young age, living with their current abilities is their normality.’ Academy of 
Medical Sciences, Human Enhancement and the Future of Work. Joint Report of the Academy of Medical 
Sciences, the British Academy, the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society. (2012), 46. 
571 Whilst Merleau-Ponty spent much time researching people with illnesses and disabilities, 
both he and Bourdieu are criticised for not theorising different types of bodies and for assuming 
the abled body as standard. For this criticism, see Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral 
Difference, 67 and 83ff. 
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Bourdieu is trying to articulate a way in which a physical body interacts with a 
social world to generate meaning. The individuality of this production derives, in 
part, from the specifics of the body: what the constraints of biology and physics 
allow the body to do, and the possibilities that are open to that kind of body in that 
social organization. Looking at it in this way means we need not agonize over 
whether disability is “really” a consequence of an impaired phenotype, or 
alternatively the result of a society’s oppression. Disability becomes a way of 
being that arises only because of the existence of both body and world.  
The question we can then ask is, what is the effect on habitus of the experience of 
being/having a body that is not the standard model?572 
 
Part of Scully’s project is to investigate whether there is a ‘disabled’ moral 
understanding that can contribute new insights to normative understanding. 
Scully uses feminist epistemology to motivate a ‘disability standpoint’. If there are 
different ways of knowing the world, then we can explore disability as a source of 
knowledge and as a source of values.  
 
This approach to disability as constitutive of embodied subjectivity moves us 
away from the assumption or idea that there is one standard model of embodiment 
by which all other shapes and forms are measured, and away from the idea of the 
body as a machine which has only one ‘proper’ use, to a conception of anomalous 
bodies. If one’s engagement in the world is understood through the way one 
moves through the world we can therefore understand disability differently, as 
there’s not just one way of being in the world. This approach which recognises 
anomalous embodied and thus includes the ‘non-standard’ yields a non 
dichotomous positive understanding of difference. This is an understanding that 
‘disabled’ bodies can never have on the definition of disability as contrast to abilty, 
wherein impairments are conceived as inadequacies or limitations. As Scully 
writes of her own hearing impairment: 
While only a slavish commitment to ideology would permit anyone to claim that 
bodily anomaly is never a source of difficulty and frustration, it is also true that the 
experience of embodied difference is not always straightforwardly bad. 
Corporeally anomalous people are of course different, because that’s what being 
anomalous means, but difference need not always be a problem. By definition my 
own hearing impairment affects my relationship to sound. It also affects how I 
deal with space, light, noisy neighbors, air travel, being underwater, playing the 
saxophone, and men whose faces are obscured by their beards. Being deaf has, at 
times, influenced my evaluation of family and community ties, the obligations of 
the state and its citizens, and the value of organic matter compared to artificial 
aids to hearing. I usually find these effects more interesting and complicated than 
the simple not-being-able-to-hear that the hearing world takes as the essential fact 
of deafness. None of them are just side effects of my hearing impairment. They 
are constitutive of my experience of deafness, and as constitutive of my identity as 
is being a woman or being of mixed race.573 
 
                                            
572 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 67. 
573 Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 16. 
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By starting with embodiment, my argument takes as significant that I live in a 
body, and although the meaning of that body is shaped by recognition that it is 
variant, for me, it is the only body through which I express my agency and 
autonomy.  
 
This approach illuminates the role of embodiment in constituting subjectivity. 
As such it can explain why changes in embodiment may result in changes in self-
understanding.  This approach to embodiment explains that illness and 
impairment can foreground the body and challenge our unified bodily perspective, 
and agency. An understanding of disability as constitutive of subjectivity can 
account for habituated ways of being in the world - on this understanding 
impairment is not something other, although it can be experienced as such. A 
person’s identification with their disability can be negative or positive. Some with 
a disability do not perceive themselves as deficient or lacking, but for others, and 
for some types of disabilities, perhaps those that arise from trauma or illness, 
where my identity may have developed and be framed independently of the 
current impairment, the impairment is experienced as other, or as disruption.  
6.1.d The embodied, relational approach to narrative agency and 
autonomy  
 
Scully’s focus on “habitus” provides the relational approach I have developed 
in this thesis with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of embodied 
experience and the impacts of impairments in and on lived experience. The 
embodied narrative relational approach I have developed to autonomy and agency 
emphasises the embodied and socially situated aspects of identity and draws our 
attention to the relational context. The approach refigures our understanding of 
self-change consequent upon impairment not in terms of threats, but relative to 
context. The push of the relational approach is to understand impairment relative 
to capacities (and social setting). Recognising the relational aspect shows that 
impairment is not a defective case – we are all embodied and socially situated.  
 
In the previous chapter I outlined critiques to approaches that characterise 
autonomy primarily in terms of independence. This characterisation has also been 
subject to critiques from disability theorists. Approaches that characterise 
autonomy in terms of independence represent disabled people in terms of 
dependence, and so by aligning independence with self-determination may 
represent disabled people as lacking autonomy.574 The relational approach I have 
developed however tells us to look to the context for support for capacities (such 
                                            
574 For discussion of this claim, see Carolyn Ells, “Lessons About Autonomy From the 
Experience of Disability,” Theory and Practice 27 (2001). 
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as, self-trust) and for avenues of narrative self-constitution and self-determination 
(open narratives).  
 
The relational approach to narrative agency and autonomy showed us that the 
salient issue with respect to self-change consequent upon neural implants was to 
autonomy competencies and their role in narrative integration and agency. By 
foregrounding our bodily perspective and threatening bodily integration (or 
unified bodily perspective) we see how illness might threaten bodily autonomy 
and frustrate autonomy competences. Conditions such as Parkinson’s disease 
frustrate the exercise of autonomy competences—self-realisation, self-direction 
and self-knowledge—through impacting on agency and threatening embodied 
narrative integration. We saw with Mike Robbins that the tremors in his arm 
prevented him from being able to carry out any sustained thinking or 
conversation. This lack of control made him unable to engage in the activities that 
he sees as indicative of the person he is, and which he values. Some impairments 
therefore might incapacitate greatly. Embodied habitus is more clearly interrupted 
by sudden illness, impairment or trauma that occurs later in life, and which 
characterises one’s embodied habitus as being split between the “before” and 
“after” habitus.575  
 
The understanding of disabled embodied habitus argues, which argues that 
impairment is a way of being, is in turn related to the development and ongoing 
exercise of competences. A varied habitus is a way of being with attendant 
autonomy competences, for example a deaf habitus and an attendant sense of 
belonging (with others) in this way of being. Responses to bodily difference 
(embodied social practices like use of sign language) can foster autonomy 
competences and help develop a sense of individual and collective identity.  
 
The relational approach also directs our attention to the social context of 
impairment and the role of others in the constitution of our identities (self-
determination is never solely about the individual).  Social understandings can 
impair by causing practical frustration and undermine normative competences. 
Social understandings can close down the range of narrative understandings 
(close down avenues for self-determination) and one’s ability to act according to 
the life they value. As noted in the previous chapter, this is what Baylis identified 
as the ‘real threat’ to identity – people’s attitudes toward disability and not the neural 
implant or treatment. The relational approach also draws attention to the role of 
the social in developing and fostering normative competences in facilitating 
narrative integration and unified practical agency.  
                                            
575 Scully notes that whilst disability is often thought of in terms of congenital disabilities, most 
people acquire impairments through the course of their lives, and as such have no prior experience 
of being ‘disabled’, see Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 13. 
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The relational understanding shows that impairments can frustrate autonomy 
competences by altering our embodied habitus and challenging social 
understandings.576 However, by drawing attention to the lived or altered habitus 
illuminates how people do exercise autonomy competences (relative to their 
embodied and social context). Autonomy competences can also be frustrated for 
those with impairments by negative social understandings of disability which can 
limit self-constituting narratives and frustrate self-determination, and further 
undermine narrative competence. However, we have also seen how social 
interactions can foster autonomy competences, in terms of fostering self-direction 
and providing social scaffolding to develop competences of self-trust. This 
approach gives a better understanding of disability than either the medical model 
or the social model by attending to how embodiment and social factors can both 
impair and foster. Thus, it more adequately addresses both the role of the body 
and others in the experience and construction of disability. This approach to 
impairment reveals more clearly the embodied and social constitutive conditions of 
subjectivity, not just the subjectivity of those with impairments.  
 
6.2 Repair and Neural Implants 
 
This relational understanding of the constitutive role of embodied disability 
will have implications for how we understand the nature of repair and the role of 
neural implants in repair.577 On the account I develop, repair is understood in 
terms of the wider context of supporting people with a focus on narrative-
integration and building autonomy competence with attention to the social and 
embodied factors constitutive of subjectivity and the first-personal perspective. 
This approach understands neural implants as one option amongst others for 
responding to impairments. It draws attention to the social aspects and may 
accord better understanding and respect for people’s lived understanding of 
                                            
576 Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie Leech Scully draw on Merleau-Ponty and later 
phenomenologists, as well as recent work in cognitive science, to argue for the importance of the 
role of embodiment in identity, see Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie Leach Scully, “Moral 
Imagination, Disability and Embodiment,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007). 
577 Scully argues that she is developing a “disability ethics” in contrast to an “ethics of 
disability”. An ethics of disability sets out ways that we should treat disabled people. In contrast a 
disability ethics develops an ethical account of bodily difference, see Scully, Disability Bioethics: 
Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 9. I take a similar approach to the question of neural implants in light 
of a “disability ethics”. In the following section, I offer a direction based on a relational 
understanding of narrative agency and autonomy which draws attention to autonomy competences 
and the role of the second person in social scaffolding. I am not setting out an account of when 
neural implants are appropriate or inappropriate as such. 
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themselves,578 as well as pointing to wider forms of repair, including recognition of 
the role of narrative and social scaffolding in this project.  
 
The approach I develop advocates making evaluations of directions for repair 
on a case-by-case basis and illuminates issues related to uptake of devices. This 
can be contrasted with the medical model of disability which understands repair in 
terms of fixing biological impairments and the social model which understands 
repair in terms of removing barriers to participation. These models take opposing 
views on the role of neural implants for repair, as for or against. The medical 
model should attend to repair beyond a focus simply on the neural implant and its 
impact on the condition. Social models should recognise that repair may include 
neural implants. The approach I develop recognises that neural implants can play 
a role on fostering autonomy competences and narrative integration and so assist 
people to live the lives that they value. It also recognises that social 
understandings of disability shape the understanding and availability of neural 
implants, and that as such the views of the people who are the potential recipients 
of these treatments should be included in the discussion with a focus on their 
experience of their lived condition. The relational account I develop also has 
implications for broader issues in bioethics, however I do not go into these here.579  
 
 
6.2.a Medical and Social Models: Repair and neural implants 
 
As noted in the first section of this chapter, the medical and social models of 
disability pose different ways of responding to people with disabilities. The 
medical model suggests correction of biological impairment and the social model 
advocates the removal of social and environmental barriers to social 
participation.580 I argue that neither is an adequate understanding of repair - the 
understanding of correcting biological impairments focuses repair narrowly to 
fixing the condition and relies on a theoretically unjustifiable conception of 
                                            
578 Scully argues that bioethics must include more empirical and phenomenological research 
involving impaired people and must include their perspective. A similar recommendation came out 
of the deliberative workshop on nano-bionic medical devices. See Goddard, Clinical Trials for Nano-
bionics: Testing Wearable and Implantable Medical Devices, 14. 
579 Jackie Leach Scully argues that disability is under-theorised in bioethics, which like 
medicine has adopted an approach to bodies which takes able bodies to be the norm. Mackenzie 
argues that bodies have been ignored from bioethics. I don’t address the broader implications of 
relational autonomy beyond the question of implants in this thesis. 
580 Again, I recognise that this a crude formulation of repair on both the medical and social 
models. However, the formulation draws attention to the fact that neither model considers 
adequately the way disability shapes subjectivity. Whilst the social model advocates changing ideas 
about the disabled and disabled lives, the model does not focus on how these ideas are shaped and 
contribute to the shaping of subjectivity and so fails to adequately account for the role of disability 
in identity. 
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normality and the social model also conceives of repair too narrowly and fails to 
allow avenues for the possibly of repair through bodily modification. These views 
frame repair in terms of neural implants or social restitution.    
 
Wasserman et al also argue that the medical model suggests correction of 
biological conditions as the appropriate response to disabilities.581 On the medical 
model, neural implants are viewed as ways to repair, correct or ameliorate 
biological impairments. The Cochlear treats hearing impairment and provides 
both adults and children with abilities to understand spoken language, 
communicate in this medium and so participate with others. DBS treats movement 
or affective disorders and allows people to participate in and continue to 
participate in daily activities, as can be clearly demonstrated in the video by Mike 
Robbins. In the same way, epilepsy prediction neural implants aim to provide 
patients with ways to anticipate the likelihood of a seizure.  
 
For most theorists, the ethical permissibility of the clinical use of neural 
implants is underpinned by a distinction between treatment and enhancement. 
Treatments restore capacities and enhancement takes people beyond the norm. 
Neural implants are permissible, and perhaps required, to restore people’s 
capacities. Neural implants for enhancement may be seen as morally permissible, 
or as many argue, impermissible.   
 
In contrast, on the social model of disability, it is the social practices 
surrounding disability and the factors in the built environment which limit 
possibilities for social activity and the removal of these barriers to participation are 
the focus for repair. The social model of disability directly questions the medical 
understanding of ‘fixing’. This is captured in the phrase: ‘Don’t fix us, fix 
yourselves’. The following quote from a Deaf individual sums up this idea: 
I’m happy with who I am […] and I don’t want to be ‘fixed.’ Would an Italian-
American rather be a WASP? In our society, everyone agrees that whites have an 
easier time than blacks. But do you think a black person would undergo 
operations to become white?582 
 
On the social model of disability the development and use of medical bionics 
may put pressure on disabled people to conform to society’s understanding of 
them, to ‘fix themselves’. This may further undermine the rights of people with 
impairments to have the environment or workplace changed to accommodate 
them, expecting people with impairments to change or modify themselves to fit 
                                            
581 Wasserman et al., “Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience,” 7-8. 
582 Neil Levy, “Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: the Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” Bioethics 
16 (2002), 137; Dolnick, Edward, “Deafness as Culture.” The Atlantic Monthly, 1993, 38. 
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with the environment or workplace.583 If we spend our resources and time in 
developing neural implants, there is little impetus to encourage people to change 
their practices towards people with disabilities.  
  
These concerns about the impacts of neural implants on people with 
disabilities are particularly evident in debates concerning the impacts of Cochlear 
ear implants on Deaf culture. These impacts are often conceived in terms of 
threats to Deaf culture and Deaf identity. When the Cochlear was first implanted 
in children in Australia, the doctors were confronted with concerns from people 
advocating for the right to be Deaf, and the Deaf Power movement. Graeme 
Clark, the developer of the Cochlear ear implant reflects on how surprised they 
were by the response from any parent that they wouldn’t want their child to hear. 
As Clark describes it, ‘[t]he signing deaf had developed a view that deafness was 
acceptable, and hearing by any means could be a threat’.584 Advocates of the Deaf 
culture movement, argue that one’s identity is not just an individual matter, but is 
cultural, and a way of life (that is, identity is relational). Signing is a language that 
creates a community and many deaf people argue that there is a felt belonging; a 
sense of community with other deaf people in this community and this is not an 
impoverished life (and one that could never be achieved with the use neural 
implants). In Chorost’s case is it deafness that impedes his autonomy or is it that 
spoken language is the primary mode by which we communicate? Does this focus 
on fixing the impairment occlude consideration of other possible courses of 
repair? 585 
 
                                            
583 A similar question can be asked about enhancement technologies and their impact on 
disabled people, as raised in the Human Enhancement and the Future of work report: ‘[T]he 
availability of these technologies [ETs] might risk undermining the rights of the disabled to have 
workplaces designed to accommodate them, and instead place on them the expectation to 
accommodate to the workplace by using enhancement technologies.’ Human Enhancement and the 
Future of Work. Joint Report of the Academy of Medical Sciences, the British Academy, the Royal Academy of 
Engineering and the Royal Society, 53. Not to mention that people with impairments might be used as 
the ‘test ground’ for medical neural implants. The development of prosthetic neural implants for 
persons in the military injured in the line of duty could be viewed as a similar instance of trying out 
developments in bionics on the injured and impaired for enhancement purposes in able bodied 
people in the future. 
584 Clark, Sounds From Silence: Graeme Clark and the Bionic Ear Story, 164. 
585 Whilst these issues may not seem as pertinent to recipients of other neural implants, such as 
DBS for Parkinson’s Disease - that is, it may appear that there is no comparable Parkinson’s 
culture - the point I am making is broad concerning social understandings of disability, and so 
applies to both recipients of Cochlear Implants and DBS, as well as the further application of DBS 
to a variety of psychiatric conditions. The focus of the critique made by the social model is that the 
focus on fixing the condition closes down other possibilities for amelioration of the condition. For 
example, looking for ways to restore the ability to walk after spinal damage when attention could 
be paid to facilitating competences that contribute to daily self-governance and self-esteem and 
trust. 
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Oliver Sacks argues that signing is its own rich language and provides 
scientific data showing enhanced spatial cognition in deaf signers.586 Sacks also 
cites evidence to show that depriving the deaf of Sign is effectively to prevent 
them from developing normal mental capacities.587 On a Deaf culture response, 
any disability experienced by the Deaf is social, and not biological, in origin - the 
decline in signing-only schools is viewed as an attack on Deaf culture.588 Rather 
than directing attention to fixing the deaf, attention and resources should be 
directed to fixing society - for example introducing Sign as a recognised 
language.589 Advocates argue that there should be respect for Deaf culture, and 
not the pressure to fix and adapt to fit in with others. 
 
On (a strong version of) the social model, Cochlear implants are not endorsed 
as an appropriate response to Deafness (which indeed may not be viewed as a 
disability for some) because the use of these neural implants may reinforce 
negative social stereotypes of people with disabilities, and their adoption by 
individuals may be viewed as inauthentic.  
Parents who choose to have their children implanted are in effect saying, ‘I don’t 
respect the Deaf community, and I certainly don’t want my child to be a part of it. 
I want him/her to be part of the hearing world not the Deaf world.590 
 
Levy identifies three arguments made by Deaf activists against the use of 
Cochlear implants: 1) the “disability argument” - ‘deafness is not a disability 
(anymore than is blackness). Since it is not a disability it is inappropriate to treat 
it by medical intervention’; 2) the “message argument” -‘that medical intervention 
to treat deafness is insulting or demeaning to the Deaf: it communicates to them 
that they are of lesser worth simply because they are Deaf’; and 3) the “culture 
                                            
586 Oliver Sacks, Seeing Voices (London: Picador, 2012). Sacks notes that this result is not just 
an enhancement due to poverty in another sense, like the blind who have enhanced hearing, but 
are higher order enhancements. Sacks argues that sign is an incredibly rich, perhaps richer 
language, than many verbal languages - with sign one has the ability to both temporally and 
spatially order language. 
587 Sacks, Seeing Voices, 27. 
588 Parents of children who are implanted with the Cochlear are urged by some practitioners to 
not teach their children sign language. It is argued that the uptake of the Cochlear could be 
hampered. Evidence from neural plasticity would suggest the opposite conclusion also, that there is 
scope for both use of a Cochlear and learning sign. For example, children that learn foreign 
languages are able to learn more than one language at a time and the learning of one language 
helps with the learning of another. 
589 There is evidence that in communities in which the use of sign is widespread, such as on 
Martha’s Vineyard, that deaf people perform as well as, and sometimes better, than non deaf 
people on educational and social indicators. See Nora Ellen Groce, Everyone Hear Spoke Sign 
Language: Hereditary Deafness on Martha’s Vineyard (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); 
Sacks, Seeing Voices, 28-30; Levy, “Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: the Lessons of Martha’s 
Vineyard,” 140-41. 
590 Levy, “Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: the Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” 141; Dolnick, 
“Deafness as Culture,” 43. 
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argument”591 - ‘that deafness, whether or not it is a disability, is the constitutive 
condition of access to a rich and living culture. Since cultures are intrinsically 
valuable, we may not engage in actions that would tend to undermine or destroy 
them’ therefore the use of Cochlear implants is impermissible because Deaf 
culture is intrinsically valuable.592 Levy dismisses each of these arguments. I do 
not outline Levy’s individual criticisms, as my interest is with Levy’s conclusion. 
Levy concludes that arguments against the moral permissibility of Cochlear 
implants fail because they put the onus or burden on people who have no 
familiarity with Deaf culture. Since  
the potential recipients of cochlear implants are, in the main, the prelingually deaf 
children of hearing parents, the burden of banning the implants would be borne 
by people who are not members of Deaf culture, and we owe that culture nothing 
over and above what we all owe cultures in general. I conclude that we cannot ask 
the parents of these children to sacrifice the interests of their children for the sake 
of Deaf culture.593 
 
Whilst I have sympathy for Levy’s conclusion in that we cannot take our 
responses to medical technology in an all-or-nothing way, my aims here are 
slightly different. I aim to develop an approach to understanding personal identity, 
agency and autonomy that can account for the constitutive role of embodiment in 
our selfhood, such that it can do justice to the claims by proponents of Deaf 
culture that their lives are not impoverished and do not need ‘fixing’, in order that 
we can allow all considerations to be in play when making decisions about 
adopting medical technology as well as understanding the impacts of the 
availability of neural implants more broadly.594 That is, I advocate an approach 
that can account for the constitutive role of disability in selfhood, and for the 
social shaping of disability.  
 
This point becomes salient in analysis of a case involving a couple, both deaf, 
seeking assisted reproduction (IVF) who did not want to genetically screen out 
any donor eggs carrying hearing defective genes. The couple was quoted as saying 
that ‘a deaf child would be a gift’. Much of the public responses, including 
philosophical responses, decried this declared preference, most often using 
                                            
591 For discussion of the cultural claim, see Robert Sparrow, “Implants and Ethnocide: 
Learning From the Cochlear Implant Controversy,” Disability & Society 25 (2010). 
592 Levy, “Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: the Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” 137-38. 
593 Levy, “Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: the Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” 134. 
Chorost’s parents were not deaf or hearing impaired. Despite advocating for the Cochlear, Chorost 
does muse about how his life might have different had he been enrolled in a signing school from an 
early age, wondering what it might have been like to growing up with people, to whom he might 
feel a sense of belonging. 
594 Perhaps if the claims to Deaf culture had been better understood signing would not have 
banned from schools after 1880 in the USA and Europe. Perhaps also parents might have the 
option to school their children in both signing and verbal languages, rather than the choice 
between implants and signing as an ‘either/or’. This might lead to a richer culture. For a discussion 
of the history of signing in schools see Sacks, Seeing Voices. 
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statements to the effect that the prospective parents were limiting the future 
possibilities of their unborn child.595 Scully makes the point that most responses to 
the couple’s declared preference reveal an assumption that to be deaf is to have an 
impaired, and impoverished, life and show that there is no positive understanding 
of Deafness. Similar discussions can be found with respect to Down’s syndrome 
and testing for the gene – Parens and Ash argue that the message sent about 
Down’s is that this is not a life worth living.596 These discussions show that 
cultural understandings of people with disabilities play into choices concerning the 
availability and uses of medical technologies. Whilst outside the topic of this 
thesis, this raises questions about which lives are (more) worth living or more 
highly valued.  
 
Debate about the use of medical intervention is often framed in terms of a 
distinction between treatment of disease and impairment and enhancement of 
traits beyond the norm. Interventions that treat impairment are seen as 
permissible, perhaps even obligatory. Enhancements, in contrast, are often seen as 
impermissible. As Levy points out: 
Many people … have importantly different responses to actual and potential 
neuroscientific (as well as medical) interventions, depending upon what they are 
being used for. Interventions to treat diseases and impairments are regarded as 
significantly more permissible (perhaps even obligatory) than interventions aimed 
at enhancing normal capacities. Treating disease is generally regarded as an 
intrinsically worthwhile activity, and we are therefore under a (possibly 
defeasible) obligation to engage in it, but enhancing already normal capacities is a 
luxury, which is at best permissible, and not obligatory, and at worst 
impermissible.597 
As Levy notes, the distinction is ‘supposed to give us a means of evaluating 
whether a proposed intervention aimed at correcting for an impairment is 
permissible (or obligatory, or ought to be state-funded, depending upon the 
account) or not’.598 Whilst there is widespread use of this distinction, there is 
disagreement on how to draw to the distinction. There are two dominant 
approaches to defending the distinction: by contrasting disease and non-disease 
states or by reference to species-typical functioning (departure from the norm). 
Many now argue that the distinction is conceptually unsound.599 Levy notes that 
formulations of the treatment/enhancement distinction rely on being able to draw 
a line between treatment and enhancement that can be used as an independent 
standard. However, neither approach is able to do this. According to Levy, the 
problem with the disease-based approach is that the distinction between disease 
                                            
595 See Neil Levy, “Deafness, Culture and Choice,” Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2002). 
596 See Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, “Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic 
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations,” Mental Retardation and Developmental Research Reviews 9 
(2003). 
597 Levy, Neuroethics, 88. 
598 Levy, Neuroethics, 95. 
599 Levy, Neuroethics, 94. 
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and other undesirable conditions (including disabilities on this understanding) is 
rather unclear, ‘part of the problem for the disease-based approach to the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is that the concepts of disease and disability 
are far more malleable than proponents are willing to recognize’.600 Accordingly, 
no clear sense can be made of the terms being contrasted, and therefore of the 
contrast itself.  The problem with the species-typical or departure from the norm 
approach is that it depends upon our being able to identify a natural baseline from 
which disease or disability is a departure. This Levy argues is ‘biological nonsense’ 
as it relies on biological determinism. Rather we need to understand ‘the way in 
which genes function in building phenotypes - the observable characteristics of 
organisms’.601  
Thus, there is no natural (or even “natural”) baseline against which we can 
measure departures. Because phenotypic traits vary as a function of the way the 
environment is structured, because they do not have any determinate effect, not 
even a tendency, outside a particular environment, talk of what a person’s 
capacities would have been in the absence of a disease is either entirely empty, or 
it presupposes a determinate environment.602 
This approach assumes that either the baseline or the environment is natural, if 
it were social, then disability would be relative to a social norm, for example, being 
tonal deaf shows up as an impairment only in a country that speaks a tonal 
language. Levy argues that the inability to set a baseline against which to measure 
normal functioning not only applies to the species-functioning approach to the 
treatment/enhancement distinction, but all formulations of it. ‘[W]ithout a baseline 
to appeal to, all conceptions of enhancement, at least all which to look to the 
distinction for an independent test of permissibility, are in trouble’.603   
 
As such, Levy argues we should recognise that the distinction is a moral and 
normative standard and that it ought to be abandoned as an independent standard 
for settling moral arguments concerning whether a technology can be used or not. 
I … argue that both of these approaches have insurmountable difficulties, and 
that the treatment/enhancement distinction ought to be abandoned. It cannot … 
do the work that writers on the topic hope for it: it cannot provide us with an 
independent standard to which we can appeal to settle moral arguments. Instead, it 
is already (at best) a thoroughly moralized standard. We ought, therefore, to 
recognize that it is a moralized standard, and assess it on moral grounds.604 
Levy concludes that some enhancement technologies may be acceptable and 
promotes the use of an ‘intervention test’ when assessing which neurotechnologies 
are permissible or not.   
 
                                            
600 Levy, Neuroethics, 95. 
601 Levy, Neuroethics, 97. For a discussion of problems with theorising disability in terms of 
phenotypes and genotypes, see Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, 23-25 and 
30-32. 
602 Levy, Neuroethics, 98. 
603 Levy, Neuroethics, 102. 
604 Levy, Neuroethics, 94. 
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I agree with Levy concerning the normative status of the distinction, that is, 
that it is our moral judgments about the permissibility of an intervention that drive 
our intuitions about the distinction. Levy’s conclusion is to endorse more human 
enhancement. My aim is to draw attention to the arguments concerning the 
treatment side of the distinction - that impairments automatically require fixing, 
that there is a norm or baseline and the understandings of disability entailed 
therein. Levy and Scully both challenge the views of disability which underlie 
formulations of the distinction between treatment and enhancement and as such 
the general standard for deciding upon the permissibility of an intervention.  
 
Neural implants offer very real opportunities for participation in social 
activities and to direct one’s life, but they should not be the default option - the 
idea of correction of biological impairment should not be the sole response of 
repair. However, arguments against the use of neural implants, whilst challenging 
the idea of repair as correction fail to give an adequate account of repair. 
Appropriate repair cannot consist entirely in focussing on the social and 
environmental factors. We need to look beyond the biomedical model and the 
social model for an adequate understanding of repair. Questions about repair 
should not be framed in terms of a contrast between neural implants or social 
change. Whilst the medical model pays some attention to repair beyond biological 
repair, and whilst social models pay some attention to repair in the biological 
context, both are conceptually impoverished as they don’t take account of 
embodiment as constitutive of the first-personal perspective, nor the social 
shaping of understandings of disability and their role in shaping first-person 
subjectivity. As such, these accounts cannot adequately account for repair. Focus 
must be paid to the embodied impacts of impairment and the social shaping of 
disability and their interaction.  
6.2.b Relational implications for repair and neural implants 
 
Here, I am concerned with the implications of this relational approach for 
understanding repair and the role of neural implants in repair.  I develop two 
directions: narrative repair for responding to the impacts of neural implants and 
the resources narrative repair may offer to challenge the social shapings of 
disability and their impact on individuals.  
 
In this section I outline an account of narrative repair put forward by 
Schechtman. I argue that on the narrative account, repair is refigured in terms of 
fostering integration - psyhco-coporeal holism - and not in terms of returning to a 
normal state (or restoring a true self). I also draw on Poltera and Nelson to argue 
for the importance of fostering autonomy and normative competences, of social 
scaffolding and the role of others and listening in repair. I then turn to the broader 
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project of repair. I argue that Nelson’s account of narrative repair using 
counterstories provides direction for challenging master narratives of disability.    
 
The approach I develop shows that first-personal accounts of self-change 
consequent upon neural implants demonstrate the necessity of attending to the 
first-personal response, with an understanding that embodiment constitutes 
subjectivity and in terms of narrative self-understanding.605 This is in contrast to 
an approach that views repair simply in terms of fixing the biological impairment.  
As raised in 3.4.a and 4.4.a, on the narrative account, repair is refigured in terms 
of fostering integration - psycho-coporeal holism, and not in terms of returning to 
a normal state (or restoring a true self). Marya Schechtman argued that the 
narrative self-constitution approach provides directions for therapeutic responses 
to self-change, as well as theoretical resources for understanding the impacts of 
change on self-understanding). If the threat to identity is a threat to narrative 
coherence, then the response is to ‘repair the narrative thread’, which is done by 
preserving ‘narrative integrity’. 
If the perceived threats to identity and selfhood emerge from a disruption of 
narrative, these threats can potentially be avoided by support aimed at helping 
patients to preserve narrative integrity. …The important thing is that the change 
be understood in a way that makes it part of a coherent personal narrative, one 
that patients and their close associates can see as, overall, self-expressive and self-
directed.606 
 
Schechtman suggests that narrative integrity draws attention to the broader 
perspective so that individuals are more likely to see the person post-intervention 
as continuous with the person pre-intervention. Schechtman writes: 
[T]he narrative approach suggests encouraging a long view of a life in a way that 
allows for moments of radical change or anomalous circumstances to be 
appropriated into an ongoing story, finding a way to bring potential 
discontinuities back into one’s life narrative, rather than allowing them to disrupt 
it.607 
 
Notably, Schechtman argues that the form that narrative repair may take will 
be varied. Schechtman cites one example of the patient who painted a portrait of 
herself depicting the DBS device as a response to their feelings of self-alienation. 
A nice example of this kind of solution to threatened identity (and of the wide 
variety of forms it might take) is found in one of the cases discussed by 
Schüpbach and colleagues. One of the women who reported feeling alienated 
from her activity, knowing that she had an electronic device in her brain, “finally 
                                            
605 The role of narrative in repair has been recognised in many domains. The role of narrative 
self-understanding in structuring and integrating selfhood over time, and integration, and narrative 
repair, has been discussed in psychotherapeutic contexts. For example, see James Phillips, 
“Psychopathology and the Narrative Self,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10 (2003); James 
Phillips, “Schizophrenia and the Narrative Self,” in The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ed. Tilo 
Kircher and Anthony David Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
606 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 138. 
607 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 139. 
  227 
coped well with it and made an artwork of her chest X-ray showing the 
stimulator.” While initially this women felt her selfhood threatened by the device, 
she eventually found a way to view it as part of herself by taking an active stance 
toward it and including it in a moment of artistic self-expression.608 
Schechtman argues that what support is appropriate will depend on the 
individual person/patient.609 
 
Jacqui Poltera argues that ‘constructing self-narratives and sharing them with 
empathetic others promotes a more flourishing life, and can be an especially 
valuable process for those who suffer from mental illness or trauma’.610 Describing 
the impacts of schizophrenia and trauma as both splintering self narratives, 
drawing on Saks’ accounts of the impacts of schizophrenia and Brison’s account of 
the impacts of trauma, Poltera draws attention to the role of others in facilitating 
their repair.611 ‘[B]oth Saks and Brison discuss how suffering from the effects of 
mental illness or disorder can splinter an individual’s self-narrative, and 
conversely, how empathetic others can help to rebuild it’.612 Poltera notes that a 
pervasive theme involves the role of empathetic others in enabling trauma 
sufferers to piece their self-narratives back together:  
Empathetic others are those who are able to bear witness to the victim’s trauma 
and to identify with her suffering. … Brison argues that trauma survivors ‘are 
dependent on empathetic others who are willing to listen to their narratives’.613  
Poltera notes that by ‘sharing her trauma narrative with empathetic others, 
and through the process of empathising with other trauma survivors and hearing 
their stories’ that Brison was able to begin to piece her life back together.614 
Nelson also draws attention to the role of empathetic others in repair, also 
using Brison’s account, arguing that recounting one’s self-narrative to empathetic 
others can facilitate rebuilding the self in the wake of social oppression or 
trauma.615 In her discussion of the impacts of violence (as one of the five faces of 
                                            
608 Schechtman, “Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation,” 139; 
Schüpbach, Gargiulo, and Welter, “Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease: A Distressed Mind in a 
Repaired Body?”, 1813. 
609 The therapeutic suggestion to prepare patients for potential narrative change is suggested 
by a number of authors. For example, see Schermer, “Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation.” 
610 Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic Listeners,” 65. 
611 Saks writes of her psychotherapist ‘Her tolerance and understanding seemed endless, and 
her steady and calm presence contained me, as if she were the glue that held me together. I was 
falling apart, flying apart, exploding—and she gathered my pieces and held them for me.’ Saks, The 
Centre Cannot Hold, 93. 
612 Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic Listeners,” 65. Brison argues that 
the experience of trauma illustrates that the self is fundamentally relational: ‘capable of being 
undone by violence, but also of being remade in connection with others.’ See Brison, Aftermath: 
Violence and the Remaking of a Self, xi; Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic 
Listeners,” 72. 
613 Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic Listeners,” 72; Brison, Aftermath: 
Violence and the Remaking of a Self, 62. 
614 Poltera, “Self-narratives, Story-telling and Empathetic Listeners,” 72-73. 
615 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 111-12. 
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oppression) on our understanding of who we are and others understanding of us, 
Nelson writes:  
Hate-motivated violence, directed at people just in virtue of their group 
membership, can catastrophically damage their understanding of who they are, 
shattering their sense of self and sometimes undoing an entire lifetime of self-
respect. Violence can also alter other people’s understanding of who the person is: 
the rape victim is taken to be defiled, the ridiculed person is seen as ridiculous. As 
Susan Brison has argued, if victims of violence are to regain an integrated self, 
they must be able to tell their identity-constituting stories of what was done to 
them, but just as important, the stories must be heard by caring others who are 
able to listen. … [V]iolence can shatter a person’s identity at the same time as it 
destroys the trust in others that is crucial for constructing the forward-looking 
stories that constitute the person’s understanding of who she now can be. 616 
 
Mackenzie and Poltera adopt a narrative relational approach to autonomy and 
agency when evaluating the impacts of schizophrenia on Saks’ life. In their 
analysis they draw attention not only to theoretical value of a narrative approach 
in understanding the trauma of integration but also to the role of ‘talk therapy’ in 
Saks’ ability to integrate her condition into her self-understanding. They make the 
point that we must focus on the first person perspective for any therapeutic goal 
or purpose to be successful and that there is a role for causal explanation, which is 
interrelated with the narrative understanding.617 Narrative repair should not be 
understood as in opposition to medical intervention aimed at repair, but rather is 
one form of repair that should be included with the use of neural implants.  
 
I have just argued for including narrative repair as a response to treatment 
that is experienced as alienating, as well as a kind of treatment, and outlined in 
broad terms the shape of narrative repair. The relational approach to repair I have 
developed, however, presents the view that ‘real’ or ‘proper’ repair must include 
challenging the social assumptions about disability which close down the available 
identity-constituting narratives available to people with disabilities and which can 
damage normative competencies. This was Baylis’ point that the ‘real threat’ to 
personal identity is from assumptions about disability and not from neural 
implants. Here I argue that Nelson’s work on counterstories provides direction for 
a form of narrative repair that challenges the social shaping of disability. Nelson 
analyses how medical master-narratives of patients deny a person agency and also 
draws on the example of master narratives of ‘the clinically correct story’ which 
encourage sex reassignment surgery for transsexuals to demonstrate how a 
                                            
616 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 111. 
617 Mackenzie and Poltera, “Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy,” 42-43. 
Mackenzie and Poltera use this understanding of the difference, and connection between, causal 
explanation and narrative self-understanding, as an argument against Strawson’s objection to use 
of narrative in psychotherapeutic contexts, as noted in 3.2.b. For a discussion of the distinction 
between causal explanation and narrative understanding in psychotherapeutic contexts, see James 
Phillips, “Understanding/explanation,” in The Philosophy of Psychiatry, ed. Jennifer Radden (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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counterstory might challenge the ‘clinically correct story’. This analysis could be 
adopted in bioethics and elsewhere to challenge the construction of disabled 
identities. This necessitates involving the people with the disabilities themselves in 
the development of these narratives. As counterstories need uptake to be 
successful, and cannot just be sound, this shows the importance of the role of 
others in this ‘deeper’ form of repair.   
 
Nelson explores connections between damage to bodies and to identities to 
understand: the kinds of illness and medical intervention that damage a person’s 
identity; how the damage is inflicted; and, what form repair to identity might 
take.618 Nelson argues that identities are narratively constituted and ‘because 
identities are narrative constructions, the damage inflicted on them requires 
narrative repair’. Nelson distinguishes between ‘damage inflicted on an identity by 
an assault to the body’ and ‘damage inflicted by defective identity-constituting 
stories’ and distinguishes between the types of repair in each case. Nelson argues 
that bodily illness and injury can damage identity-constituting narratives,619 whilst 
defective identity-constituting narratives can damage the body. In the former, the 
mechanism of repair to identity is achieved via repair to the body, and in the latter 
it consists in making use of the counterstory. Nelson writes: ‘Damage inflicted by 
defective identity-constituting stories can also be repaired, but here the work of 
repair consists in uprooting the defective stories and replacing them with stories 
that more accurately represent the person’.620   
 
As noted in an earlier chapter (2.4) Nelson argued, drawing on Korsgaard, 
that illness and bodily damage, can threaten who one is, and one’s ability to take 
up the narratives that have constituted her life.621 Nelson distinguishes between 
damage to self-understanding from illness (inability to take up self-constituting 
narratives) and repair to the body that medical intervention may give in terms of 
providing avenues for self-control and self-direction.622 
 
In addition to the damage of illness on identity-constituting narratives, Nelson 
identifies the (further) damage done to the character in Wit’s play by the identity-
constituting narrative of ‘patient’ which denies her exercise of autonomous agency. 
                                            
618 Nelson, “Damaged Bodies, Damaged Identities.” 
619 As Nelson discusses, not all bodily damage causes damage to an identity, as not all illness or 
damage changes one’s, and other’s, sense of who one is. For example, an ingrown toe nail (and 
surgery to fix this) most likely will have little impact on one’s sense of who one is and how they 
ought to act. In contrast, Alzheimer’s Disease, or open heart surgery for heart disease, may have 
significant impacts on one’s sense of who one is. 
620 Nelson, “Damaged Bodies, Damaged Identities,” 10. 
621 Nelson, “Damaged Bodies, Damaged Identities.” 
622 Nelson states that repair for identities damaged by severe illness or injury can be difficult or 
even impossible to do. In cases where repair is possible this is achieved through medical 
intervention. 
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A patient, Nelson notes, is not constructed as an agent but rather someone to be 
acted upon. This identity as patient, Nelson argues, sets up different expectations 
‘about how she is to act, what she is responsible for, to whom she is accountable 
(and more importantly still, … how she may be treated’.) Nelson describes the 
damage to identity that third person constructions can do using a discussion of a 
medical interview which treats its subject as a third person construction - ‘as a 
research subject with a clinically fascinating mass of cancerous ovarian tissue’. 
Nelson argues this is a third-person construction of the patient because it reduces 
her to a research subject and doe not include any of the stories that constitute the 
patient from the first person perspective. Nelson argues that this further damages 
the patient’s identity, beyond the damage of the illness. 
 
 In this analysis, Nelson draws on an account of master-narratives as causing 
narrative damage and counterstories as the means by which to effect narrative 
repair as articulated in Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Nelson argues master 
narratives construct defective narratives about (groups of) people, which cast 
them as morally lacking which limit their ability to exercise normative 
competencies and constrain their agency. Nelson writes: 
 I argue that personal identity, understood as a complicated interaction of one’s 
own sense of self and others’ understanding of who one is, functions as a lever 
that expands or contracts one’s ability to exercise moral agency. The way in 
which others identify us establishes what they will permit us to do; if they identify 
us as morally defective, they will perhaps humor us or hospilitize us, or else treat 
us with suspicion, contempt, or hostility. This restricts our freedom to act. How 
we identify ourselves establishes our own view of what we can do; if our self-
conception marks us as morally defective, we will mistrust our own capabilities 
and so treat ourselves with suspicion or contempt, or exempt ourselves from full 
responsibility for our actions. This too restricts our moral agency.623 
 
Nelson argues that master narratives cause ‘doxastic damage’: that is, they 
cause damage to how we understand ourselves, and how others understand us.624 
Nelson argues that the damage done to a sub-group’s identity comprises both 
harms from the third- and first- personal perspectives. Nelson argues that the 
identity of a sub-group is damaged from a third-personal perspective when stories 
depict the sub-group as morally unworthy. This, Nelson argues, has the effect of 
crowding out stories that a sub-group might tell from a first-personal perspective. 
Individuals of the sub-group can then suffer the harm of deprivation of 
opportunity of the goods on offer from society - jobs, social standing etc. A sub-
group’s identity is damaged from a first-personal perspective when members of 
the sub-group accept those identity-constituting stories as their own (the third-
personal and first-personal stories align). Individuals of the sub-group can then 
                                            
623 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, xi. 
624 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 106. 
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suffer infiltrated consciousness.625 These harms - deprivation of opportunity and 
infiltrated consciousness - are described by Nelson as compound harms, because 
they arise from the damage done to the sub-group’s identity is depicted as moral 
unworthy. The practical harms that arise are practical because they result in 
diminished possibilities for autonomous agency. 
 
Nelson argues that master narratives which damage identities need to be 
resisted. The tool by which to do this, and to repair the damage done, is the 
counterstory. Nelson argues that ’[t]he proper tool for this sort of resistance and 
repair is the counterstory’.626  Whereby, master narratives depict groups as 
morally defective - counterstories affirm their status as competent moral agents. 
Counterstories replace (resist and overturn) these defective narratives with a 
narrative that describes the people more accurately and accords full moral agency 
to members of the subgroup.  
Counterstories, which root out the master narratives in the tissue of the stories 
that constitute an oppressive identity and replace them with stories that depict the 
person as morally worthy, supply the necessary means of resistance. Here, 
resistance amounts to repair: the damaged identity is made whole. Through their 
function of narrative repair, counterstories thus open up the possibility that the 
person could attain, regain, or extend her freedom of moral agency.627  
This involves replacing the defect identity constituting narratives which depict 
members of the sub-group as morally defective with identity constituting 
narratives that depict the members as morally worthy. It is this aspect which 
Nelson views as resistance. Note, resistance, for Nelson, leads to repair of 
identities damaged by master narratives. The repair function amounts to the 
replacement of partial or limited narratives with a fuller picture of identity (one of 
moral worth), the practical impact is described by Nelson as the attaining and 
regaining of freedom and moral agency. By resisting master narratives and 
repairing damaged identities members of the subgroup can reduce (and if effective 
do away with) the practical harms of deprivation of opportunity and infiltration of 
consciousness. So, counterstories are a means by which individuals and groups 
can reidentify themselves. 
 
Nelson identifies three modes of counterstory/resistance from minimum to 
maximal resistance: refusal, repudiation and contestation.628 These range from 
minimally putting one’s own counterstory (mere first-person perspective repair); 
through to attempting to change third-person narratives, and from a piecemeal 
approach to a systematic one. ‘Full’ repair mends damage done to the first-person 
perspective - the infiltrated consciousness is removed, as well as damage done by 
the third-person perspective – developing stories the person/subgroup can tell that 
                                            
625 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 107-08. 
626 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 149. 
627 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 150. 
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are identity constituting from a first-person perspective. There are limits to what 
amount or repair minimal strategies can make, as the conditions remain 
unchanged, and my identity will still in part be seen and constituted by others 
through/in terms of the master narrative.  
 
Nelson argues that the success of repair depends on both the soundness of the 
narrative counterstories (in terms of the credibility constraints articulated in 
chapter 3) and the willingness of others to take up the story. Like Schechtman, 
Nelson recognises that individual counterstories will vary.  
 
Nelson’s approach gives us resources for responding to Baylis’ argument that 
the ‘real’ threat to identity in cases of intervention is not the implant, but the views 
of illness and disability which reduce the range of identity-constituting narratives 
available to those who are ill or disabled. Nelson’s response is that these master-
narratives about illness and disability need to be challenged with counterstories; 
that is, accounts in which disability is not presented as indicative of a defective, or 
less valuable life.    
 
In the context of sex reassignment as the clinical model of treatment for 
transsexuals, Nelson illuminates the role of the notion of restoring normality that 
this narrative promotes as well as the possibilities for counterstories. Nelson’s 
discussion illuminates how the clinically correct medical narrative casts ‘repair’ for 
identity issues in terms of medical intervention, for example, surgery, which 
repairs/corrects the pathology or defect. Nelson questions whether this medical 
intervention is ‘repair’ and what it is ‘repairing’ by first analysing the construction 
and mechanisms of the master narrative, and then by posing (three) possible 
modes of counterstory. A counterstory which repairs damaged identity aims to 
open up new identity-constituting identities. This is in contrast with the surgery 
which repairs the pathology, but leaves the damaged identity ‘in tact’.  
 
Nelson acknowledges that some individual’s counterstories might endorse ‘sex 
reassignment surgery’. Nelson cautions that this must be a story that redescribes 
passing, in terms that are not defective. Without performing this role the decision 
to engage in sex reassignment surgery does not constitute narrative repair, but 
rather would amount to (understandable) conformity and not resistance. 
In the face of a gender ideology that is particularly intransigent, one might find it 
considerably easier to relieve one’s gender dysphoria by reshaping one’s body 
than by trying to reshape our culture’s understanding of gender. In any case, that 
larger social understanding cannot be reshaped merely by a theoretical debunking 
of gender essentialism. What is required in addition are identity-constituting 
stories that offer alternative possibilities for being gendered—stories that 
transgendered people might then be able to incorporate into their own sense of 
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who they are. …[T]hough, these new stories wouldn’t preclude undergoing 
physical changes, including sex changes.629 
 
 This account of repair necessarily means involving, hearing from and listening 
to the people who are ill or disabled. This is a point that Scully makes forcefully - 
that we need to include the people whose lives are directly affected in the project 
of theorising disability’s significance. 
 
Nelson’s account of master narratives and counterstories draws our attention 
to the role of masternarratives in frustrating narrative competence. Nelson draws 
on Paul Benson’s understanding that freedom is related to one’s normative 
competence to support her argument for this link between identity and agency. 
Nelson claims that normative competence can be understood through three 
conditions: (1) The ability to understand and act on moral norms; (2) The ability 
of others to recognise by one’s actions that one is a morally responsible person; 
and (3) The ability of the agent to see herself as a morally responsible person. 
Nelson uses this analysis to argue that oppressive narratives can reduce one’s 
normative competence, and thus reduce one’s freedom. Nelson’s relational account 
also draws our attention to the role of others in building competences, and the 
importance of others in listening. Nelson’s understanding thus broadens our 
understanding of repair, paying attention to the role of others in repair. 
 
The approach shows we should attend to the practical impacts of neural 
implants on self-understanding and widen our understanding of ‘repair’ to include 
narrative repair focussing on autonomy competencies and their role in narrative 
integration and agency. We should attend to the wider environment of repair, 
beyond simply focussing on the neural implant and its impact on the condition. 
This involves a particularism, and necessitates a case-by-case approach. It also 
illuminates the role of others and social scaffolding in building autonomy and 
normative competences, and so in effective repair. Implants are one option for and 
in repair. 
 
The approach recognises the social shaping of understandings of disability and 
the subjective shaping of disability on our first-person subjectivity, beyond social 
and environmental factors only and offers resources for challenging these 
understandings.  Here we are urged to attend to the wider social context of repair, 
that is beyond the removal of social barriers and to challenging the narratives 
which construct and limit the range of identity-constituting narratives for people 
with disabilities. This points to the necessary involvement of people with 
disabilities in constructing these narratives.  
 
                                            
629 Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, 129. 
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This approach to repair addresses the inadequacies of the social and medical 
models’ responses to repair. Both correction of impairments and concern for the 
social barriers which limit participation are important. However, repair should be 
understood more broadly in terms of assisting to support the lives of others. 
 
Moreover, it provides tools for understanding that people have differing 
responses to neural implants, even people with the same condition. And so, it 
contributes to the practical problem of uptake - both for the people with the 
implants and the practitioners who suggest these forms of treatment. It also shows 
the crucial role of others in practical uptake of neural implants.  
 
  The social model of disability fails to recognise that there are sometimes 
biological and social grounds for repair that recommends fixing a biological 
impairment. The medical model of disability fails to recognise that there are 
sometimes biological and social grounds for repair that do not involve (just) fixing 
a biological impairment. 
 
The relational approach challenges the medical assumption that impairments 
automatically require fixing, and the social assumption that removing barriers to 
participation is enough for repair. It directs attention to ‘what’ it is that the neural 
implant is fixing or ameliorating (and perhaps should be directed functionally). 
This is important also when we consider that neural implants are being developed 
for, and used for, conditions which include cognitive impairments.  
 
6.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have shown that the approach I develop provides resources 
for an understanding of impairment in its constitution of embodied identity and 
the shaping of understandings, as well as for developing a positive understanding 
of disability. I further argued that the approach I develop widens the concept to 
include narrative repair at the level of treatment with a neural implant, as well as 
narrative repair aimed at challenging assumptions about disability. This is not an 
argument against neural implants, but rather for a better understanding of 
disabled experience and the moral choices that follow from this. This approach 
might endorse the choice of an implant as well as attending to social shapings of 
disability. Neural implants are one option for repair, and there are other 
therapeutic responses, in addition to, or alternative to them. Importantly, for 
repair to be effective, these discussions need to involve the potential recipients of 
implants and intervention, and others need to be sympathetic listeners prepared to 
assist with uptake of people’s stories. 
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6.3.1 Thesis conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have explored the philosophical, and practical, problems 
arising from understanding reports of self-change following neural implants. I 
have used case studies from recipients of neural implants, focussing on changes 
from sensory prosthetic neural implants, the Cochlear for hearing impairments, 
and cognitive prosthetic neural implants, such as DBS for motor and psychiatric 
disorders. 
 
I have answered the key theoretical challenges I set out in the first chapter: 1) 
to clarify the literature - do neural implants threaten identity? And if so how? 2) 
to make sense of the first-personal accounts - what does it mean to say that 
someone is a different or no longer the same person? 3) to outline the relation 
between the key concepts raised in the first-personal accounts - identity, agency 
and autonomy. In doing so, I have also addressed the key practical problem 
concerning what it means to say an implant works for me but not you, where we 
have different uptake or responses to the effects of the implant: those cases when 
an implant can be experienced as threatening by one person, and empowering by 
another.  
 
To address these challenges, I have developed an account of understanding the 
impacts of change in terms of impacts on practical identity, narrative agency and 
autonomy competences. I have argued that the accounts of self-change reveal that 
changes from implants can both facilitate and frustrate the exercise of autonomous 
agency, and both foster and challenge narrative coherence and self-understanding. 
I showed that these first-personal accounts are not merely metaphorical; rather 
they illuminate what’s involved in personal change and reveal the impacts of 
neural implants on our identity, autonomy and agency.  
 
A summary of the argument and conclusion is as follows. I located the domain 
of the problem as one concerning agency (as embodied and relational), set out 
understanding the problem in terms of change over time in terms of narrative (in 
terms of impacts on narrative agency), and argued that the salient impact is on 
autonomy competences. I concluded that it is better to understand the impacts of 
self-change in terms of impacts on autonomy competences that may be hindered 
or fostered, and their role in impairing or fostering narrative integration which 
will have an impact on our autonomous agency and self-understanding; rather 
than in terms of metaphors, threats to narrative identity, or threats to autonomy 
and authenticity. I further argued for the importance of attending to the impact of 
neural implants of our self-referring attitudes; that is: our normative competence. 
This approach can inform cases of self-change not just from neural implants, but 
change from illness, trauma, or major social disruption 
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In the first chapter I identified the problem as a philosophical problem - there 
is a disagreement as to whether and how neural implants threaten personal 
identity.  Whilst most agree that it is our practical or narrative identity that is at 
issue following neural implants, there was disagreement as to whether and how 
neural implants threaten identity. Schechtman argues that neural implants 
threaten narrative identity, Baylis that neural implants threaten agency and 
Mackenzie and Walker that neural implants threaten autonomy. I also set out the 
practical problem raised by change consequent upon neural implants. I argued 
that an adequate account of personal identity should both be able to explain 
what’s at stake in these changes, as well as explain why for some, changes can be 
experienced as empowering, but for others, they can be experienced as 
threatening.  
 
In the second chapter I used literature in practical identity, using Ricoeur, 
Korsgaard and Atkins to show that it is practical identity, a concern with who we 
are from our first-personal understandings, that is at stake in changes following 
neural implants, and not metaphysical identity, a concern for what we really are. 
An approach to practical identity focusses attention on the continuity and unity of 
agency to selfhood. I showed that neural implants can both assist with our ability 
to act out of our self-conceptions of who we are and so facilitate agential unity, as 
well as frustrate this ability. 
 
In the third chapter, I argued that in order to adequately explain what’s at 
stake in these cases of changes to our practical identity, that we need to adopt a 
narrative understanding of the unity and continuity of practical identity.  Using 
work by Schechtman, Ricoeur, and Atkins, I argued that narrative structures our 
understanding and can account for the persisting subject of experience over time, 
the narrative agent. As such, a narrative approach accounts for why it matters to 
us to be a continuing person over time.  
 
In the fourth chapter I developed an account of narrative agency to illuminate 
potential threats to narrative coherence. Using work by Atkins, Baylis and 
Nelson, I showed that neural implants can both challenge, as well as facilitate, 
narrative coherence, and so our understandings of ourselves as continuous 
persons. I also showed that implants might directly challenge our agency, which in 
turn can threaten narrative coherence. I argued that this focusses our attention on 
how change is integrated; it is not the change itself that is salient, nor whether my 
identity survives per se, but whether I can integrate change. I located a further 
threat to identity, not from neural implants, but from social understandings of 
people with illness and disabilities. 
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In the fifth chapter I argued that by adopting a relational narrative approach 
to autonomy this illuminates the salient issue as how neural implants affect our 
autonomy competences, i.e. how neural implants might facilitate the exercise of 
autonomy skills, as well as frustrate the exercise of these skills. I further showed 
that impacts on autonomy and narrative competences might have implications for 
the ability to meaningful author one’s life, through interfering with narrative 
integration and so impacting on autonomous agency. In doing so, I refigured the 
question concerning whether and how neural implants threaten identity – we 
should not understand impacts consequent upon neural implants (self-change) in 
terms of threats to identity; rather we should examine change in terms of impacts 
on autonomy competence and their role in impairing or fostering narrative 
integration and agency. I argued that the relational approach focusses our 
attention on both the embodied and socially situated nature of selfhood.  
 
In the sixth and final chapter, I offered a positive understanding of impairment 
and sketched out the directions for a wider way of therapeutically responding to 
the adoption of neural implants, as well as to understandings of impairments, with 
an understanding of how narratives of disability shape our understandings of 
people with disabilities (in turn suggesting the forms of treatment options that 
should be available).  
 
In building this argument I have drawn attention to the constitutive role of 
embodiment and the social setting of agents, as well as to how both changes in 
embodiment and the role of others can challenge our abilities to act out of our 
conception of who we are, our narrative coherence and ability to meaningfully 
author our own lives. Through this argument I have outlined the three concepts – 
agency, identity and autonomy, and suggested that they are interconnected 
aspects of selfhood, and should not understood in a reductive matter. The first-
personal accounts reveal that these different aspects of the self are all at play when 
assessing the impacts of neural implants on personal identity, and that whilst 
interrelated these concepts come apart. In doing so I have developed a full-
blooded account of agency, as embodied and relational, including narratively 
structured agency and autonomous agency.  
 
I have positioned my approach not only against metaphysical reductionist 
approaches to selfhood and personal identity and autonomy, but also against 
postmodern approaches which profess agency and autonomy to be illusions - both 
approaches provide no place for agency, let alone a full blooded account of 
agency. Through doing so I demonstrated that whilst these are divergent 
responses to the conclusion that there is no Cartesian ego, metaphysical, and 
postmodern approaches, have much in common because they both deny the 
importance of the first-person perspective and so are inadequate to both explain 
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what matters to us in self-change, as well as in providing resources for responding 
to self-change. Metaphysical approaches assume the unity of agency, whereas 
postmodern approaches fail to account for the challenges that self-fragmentation 
present. 
 
The approach I have developed has relevance beyond understanding the 
impacts of neural implants, because it offers a theoretical lens for understanding 
and responding to self-change from situations which arise in the contingency of 
life - illness, trauma and so on. By taking our embodied and relational situation as 
fundamental to any account, this approach illuminates the conditions which 
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